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Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with the selection and early career education of 
executive branch officers in the Royal Navy c1902-1939. The thesis attempts to 
place naval selection and educational policy in context by demonstrating how it 
was affected by changing naval requirements, external political interference and 
contemporary educational reform. It also explores the impact of the First World 
War and the Invergordon mutiny upon officer education. 
The thesis discusses the selection of potential executive officers, 
exploring what methods were used, why they were used and how they were 
developed over time. It discusses the increasing openness of the officer corps 
of the Royal Navy to boys of talent, irrespective of their background; and shows 
that this trend was driven by political demand, fuelled by the increasing number 
of well educated lower middle class boys, and welcomed by many in the Royal 
Navy. 
The thesis demonstrates that the Fisher-Selborne Scheme of officer 
education combined existing naval practice with recent educational 
developments to produce a unique and innovatory educational system. It shows 
how many of the assumptions on which the scheme was founded were 
subsequently proven to be wrong, and demonstrates its gradual dismantling 
through the inter-war years.  
The thesis considers the development of the Special Entry scheme, 
initially in response to a shortage of junior officers but later as a means of 
broadening entry to the officer corps. It contrasts the fortunes of the two 
schemes in the inter-war period, in which the educational side of the Special 
Entry scheme was largely unaltered. 
Overall the thesis seeks to place the development of the Royal Navy’s 
systems for the selection and early career education of executive officers in 
context by exploring how and why they were developed and their response to 
the changing fortunes and shape of the Royal Navy. 
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Abbreviations and terminology employed herein. 
 
DTSD  Director of Training and staff duties, a naval officer (generally a 
captain) employed within the Admiralty and largely responsible for the 
administration of officer education. He was expected to comment on all 
questions of officer education and suggest answers to problems, but was rarely 
required to sit on committees and did not have an active role in formatting 
syllabi. The role was created as part of the reorganisation of the Admiralty in 
1917. 
 
Director of Education/Advisor on Education  Civilian employed within the 
Admiralty and responsible for providing advice on non-professional education. 
Director of Education 1903-1917 Sir James Alfred Ewing 
Acting Director of Education 1917-1919 Cyril Ashford 
Admiralty Advisor on Education 1919-1936 Alexander McMullen 
 
HMC  The Headmaster’s Conference, the organisation which represented the 
interests of independent boy’s secondary schools in the period. The HMC 
investigated and campaigned on behalf of its members and spoke to the Navy 
on their behalf. 
 
KRs and AIs  King’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, the rules 
governing all aspects of naval life from sunset ceremonies to magazine safety. 
Procedures for the instruction and examination of all personnel were laid down 
in KRs and AIs. Amendments to KRs and AIs were, from 1909 onwards, 
published in Admiralty Weekly Orders; in 1914 these were supplemented by 
Admiralty Monthly Orders. From 1921 a system of Admiralty Fleet Orders 
(AFOs) and Confidential Admiralty Fleet Orders (CAFOs) was introduced. 
 
Term system  Between 1903 and 1937 each entry to Osborne or Dartmouth 
was referred to as a term. The college year was divided into three terms along 
the same lines as a normal school thus there were three entries of cadets every 
year – in January, May and September. Throughout their time at the colleges, 
cadets spent most of their time with their term-mates with whom they shared 
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lessons, sports, dormitories, and free time. Contact with cadets in other terms 
was strictly limited and the terms competed with each other at sports. In 1937 
the term system was replaced by a house system similar to that in most public 
schools. Houses contained cadets of all ages who were allowed to mix freely 
and took part in sports and social activities together although they continued to 
share lessons and dormitories only with cadets of the same entry. 
 
Term log/ line book  The collective diary kept by the members of a term during 
their time in the college. It recorded daily events and the achievements the term 
or its members. Logs and line books were enlivened by drawings, cartoons, 
poetry and jokes which showcased the creative talents of cadets and 
demonstrated their feelings about the college. 
 
Midshipman’s journal  All midshipmen were required to keep a journal which 
recorded their lives and work and the activities of their ships. The keeping of a 
journal was designed to ensure midshipmen took an interest in their work. The 
contents often include essays about various aspects of naval warfare or the 
places visited by the ship. Midshipmen were required to illustrate their journals 
with hand-drawn charts and technical drawings, many included photographs or 
paintings of the places they visited. Journals were frequently inspected by the 
officers in charge of the training of midshipmen, and midshipmen could not be 
promoted unless their journal was up to standard. 
 
Gunroom  The living space for midshipmen in a ship in which they ate, worked 
and studied. The gunroom was ruled by a sub-lieutenant. The term ‘gunroom’ 
was also used to describe the recreational space set aside for each term at the 
naval colleges. 
 
Snottie’s Nurse  From 1912 onwards the officer in charge of the midshipmen in 
a ship. The snottie’s nurse was responsible for ensuring the adequate progress 
of midshipmen in their studies and was nominally responsible for disciplining 
them although he normally gave the sub-lieutenant of the gunroom a free hand. 
 
Abbreviations for archives: 
TNA  The National Archives 
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CCA  Churchill College Archives 
BRNC  Archives of Britannia Royal Naval College Dartmouth 
RNM  Archives of the Royal Naval Museum 
IWM  Archives of the Imperial War Museum 
NMM- Archives of the National Maritime Museum 
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Dramatis Personae 
 
Admiral of the Fleet John Arbuthnot ‘Jacky’ Fisher 1st Baron Fisher (1841-1920) 
- As Second (1902) and then First (1905 to 1910) Sea Lord, Fisher presided 
over the reform of the Royal Navy including the introduction of new ships, the 
revision of fleet disposition and an attempt to completely change the way in 
which Royal Navy officers were educated and employed. Fisher’s reforms form 
the heart of this thesis. Fisher served again as First Sea Lord in 1914-1915, 
clashing with Winston Churchill who had previously been his ally in 
implementing manning reforms. 
 
William Palmer, 2nd Earl of Selborne (1859-1942) – First Lord of the Admiralty 
from 1900 to 1905. Selborne supported Fisher in his reforming efforts, 
facilitating the integration of the engineering and executive corps of naval 
officers. 
 
Sir Winston Churchill (1874-1965) - As First Lord of the Admiralty from 1911-
1915, Churchill was a strong advocate of the democratisation of the officer 
corps. He served again in the role from 1939-1940 and again advocated the 
democratisation of the officer corps. After becoming Prime Minister in 1940 
Churchill retained a keen interest in the Navy. 
  
Albert Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Hillsborough (1885-1965) – Alexander 
twice served as First Lord of the Admiralty, from 1929-1931, and from 1940-
1946, the first Labour Party member to hold the post. He was an enthusiastic 
advocate of the democratisation of the officer corps. 
 
Permanent Secretary to the Board of Admiralty (hereafter referred to by the 
abbreviated form in daily use ‘Secretary of the Admiralty’) - The senior civil 
servant at the Admiralty and the man to whom most communications concerned 
with officer education and selection were addressed. He was himself a member 
of the Board of Admiralty and could have a considerable role in policy making. 
Holders: 
1874-1907 Sir Evan MacGregor 
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1907-1911 Sir Charles Thomas 
1911-1917 Sir William Graham Greene 
1917-1936 Sir Oswyn Murray 
1936-1940 Sir Richard Carter 
 
Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas (1842-1913) – As Commander in Chief 
Portsmouth (1904-1907) Douglas presided over a series of committees 
concerned with the practical implementation of the Fisher-Selborne Scheme for 
the education and employment of naval officers. 
 
Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (1871-1946) – A highly capable naval officer and 
historian, Richmond none the less succeeded in making himself very unpopular 
within the service. He was the first officer to hold the post of Director of Training 
and Staff Duties in 1918, subsequently becoming the Captain of the Royal 
Naval College Greenwich. Richmond finally left the Royal Navy in 1931 and 
became a distinguished historian, holding the post of Vere-Harmsworth 
Professor of Naval History at Cambridge University from 1934-1936. Richmond 
was one of the founders of the Naval Review and wrote extensively on officer 
education. 
 
Sir James Alfred Ewing (1855-1935) – Ewing is sometimes referred to as 
‘Alfred’ rather than ‘James’. A distinguished physicist and engineer, Ewing was 
given the newly created role of Director of Education in 1903. Between 1914 
and 1917 his considerable academic talents were exercised as the Head of 
Room 40, the Admiralty’s cryptanalysis organisation which also employed 
various civilian staff from Osborne and Dartmouth Naval Colleges. In 1917 
Ewing left the Admiralty for Edinburgh University and his naval work came to an 
end.  
 
Alexander McMullen – McMullen’s association with the Royal Navy began with 
teaching science at Dartmouth, before serving at sea in the First World War. 
(His performance at Jutland was sufficiently impressive to see him 
recommended for early promotion). From 1919-1936 he served as Admiralty 
Advisor on Education. 
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The Royal Naval College Osborne - Founded in 1903, Osborne occupied a 
proportion of the Royal Estate at Osborne House on the Isle of Wight. It housed 
Fisher-Selborne Scheme cadets for the first two years of their education. 
Plagued by poor health, and with the buildings in poor condition, Osborne was 
closed in 1921. Officers serving at Osborne were appointed to HMS Racer, the 
slop acting as tender to the college. 
 
The Royal Naval College Dartmouth - Home to the cadet training ship Britannia 
from 1863 onwards, the construction of the College began in 1898 with the 
foundation stone being laid in 1902. The College opened in 1905 and housed 
Fisher-Selborne cadets in their final two years ashore. The establishment was 
known as HMS Britannia until 1908, HMS Espiegle until 1910, and HMS 
Pomone until 1922 when the name of HMS Britannia was restored. 
 
Sir Cyril Ashford (1867-1951) - Formerly Head of Science at Harrow, Ashford 
was appointed Headmaster of Osborne when it opened in 1903. When the first 
batch of Fisher-Selborne scheme cadets moved to Dartmouth in 1905 Ashford 
went with them, remaining as the headmaster there until his retirement in1927. 
Ashford’s retirement was marked by his being knighted. 
  
Charles Godfrey (1873-1924) - Formerly Head of Mathematics at Winchester, 
Godfrey succeeded Ashford at Osborne and remained as the headmaster there 
until the closure of the college in 1921. Godfrey was a noted pioneer of modern 
mathematical education. 
  
Eric Kempson (1878-1948) - Taught at Dartmouth before the First World War, 
saw war service in the Royal Engineers (winning the Military Cross) and 
subsequently became Head of Science at Rugby. Kempson succeeded 
Ashford, becoming the headmaster of Dartmouth in 1927, he retired in 1940. 
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Royal Navy officer entry schemes 1902-1939 
 
Fisher-Selborne scheme - First cadets entered in 1903. Took boys at the age of 
thirteen and put them through four years of education at Osborne and 
Dartmouth, normally followed by eight months in a cadet training cruiser and 
two years four months as a midshipman. Sometimes referred to as the 
Selborne-Fisher, Fisher, or Selborne scheme.  
 
Special Entry - First cadets entered in 1913. Took boys at the age of seventeen 
and put them through a year or eighteen months of education in a dedicated 
training ship before sending them to sea as midshipmen. 
 
Warrant officers - The rank of warrant officer was reached by ratings after men 
years of service, typically men were in their thirties when they reached it. From 
1903 onwards a limited number of warrant officers were commissioned. 
Because they were so old when first commissioned they had no hope of rising 
to the highest ranks of the Royal Navy 
 
Mate - Introduced in 1912, the Mate Scheme allowed ratings the chance to gain 
a commission at a relatively young age and so compete for promotion to the 
highest ranks of the service. From 1931 onwards the men in the scheme were 
called ‘upper-yardmen’, and the rank of mate was replaced by sub-lieutenant. 
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 Introduction 
 
Given the acres of print devoted to the careers of the Royal Navy’s officers, it is 
perhaps surprising that so little should be devoted to their selection and early 
career education.1 This is particularly so as the distinguished record of the 
Royal Navy in both peace and war has only been achieved through the skills 
and efforts of its personnel, in particular its officers. Given the dependence of 
Britain on the Royal Navy the selection and education of officers has been a 
critical factor in the maintenance of naval and, by extension, national strength. 
Officer selection and educational policies have been driven by a wide variety of 
internal and external factors, and so illustrate both the priorities of the Royal 
Navy and its relationship with the state.  
 Whilst the selection and education of Royal Navy officers is generally 
deserving of greater attention from historians, the period from 1902 to 1939 is of 
particular interest because it saw an almost complete cycle of educational 
development. The Fisher-Selborne scheme of 1902 put in place an educational 
system based around science and engineering. By 1939, much of this system 
had been dismantled in favour of a more traditional approach centred on 
seamanship and leadership. At the same time, officer selection became 
increasingly meritocratic, the officer corps being opened gradually to men from 
less wealthy backgrounds. 
 Any examination of officer selection and education must be pursued from 
a clear starting point. The subject is too extensive to be fully examined within 
the scope of a PhD thesis and so limitations must be imposed. In the first place, 
it is necessary to define the terms ‘selection’ and ‘education’. For the purposes 
of this thesis, I shall define selection as the process by which boys were chosen 
to enter the naval officer education system.  
 The Oxford English Dictionary offers several relevant definitions for 
education, thus: ‘the process of ‘bringing up’ (young persons); the manner in 
which a person has been ‘brought up’; with reference to social station, kind of 
manners and habits acquired, calling or employment prepared for, etc’ and ‘the 
systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young in preparation for 
the work of life; by extension, similar instruction or training obtained in adult 
                                               
1
 For example Law’s naval bibliography of the Second World War lists three hundred and five 
books about the wartime Royal Navy of which only nine are devoted to training. Derek G Law, 
The Royal Navy in World War Two: An Annotated Bibliography (London: Greenhill, c1988) 
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age. Also, the whole course of scholastic instruction which a person has 
received’; finally ‘culture or development of powers, formation of character, as 
contrasted with the imparting of mere knowledge or skill’.2  
 All these definitions may be applied to some aspect of the education of 
naval officers between 1902 and 1939. Naval officers pursued a course of 
academic and professional learning and were immersed in seagoing life and 
naval culture including history, uniforms, customs, and prescribed behaviors. 
The system was designed to shape their attitudes and behavior; to be a naval 
officer was not merely a job, or even a profession, it was to be a cell of a great 
living organism. The Royal Navy made some distinction between education and 
training  in 1902, education was defined as the development of character and 
seagoing instinct and training as the mastering of knowledge.3 Training was 
thus, in some ways, subordinate to education  the knowledge and skills gained 
through training contributed to the development of an officer who was master of 
his men and his environment. As the Royal Navy did not confine itself merely to 
imparting knowledge it seems reasonable to refer to the officer development 
process as education. 
 The education of naval officers in the period from 1902 to 1939 was 
characterised by the enormous number of widely varying and constantly 
changing instructional schemes and courses  themselves dictated by an even 
wider variety of concerns and developments. As space is limited I have chosen 
to concentrate on the early career education of executive branch officers. 
 By early career education I mean that received by officers between 
joining the Royal Navy and qualifying as an acting sub-lieutenant at the age of 
twenty-one. I am therefore concerned with the studies of cadets and 
midshipmen. Cadets started either a four year course at Osborne or Dartmouth 
naval colleges aged thirteen; or, at the age of seventeen, the one year or 
eighteen month Special Entry training course aboard a training ship. Some boys 
entered from nautical training colleges as Direct Entries, either joining a 
Dartmouth term part-way through its time at the colleges or training alongside 
the Special Entry. For most of the period in question both groups subsequently 
                                               
2
 ‘Education’ in Oxford English Dictionary Online <http://www.oed.com> [Accessed 20 January 
2012] 
3
 The National Archives (TNA) Papers of  Records of the Admiralty, Naval Forces, Royal 
Marines, Coastguard, and related bodies (ADM) 7/941 ‘New Scheme of Training Officers and 
Men 1903’, ‘Scheme for Entry, Training and Employment of Officers, Men and Boys for the 
Royal Navy’, extract from Board minutes No.1045, 21 November 1902 p.1 
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served for eight months or so aboard a seagoing training cruiser. On completion 
of their cadet training young executive officers served as midshipmen aboard 
operational warships of the fleet for two years and four months before taking 
examinations that, if passed, earned them the rank of acting sub-lieutenant. 
 Their subsequent education, with which I am not concerned, consisted of 
sub-lieutenants courses which at various times included up to a year of general 
naval studies at Greenwich Naval College, and subsequent shorter courses in 
gunnery, torpedo, signals and navigation held at naval establishments in the 
Portsmouth area. Only after he had passed these courses was an officer’s 
commission confirmed. Following a further period at sea, many executive 
officers went on to qualify as specialists in gunnery, torpedo, navigation, 
signals, submarines or aviation and could expect to be employed in their 
specialisation until at least the rank of lieutenant-commander. As their careers 
progressed officers undertook more courses and examinations  these being 
designed to qualify them for more complicated work in their specialisation, or for 
destroyer command, or as staff officers, or to prepare them for senior rank.  
 The education officers received after commissioning was vital in shaping 
their careers and had a critical role in determining the future of the Royal Navy 
 including its tactical and strategic development, the ships and weapons it 
used and its fortunes in battle. It is an area deserving of several theses and to 
attempt to condense it into one, itself concentrating on early career education, 
would do it a great injustice and present a grossly unbalanced account. 
Consequently I have chosen to neglect the education officers received after 
being ranked acting sub-lieutenant; except where investigations or changes of 
policy impacted upon the education of cadets or midshipmen. 
 I have also opted to largely exclude those executive officers who began 
their careers as ratings. Most of the ratings who achieved commissioned rank 
did so via the rank of warrant officer. Generally they were not commissioned 
until the age of thirty or older, and had little hope of promotion beyond 
lieutenant-commander. Consequently their selection and education was 
completely different from that of other executive officers. A small number of 
ratings became officers at a young age via the Mate Scheme. Although their 
training was generally completely separated from that of other executive officers 
they have a case for inclusion here  not least as pressure to expand their 
numbers was a significant factor in officer selection policy. However I have 
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again opted to largely ignore them, preferring to concentrate on the experiences 
of the vast majority of officers  those who entered the Royal Navy as cadets. 
The small numbers of mates, combined with the great differences between their 
educational experiences and those of other executive officers, means that they 
naturally fall largely outside this narrative. 
 Finally, I have chosen to concern myself almost exclusively with officers 
of the executive branch. This branch was the largest and most powerful within 
the Royal Navy. Aside from commanding ships executive officers were also 
responsible for navigation, communications, damage control, and the 
maintenance and use of all weapons and many auxiliary systems. They also 
dominated the lives of ratings  being largely responsible for discipline, the 
welfare of personnel, and the domestic tasks of ship maintenance which 
occupied much of the working week. Consequently they dominated the higher 
ranks of the Royal Navy, exercising control over its development, deployment 
and preparation for war; only they could rise to the head of the service.  
Between 1905 and 1921 the executive and engineering branches were, 
to some extent, integrated as explored below. However, even in this period very 
few commands were given to engineer officers, and the executive officers 
continued to dominate the service. Only those officers fulfilling executive 
functions can truly be described as professional naval officers. In 1957 the 
American sociologist Samuel Huntington published The Soldier and the State in 
which he provided a definition of the professional military officer.4 His work 
provides a convenient starting point for any consideration of the history of the 
Royal Navy officer corps in the 1903-1939 period. Samuel Huntington, drawing 
on the work of preeminent social scientist Harold Lasswell, identified various 
factors as important in shaping the profession of military officership.5 
 Samuel Huntington explained that to be considered a profession an 
occupation must combine specific expertise, clearly defined responsibilities, and 
a sense of corporateness.6 The second of these is, within the context of this 
thesis, easily dealt with  the professional officers of a national military force are 
responsible for the security of the nation; if they do not act in the interests of the 
nation’s security they have failed in their professional duty. This responsibility to 
                                               
4
 Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957; repr.d 1987)  
5
 Harold D Laswell, ‘The Garrison State’, American Journal of Sociology, 48 (1941), pp.455-468 
6
 Huntington, Soldier State, p.8 
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the state differentiates military officers from mercenaries who owe no allegiance 
but instead sell their skills to the highest bidder.7 
 The specific expertise of the military officers to which Samuel Huntington 
referred, and to which he attached Harold Laswell’s terminology, is ‘the 
management of violence’.8 This separates officers from the enlisted personnel 
whose function it is to actually apply violence ― they are tradesmen rather than 
professionals, applying current skills to current problems. In contrast officership, 
although incorporating manual skills, requires a far wider breadth of knowledge 
and an understanding of history and society. It is the ability to manage violence, 
rather than to merely inflict it, which separates the officer from the enlisted man; 
and the enhanced ability to do so that distinguishes the good officer from the 
mediocre.9 
 This definition of officership, equally applicable to sea, land, and air 
forces, specifically excludes those officers whose primary function is not 
combat. Military doctors, engineers, and communications specialists are 
auxiliaries  supporting the professional military officers in the same way that 
nurses support doctors.10 The only true professional military officers are those 
responsible for ‘the management of violence’. This thesis is primarily concerned 
with the way in the Royal Navy taught young officers the principles of the 
management of violence. In a naval context this encompasses not only the pure 
combat elements of tactics, strategy and the employment of weapons, but also 
navigation, seamanship, leadership and other qualities essential in producing 
an effective naval force  including the general secondary education needed as 
a basis for professional studies. 
 Samuel Huntington devoted little attention to the Royal Navy of the early 
twentieth century but had he done so he would have seen many of his ideas 
about the characteristics of military professionalism played out. The director, 
promoter, and lead actor in this piece was John ‘Jackie’ Fisher, Second Sea 
Lord from 1902 to 1903 and First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910 and again from 
1914 to 1915. Fisher recognised what later became the essentials of Samuel 
Huntington’s thesis and sought to address them for the benefit of his service. 
 
                                               
7
 ibid, p.9 
8
 ibid, p.11; Laswell, ‘Garrison State’, pp.455-468 (p.455) 
9
 Huntington, Soldier State, pp.11-13 and p.18 
10
 ibid, p.11 
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The Fisher Reforms 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century the officer corps of the Royal Navy was 
divided into two distinct groups. On one hand, the so called military branch  
the officers who navigated and fought the ship, generally known as executive 
officers. On the other, the civil  encompassing all the auxiliary trades such as 
engineering, medicine and logistics. This division was in some ways logical as it 
separated those officers who were responsible for ‘the management of 
violence’, to say nothing of the navigation and general safety of the ship, from 
those who were not.  
However it ignored the fact that responsibility for the propulsion of the 
ship – and a ship that could not move under its own power was, besides being 
extremely vulnerable to the enemy and the elements, of little military value – 
had passed away from the military branch. Once the Royal Navy had begun to 
employ engines in its ships it had also employed specialists to operate them; 
these specialists evolved into a corps of engineering officers, their role being 
confined to operating and maintaining the ship’s engines and associated plant.11 
Despite their importance the engineer officers did not have the same 
status as the military. Trained separately, they wore a different uniform without 
the curl in the sleeve lace that symbolised the power of their colleagues. 
Engineers could not rise to the highest ranks of the service because they were 
not eligible to command ships and fleets. Despite the importance of their work 
they had little power over the men of their departments  discipline, especially 
punishment, was in the hands of the military branch. Fully aware of their value, 
the engineers had long campaigned for better conditions. In this they were 
supported by many civilian advocates in particular Members of Parliament 
(MPs).12 
Research and development was increasingly entrusted to experts 
ashore, many of them civilians, rather than being undertaken by naval officers 
                                               
11
 For the history of the engineering branch, and engineer officers in particular, see Geoffrey 
Penn, HMS Thunderer: The Story of the Royal Naval Engineering College Keyham and 
Manadon (Emsworth: Kenneth Mason, 1984) and Oliver C Walton, 'Officers or Engineers? The 
Integration and Status of Engineers in the Royal Navy, 1847-60', Historical Research, 77 
(2004), pp.178-201  
12
 Hansard, House of Commons (HC) Debates (Deb) (all 4th Series) 1 March 1901 cc.1459-
1508; HC Deb 18 March 1901 cc.317-337; HC Deb 22 March 1901 cc.930-975; HC Deb 21 
February 1902 c.732 and cc787-840; HC Deb 25 February 1902 cc.1048-1081; HC Deb 10 
June 1902 c.236; HC Deb 8 August 1902 c.1154 
  19 
themselves. The Navy struggled to reconcile these developments; executive 
officers specialising in gunnery or torpedo were taught a strange mixture of 
skills and knowledge; instead of merely directing the use of their weapons, they 
were taught the minutiae of their construction and maintenance, but little about 
the best strategies and tactics for their use. One officer later complained that 
the Long Course for gunnery officers would have been more useful if it had 
been decided whether the students were being trained as gunnery officers, gun 
manufacturers, ordnance artificers, gunners, gunner’s mates or seamen 
gunners.13 The only thing that did not seem to be included in the curriculum was 
how to get the guns to actually hit their target.14 
Fisher had built his career on scientific knowledge and engineering skill. 
He had achieved promotion and fame through his mastery of technology, firstly 
gunnery and then torpedoes and electronics. Fisher had played an important 
role in introducing torpedoes to the Royal Navy, superintending the first 
purchases made, and establishing the torpedo branch and its headquarters 
HMS Vernon.15 He had long been concerned about the division between the 
military and engineering officers and, in particular, young military officer’s lack of 
knowledge and experience in science and engineering. As early as 1873 the 
then Second Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral Sir Walter Tarleton, had come away from 
a lecture given by Fisher convinced that ‘mechanical training will in the near 
future be essential for all officers’.16  
Fisher’s plans for the service were driven by a ruthless obsession with 
military effectiveness and efficiency combined with the enthusiasms of a small 
child in a sweet shop. He oversaw the construction of the Dreadnought type 
battleships and the creation of the Royal Navy’s submarine force; his 
enthusiasms for battle cruisers and fleet submarines proved rather less 
successful. Although he redistributed the fleet to meet the threat from Germany 
he also resisted the development of an effective staff organisation and 
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ruthlessly crushed all opponents. To man his new ships he proposed to create a 
well trained, mechanically literate and extremely flexible force of personnel.  
Fisher thought that naval manpower was used inefficiently, with 
peacetime and wartime requirements being at odds with each other. In 1901 he 
suggested that too little use was made of unskilled labour; he proposed that 
ships should carry large numbers of soldiers to do the unskilled work and 
provide landing parties.17 The prospect of carrying soldiers aboard ship was 
particularly attractive as Fisher was concerned about the large number of naval 
personnel serving ashore, and frequently dying, as members of naval brigades. 
He highlighted the recent loss of HMS Sybille which he attributed to her captain 
being employed ashore. Fisher did not demand the best British regiments for 
the task  he suggested using black or Chinese troops.18  
Fisher had a very negative view of the professional sea soldiers already 
carried aboard HM ships  the Royal Marines. Fisher complained that Royal 
Marine officers were ‘absolutely useless’, because they were incapable of 
carrying out any shipboard task and, having been ‘brought up upon military 
lines’, were impossible to educate. Writing in May 1902, Fisher favoured getting 
rid of them (and presumably marines) describing them as ‘relics of the 
Armada’.19  
Fisher wanted to create a force of efficient naval officers and ratings who 
could be used in a variety of capacities as required. He favoured creating a 
small cadre of specialist officers and ratings to carry out the most difficult 
technical tasks, and training the remainder to do a variety of less skilled work. 
Thus junior ratings would be employable as seaman or stokers, perhaps 
forming part of the engine room compliment on a daily basis but serving a gun 
should battle be joined.20 Officers would be capable of taking charge on the 
bridge or in the engine room and employed for watch-keeping as required. 
Initially he planned to retain the separate engineering and executive branches, 
but with the potential for their ultimate integration  for officers to become 
largely inter-changeable. 
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Engine Room Artificers (ERAs) had been introduced to the Navy in 1868 
but had joined as fully trained men aged 21-35 and had been promoted to Chief 
Petty Officer (CPO) soon after joining. Fisher introduced a new group  artificer 
apprentices who joined the Navy at the age of fifteen having passed a 
competitive examination administered by the Civil Service. The standard 
required for entry was higher than for other rating branches, and the training 
period far longer. Artificers did a four year apprenticeship ashore, whereas all 
other ratings went to sea within three years of joining. Their value to the service 
was reflected in their high pay, segregated accommodation, and high status  
they could expect to become CPOs by the age of twenty-three. The way in 
which artificers were developed and treated reflected their important place in 
Fisher’s plans. The technical abilities of the artificers, and their ability to work 
unsupervised, freed officers from most of the heaviest and dirtiest engineering 
work, making employment as an engineering officer a more gentlemanly 
prospect.  
Fisher’s plans relied on the premise that naval technology was constantly 
improving and, although it was becoming more complex, it was also becoming 
more reliable. This suggested that in the future engineering officers might not be 
needed, especially as the artificers became more adept. This argument proved 
to be completely unsound and even in 1903 there was strong evidence that the 
increasing variety and complexity of naval equipment meant that no person 
could master the maintenance and use of more than a small portion of it.  
Specialist engineer officers had been abolished by the United States 
Navy in 1899  replaced with a system in which officers had a thorough all-
round education and could be employed as engineers on one commission and 
deck officers on the next. This system had proved reasonably successful, 
although this success probably owed something to the fact that engineer and 
executive midshipmen had trained together at Annapolis since 1874 and had 
studied the same curriculum since 1882.21 Thus there already existed officers 
with a shared background and common professional knowledge, and the cadre 
of skilled technical ratings needed to compensate for the officers’ lack of 
expertise. 
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Fisher with the support of the First Lord of the Admiralty, William Palmer 
the Second Earl of Selborne, produced an entirely new system for the entry, 
training, and employment of officers  the Fisher-Selborne scheme, published 
on Christmas Day 1902. The scheme provided for cadets to enter the Royal 
Navy at the age of twelve and spend four years pursuing a science and 
engineering based curriculum ashore, after which they would go to sea for 
around three years to learn the practical skills of the naval officer. Only as sub-
lieutenants would they choose between the executive and engineering 
branches  thus the two branches would be staffed by men from similar 
backgrounds who had been educated together. The engineers were to move 
from the civil to military status, thus enhancing their right to command and 
discipline their men.22 
It was the possibility of creating a united officer corps that ensured the 
support of Selborne. Shortly after becoming First Lord, Selborne visited Fisher 
(who was then Commander in Chief (hereafter C-in-C) Mediterranean) and was 
quickly converted to his way of thinking. Thereafter he actively backed Fisher’s 
manning reforms, indeed he insisted on Fisher being made Second Sea Lord 
despite his seniority (the job normally went to a vice-admiral), cunning, and 
divisiveness.23 Fisher later wrote that Selborne accepted his proposals for the 
officer corps ‘without the alteration of a comma’ and ‘benevolently spared me 
from the Admiralty to become C-in-C Portsmouth to see that scheme carried 
out’.24 So important was Selborne’s influence that the scheme for officer 
education and employment came to carry his name as well as Fisher’s. 
Selborne was no unthinking disciple; there were strong reasons for him 
to support Fisher. He was acutely concerned about the demands of the 
engineers for greater status and linked this to rising social discontent 
elsewhere. He feared that if the engineers were not given better prospects they 
would be vulnerable to outside influence and that this would lead to pressure for 
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parliament to intervene in the Navy’s business.25 He was shrewd enough to 
recognise that Fisher’s ideas offered the prospect of a more efficient, 
economical and effective fleet  a prospect particularly enticing as Selborne 
feared the loss of British naval pre-eminence and with it the loss of national 
strength and prestige.26  
As parliamentary pressure increased the First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord 
Walter Kerr, was gradually converted to Selborne’s viewpoint, noting that ‘the 
time has arrived when this mischievous spirit can no longer be disregarded’. 
Although he noted the objections of Admiral Lambton, whom he considered to 
represent many other officers, Kerr gave his acquiescence to the Fisher-
Selborne scheme.27 
The parliamentary pressure that so concerned Selborne and Kerr arose 
largely from the debates on the 1902-1903 naval estimates. On this occasion 
the status and, in particular, disciplinary powers of engineer officers had been 
criticised by MPs including Mr Platt-Higgins the member for Salford, Mr Allan, 
member for Gateshead, Colonel Ropner, member for Stockton, and Mr Duke, 
member for Plymouth.28 The previous year Platt-Higgins had been among a 
group of fifty MPs who had tackled Selborne on the issue. 
The Fisher-Selborne scheme was widely and viciously attacked  the 
charge against it being led by those opposed to any prospect of inter-
changeability, strongly supported by both those against changing the curriculum 
and opponents of the thirteen year old entry. Amongst the most negative 
responses to the scheme was that published in Brassey’s Naval Annual for 
1903. Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton was deeply critical of the scheme, 
which he viewed as the work of engineer agitators. Hamilton felt the scheme 
would not conquer social divides, nor make the fleet more efficient, nor produce 
another Nelson. He noted that naval officers were already expected to be 
seamen, soldiers and diplomats and said it was too much to expect them to be 
engineers as well. He was critical of the scheme of education, being a firm 
believer that naval officers were made at sea and that classroom studies could 
not be satisfactorily conducted aboard a warship. Finally Hamilton believed that 
the prestige of officers would be damaged if they were dependent on 
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engineering ratings and thought that this would have a negative effect on naval 
morale.  
 Hamilton accused the Admiralty of manufacturing favourable publicity for 
the scheme. He noted that a very detailed announcement had been made on 
Christmas Day, yet two days later The Times had published a detailed and 
favourable assessment. Hamilton suggested that this assessment had been 
supplied by the scheme’s backers.29 
 This reaction was echoed in a House of Lords question session on 8 May 
1903, during which Selborne was forced to defend the scheme against attacks 
by the Earl of Glasgow and Lord Spencer. The Earl was a former president of 
the Institute of Naval Architects and a man well acquainted with naval engineers 
yet he was against the scheme. He described it as ‘the most unfortunate 
proposal that has ever been made with respect to the Navy’ although he did 
acknowledge its widespread support.  
 Like Hamilton he viewed the scheme as the work of engineer agitators, 
albeit civilians rather than those in the Navy. He cited a deputation of engineers 
who had waylaid the First Lord on 16 July 1901 and was of the view that the 
scheme benefitted them rather than the Navy. Whilst the Earl agreed that boys 
should enter the service aged thirteen, he thought specialist engineers essential 
and feared that the power and prestige of the officer corps would be 
undermined. Finally the Earl doubted that the cadets, even if keen and 
intelligent, could cope with the curriculum. Small wonder that he talked of 
‘careers flung into the melting pot with a spirit of cheerful optimism’.30 
 Lord Spencer did not see any need to change officer training  the 
existing system had, after all, produced the greatest navy in the world. Whilst 
accepting the thirteen year old entry, and the proposed curriculum, he was 
against any suggestion of inter-changeability and was frustrated that entry could 
not be more open, although he appreciated the financial constraints.31  
These reactions illustrate the depth and nature of most of the criticisms 
of the Fisher-Selborne scheme, as well as the suspicion with which Admiral 
Fisher was viewed and the animosity he attracted. That such scathing criticism 
by a senior officer should be published in a respected journal is indicative of the 
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strength of reaction to the Fisher-Selborne scheme whilst the questions asked 
in the Lords demonstrate the variety of objections raised.  
Cadet curriculum aside, the Fisher-Selborne scheme was largely an 
adaptation of the existing arrangements for officer education. Since the 1850s 
officers had undergone an initial spell of training in a static ship followed by a 
period at sea as a midshipman. More recent plans allowed for cadet training 
ashore (construction of Dartmouth Naval College had begun in 1898) followed 
by six months in the training cruiser, midshipman time in the fleet and finally the 
examinations for sub-lieutenant. The Fisher-Selborne scheme dramatically 
altered the balance of the training system, doubling the length of the initial shore 
course from two to four years but with no increase in the three years served as 
a midshipman. Thus it was clear that the naval officers of the future were to be 
engineers as much as, or more than, they were seamen. Moreover the 
introduction of an engineering based curriculum was not merely a reflection of 
the changing needs of the service but rather it indicated a revolution in the 
officer corps and the prospect of completely inter-changeable deck and 
engineering officers. 
The introduction of the Fisher-Selborne scheme in 1903 paved the way 
for inter-changeability. Fisher’s system required the majority of officers to hold 
specialist qualifications and to be appointed to ships in these roles but to be 
employed aboard as needed. Thus a torpedo specialist, although in charge of 
the torpedo department and employed in it at action stations, might be required 
to keep watch in the engine room under normal steaming conditions. An 
immediate start was made in integrating the two groups, the engineers dropped 
their existing rank titles in favour of a modified version of the executive; chief 
inspectors of machinery became engineer rear-admirals, engineers became 
engineer sub-lieutenants. In September the first cadets began a two year 
course at the new naval college at Osborne, to be followed by two years at 
Dartmouth before going to sea. 
 As First Sea Lord in 1905 Fisher was able to introduce a system of 
genuine, if limited, inter-changeability  the exact details being worked out by a 
committee headed by Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas. The Douglas Committee 
declared that, whilst the cadets at Osborne were very keen on engineering, 
there was little prospect of them volunteering for the engineering branch if it 
meant they could not rise to the highest ranks of the service and command 
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ships and fleets. It also felt that there was a social gap between the executive 
and engineering branches. However both of these problems could be remedied 
by integrating the engineers into the military branch; all officers could be trained 
by the Fisher-Selborne scheme and those that wished to specialise as 
engineers could do so at the age of twenty-two. Provided they held bridge 
watch-keeping certificates, engineers could revert to upper deck duties on 
promotion to commander and thus become eligible for command and promotion 
to the highest ranks.32 
 On 30 November 1905 the Cawdor Memorandum was published, setting 
out the future of the reformed military branch. It announced that there was no 
need for a separate engineering branch and that henceforth engineering would 
become an executive specialisation.33 Having been integrated into the military 
branch, the engineers gained the rights and privileges previously denied them  
promotion to the highest ranks, full command over their subordinates, the right 
to sit on courts martial and the curl in the sleeve lace that signified the right to 
command. Whereas the United States Navy had opted for a highly flexible 
officer corps with limited specialist knowledge, the Royal Navy chose a system 
in which each man was an expert in his specialist field  sacrificing flexibility in 
assignments in favour of having officers who were not totally reliant on the 
technical skills and knowledge of their ratings. Thus true inter-changeability was 
not achieved.  
 The question naturally arose of what to do with the existing engineer 
officers; the older members of the branch lacked the experience of upper deck 
duties needed to take full advantage of the new system but their engineering 
knowledge and experience made their retention essential. In February 1907 the 
Douglas Committee produced a second report dealing with these questions. 
The committee thought that the existing engineers lacked the skills needed to 
command ships. The officers produced through the Fisher-Selborne scheme 
would have these skills and it was important that they were not placed in a 
position far superior to the older engineers. It was recommended that the old 
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engineers should keep their existing titles  engineering lieutenant rather than 
the new lieutenant (E) which reflected that their high level of technical expertise 
and lack of executive skills and experience. They should wear the executive 
uniform  complete with curl in the lace  but retain the purple stripes they 
currently wore between the gold stripes of rank. They should given command 
of, and disciplinary powers over, all the men working in their department 
regardless of whether the men were engineer ratings or not. The senior 
engineer officer of a ship should report directly to her first lieutenant, or, if senior 
to him, directly to her captain.34 
 The last engineer cadets entered Keyham College in 1905; it closed 
when they finished their course in 1910. In July 1913 it reopened, commanded 
for the first time by an engineer captain, charged with delivering the one year 
engineering specialisation course for Fisher-Selborne scheme officers.35 For 
several years the engineering branch existed in a kind of limbo  entry to it had 
been cut off but it had not yet been integrated into the military branch. Only in 
January 1915, with Fisher back at the Admiralty and again able to harness the 
energies of a sympathetic First Lord  on this occasion Winston Churchill  
were the engineers absorbed into the executive branch and finally able to adopt 
their new uniforms. Even then they retained their separate ranks and had no 
prospect of commanding ships or fleets; full integration into the executive 
branch was reserved for the officers produced by the Fisher-Selborne 
scheme.36 
The Royal Marines were also included in the Fisher-Selborne scheme, 
the expectation being that marine officers would take an active role in the 
running of their ships, available for watch-keeping and other duties when not 
busy with the marine detachment. The 1907 plans paved the way for their 
integration into the military branch.37 These aims were never achieved; the 
Royal Marines continued to enter and train their own officers and these officers 
continued to be employed solely within their own service.  
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The integration of the Royal Marines was doomed to failure because the 
skills needed to command a large force of marines were not those needed to 
command a ship or a fleet. Even had it been possible to train men as both 
platoon commanders and watch keepers it would not have been possible to 
integrate the higher ranks of the two services. There was also a desire to 
maintain the distinctive character of the Royal Marines which was, in itself, a 
reflection of the distinctive identity of naval officers. The distinctive identity of 
naval officers, and of executive officers in particular, must be understood if the 
officer selection and education systems are to be placed in context. 
 
Royal Navy Officer Identities 
 
Entering officers at the age of twelve, as demanded by the Fisher-Selborne 
scheme, meant that they could be thoroughly educated  not only in 
engineering, science and seamanship, but also in the spirit, customs and 
traditions of the Royal Navy.  They would be social and professional equals, 
presenting a united front to the outside world  a Nelsonian band of brothers. 
Thus would be achieved what Samuel Huntington called ‘corporateness’. He 
pointed out that this feeling of corporateness was the result of shared 
background, and professional lives that dominated personal. He noted that the 
professional world of the military officer firmly excludes those who are not 
qualified to enter it. 
Among Fisher’s motives was a desire to unite the officer corps and to 
remove the existing social divide between the engineering and executive 
branches. Fisher aimed to remove these problems by recruiting all officers at 
the same age and through the same system. Thus shared knowledge, 
combined with shared formative experiences, would produce officers with a 
shared mentality and strong personal bonds. The published plans for the 
scheme referred to a desire to ‘consolidate into a harmonious whole the fighting 
officers of the Navy’.38 
This ‘harmonious whole’ would have the shared outlook and skills that 
Samuel Huntington demanded to achieve corporateness. In such a society the 
engineering specialist would be treated with the same respect as the gunnery or 
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torpedo specialist. Whilst raising the social status of engineering was highly 
desirable there was a definite risk that the engineers produced under the old 
system would be in an even worse position than before  increasingly 
outnumbered by men with whom they had little in common and who were not 
reliant on their technical expertise. They might therefore find themselves even 
more firmly excluded from the professional circle. 
Samuel Huntington’s three part definition of a profession is a 
simplification of a longer list of qualities, which have also been highlighted by 
other sociologists and historians such as Teitler, Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 
and Perkin.39 All these authors agree that a profession exists where a group of 
practitioners monopolise a specific type of expertise which requires a high level 
of education to achieve and which benefits, and is sold to, wider society. The 
group of practitioners organises itself into a professional body that regulates 
entry to the profession and negotiates with society on its behalf. In the 
nineteenth century the development of many professions was characterised by 
the development of bodies which aimed to closely define and control entry to 
the profession and to raise its status. 
The Royal Navy did not entirely fit the normal patterns of development. 
The standards for entry had been laid out with the introduction in 1677 of an 
examination  the passing of which entitled a man to be commissioned as a 
lieutenant. In Samuel Huntington’s view this examination alone did not make the 
officers of the Royal Navy professionals because advancement within the 
service depended largely on patronage rather exclusively on professional skill.40 
In the nineteenth century the Royal Navy, like many other developing 
professions, placed increasing emphasis on uniform educational standards. 
Historically most future officers had entered directly into the ships of the fleet as 
the protégées of particular officers and had received whatever education was 
available in their ships, with the result that those being commissioned varied 
enormously in age, education and practical experience. From 1859 onwards all 
executive officers began their careers aboard HMS Britannia and went through 
the same course of pre-commissioning education and training. Further 
uniformity was imposed by the introduction of a single opportunity for entry  
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which required candidates to pass an official set of examinations and meet the 
approval of interviewers appointed by the Admiralty. 
The military officers of the Royal Navy never formed a professional body 
 there was little need for them to do so. The state valued their services and 
was prepared to pay for them, indeed often there was a great deal of public and 
political desire to strengthen the Navy. Entry to the officer corps was tightly 
controlled by the Admiralty, and outsiders kept from the service by the walls of 
the dockyards and of the ships themselves. Aboard ship officers enjoyed the 
trappings of high status  they lived apart from the crew in more opulent 
conditions, did little manual work, and were attended by servants. The public 
held the Navy in high regard and the high status of the officers was reflected in 
their close links to the crown; members of the Royal family launched and 
sponsored ships, Queen Victoria dressed her sons in sailor suits and sent 
several of them into the service. The expertise, exclusivity, and the status of the 
executive officers ensured the rewards other developing professions craved. 
Such professional naval officer organisations as did exist were 
essentially learned societies  devoted to the transfer and development of 
professional knowledge, rather than campaigning for better conditions or more 
recognition or tighter restrictions as to who was commissioned. In 1872 an 
attempt was made to found a ‘Junior Naval Officers Professional Association’ 
with the aim of allowing lieutenants to pool their knowledge and debate the 
future of the service. This organisation foundered within two years; Goldrick 
suggests this was because membership was limited to lieutenants, a restriction 
he describes as ‘artificial  and unworkable’.41 
The Naval Society, founded in 1912, and its publication The Naval 
Review, was rather more successful. The Naval Review was intended to be the 
principal forum of a corresponding society, devoted to the non-technical aspects 
of the naval profession, and designed to encourage officers to think and write. 
Contributions were anonymous which encouraged free discussion unhindered 
by rank and personal sensibilities. Early issues considered problems of 
strategy, tactics, naval education, discipline, and varying aspects of daily naval 
life including boats, gunnery, and readiness for war  in other words most 
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aspects of the work of the professional naval officer. The Naval Review was 
widely read, and many different officers contributed to it, but it was habitually 
viewed with suspicion by the naval authorities and did not have much influence 
on the service in general.42 
Within the Royal Navy of the early twentieth century ideas of officerly 
attributes were habitually discussed in terms of ‘officer-like qualities’  a 
concept which was never defined but was well understood within the service. 
Officer-like qualities encompassed a wide range of attributes which together 
made the complete officer  a man who enjoyed the complete trust of superiors 
and subordinates in all circumstances of peace and war. Such a man needed to 
be brave, determined, honourable, loyal, alert, intelligent, fair minded, physically 
fit, courteous, honourable, inspirational, and a skilled seaman and sea-fighter. 
Beyond these attributes he must also be devoted to the Royal Navy and enjoy 
living and working at sea. Thus equipped he would be able to handle any 
situation he found himself in, be it entertaining royalty, nursing a ship through a 
storm, fighting a battle, or spending weeks at a time on eventless patrol. 
The concept of officer-like qualities, if not the terminology, had appeared 
by the mid eighteenth century. As the Royal Navy’s officers had begun to carve 
out a distinct identity, symbolised by their wearing uniforms and being held to 
certain professional standards, so ideas about how they should behave began 
to appear. The officer was expected to be a seaman, a gentleman and a leader 
 the last quality partly arising from the first two. Behaviour such as duelling, 
drunkenness, quarrelling in public, and socialising with ratings became 
increasingly unacceptable. Seamanship, bravery, and gentlemanly manners 
were prized, and there was increasing emphasis on education.43 In 1747 a 
pamphlet, probably written by Admiral Vernon, was published stating: ‘It is 
certainly necessary that a sea officer should have good natural courage: but it is 
equally just that he should have a good share of sense, be perfect master of his 
business, and have some taste for honour’.44 
These ideas found concrete form in the Articles of War first published in 
1661, revised in 1749, and frequently read out to the company of every ship 
thereafter. They were primarily a response to fears that naval officers were 
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treacherous or cowardly, and many of the clauses reflect these fears  mutiny, 
aiding the enemy, embezzling prizes, and cowardice in action were all 
punishable.45 The articles also outlined a code of behaviour for all naval 
personnel, forbidding sodomy, theft, and ‘profane Oaths, Cursings, Execrations, 
Drunkenness, Uncleanness, or other scandalous Actions, in derogation of 
God's Honour, and Corruption of Good Manners’. Higher standards were 
expected of officers who were additionally barred from ‘behaving in a 
scandalous, infamous, cruel, oppressive or fraudulent Manner, unbecoming the 
Character of an Officer’.46 
Officer-like qualities fell naturally into two categories. On one hand, 
professional skills and knowledge, be it of sail handling, the inner workings of 
fifteen inch guns, or grand strategy. On the other hand personal qualities 
including not only attributes such as courage and determination but also the 
manners, appearance and behaviour of a gentleman. It was the question of 
personal attributes that caused most difficulty in the reform of the officer corps 
and of naval education. 
The military officers of the late nineteenth century Royal Navy were 
drawn from the wealthier sections of society. The combination of stiff entrance 
examinations and the cost of launching a boy into an officer’s career served to 
exclude the poor. The need to secure a nomination before even attempting the 
entrance examinations served to exclude those who lacked connections at the 
highest levels of the Navy, society or government. The result was a military 
officer corps comprised of men from the upper and upper middle classes.47 
Whilst the engineers had, since their introduction into the service in 1837, 
been bound by the articles of war the engineering officer corps had developed 
along different lines from the executive  the Royal Navy initially relied on 
recruiting trained engineers from the open labour market. These men were from 
a different background  they were more likely to be from northern or urban 
areas and less likely to come from naval families, Walton wrote that ‘socially 
and culturally their roots were in the labour aristocracy’ and that once in the 
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service they continued to identify with other well paid highly skilled technicians 
rather than with military officers.48 
The Royal Navy’s early attempts at training its own engineers brought in 
boys who were mostly the sons of sailors or dockyard workers. The entry was 
gradually revised; from 1876 onwards candidates were required to pass the 
Civil Service examinations, a move described by Penn as ‘a determined attempt 
to convert the engineer into a true officer by recruiting him from the officer rather 
than the mechanic class’.49 At the same time training began to move out of the 
dockyards and into separate facilities so that the young officers were 
segregated from the workmen and their development could be more closely 
controlled. The main public school games cricket and rugby were encouraged, 
as were the more naval pulling (rowing) and sailing.50  
There remained a considerable divide between the engineering and 
military officers, the former being employed on work that far more closely 
resembled that of their ratings (their working clothes also more closely 
resembled those of their men, especially when dirty). Fisher’s schemes aimed 
to overcome the differences between the engineer and executive officers 
through giving them many of the same skills and similar employment and 
through filling both branches with boys from the same backgrounds. 
 Thus he would achieve his ‘harmonious whole’ or, to use Samuel 
Huntington’s terminology, ‘corporateness’. This shared identity inevitably 
depended on all officers being drawn from the wealthiest part of society, 
because only the wealthy could afford to support a boy through his early career 
training  cadets were not paid by the state (instead their parents paid several 
hundred pounds for their education) and midshipmen and sub-lieutenants relied 
on parental support. 
It is inevitable that issues of social class intrude upon any discussion of 
the composition and attitudes of the Royal Navy officer corps in the 1903-1939. 
Social class is a highly complex and controversial issue with authors offering a 
variety of models for British society in the period.51 British society was 
moderately turbulent, the fluctuating economy, world war, and political pressure 
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combining to ensure that whilst some sections of the population gained 
considerably in wealth and power others suffered dramatic losses. This in turn 
created friction between different groups and consequent political responses. 
 The Navy was relatively autonomous  its men lived distantly from the 
rest of the population in a society with its own rules and divisions. However 
naval personnel did not constitute their own social class, nor even two separate 
classes (officers and ratings). Instead the service was subject to the same 
pressures as the rest of the nation in particular it was affected by the increasing 
political power and education of the lower middle and upper working classes. 
So far as this thesis is concerned the issue of the varying class backgrounds 
manifests itself in various ways. 
 Educationally, the Royal Naval Colleges Osborne and Dartmouth were 
an offshoot of the civilian system of private education. They were largely staffed 
by men who would otherwise have taught in the private secondary system and 
they took their pupils from the private primary system. They were thus 
institutions of the upper and upper middle classes; and in this way they reflected 
the officer corps of the Royal Navy as a whole.  
More critically class issues affected the selection of officers. During this 
period the vast majority of naval officers were recruited from the upper and 
upper middle classes. That is to say their parents were part of the 11.6% of the 
population that received 47.5% of nation’s income.52 Comparative wealth aside 
the upper, and most especially middle, classes are difficult to define but they did 
have certain shared characteristics. These characteristics mostly took the form 
of prescribed behaviour or desires  people who considered themselves middle 
class were generally salary earners in white collar occupations. Wherever 
possible they aimed to employ servants, to have their children privately 
educated and, above all, to separate themselves from the working classes by 
living in different areas, dressing in different clothing and pursuing different 
hobbies.53 
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This desire for separation stemmed partly from a fear of the working 
classes. The inequities of wealth meant that the rich were undoubtedly bigger, 
healthier, and better educated than the poor. The poor were widely perceived to 
be stupid, feckless, irresponsible or immoral  in contrast to the middle and 
upper classes who had, through industry and morality, built an empire.54 In the 
late nineteenth century there was a widespread fear that Britain was in danger 
of entering a chronic decline, or even collapsing, as a result of her ill-educated, 
physically weak and immoral population. These fears played a critical role in the 
‘national efficiency’ movement which highlighted causes as widespread as the 
poor organisation of the Army, the lack of facilities for scientific education, and 
the possibility of selectively breeding from the human population.55 In the 
aftermath of the First World War fear of the working class was largely founded 
in the fear of a communist revolution. 
 This widespread dislike and distrust of the working classes was 
unfortunate given the questions that arose about the future of the Royal Navy 
officer corps in the 1903-1939 period. An officer corps drawn from the 
wealthiest sections of society was becoming increasingly unacceptable to 
politicians and the general public. Politicians, whilst they had no control over the 
education of young officers, did manage to exercise some control over 
selection. The 1903-1939 period, and in particular the 1919-1939 period, was 
characterised by political attempts to force the Royal Navy to enter officers from 
a wider range of backgrounds.  
Today this would probably be called ‘widening access’ and in fact many 
of the issues it encompassed are familiar modern media fare. Within the service 
a variety of terminology was used. The terms of reference for the Bennett 
Committee, for example, referred to the need for officers ‘from all classes of the 
community’.56 Other documents desired a more ‘democratic’ officer corps.57 A 
paper written by the First Sea Lord in 1931 referred to the process of opening 
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the officer corps to men from a wider variety of social classes as 
‘democratisation’ and it is this word that I shall use to describe the process.58 
This term has been adopted concurrently by Christopher Bell.59 
Advocates of democratisation wished to open entry to the officer corps of 
the Royal Navy to boys from a wider variety of backgrounds rather than 
continuing to confine it to the sons of the upper and upper middle classes. 
Democratisation carried the implication that, given equal opportunity at the start 
of their careers, officers from all backgrounds were equally capable of rising to 
the top of the service.   
Although some campaigners for democratisation aspired only to enter 
the sons of poorer professionals others favoured opening the selection process 
to any boy of sufficient talent, regardless of background and family income. 
There was no suggestion that reduced officer-like qualities should be accepted 
as the price for a more diverse officer corps, only that many boys capable of 
meeting the existing standards were not being given a chance. Although 
politically led, democratisation was underpinned by the massive growth in state 
secondary education that enabled many boys from working and lower middle 
class backgrounds to achieve the academic standards required of potential 
officers. The pro-democratisation forces acting on the officer corps of the Navy 
reflected wider desires for equality.60 
Democratisation threatened to undermine the shared identity of the 
officer corps that Fisher had been so determined to nurture. A democratic 
officer corps could not promote itself as an upper class institution and could not 
dictate its member’s choices of hobbies, clothing, or spouses. The relationship 
of the officer corps and the lower-deck was also bound to be altered. Naval 
discipline rested to some extent on the deference ratings paid to officers whilst 
the gulf in pay and living conditions reflected that between the rich and poor 
ashore.61 
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The democratisation of the service made the corporateness of the officer 
corps even more important, and this was largely produced through naval 
education. Through its schemes of selection and education, the Royal Navy 
aimed to produce young officers who were leaders, gentlemen, and had the 
required professional skills. It required an officer corps of men who were loyal to 
the service and to each other  requiring the personalities of young officers to 
be developed in a particular way. Mary Jones has suggested that the Navy in 
fact pursued a divided curriculum. The ‘visible’ concentrating on professional 
knowledge and skills (i.e. specific expertise) actively taught. And the ‘invisible’  
in which attitudes and behaviours (i.e. a sense of corporateness) were learnt 
through immersion in a carefully calculated naval atmosphere.62 
This thesis is largely concerned with the way in which officers were 
developed through this divided curriculum. It details the visible curriculum for 
cadets and midshipmen and explores the invisible  how young officers were 
shaped by their environment, the personnel around them, and the history of the 
service. It also explores how democratisation was pursued and the impact it had 
on officer education. 
A substantial complication in any attempt to analyse officer education is 
the fragmented way in which it was administered and controlled. No one 
individual or office was responsible. The First Lord of the Admiralty (hereafter 
First Lord) was responsible for the selection of cadets, but the process by which 
they were selected was the responsibility of the Second Sea Lord.  
As the head of naval personnel, the Second Sea Lord was nominally 
responsible for officer education but on a day to day basis he had little 
involvement, leaving most educational decisions to his subordinates. The 
development of the cadet curriculum was left almost entirely to the staff of 
Dartmouth and Osborne; for administrative purposes the colleges came under 
the command of their local C-in-C (Plymouth and Portsmouth respectively).  
The education of midshipmen was largely in the hands of the Director of 
Training and Staff Duties (hereafter DTSD), a naval officer working in the 
Admiralty building. The Training and Staff Duties Division was created as part of 
the reorganisation of the naval staff in 1917, so placing officer education firmly 
under naval control with civilians employed as advisors rather than policy 
makers. Thus James Ewing, who served as Director of Education from 1903-
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1918, was succeeded by Alexander McMullen who was titled Advisor on 
Education. 
Changes in selection or educational policy generally resulted from the 
work of specially appointed committees, normally comprised of a mixture of 
naval officers and civilian experts. However, policy could also be heavily 
influenced by senior officers serving in the fleet or in the specialist departments 
of the Admiralty. Aside from complicating the work of the historian this divided 
responsibility resulted in conflict and confusion, the effects of which on selection 
and education will be demonstrated by this thesis.  
Most prominent amongst the DTSDs of the period is Herbert Richmond, 
who rose to the rank of Admiral before leaving the Royal Navy to become Vere-
Harmsworth Professor of Naval History at Cambridge University. Richmond’s 
extensive writings on naval education, combined with biographies by Marder 
and Hunt, make his one of the loudest voices heard by the historian.63 Volume 
must not however be confused with influence  and Richmond’s was limited. 
Consequently, his main place in this narrative is as a dissenting voice, 
repeatedly challenging established naval policy to little effect.  
Young officers were taught by naval personnel of all ranks, especially 
during the seagoing part of their education. Ratings provided mostly informal 
education in seamanship and taught young officers about the men they would 
be expected to lead. Some officers were employed for instructional duties; 
others, whilst they did little if any actual teaching, exercised a powerful influence 
over their charges.  
Whilst most officer education was undertaken by Royal Navy personnel, 
civilian teachers also played a vital role. School subjects such as English, 
French, and history were taught to cadets at Osborne and Dartmouth by 
civilians. Mathematics, navigation, and engineering were taught by a mixture of 
civilian and naval staff. The two colleges had headmasters, who reported 
directly to the captain, and led large civilian teaching staffs who enjoyed 
considerable freedom in selecting teaching methods and producing curricula. 
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The Royal Navy did not provide formal leadership teaching  instead 
relying on young officers absorbing useful techniques from a variety of 
exemplars. The most important, and central, figures were adult naval officers 
but naval ratings and the civilian teaching staff at the naval colleges also played 
an important role, as did the inspirational exploits of the great naval officers of 
the past.  
Changes in the naval education system, and to some extent the 
democratisation debate, were frequently driven by changes in the employment 
of the officer corps, in particular efforts at inter-changeability. It is therefore 
necessary to establish a clear chronology of the major relevant events of the 
period. This chronology is the foundation of the in-depth studies to be found in 
the later chapters, although in itself it presents only a narrow view of the 
problems facing the Royal Navy. 
 
Chronology and Background 
 
Actually implementing Fisher’s scheme proved difficult, so much so that in 1912 
the Custance Committee was set up to iron out the numerous difficulties. This 
committee, whilst leaving the scheme essentially untouched, considerably 
altered the selection and education of officers. The following year an additional 
system of officer selection and development, the Special Entry scheme, was 
added to meet the demands of the ever expanding fleet. These boys, most of 
them privately educated, entered at the age of seventeen. They generally had a 
year of preliminary cadet training, concentrating on professional subjects rather 
than academics, before going to sea as cadets then midshipmen in the same 
way as the Fisher-Selborne scheme officers. The first of these cadets had been 
in the Navy for less than a year when war broke out in August 1914. 
The strains of the First World War ultimately destroyed Fisher’s scheme. 
On the outbreak of war in 1914 Dartmouth was emptied  every cadet was sent 
to sea. The decision to mobilise the Dartmouth cadets in the event of war was 
probably taken in July 1911. On the 27th of that month the Admiralty contacted 
the Treasury to discuss the required financial arrangements. Some cadets 
would remain in the colleges; whilst the parents of those at sea would not be 
expected to pay fees, they would be required to pay the £50 annual allowance 
which covered personal expenses. This decision meant that cadets would be 
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placed on a similar footing to midshipmen serving in the fleet  expected to play 
an active officer-like role but not treated as adults. Whilst they could, at their 
captain’s discretion, be promoted early to midshipman they could not receive 
early promotion to sub-lieutenant.64 Clearly it was anticipated that any war 
would be brief enough not to seriously interfere with the education of cadets.  
 The proposals aroused little alarm. Treasury officials decided not to 
interfere, believing the cadets would have a useful role to play.65 There was no 
media outcry and the parents of the cadets were not informed. Cadets from 
both Osborne and Dartmouth took part in the test mobilisation of July 1914; 
shortly afterwards lists were published at Dartmouth attaching each cadet to a 
specific ship should war break out.66 Even so, Dartmouth cadets were 
incredulous when the order to mobilise arrived on the afternoon of 1 August.67  
 The cadets were quickly in action; 23 were dead by 16 November.68 
Public outcry inevitably followed but the cadets, and most of their parents, were 
content. One mother, writing the introduction to her son’s diaries published in 
1916 explained: ‘It seemed to me that if my son was too young to be exposed to 
such danger, the principle must apply equally to the son of my cook, or my 
butcher, or my gardener, whose boys were no less precious to them than mine 
was to me’.69 
In writing these words the mother reaffirmed that in the Royal Navy 
danger was shared quite equally amongst all ranks of society. This may well 
have reflected her own desire for all to play their fair part in the war and pride 
that her son was doing so. However it may also have been designed to 
positively influence the reader’s opinion of the war and of the Royal Navy, given 
that the book was published in 1916 it is likely that some thought was given to 
its potential impact on public opinion. Even so when judged against other items 
published during the war, such as the letters by the mothers of other cadets 
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discussed below, it seems likely that the introduction reflected her true 
feelings.70 
 The Times published a negative letter from one mother but she criticised 
the lack of swimming instruction at Osborne rather than the decision to send the 
cadets to sea.71 The decision was criticised in Parliament but the complainant 
did not claim to speak on behalf of his constituents. Mr Joynson-Hicks 
repeatedly asked what purpose sending the cadets to sea served and how 
many had been killed. He was told that although the cadets had suffered 
disproportionately (by February 1915, 41 out of 423 had died) they were doing 
the full work of midshipmen.72  
Joynson-Hicks’ views were published in a letter in the Morning Post, in 
which he asked Churchill to return the cadets to Dartmouth, arguing that they 
were of little practical value aboard ship, were being exposed to sights far 
beyond their years, and that the long term future would be best served by 
returning them to Dartmouth. A number of replies were published, all of them 
favouring the cadets remaining at sea. One was from a cadet’s mother who 
wrote that: ‘Should the Admiralty see fit to remove our sons from the danger 
zone the relief would be immeasurable. Nevertheless, for my own part, if my 
son can best serve England at this juncture by giving his life for her, I would not 
lift one finger to bring him home. If any act or word of mine should interfere with 
or take from him his grandest privilege I could never look him in the face 
again’.73 
 In fact the cadets had swiftly proved their value at sea. Most joined ships 
of the Reserve Fleet and found themselves doing the work of midshipmen, often 
including important roles in gunnery control. Their extreme youth was a matter 
of embarrassment to some; one captain sentenced his cadets to bouts of 
jumping off the capstan in a fruitless attempt to break their voices.74 Otherwise 
little concession was made  cadets were bullied by their seniors in the 
gunroom and, when in harbour, were expected to study as they would have in 
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peacetime despite their tiredness. The value of the cadets was frequently 
recognised by early promotion to midshipman; those in Hogue were so rated on 
2 August 1914, while the survivors of Cressy and Aboukir were promoted on 22 
September.75 The first term of Special Entries, four of whom fought at the 
Falklands aboard HMS Inflexible, had to wait until December.76 
 So successful were these cadets that others followed them to sea early. 
By 1916, instead of spending six terms at each college, cadets spent only four 
at Osborne and five at Dartmouth. The entries of September 1916 and January 
1917 spent only three terms at Osborne.77 The naval authorities showed no 
inclination to bow to the concerns of those who felt that the cadets were too 
young to go to sea in wartime. In March 1917 a committee chaired by Lord 
Selborne proposed meeting the increased demand for officers by entering large 
numbers of Special Entry cadets on temporary commissions but this was to 
avoid the post-war navy being afflicted with huge numbers of half-educated 
officers.78 The proposals were rejected, it was felt that the necessary Special 
Entry cadets could not be entered and trained quickly enough to meet the 
projected demand for officers in 1920.  
Had the war not occurred the Fisher-Selborne and Special Entry 
schemes would probably have continued to develop gradually. Instead, a series 
of reforms were made to meet wartime demands, completely disrupting the 
gradual development of the training schemes. On the other hand fighting a 
major naval war for the first time in a hundred years focussed naval minds on 
what aspects of officer development should be emphasised. Wartime 
experience seemed to justify the demands of those who thought officers needed 
more training in the arts of naval warfare.79  
 Several modifications to the education of midshipmen were made during 
the First World War. They were made with aim of producing effective officers 
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more quickly but had wider reaching effects. After a year of war it was readily 
apparent that the training scheme for midshipmen could not be implemented 
under wartime conditions. It required attendance at several hours of lectures 
daily, completion of an extensive academic syllabus, and thorough practical 
training in navigation; at the same time midshipmen were supposed to take an 
active role in the work of their ship and devote a third of their time to 
engineering.  
 In 1915 a committee was formed to investigate the training of 
midshipmen in the Grand Fleet. The committee took the view that ‘the main and 
principal object of the training afloat must be to produce competent deck 
officers’, because deck work, rather than engineering, was the main occupation 
of military officers. The committee suggested that midshipmen should devote an 
eighth of their time to engineering rather than a third, unless they wished to 
specialise in engineering.80  
 The separation of the engineering specialist midshipmen from the rest 
was reinforced by the suggestion that other midshipmen assigned to 
engineering instruction should only work in the engine room in harbour. At sea 
they should be employed exclusively on deck duties, including manning the 
armament. The suggestions of the committee were adopted; and so by 
separating the engineering specialists from the rest the Navy divided its 
midshipmen into two groups, which would not be inter-changeable as officers.81 
Although the change was intended as a temporary response to wartime 
conditions it marked the beginning of the end of inter-changeability. That such a 
change was made with little opposition demonstrates that many in the Royal 
Navy had never been won over by inter-changeability and were happy to 
abandon it. 
In 1916 it was decided that engineer officers (who were in short supply) 
should devote their time to engineering duties. They were not required to do any 
work on deck, but nor were they entitled command ships other than 
submarines. Midshipmen specialising in engineering were appointed to ships as 
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supernumeraries for engineering instruction, and were not required to work on 
deck.82 The shortage of engineers at this time owed more to the premature 
ending of the old style engineer entry than to a lack of enthusiasm amongst the 
products of the Fisher-Selborne scheme.83  
 The Goodenough Committee, which submitted its report in February 
1918, was charged with considering the post-war education of those whose 
studies had been disrupted. This committee was of the opinion that the 
reduction in time devoted to engineering was not, in any way, a departure from 
inter-changeability.84 On the other hand the wartime products of Dartmouth 
were not technically minded and their short time at the colleges, combined with 
the demands wartime active service made upon them, had not allowed them to 
become competent engineers.85 The committee suggested that, although 
common entry and cadet training should continue, midshipmen should choose 
whether or not to specialise in engineering after six months at sea. Those who 
chose to become engineers should follow a separate curriculum from the rest.86 
 This suggestion attracted some dissenting views from those who 
commented upon the committee’s report. Charles Godfrey, the Headmaster of 
Osborne, urged patience  he pointed out that only two terms had reached the 
point of specialisation before war broke out and that sufficient of them had 
volunteered for engineering.87 On the other hand Herbert Richmond, 
commenting in his capacity as DTSD, urged the abandonment of inter-
changeability. He suggested that young officers resented having to devote their 
time to engineering and thought that in any case they would do better to devote 
their time to other affairs such as damage control and navigation given how few 
ships had been lost due to engineering as opposed to other failures.88 
 Perhaps the views of the Goodenough Committee were a factor is the 
appointment of the McKenna Committee in 1918. This committee was charged 
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with investigating the success of the Fisher-Selborne scheme in providing 
specialist engineers and whether the future lay in inter-changeability or a 
separate corps of engineers.89 The committee members were Jellicoe (who, as 
C-in-C of the Grand Fleet, had presided over the separation of the engineering 
midshipmen from the rest), the MP Reginald McKenna (who had been First 
Lord from 1908-1911) and Engineer Vice-Admiral Sir George Goodwin. 
 The committee reported a shortage of volunteers to specialise; 25% were 
needed but only 17% volunteered (this was not an entirely reliable guide to 
enthusiasm for engineering amongst young officers because the war had 
considerably disrupted things and consequently reduced the number of 
volunteers).90 Offering early command of a submarine as an inducement to 
volunteer had been unsuccessful. Even so the committee felt that the Fisher-
Selborne scheme could produce adequate numbers of engineers, and noted 
that those who had chosen to specialise in engineering rarely reverted to deck 
duties.91  
The McKenna Committee proposed a partial separation of the 
engineering and executive officer corps. It suggested a dual scheme whereby 
officers could specialise in engineering either as sub-lieutenants (with no right to 
revert to deck duties), or as lieutenants with a year of watch-keeping experience 
(in which case they could revert after seven and a half to nine years). Only 
those officers who chose to revert to deck duties would qualify to command 
ships and potentially rise to the top of the service.92 
The difficulty of this scheme was that it would encourage officers in a 
position to revert to deck duties to do so in order to improve their career 
prospects. It was therefore suggested that a separate portion of the Navy List 
should be formed for engineer officers of commander and higher ranks; and that 
these officers should compete amongst themselves for promotion and 
employment. The committee agreed with this suggestion; and the revised 
scheme came into force in December 1918.93 
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 The end of the war was an excellent opportunity to consider the long-
term future of the officer corps and not to have done so would, under the 
prevailing circumstances, have constituted dereliction of duty. The strategic, 
financial, and technological landscapes had all been radically and irrevocably 
altered. The Royal Navy of the 1920s would have to be smaller, cheaper, and 
make better use of technology  its officers would have to change with it. 
Furthermore war had demonstrated that some aspects of the Fisher-
Selborne scheme were unworkable. The average young officer was simply 
incapable of learning all that was required of him, especially under wartime 
conditions. At the same time the war had accelerated technological 
development, filling ships with an increasingly wide variety of increasingly 
sophisticated equipment. This equipment demanded ever more specialist 
knowledge and so inter-changeability became progressively more unworkable. 
The greatest change to the Royal Navy officer corps in the early post-war 
period was the abandonment of inter-changeability and with it the operational 
end of the Fisher-Selborne scheme. The educational side of the scheme 
continued in a modified form and the end of inter-changeability enabled many 
important reforms to be made, supporting the effort to produce an officer corps 
of thinkers rather than technicians.  
The end of inter-changeability was not universally welcomed, on the 
contrary it was referred to as ‘the great betrayal’ by naval engineers and their 
lobbyists. A typical exponent of this view was Louis Le Bailly, himself an 
engineer officer, who later wrote: ‘A reactionary Admiralty, worried at the Navy’s 
poor showing in World War One, lumped the blame on Fisher and abolished the 
whole arrangement’.94 In reality the abandonment of inter-changeability was a 
long drawn out process driven as much by the officers of the fleet, including 
some engineers, as by the Admiralty.  
 In April 1920 the Admiralty decided that midshipmen who had spent a 
year at sea should be allowed to volunteer for engineering duties. Those who 
did would take the engineering examination with a view to earning accelerated 
promotion. Those who did not would take the examination but would not gain 
any seniority if they did well.95 The result was rather predictable, in August 1920 
deep resentment was reported amongst midshipmen not specialising in 
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engineering who thought they were wasting their time  a suggestion borne out 
by their tendency to fail the exam.96 
 Pressure was rising for the engineering and executive branches to be 
separated  a view endorsed by a committee set up in October 1919 to 
consider the future of electrical engineering in the fleet. So great was the 
volume and complexity of the fleet’s electrical equipment that there was a 
growing need for specialist officers to oversee it. The work was currently in the 
hands of the torpedo branch but many torpedo officers lacked both the time and 
specialist knowledge to be effective. Reporting in December 1919 the 
Field/Waistell Committee declared that it would be best to have a separate non-
executive engineering branch with no prospects of command  in short that 
inter-changeability should be abandoned.97 
 With rising evidence in favour of separating deck and engineering 
officers, the Admiralty did so via AFO 2157/20 of 17 July 1920. The AFO 
(Admiralty Fleet Order) not only separated the two branches, it also revoked the 
right of engineers to command ships and shore bases and removed the 
possibility of their reverting to deck duties. By way of compensation engineers 
were paid more than executive officers and prospects of promotion within the 
engineering branch were better than in the executive branch although there 
were few jobs of flag rank. Engineers also retained the executive curl in the gold 
lace on their sleeves and their membership of the military branch which meant 
they could discipline the ratings of their department and sit on courts martial.98 
Whilst these change angered many engineers only five out of the twenty-
three holding command posts did not agree to lose them and join the new 
engineering branch.99 However there continued to be a shortage of volunteers 
to enter the engineering branch. In July 1921 the Tudor Committee reported 
that since October 1919 only 44 out of 783 eligible midshipmen had volunteered 
for engineering, 51 were needed every year. It was suggested that volunteers 
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should be recruited in their final term at Dartmouth (or as soon as possible after 
commencing Special Entry training) and should begin their engineering training 
at the end of their time in the training cruiser.100 In May 1922 the first 
midshipmen commenced a four year engineering training course at Keyham; 
their education was entirely separated from that of executive midshipmen, and 
the institution of the course a clear sign that the engineering branch saw its 
future as a corps of engineers rather than as a corps of seamen. 
 The changes did not satisfy the desires of many executive officers. In 
1924 DTSD, Captain Hugh Tweedie, circulated a paper around the Admiralty 
complaining that the engineers were now not sufficiently distinguishable from 
the executive officers and that this created confusion and, more importantly, 
suggested that the engineers had as much responsibility as the executive 
officers. He complained that the executive officers were in danger of becoming 
the ‘slaves’ of the engineers whose demands for equality ‘appear to be based 
on a mistaken assumption that a sailor’s profession is not a profession at all’.101 
 Tweedie thought the professional responsibilities of the executive officers 
went well beyond seamanship, navigation and fighting. It was they, and they 
alone, who were the guardians of the spirit and traditions of the service. He 
wrote that ‘it is of the greatest importance that if the Navy is to uphold its 
traditions and to maintain a rigid discipline ensuring a measure of content and 
general pride of service that the officers comprising the line of command who 
are alone responsible must first of all be seamen’.102 
 Tweedie’s remarks illustrate the failure of Fisher’s reforms to promote a 
positive view of engineering amongst executive officers. Tweedie did not regard 
engineering or the mastery of technology as part of the executive officer’s 
essential professional knowledge, and he did not regard anyone who was not a 
seaman as a professional naval officer. In Samuel Huntington’s terms, the 
engineers did not have the specialist knowledge that characterised the 
professional naval officer and thus had been rejected from the professional 
circle  the corporateness of the professional officer corps did not extend to 
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them. It is impossible to say how far Tweedie’s views were typical but 
subsequent events suggest that they were a fair summary of how many 
executive officers defined their profession.  
  Published the following year, AFO 3241/25 deprived engineers of all 
military command and placed them on a separate section of the Navy List from 
executive branch officers. Whilst engineers did not lose their military status and 
therefore continued to command and discipline the men working in their 
departments, command in any other situation now devolved to the senior 
executive branch representative present. Not only did this mean that an 
executive officer had to take charge of damage control and other engineering 
related tasks, it also meant that if all the executive officers in a ship were killed 
command would pass to the senior seaman warrant officer and not to the senior 
engineering officer. To make matters worse, the AFO specified that the 
distinguishing cloth the engineers wore as part of their rank insignia should be a 
brighter shade of purple. 
 These changes were considered betrayal by the engineers, a point 
made clear by one MP who told the house ‘The promise was made to them that 
they should remain in the military branch’.103 Another MP alleged that the 
engineers had received the executive uniform (with a curl in the lace and no 
distinguishing stripes) as a reward for their war services.104 His comments were 
inaccurate, these changes had been announced before the war even if their 
implementation had been delayed, but they reflected the proud wartime record 
of the engineer officers whose loyalty and skill was beyond doubt. Given the 
symbolic importance attached to uniform, the brighter purple distinguishing cloth 
inevitably became a symbol of the engineer’s second class status. 
 Whilst the abandonment of inter-changeability crushed the hopes of 
some officers and weakened the authority of the engineers, it strengthened the 
fleet by allowing officers to concentrate on their primary duties. It was not driven 
by a desire to reduce the status of engineers compared to executive officers but 
by operational requirements. In abandoning inter-changeability the Royal Navy 
finally acknowledged the fallacy of Fisher’s argument that an officer could 
become a complete master of his profession. For all their lost prospects and 
powers, the engineers did gain higher pay and improved prospects of 
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promotion. However their loss of command, and the defacing of their uniforms, 
was enough for many engineers to consider themselves betrayed. Thus was the 
‘great betrayal’ of naval folklore born. 
 The re-separation of the executive and engineering branches enabled 
the officers of each to concentrate on their own particular duties. It also created 
space for the reform of the early career education of executive officers to 
emphasise seamanship and leadership. The curriculum at Dartmouth was 
rebalanced, the engineering content was greatly reduced, and more of an 
emphasis placed on English, history, and foreign languages. The curriculum for 
midshipman was gradually reformed to emphasise seamanship and leadership 
over technical knowledge. 
The end of the war meant a reduced need for officers and thus a reduced 
number of cadets and midshipmen. Many young officers were forced to leave 
the service. Osborne, beset by problems of ill health and badly constructed 
accommodation, closed in 1921. Thereafter Fisher-Selborne cadets undertook 
the whole of their shore course at Dartmouth. The Special Entry, who had done 
their early training ashore during the war, resumed ship based training; only in 
1939 were they moved ashore for good. 
In the years after the war, the Royal Navy came under increasing 
pressure to democratise the officer corps. In 1919 the Anderson and Ricardo 
committees recommended a widening of the entry to include the best and 
brightest boy seamen and civilians from lower middle class backgrounds. Little 
was done until a Labour government came to power in 1929. In 1931 the 
Admiralty was forced to set up the Bennett Committee to discuss the entry of 
officers. The 1930s saw a gradual and limited democratisation of the officer 
corps  achieved largely through the Special Entry. 
In October 1931 a naval mutiny at Invergordon forced the problems of 
officer education to the fore again. A series of educational reforms followed, 
emphasising leadership and seamanship. Once the dust of Invergordon settled, 
officer selection and education entered a period of relative stability. From 1936 
onwards this was aided by naval rearmament which made the government 
more willing to spend money on officer education and the Navy a more 
attractive career. 
Perhaps the prospect of war also served to draw attention to the 
inadequacies of naval education. In 1937 the James Committee was formed to 
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consider the education of officers of all ranks in tactics and strategy. In 1938 the 
Watson Committee gave further consideration to the training of young officers. 
By 1939 the Fisher-Selborne scheme had been largely abandoned. Although 
Dartmouth was still teaching a four year course based on science and 
mathematics, engineering was now a small part of the cadet’s education. 
Furthermore the vast majority of the officers produced by the college served in 
the executive branch, their professional development and prospects entirely 
separate from those of engineering officers. 
Having outlined the history of the officer corps of the Royal Navy in this 
period it is also necessary to examine the nation that the Royal Navy served 
and the society, and in particular the educational system, from which it drew its 
officers. It is necessary to consider the economic, political and social history of 
Britain. 
Historians have traditionally considered the early part of the twentieth 
century a period of British decline. They point to the failure of British industry in 
relation to nations such as America and Germany and to periods of economic 
depression.105 Certainly the British economy did struggle, first losing the lead in 
high-tech industries and subsequently suffering a decline in traditional industries 
such as shipbuilding and textiles.106 However there was a significant recovery in 
the 1930s which saw growth in modern industries such as aircraft and car 
production.107  
It has also been suggested that British prestige and naval power declined 
significantly during the period.108 In some ways this allegation is justified, Britain 
was not able to retain the pre-eminent position it held early in the century. Even 
in the years before the First World War British naval superiority had been 
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eroded through the ability of other nations to build modern ships in large 
numbers.109  
The Royal Navy emerged from the war as the most modern and powerful 
naval force in the world despite failing to achieve a decisive victory over the 
German fleet during the war and struggling to protect British trade.110 Lacking 
credible opposition, and constrained by treaty restrictions and national finances, 
it shrank greatly in the post-war years. However Britain continued to build large 
numbers of new warships well into the 1920s so that obsolescence and the loss 
of construction capacity did not become a problem until the 1930s.111  
The defining event of the period was the First World War. The war itself 
was enormously expensive in both human and monetary terms and its 
consequences were far-reaching. It was widely felt that the war had destroyed 
the best of Britain’s men and seriously dislocated society.112 The post-war years 
saw high unemployment and a feeling of betrayal amongst ex-servicemen.113 
Desire to avoid a future conflict of the same scale and horror boosted support 
for a wide variety of political movements and bolstered support for the League 
of Nations.114 Public sentiment in Britain favoured disarmament and making 
peace rather than war.115  
The net result was dramatic cutbacks in military strength and spending, 
governed by the ‘Ten Year Rule’ which assumed that no major conflict would 
take place with the next ten years. Government policy coincided with public 
sentiment which had drifted away from a ‘pleasure culture of war’ to one of 
pacifist sentiment and a rejection of military service.116 This was reflected in a 
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decline in membership of military organisations such at the OTC.117 Only in the 
mid 1930s, amidst the rising threat of various extreme regimes abroad, did 
public and political sentiment shift towards military expansion. In the last years 
of the 1930s Britain commenced a major rearmament programme and the 
general public became increasingly resigned to the prospect of war.118 
The inter-war period was one of short-lived and unstable governments 
with six general elections between 1918 and 1931.119 Stability was thereafter 
achieved through the development of a coalition ‘National Government’ which, 
in various guises, held power until the outbreak of the Second World War. The 
fragility of these governments was such as to restrict their policy making 
options.120 Britain’s inter-war politicians have been criticised by historians who 
point to mass unemployment, the faltering economy and the failure of 
appeasement. More recently opinion has moderated, recognising that these 
problems were nigh on insoluble.121 
The growth of enfranchisement to embrace all adults also contributed to 
the changing political landscape. The 1918 Representation of the People Act 
gave the vote to all men aged twenty-one or over and women aged thirty or 
over, in 1928 parity was granted to women. Despite the uncertainty and 
instability Britain was never really threatened by either communist or fascist 
revolution.122 Such a revolution was widely and continuously feared and this 
contributed to the growth of class-based politics in the 1920s and to the 
restriction of various civil liberties in the 1930s.123  
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There is no clear class-based narrative of early twentieth century British 
history; after due consideration David Cannadine concluded that ‘the only 
master narrative left is that there is no master narrative whatsoever’.124 The 
population could not be clearly divided into upper, middle and working classes  
many people could not be definitively said to belong to one or the other and 
there was some scope to move between them. Class-based conflict was limited 
with the main political parties attracting support from across the social 
spectrum.125 
In so far as the fortunes of the British population can be considered on a 
class by class basis it must be admitted that the main losers of the period were 
the upper class. From the 1870s onwards they had suffered from falling 
agricultural rents, a disaster for the landed classes whom derived the bulk of 
their income from agriculture.126 The extension of the franchise in 1884 and 
1918 undermined their political power and this weakness was demonstrated by 
the introduction of death duties in 1894 and by the passing of the ‘People’s 
Budget’ in 1909.127 Many estates were broken up and sold to meet the 
demands of the exchequer and those who avoided selling were often obliged to 
dramatically reduce their expenses.128 To make matters worse the upper class 
sustained the highest proportion of losses in the First World War.129 
The working class in contrast generally improved its position. Although 
plagued by unemployment, slum living and poor health the poor benefitted from 
improved education, increased political power and, in some cases, better 
housing and diet.130 Skilled and well paid working class people were 
increasingly able to copy the lifestyles of the middle class through amusements 
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such as cycling and cinema attendance.131 There was an increased sense of 
working class identity characterised by rising trade union membership.132 
The fortunes of the middle classes were more mixed. For those at the top 
wealth and education provided an opportunity to move into the elite. Although 
men educated at top public schools continued to hold the vast majority of 
positions of power and influence, they themselves were increasingly likely to be 
of middle class origin  the sons or grandsons of businessmen or 
industrialists.133 
Other members of the middle classes fared less well. Those at the 
bottom, the clerks and small shop keepers, were at the mercy of economic 
fluctuations and struggled to retain their distinctive identity in the face of their 
upwardly mobile working class neighbours.134 They were unable to join the 
wealthier sections of the middle class who, aided by improvements in transport 
and a boom in housing construction, were increasingly moving to new suburbs 
from which the poor and undesirable were deliberately excluded.135 
The upward mobility achieved by many in the working and middle 
classes owed much to the evolution of British education both private and state. 
One of the difficulties faced by the Royal Navy in selecting and educating naval 
officers was the lack of a national system of education. Schools varied 
enormously in scope and quality and provision varied dramatically between 
different areas. The education a child received was dependent on the wealth 
and attitude of its parents. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw 
great upheaval in the way that British children of all social classes were 
educated. Here we shall concern ourselves with the changes in the education of 
boys in England and Wales. 
 In the early nineteenth century two religious societies were founded 
which together provided educational opportunities for most working class 
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children in England.136 A series of parliamentary acts concerning factories, 
workshops and mines created a minimum age for employment in these 
industries and required children to be allowed to attend school on a part-time 
basis, often with factory owners providing educational facilities.137 
 Many of the resultant schools were very poor. Some of the religious 
schools prioritised godliness and good behaviour over literacy, relying on 
teenage monitors teaching from religious primers.138 Factory schools principally 
gave children a respite from their dangerous and exhausting work rather than 
an education.139 However the average quality gradually improved and many of 
the religious schools were well-supported by parents.140 
 There was also an extensive network of private schools charging a 
shilling a week or less. The scope and quality of these schools varied 
enormously according to local demand. They operated at every time of day and 
night and, whilst some taught nothing but reading, others offered curricula 
including history and geography  fees were dependent on the material taught. 
Attendance was patchy with children only going to school when familial finances 
allowed and work was not available.141 
 Only in 1870 was any attempt made to establish a national system of 
education in England and Wales. The Elementary Education Act set up local 
‘School Boards’ which were to ensure that every child aged between five and 
thirteen had access to education. They could either pay for children to attend 
existing establishments or set up new schools for which no fees would be 
charged. They were able to make local byelaws compelling school attendance. 
In 1880 attendance became compulsory and in 1891 elementary schools were 
barred from charging fees. 
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 The act was the product of sustained pressure to improve educational 
opportunities for the poor and there were a number of motivations behind it. The 
desire to remove children from dangerous working environments was 
undiminished; as was the desire to condition the poor to a life of hard work, 
obedience and law-abiding behaviour. However it was also realised that existing 
educational provision could not meet the ever expanding demand for skilled 
workers such as engineers and clerks.142 
 The establishment of a state system of schooling did not put an end to 
the existing schools. The new ‘Board Schools’ were primarily built in places 
where provision had been lacking. It was some years before private elementary 
schools were effectively stamped out. Meanwhile the number of schools 
provided by religious organisations actually increased owing to the willingness 
of the government to fund their construction and parents to send their children 
to them.143 
 In addition to paying for the construction of schools the state also paid an 
annual fee for each child known as a grant. Grant money was paid for children 
reaching an acceptable standard in the ‘Three R’s’  reading, writing and 
arithmetic. Additional grant could be earned by success in other subjects which 
encouraged schools to teach their eldest pupils subjects such as history, 
geography, science and modern languages. In larger towns and cities this 
provision gradually became consolidated into ‘higher grade’ schools which took 
their pupils from surrounding elementary schools. There was no legal basis for 
these schools to exist but the authorities turned a blind eye recognising that 
they met local needs.144 Only in 1895 did the Bryce Committee recommend the 
setting up of separate state secondary schools.145 
 At the other end of the scale were the great public schools at which the 
sons of the wealthy and powerful were educated. The core group of public 
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schools were defined by their inclusion in the Clarendon Report of 1864.146 The 
subsequent Public Schools Act of 1868 established boards of governors for 
these schools, freeing them from their ancient statutes and allowing their 
governors and headmasters almost complete control over curricula, fees and all 
aspects of school life. 
 This freedom separated the Clarendon Schools from the great bulk of 
endowed schools, which were instead subject to the Endowed Schools Act of 
1869. Whereas the Clarendon schools were wealthy institutions, generally 
drawing their pupils from across the nation, the endowed schools were typically 
poorer local institutions. Often the endowment also had to bear the cost of 
providing alms for the elderly or feeding and clothing the pupils of the school.147 
Many of these schools were several hundred years old and most taught a 
curriculum based around classical languages. 
 Under the terms of the 1869 act a group of three commissioners was 
appointed to review and reformulate school endowments. The aim was to divide 
the schools into three grades each catering for a distinctive type of boy. Third 
grade schools were to take pupils aged up to fourteen, second grade up to the 
age of sixteen and first grade up to the age of 19. Whereas elementary Latin 
would be the most advanced subject in the third grade schools, the second 
grade would teach Latin and modern languages, and first grade would give their 
pupils the Greek and Latin necessary for university entry. Whilst third grade 
schools were intended to draw their pupils from the skilled working class, first 
grade schools were to draw theirs from the landed classes and wealthy 
businessmen. Undesirable pupils would be barred through high fees although a 
limited number of children might benefit from scholarships.148 
 Many of the smaller and poorer third grade schools ultimately ended up 
within the state system. At the other end of the scale schools such as Repton 
and Sherborne were able to climb into the ranks of public schools after 
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shedding the poor scholars for whose benefit they had originally been 
founded.149 
 The middle and later years of the nineteenth century also witnessed the 
foundation and growth of an enormous number and variety of schools owned by 
companies and individuals. They varied from small establishments catering for 
parents who did not wish to send their children to the local elementary schools 
to grand establishments such as Cheltenham and Marlborough which were able 
to establish themselves as public schools.150 
 The enormous growth in the public school sector was in response to a 
variety of stimuli. Entry into elite professions increasingly required a good level 
of education and schools were needed to supply this.151 More importantly the 
schools provided ‘character training centres for the new middle classes’.152 
They were designed to ensure that their pupils imbued the right values, learnt 
the correct behaviours and made contacts that would help them in later life. A 
prosperous businessman or industrialist could raise the status of his family by 
sending his son to school alongside the sons of the traditional elite.153 Their 
prestige was so great that other schools copied them  instituting classics 
based curricula, houses and competitive sport.154 
 The reforms within the educational system prompted headmasters to 
organise themselves into bodies through which they were able to represent their 
collective interests. The first was the Headmaster’s Conference (HMC) founded 
in 1870 and catering for elite establishments.155 In 1890 the Incorporated 
Association of Headmasters was founded to cater for the lesser private schools. 
Schools were not allowed to belong to both bodies until 1904.156 
                                               
149
 Simon, Labour Movement, p.99; Bamford, Public Schools, p.194; Roach, Secondary 
Education, p.33 
150
 Simon, Labour Movement, p.102 
151
 J Gathorne-Hardy, The Public School Phenomenon, 597-1977 (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1977) p.69 and pp.163-164; JM Bourne, Patronage and Society in Nineteenth-
Century England (London: Edward Arnold, 1986) p.23 
152
 CB Otley, ‘Militarism and Militarization in the Public Schools, 1900-1972’ The British Journal 
of Sociology 29 (1978) pp.321-339 (p.321) 
153
 Arthur Marwick, Image and Reality, p.24; K Boyd, Manliness and the Boys Story Paper in 
Britain: A Cultural History, 1855-1940 (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003) pp.127-128; 
John Tosh, A Man’s Place: Masculinity and the Middle-Class Home in Victorian England 
(London: Yale University Press, 1999) p.117; Rupert Wilkinson, The Prefects: British 
Leadership and the Public School Tradition: A Comparative Study in the Making of Rulers 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1964) pp.4-24 
154
 Gathorne-Hardy, Public School Phenomenon, p.226 
155
 DP Leinster-Mackay, The Educational World of Edward Thring: A Centenary Study (London: 
Falmer, 1987) p.101; Simon, Labour Movement, p.104 
156
 Roach, Secondary Education, p.123 
  60 
 Membership of the HMC was one feature that helped to identify a public 
school, not least as prospective members had to go before a committee which 
considered the reputation of the school and the standing of its headmaster. 
Other identifying features of a public school were success in sending pupils to 
university or to Sandhurst and participation in sporting contests and other 
events against the Clarendon schools. Thus although the HMC had about 100 
members in 1900 only 64 of them could really be considered public schools.157 
 The early years of the twentieth century saw considerable expansion of 
state secondary education. The 1902 Education Act enabled the ‘Local 
Education Authorities’, which succeeded schools boards, to build fee paying 
secondary schools. From 1907 onwards these schools were required to provide 
a free education to 25% of their intake.158 Provision was further expanded by 
the 1918 Education Act so that, whereas in 1913 1 in 40 elementary school 
pupils had progressed to secondary education, 1 in 13 did so in 1929.159 
 1918 also saw the introduction of the School Certificate which provided a 
means for all children to prove their educational attainment. The introduction of 
this national qualification removed the public schools’ monopoly in providing an 
education perceived as suitable for professions such as Royal Navy officer; by 
passing it anybody could prove they were intellectually suited to the career of 
their choice. 
In the inter-war period pressure for the extension of high quality 
secondary education came mainly from the Labour Party which, from 1922 
onwards, was committed to a policy of ‘secondary education for all’. In contrast, 
and more mindful of national finances, the Conservative Party favoured 
concentrating resources on those most likely to benefit from them. The 
Conservative commissioned Hadow Report, The Education of the Adolescent  
published in 1927  became the key influence on inter-war state secondary 
education. 
 The report found that no less than nine different systems of state 
education for children up to the age of fourteen were in use in England and 
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Wales. The quality and type of secondary provision was particularly variable. 
Some schools seemed to offer children very little whilst others were obsessed 
with examination results or with the teaching of particular subjects.160  
 The report recommended that the schooling of children aged between 
eleven and fifteen should be entirely separated from that of younger children. 
Secondary schools should be divided into three types  higher elementary 
schools taking children from one elementary school, central schools taking 
children from all the elementary schools in the area, and grammar schools 
selecting the brightest children in the area. Higher elementary and central 
schools were intended to provide a semi-vocational education, especially to 
children in their last two years. Grammar schools were to concentrate on 
academic subjects, preparing children for the School Certificate and university 
entrance examinations.161 
 Many grammar schools subsequently achieved academic standards on a 
par with, or ahead of, some public schools. Middle class parents increasingly 
saw them as offering a cheap alternative to private education and their children 
increasingly dominated them. Middle class enrolment increased despite 
parental wariness of the working class children who attended the grammar 
schools, and the effect they would have on the manners and accents of their 
own children.162 Doubts later arose about the academic emphasis in grammar 
schools, and in 1936 the House of Commons passed a motion stating that 
grammar school pupils were overburdened with homework and that other areas 
of their development were being stunted as a result.163 
 The Hadow Report hastened the demise of the technical schools. These 
schools typically took their pupils from poorer backgrounds than the grammar 
schools. They taught science, engineering and mathematics to a high standard 
as well as practical skills. Many tried to copy the public schools by teaching 
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foreign languages, promoting the arts and sport, and sending pupils on trips 
aboard. Their ambitions were frequently reined in by local councils which, 
wishing them to confine their efforts to preparing pupils to enter the workplace, 
barred them from offering the School Certificate.164 Technical schools, 
combining technical instruction with a broad education, would have been an 
excellent source of Special Entry cadets had the Royal Navy been willing to 
take the boys and the state willing to support the schools. 
 State provision was increasingly enhanced by scholarships to private 
schools. Private schools could adopt ‘direct-grant’ status under which, in 
exchange for making up to 25% of their places available to children holding 
local authority scholarships, they received funding directly from government 
sources. These schools remained entirely independent and achieved some of 
the best academic results in the country.165  
Direct-grant status must have been attractive to the naval authorities, 
potentially offering enhanced funding for Dartmouth and a more democratic 
officer corps (with scholarship entry limited to those who had satisfied the naval 
interviewers). Although there was never any attempt to secure direct-grant 
status for the college, the possibility of local authority scholarships for boys who 
could not otherwise afford to become officers, first raised in 1910, was raised 
again in 1918 and 1931.166  
The net result of all this educational change was to create a large body of 
working and lower middle class boys who, in educational terms, were equal or 
superior to the richest pupils of the best public schools. By passing the School 
Certificate they proved themselves equally clever. They had absorbed the 
behaviours and values taught in public schools either through attending them on 
scholarships or through schools which mimicked them as closely as possible. 
These boys ultimately demanded entry to professions hitherto closed to them, 
including officer entry to the Royal Navy. 
The final element to be considered before launching into a detailed 
consideration of officer selection and education is the extent and nature of the 
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existing historiography, and the availability of primary source material. The 
existing historiography can broadly be divided as follows: items directly 
concerned with naval education and selection, items dealing with the wider 
history (and in particular the social history) of the Royal Navy at this time, 
histories of civilian education, and more general social and political histories of 
Britain. There is inevitably considerable overlap between many of these studies, 
for instance those addressing the role of education in determining social class. 
The history of the Royal Navy in the early part of the twentieth century 
remains patchy and quite fragmented. Matters of strategy, logistics, and social 
history have been pursued by a wide variety of authors  their methods and 
approach varying considerably. To some extent there is a separation between 
the history of the wartime and peacetime navies, with the volume of works on 
the former dwarfing that on the latter. Whilst numerous historians have 
addressed the preparation of the Navy for war and matters of peacetime 
strategy and development, certain aspects are still ignored.167 Rüger claims that 
the relationships of navies to their nations have been neglected;168 he is quite 
right to do so, but he himself ignores a key interface between navies and the 
general public  recruitment.  
Whilst the relationship of the Royal Navy and parliament has been more 
thoroughly explored than the Royal Navy’s relationship with the general public, 
such exploration has concentrated on matters of strategy and construction 
policy, whilst ignoring parliamentary interference in the social makeup of the 
Navy. The history of the role of government in naval manpower issues in this 
period is distinctly sparse; cuts to the strength of the service are well 
documented, if not thoroughly understood, and there is some literature on 
democratisation but very little else. 
The inter-war period dominates this thesis and here the most useful 
starting point remains Roskill’s two part Naval Policy Between the Wars which 
suffers from its reliance on a limited range of sources, a degree of factual 
inaccuracy, and the bias resultant from an officer writing about a service of 
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which he was himself part. It does however cover a great deal of ground so far 
as naval tactics and strategy and relations between the Navy and the 
government are concerned.169 
Traditionally scholarship on the inter-war Royal Navy is based around 
ideas of stagnation and decline postulated by authors such as Barnett.170 Such 
works place the Royal Navy as a symbol of the decline in British power both 
military and industrial. The service is presented as tactically sterile, often poorly 
led, and the victim of massive cuts which left it a shadow of its former self. More 
recently authors such as Grove, Nicholas Lambert, Bell, Ferris, and Greg 
Kennedy have challenged these assertions  arguing that the Royal Navy was, 
in fact, in relative terms as strong or stronger than it had been in any time in the 
past hundred years, an innovator in both tactics and weapons, and largely led 
by men of competence and dedication. These authors individually cover less 
ground than Roskill and their scholarship is all the sounder for this.171 
The social history of the Royal Navy in the 1903-1939 period had, until 
recently, attracted less attention than other areas. Several works have been 
produced by former naval officers  they offer a wealth of anecdotal detail about 
many aspects of naval life but little by way of serious analysis. Wells offers a 
wide ranging view of naval life, but his work suffers from a lack of detail. The 
same may be said of Owen’s Plain Yarns From the Fleet, although this author 
packs a wealth of anecdotal detail (much of it autobiographical) into a 
comparatively short book. Both authors write affectionately of the naval ratings 
with whom they worked but their accounts are ill-balanced and somewhat rose-
tinted. Their accounts of the lives and work of naval officers were doubtless 
influenced by their own experiences in the service.172 
Those academic studies that do exist are concerned largely with specific 
aspects of the lives of ratings. Carew offers a detailed account of all facets of 
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lower-deck politics, although this focus inevitably produces an overly negative 
account structured around lower-deck grievances.173 McKee’s Sober Men and 
True, is a study of the origins, careers and lives of naval ratings, largely as 
viewed by the men themselves, whilst it covers a wide variety of ground it is 
largely superficial.174 
Those interested in the lives and careers of officers have little to go on. 
Wells and Owen offer some useful insights based on personal experience, but 
little detailed information. Howard-Bailey’s promisingly titled Social Change in 
the Royal Navy is in fact a biography of Admiral Sir Frank Twiss but does offer a 
wide ranging account of naval life.175 Recently Lavery has given considerable 
attention to the experiences of officers in the Second World War but his books 
(Churchill’s Navy, Hostilities Only, In Which They Served) suffer from continued 
reliance on the same few sources and are not particularly useful to those 
studying the peacetime Royal Navy. Even so, Lavery’s work is a valuable 
addition to the social history of the twentieth century Royal Navy.176 
More recently historians have begun to apply methods and approaches 
from other aspects of social history to the Royal Navy, rather than treating it as 
something separate from normal society.177 In this they have been hampered, to 
some extent, by the tendency of previous generations of naval historians to 
gather evidence only from the sailors themselves and not from their families or 
the communities in which they lived. To some extent their work intertwines with 
that on contemporary British culture, and in particular that concerned with 
middle and upper class masculinity.178 
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Naval education has been discussed in a variety of ways. The historian 
considering the education of the Royal Navy in the second half of the nineteenth 
century is fortunate indeed, for he has access to the works of Jones, Dickinson 
and Gordon who between them offer a more or less complete account of 
military branch education.179 Jones provides detailed information on officer 
selection, as well as a thorough picture of the curriculum and her account is 
generally well balanced. Dickinson gives far more space to official discussions 
and examines the resultant policy in great detail, but tends to neglect the 
practical impact of these policies.  
Gordon, whilst not overly concerned with official policy, offers a wide-
ranging discussion of the factors affecting the later career education of officers, 
the place of this education in the development of individual careers and the 
consequent impact on the Navy. Gordon’s work is partly an extension of the 
enquiries into the intellectual history of the service made, among others, by 
Marder and Schurman. These authors focused on the development of staff 
organisation within the Royal Navy and how far officers were encouraged to 
study history rather than science and to learn to think and write rather than 
design, maintain and use weapons.180  Davison’s The Challenges of Command 
promises to add to Gordon’s picture of the doctrinal development of Royal Navy 
in the first years of the twentieth century.181 
So far as the actual process of early career education is concerned, a 
variety of texts discuss the 1903-1939 period. Most of them take much the 
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same pattern  a chronological history focusing on Osborne and Dartmouth as 
naval institution. A wealth of detail is supplied but little information on the 
education provided or as to how the colleges were organised.  
The notable exception to this is Partridge’s The Royal Naval College 
Osborne which, whilst dominated by the experiences of cadets, offers a 
balanced picture of the college as both a school and as a naval establishment 
and examines the circumstances of its creation and closure. Partridge also 
examined the background and selection of cadets, adding further value to his 
work (this subject being largely ignored, otherwise only Jones provides an 
analysis of officer selection in this period and hers is more wide ranging than 
Partridge’s). Whilst praising the teaching and facilities at the college, he makes 
little attempt to judge its success in producing officers. This is understandable 
given that, after leaving Osborne, cadets spent two years at Dartmouth before 
going to sea and over two years as midshipmen before commissioning; thus 
Osborne had a limited role in officer development. More seriously, Partridge 
makes no attempt to examine the educational origins of the Fisher-Selborne 
scheme or the philosophy of the college’s academic staff.182  
This neglect of the cadet curriculum is a repeated flaw in naval historians’ 
evaluation of officer education; all the more so given the prominence and 
importance of many of the educators involved and the pioneering curriculum 
they pursued. The daily lives and work of academic staff are generally 
neglected, although Pack’s Britannia at Dartmouth is something of an 
exception.183 Pack’s lively and detailed account of life at the college between 
the world wars is given weight by his own service as a term officer. However 
personal experience has produced a rather positive bias and an account of 
limited outlook, making little attempt to link the college to the rest of the Navy. 
Even so, Britannia at Dartmouth is of great value to the historian as a window 
into college life. Much the same can be said of Hughes’ The Royal Naval 
College Dartmouth, an earlier work produced by a master at the college and 
similar in style and content to Pack’s work.184 
More recent work on Dartmouth by professional historians has tended to 
be more balanced than Pack’s, notwithstanding the strong links of many of the 
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authors to the college. However, these histories tend to be somewhat formulaic, 
relying on the same sources to tell the same story to the same audience  
primarily former students of the Colleges. Two good books of this type are 
available to the historian, those by Davies & Grove and Harrold & Porter, 
respectively produced to mark the seventy-fifth and hundredth anniversaries of 
the opening of Dartmouth Naval College. Haskins has produced a similar 
volume for Osborne.185 These volumes all provide a useful insight into daily life 
of the colleges, and some information about their origins and development, but 
rather neglect the development and operation of their academic systems. 
Penn’s history of HMS Thunderer, whilst again focusing on an institution of 
naval education, also provides a useful study of the history of engineer officer 
education in the Royal Navy.186 
A final flaw is a tendency to neglect the relationship of the colleges to the 
rest of the Navy. The lives of young officers in the fleet remain a generally 
neglected area  there is no serious academic study of the lives of midshipmen 
or seagoing cadets. Authors such as Pears combined fact with a degree of 
fiction.187 Walker’s study Young Gentlemen is not a particularly reliable guide to 
the history of the midshipman, but its chapters on the life of modern (1938) 
midshipmen are invaluable.188 A more scholarly approach was adopted by Penn 
and Lewis making their work most useful.189  
There is, as yet, no series of novels providing such a complete picture of 
the early twentieth century as the adventures of Hornblower or Ramage provide 
for those interested in earlier periods. However, officer education is a 
reasonably popular subject for those novels that do exist, especially when 
written by naval officers. Probably the most famous is The Gunroom by Charles 
Morgan which was published in 1919. The Sub, published in 1917, offers a 
detailed, realistic, account of early career education in the early years of the 
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Fisher-Selborne scheme although it is not the autobiography it claims to be  
the author, Henry Taprell Dorling, having entered the Royal Navy in 1897.190 
Some officers chose to wait until later in life before transforming their 
experiences into fictional form. Gilbert Hackforth-Jones wrote prolifically and 
imaginatively, but the early chapters of The Greatest Fool, dealing with life at 
Osborne, doubtless owe much to personal experience. Although they appeared 
in print thirty-four years after the author entered the college, they are entirely in 
keeping with non-fictitious accounts of college life. The Cradle of Neptune was 
published in 1951, three years after The Greatest Fool, and considered life at 
Dartmouth in the mid thirties.191 Again it appears to be based on the 
experiences of the author (John Lodwick) and, like The Greatest Fool, is 
notable for the rather negative portrayal of the college and the disaffection of its 
cadet characters. 
In contrast to the paucity of novels, there is a wealth of autobiographical 
material on the early twentieth century Royal Navy, albeit disproportionately the 
work of executive officers who enjoyed successful careers. The limitations of 
these sources are well documented; the problems of selective, limited, or false 
memory, the desire to present the subject in a certain light and the possibility of 
being written to an agenda. However psychological research, such as that 
conducted by Schacter, suggests that people best remember their late 
adolescence and that memories of events which stretched over long periods are 
substantially accurate.192  
Therefore the sections of autobiographies that deal with naval training 
are likely to be amongst the most accurate  especially as many authors are 
willing to discuss their youth with more freedom and honesty than their later 
career, youthful mistakes being less significant and more easily forgiven. On the 
other hand if the writers did not enjoy their experiences this is likely to be 
reflected in their accounts of life as a cadet and midshipman. Alternatively, 
officers who went on to successful careers may feel obliged to present the 
training they received in as positive a light as possible. 
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Amongst the most useful autobiographies of inter-war officers are those 
produced by Courtney Anderson, Louis Le Bailly, Bob Whinney and Phillip 
Seymour. All discuss their early career education in considerable detail and 
reflect upon its impact upon their careers.193 All of these officers enjoyed some 
success, Seymour chose to retire early at the age of thirty-four and Whinney 
retired as a commander but Le Bailly and Anderson reached flag rank. Given 
their success it is likely that all were inclined to write favourably about their 
formative naval experiences. Le Bailly’s autobiography should be treated with 
extra caution, as he was and remained a staunch supporter of the engineer 
cause and is bitterly critical of the Royal Navy’s treatment of its engineer 
officers.  
It is not only naval historians who have failed to provide a full account of 
the Royal Naval colleges Osborne and Dartmouth. Despite there being some 
interest in the career of Charles Godfrey, and a great deal in the evolution of 
scientific education, this has not translated into a wealth of writing on the naval 
colleges. No consideration has been given to the education young officers 
received at sea. The net result is that the early career education of naval 
officers remains on the periphery of the educational history of Britain in the early 
twentieth century. 
The most useful work on Godfrey’s career has been done by Price and 
Howson.194 Whilst the college curriculum was not widely copied, it greatly 
influenced teaching methods elsewhere and yet this influence has gone largely 
unremarked and uninvestigated. The careers of James Ewing and Cyril Ashford 
have been neglected  something of an omission given the impact of their naval 
work and the interest in Ewing’s work as a crypto-analyst to say nothing of his 
great achievements in physics and engineering. The only biographer of a 
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science educator to take a great interest in the colleges was Nye in her study of 
naval-officer-turned-physicist Patrick Blackett.195 
The educational systems at the colleges had their foundations in 
nineteenth century developments in education, most especially in the 
development of the public schools. As most naval officers in the early twentieth 
centuries either attended public schools, or probably would have done so had 
they not joined the Royal Navy at the age of thirteen, an understanding of these 
institutions is essential and reference to authors such as Wakeford and Krumpe 
is required.196  
The democratisation of the officer corps has also been neglected. The 
nature of the executive officer corps in the earliest part of the twentieth century 
is well understood, and authors such as Gordon and Jones have gone some 
way to explaining why it was so. However attempts at democratisation made in 
the inter-war period have generally been viewed as grudging gestures made by 
a reluctant Admiralty although there is some acknowledgement of the difficulties 
the service faced. Most recently, Bell has argued that the inter-war period was 
‘two decades of cautious and reluctant experimentation' in democratisation.197 
Studies of class mobility in the period have ignored the problem altogether.198 
There is a great deal of primary evidence available to the historian of the 
early twentieth century Royal Navy. The historian of naval education and 
democratisation is particularly well served with official documentation and 
contemporary publications, but suffers from a comparative lack of accounts by 
those actually involved. 
One useful group of sources is the various editions of How to Become a 
Naval Officer. This was a semi-official recruiting document produced by the 
naval tailors Gieves. It laid the advantages of a naval career and included a 
wealth of detail on how to get into the Navy, the nature of officer education, and 
the structure of officer careers. Whereas numerous versions were produced for 
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the Fisher-Selborne scheme, there was only one version for the Special Entry 
which was published in 1927.199 
There is an enormous amount of naval paperwork on the subject, most of 
it accessible (the glaring omission being personnel records). Historians may 
peruse the evidence gathered and the reports made by numerous committees 
into naval education and officer selection which are held by the National 
Archives. These papers are enriched by official and unofficial comment 
illustrating a variety of viewpoints (if not in such forthright terms as the authors 
may have desired). However, I have found the value of this material to be 
hindered by the tendency of discussions to be spread across several files, often 
in completely different series of documents, occasionally in a more or less 
random order.  
The National Archives also house the papers of the Board of Education 
which often assisted the Admiralty in formulating policy and carried out 
inspections of the naval colleges. These papers are present in limited numbers, 
something of a disappointment given that those filing them took care to collect 
the material on each subject together and generally presented it in a logical 
order. Fragmentary evidence also comes from Treasury papers; generated 
when the Admiralty applied for funding for some scheme or another, these 
papers reveal little detail of the naval schemes but are a useful guide to the 
practical difficulties in implementing them! 
Hansard is also a useful source on official policy via the Royal Navy’s 
position being relayed to the Houses of Parliament. Hansard clearly displays the 
opinions of politicians on naval matters and also offers a glimpse of their 
constituent’s views. Occasionally, it offers an insight into policy making absent 
from the Admiralty files in the National Archives. It is also a useful source of 
statistics many of which do not appear in naval documents. Political and public 
opinion can also be found in newspapers and other periodicals although they 
were not greatly concerned with the subject and one must be aware of editorial 
bias as well as inaccurate reporting.  
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Objective opinions of naval officers themselves are rather harder to come 
by. Although substantial archives of personal documents are available, few 
contain letters or diaries addressing personal experiences of selection or 
education. Doubtless many such useful documents have been destroyed or are 
out of reach of the historian, lost and forgotten in attics or garden sheds. This is 
unfortunate given the great value of such documents in revealing private 
thoughts soon after the events to which they refer as well as the daily lives and 
concerns of their authors. The loss may not, however, be so great as imagined 
given that many of those letters and diaries that are available are devoted to 
sports results, examination marks, or accounts of places visited. 
Some officers, or their families, left substantial collections of personal 
documents to various archives. The principal disadvantage of these collections 
is that material may have been removed before they were made publically 
available. Against this personal collections contain a wide variety of material  
often a cadet career can be glimpsed through the eyes of the boy (and, to a 
limited extent, his parents) and through the eyes of a long-retired officer. 
Unfortunately, as with other first hand accounts, almost all the surviving material 
comes from men who completed their training and gained their commissions  
the voices of those who failed, either as candidates or as young officers, are 
virtually absent.  
Although many personal documents have evidently been lost substantial 
numbers of midshipmen’s journals survive. Midshipmen were required to make 
daily entries in these diaries, recording the work of the ship and the nature of 
their instruction. Because the journals were regularly examined by senior 
officers, they tend to be quite impersonal and unemotional; as such they are of 
limited value in discerning the feelings and opinions of their authors. However I 
have found them to be an excellent source of information on daily life, including 
education, and the occasional comment betrays the true emotions of the writer. 
Throughout the period they were written and illustrated in much the same style; 
they can make monotonous reading but it is easy to pick out unusual elements 
in the experiences of individuals. 
The Naval Review, a journal produced by naval officers to be read by 
naval officers, is another useful source. It was published four times a year 
throughout the inter-war period and consequently offers a large mass of source 
material. Articles were published anonymously in order to avoid censorship and 
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encourage the free circulation of ideas. However The Naval Review tended to 
be most attractive to the more radical officers in the Navy and so it cannot be 
taken as indicative of unanimous, or even majority, opinion on the part of the 
officer corps. Furthermore, it did not have complete freedom of publication and 
so certain viewpoints may have been repressed. For these reasons, it is most 
useful when considered in conjunction with other source material. 
A final source of information and one that I have largely neglected is the 
officers themselves. A diminishing band of inter-war officers survive and they 
may offer much to the historian. I have neglected them owing to the difficulties 
in gathering testimony and the problems of memory associated with old age and 
the recollection of long distant events. This omission is regrettable, but I hope to 
have gathered sufficient information from other sources to compensate for any 
loss. Some physical reminders remain of their lives as young men; most of 
Osborne is long gone but Dartmouth is still training naval officers and, in some 
respects, seems little changed. 
Given the source material available, it seems reasonable to attempt as 
full a consideration of the selection and early career education of executive 
branch officers as is possible within the confines of a one hundred thousand 
word thesis. I will consider the selection of cadets, both the methods used and 
the type of boys recruited. I will examine each stage of early career education in 
detail, considering their purpose and evolution. I will discuss the relationship 
between the naval and civilian education systems. I will aim to provide a 
thorough overview of how the Royal Navy developed its executive officers in the 
1902-1939 period. 
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Chapter One  Officer Selection 
 
The selection of potential officers was of critical importance to the Royal Navy in 
the 1903-1939 period. The success of the Navy rested largely upon its officers 
and it was therefore essential to choose the right men and boys. The problems 
of selection were great because few of the candidates were obviously entirely 
suited to being a naval officer  the Navy was generally picking from unproven 
youngsters with little, if any, nautical experience. There was also some debate 
as to how selection should best be accomplished. Furthermore the Royal Navy 
did not have an entirely free choice as to who was selected; in contrast to officer 
education, officer selection was subjected to numerous attempts at political 
interference. 
 In the period from 1903-1939, the Royal Navy was concerned with 
recruiting five separate groups of officers. The first were men with professional 
qualifications such as doctors. The second was those raised via the rank of 
warrant officer after many years of service. Both groups are outside the scope 
of this thesis. Instead I will concentrate on the twelve and thirteen year olds 
being recruited for the Fisher-Selborne scheme, the seventeen and eighteen 
year olds being recruited for the Special Entry and  to a lesser extent, on the 
men being promoted from the lower-deck via the Mate scheme who were in 
their twenties. 
 In selecting potential officers, the Royal Navy faced two problems. The 
first was that of identifying suitable candidates amongst those who applied. The 
second, and thornier, was that of who should be allowed to apply. 
Democratisation, the opening of entry to the officer corps to men who been 
denied access owing to their poverty or low social rank, was a key issue 
throughout the 1903-1939 period. The progress of democratisation was 
influenced on one hand by the willingness of the Navy to change, and the ability 
of politicians to make it, and on the other by supply and demand. The latter, 
hitherto largely overlooked by historians, was of critical importance  there 
could only be democratisation once there was a suitable supply of candidates 
and demand for more naval officers. 
The democratisation of an officer corps, and the implementation of 
promotion by merit without social considerations, is viewed by some writers as 
an essential part of the professionalisation of a military force. Jacques Van 
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Doorn argues that the development of genuinely professional military forces 
requires the democratisation of the officer entry.1 Morris Janowitz identifies the 
democratic entry and promotion of officers as one of the five defining 
characteristics of the modern professional military force.2  
These authors were American and were concerned predominantly with 
American experiences. Fewer authors have discussed the social origins of 
British officers. The only detailed study of the formation of the professional 
officer corps of the Royal Navy is that by Gerke Teitler.3 He argues that 
professionalisation had occurred by the end of the eighteenth century. A corps 
of specialist naval officers had grown up in response to the construction of 
specialist warships.4 The specialist ships required specialist handling and 
tactics and thus a corps of specialist seamen.5 Gerke Teitler suggests that the 
upper class identity of the officer corps played an important role in enabling 
professionalisation to take place. The ability to dispense patronage gave 
captains a financial and social boost which sea service alone could not supply.6 
The gradual exclusion of the poor and uneducated fostered a collective sense 
of identity amongst the officer corps.7 
The officer corps of the RAF was also founded on a shared sense of 
upper class identity. Formed in 1918 it prided itself on a modern image and a 
disregard for military tradition.8 RAF officer recruitment brochures emphasised 
character over social background.9 However those interviewing candidates 
were most inclined to spot desirable characteristics in boys from the public 
schools.10 Furthermore the rumbustious social life for which the RAF was 
famous, and through which it built espirit de corps, was largely an adaptation of 
common public school behaviour.11 
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The situation of the British Army was somewhat different given the 
separation between the different regiments which placed a greater or lesser 
importance on the backgrounds of their officers. In the years before the First 
World War, Army officers were more or less professionals. The British Army 
was the servant of the state and its officers had the skills of professional army 
officers and a distinctive identity. The purchase of commissions had been 
abolished in 1881. 
 However officers could not live on their pay alone and required a private 
income. Regiments took only the cadets they wanted from Sandhurst and family 
background was at least as important as professional skills.12 Officers who 
lacked the required social graces were ostracised by their fellows. The major 
social pursuits of officers were those of the upper classes, and in particular the 
aristocracy, with a strong emphasis on equestrian pursuits.13 
 During the First World War the Army expanded enormously. Initially the 
expanded requirement for officers was met by commissioning huge numbers of 
public school products. Many of them had gained military experience through 
the OTC but the main attraction was the qualities of leadership, endurance, 
bravery and determination they were assumed to have learnt at school.14 The 
death rate amongst officers was so high that officer recruitment had to be 
expanded, initially to boys from minor public and grammar schools but 
ultimately to men who had only elementary educations but had proven their 
military worth.15 
Even so, many regiments attempted to retain pre-war standards of officer 
behaviour, so that miners and fishermen dined in the grandest style possible in 
military billets and learnt to talk in as much of a public school fashion as they 
could manage.16 Thus it was clear that the professional identity of army officers 
was inextricably linked to upper class values, manners and interests. Little 
happened to change this identity in the inter-war period, the ‘temporary 
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gentlemen’ returned to civilian life and a new generation of officers was 
recruited from the public schools.17 
Overall it is clear that the officer corps of the British armed forces were 
professionalised before they were democratised. The selection of officers from 
a limited part of the population gave them a collective identity which provided a 
foundation for their shared military identity. Familial wealth enabled officers to 
withstand long periods of unpaid training or military unemployment. The high 
costs of officership also served to exclude the poor and so distanced the 
officers from the ranks. 
 In selecting potential officers, the Royal Navy was looking for embryonic 
officer-like qualities. Thus the selection process needed to investigate traits 
such as bravery, determination, leadership skills, initiative, honesty and 
integrity, a keen and genuine interest in the service, intelligence  in particular 
the ability to master the officer training syllabus  common sense, self-
confidence, physical fitness, and a pleasant personality. There was also the 
thorny issue of whether or not the candidate was a gentleman.  
 These qualities were easier to identify in some candidates than in others. 
The Fisher-Selborne scheme was particularly problematic as there was no 
guarantee that a boy who was suitable at the age of twelve would still be 
suitable when he was twenty-one. Conversely a slow developing boy might 
appear unsuitable at twelve but be an excellent candidate a few years later. 
Special Entry candidates were easier to analyse  their adult personalities were 
closer to being fully formed and they had been given some opportunity to prove 
themselves in and out of the classroom. Ratings were older still; but their 
experiences in the service might have led to certain qualities being repressed or 
over-emphasised. 
Throughout the period the question of democratisation was divided in two 
 promotion from the lower-deck and the widening of the cadet entry; I have 
chosen to concentrate on the latter. The two means of democratisation attracted 
different supporters and were generally considered separately by the naval 
authorities. 
Whereas demand for the widening of the cadet entry came primarily from 
outside the service, the demand for promotion from the lower-deck came mostly 
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from the ratings themselves. From the mid nineteenth century onwards naval 
ratings began to combine into societies which existed primarily to provide death 
benefits for the widows and children of their members (only the families of men 
killed in action were supported by the state). These organisations had a 
subsidiary role of campaigning for improved conditions, which the men 
themselves were barred from doing. 
From 1898 onwards the interests of ratings were increasingly 
represented by Lionel Yexley, a retired petty officer, who published The 
Bluejacket and later The Fleet which campaigned for improvements in 
conditions. At the same time the political muscle of the lower-deck began to be 
exercised, men using their votes in support of candidates who promised to 
campaign on their behalf.18  
The reform movement enjoyed the support of Fisher and Churchill. In the 
years leading up to the First World War improvements were made in victualling, 
the cost to men of maintaining their uniforms reduced, pay raised, and 
punishments modified. Two avenues of promotion were opened up: in 1903 
from chief warrant officer to lieutenant, and in1912 from able seaman to mate 
(the equivalent of sub-lieutenant).19 
Because it had been achieved through the efforts of agitators such as 
Yexley, promotion from the lower-deck was inextricably linked with the other 
demands made by reformers. In the years following the First World War this 
became something of a handicap  the increasing links between the friendly 
societies and trade unions made the Admiralty suspicious of them and their 
demands. Ratings who called for reform were dismissed from the Navy, access 
to the civilian political process was restricted, and an official system of airing 
grievances introduced.20  
The association of lower-deck promotion with lower-deck revolt went 
beyond the means through which it might be achieved. If widespread 
promotions were to be introduced the social structure of the service would be 
challenged. There had gradually developed a great division between the officers 
and ratings, extending beyond duties and responsibilities into what men wore, 
where they lived and what they were paid. The superior status of some ratings 
was recognised by their leading a more officer like existence  a uniform which 
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resembled that of an officer, enhanced living facilities, and relief from menial 
tasks.  
Relations between the different ranks were generally harmonious, and if 
nothing else people knew their position in the hierarchy  this harmony and 
stability would have been undermined by the mass movement of men from the 
mess deck to the wardroom. Officers promoted from the ranks were said to 
have come ‘through the hawsehole’ which implied that they had come aboard in 
the same manner as rats and mud.21 In contrast, the democratisation of the 
cadet entry primarily threatened only the cohesion of the officer corps. 
Regardless of their background cadets began their careers as prospective 
officers and were afforded the appropriate chattels and moulded in the 
appropriate fashion. 
 One of the promises made by Fisher was that his new scheme of 
entering and training officers would mean a complete change in the way 
potential officers were selected. In the course of the nineteenth century a 
system had developed whereby nominated candidates were entered into the 
Royal Navy after passing an interview and academic and medical examinations. 
It was entirely unremarkable that naval cadets should be selected in this way. 
Nomination was the preferred way of filling all Civil Service vacancies and the 
introduction of the Civil Service entrance examinations in the later part of the 
nineteenth century legitimised rather than destroyed the existing system.22  
The hurdles facing the potential officer grew during the nineteenth 
century. The power of captains to enter whom they pleased was gradually 
eroded to the point of disappearance. In 1837, a minimum age of twelve was 
set (in 1849 an upper limit of fourteen was imposed), candidates were also 
required to be healthy and ‘able to write English from dictation and acquainted 
with the first four rules of arithmetic, reduction and the Rule of Three’. 
Standards continued to vary  mid-century tales tell of potential cadets facing a 
variety of tests included drinking sherry, jumping over chairs, writing out the 
Lords Prayer and knowing the capital of Madagascar.23 
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In 1855 a number of changes were made which served to regularise the 
entry process. Candidates were now to be fourteen or fifteen years old. Apart 
from English and mathematics they were also examined in geography and 
foreign languages, and interviewed to assess their suitability.24 In 1869 the rules 
were changed again. There were now two nominated candidates for each place 
and a competitive examination with the top half of the candidates gaining 
admission. The new entrance examination included Latin, French, and a third 
foreign language.25 The imposition of these examinations, along with the 
introduction of cadet fees of £70 per annum, served to exclude all but the 
richest from the officer corps of the Royal Navy. 
The entry of engineering cadets was an entirely separate business, the 
first scheme for doing so being published in 1837. In 1863 it was decided that 
candidates needed to be fifteen years old and should sit examinations covering 
English, geography, French, and various branches of mathematics including 
geometry, arithmetic, algebra, and quadratic equations. The so called ‘Engineer 
Students’, were not actually in the Navy; they worked in the dockyards, were 
educated by the dockyard schools, wore no uniform and, outside working hours, 
lived as civilians. 
There was a shortage of candidates and the life of a naval engineer was 
particularly unattractive to the upper classes with their disdain for manual work. 
The position of the naval engineer was, therefore, significantly improved by the 
introduction of the artificer rating in 1868  the provision of such skilled men 
relieved the engineering officers of much of the dirty work of their department. 
Even so in 1875 the Cooper-Key Committee noted that the majority of 
engineering officers were the sons of seamen, marines, or dockyard workmen. 
As the future of naval engineering officers most certainly lay in the 
wardroom it was considered desirable to attract boys from the higher social 
classes and to educate them separately from their future subordinates. In 1876 
it was decided that candidates, aged fifteen or sixteen, would take the Civil 
Service examinations available at various centres around the country. This not 
only widened the geographical background of the candidates, but made the 
profession appear respectable  the higher grades of the Civil Service were 
entirely socially acceptable occupations, and the examinations were already 
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used to select Army officer cadets. In the same year training moved aboard the 
battleship Marlborough, and the following year students were put into naval 
uniform. These measures moved their position closer to that of the cadets in 
Britannia, although they were still clearly differentiated by their doing a great 
deal of manual work.26 This difference, along with the lower status of engineers 
within the service, meant that the higher echelons of society remained reluctant 
to enter their sons into the branch. 
Fisher himself wished to secure the best boys for the service, regardless 
of class or parental wealth, he wrote: ‘do not exclude for poverty alone, either at 
the outset or afterwards. Let every fit boy have a chance’.27 This desire owed 
little to democratic sentiment and much to a desire to improve the efficiency of 
the service, Fisher later wrote that entry to the officer corps of the Royal Navy 
was limited to 1/40th of the population and what it needed was the brains of the 
other 39/40ths.28  
He also wished for the officer corps to be comprised of men of similar 
outlook, sympathetic to each other and able to live harmoniously. This he hoped 
to achieve by recruiting all officers from the same class, which in turn meant 
doing away with the existing relatively democratic engineer entry.29 This plan 
had the support of both the Prince of Wales and Lord Selborne.30 Selborne was 
particularly concerned by the demands of the engineers for improved status, 
and feared their entering into an alliance with the trade unions.31 Thus although 
Fisher’s own views were essentially democratic he thought it more important 
that the Navy’s officers should be in harmony with one another and he was, in 
any case, obliged to rely on the support of men who had no wish to see the 
officer corps democratised. There was thus a need to create systems for cadet 
entry that considered background as well as mental and physical fitness. 
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Entry of Fisher-Selborne and Special Entry Cadets 
  
Under the terms of the Fisher-Selborne scheme candidates, aged twelve, were 
faced by three hurdles  a competitive interview followed by a qualifying 
examination and medical testing. An application could be made on behalf of any 
boy but he could not be interviewed without a nomination from the First Lord  
who thus screened all applicants for social acceptability. No attempt was made 
to disguise this; the families of suitable applicants received a letter informing 
them that the First Lord had selected them for a nomination. An element of 
naval patronage was retained, with Admiralty Board members, flag officers, and 
captains all having the right to recommend candidates.32 
It is clear that although the Fisher-Selborne scheme was intended to 
widen entry to the naval officer corps, (by opening it to boys who would not 
previously have been able to secure nominations), it was not an attempt to 
democratise it. The cost of supporting a boy as cadet and midshipman meant 
that entry was limited to the wealthier members of society. Nominated 
candidates were to be interviewed by a board comprised of senior naval officers 
and educational experts, which at least helped to ensure that candidates were 
selected on their merits as gentlemen and potential leaders rather than through 
influence as had previously been the case.  
In fact the interview was a late addition to the scheme. It had been 
intended that selection would be entirely in the hands of the First Lord with his 
power in the matter being balanced by his being directly responsible to 
parliament and thus the nation.33 Under parliamentary pressure, Selborne 
appointed a committee of Fisher, Commander Hyde-Parker of HMS Britannia, 
Cyril Ashford the Headmaster of Osborne Naval College and his own assistant 
private secretary (Vincent Baddeley) to discuss the entry process. They opted 
to interview all those who appeared suitable and found that, despite their 
generally differing views, they were able to quickly reach a consensus on each 
candidate.34 The selection committee was thus judged a success and remained 
in place; throughout the life of the scheme potential cadets were selected by an 
interview panel composed of naval officers, civilian education experts (normally 
public school headmasters), and Admiralty civil servants. 
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  This is not to say that the interviewers had an easy task  in fact their 
work was extremely difficult, the true character and intelligence of twelve year 
olds being hard to discern. Courtney Anderson later unearthed a note written by 
an early committee member. This man felt that the role of the committee was to 
ascertain whether the boy was a) a gentleman, b) a sharp and intelligent one, c) 
if he is observant and enthusiastic, d) if enthusiastic and keen about the Navy 
and patriotic, e) if fond of manly sports, f) what his relatives and ancestors have 
been. On second thoughts, f had been crossed out, the interviewer perhaps 
feeling that to be invited for interview meant that one was a gentleman and that 
the profession of a father was not always proof of his class  engineers, 
paymasters, and clergy being drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds. 35 
 Ultimately the committee member decided that questions on eating 
habits and the appropriateness of serving certain sauces with various foods 
were a good test of gentlemanly qualities. This suggests that he thought it 
important that the boys selected for the scheme should be socially compatible 
with the officers already in the service. 
The interviewers were aided by a form completed by the candidate’s 
headmaster. The original form had twelve questions and enquired about the 
progress and potential capabilities of the boy and his conduct. Headmasters 
were to report on the boy’s suitability, his skill in foreign languages and practical 
mechanics, and his keenness in work and play. The Admiralty also wished to 
know if the boy had influence over his peers and if so what kind, if he was 
physically strong and active, if he was ‘frank truthful and obedient’ and ‘have 
you detected in him any offence against morals’. Finally, the headmaster was 
asked if the boy had received extra or special tuition in preparation for his naval 
candidature. In 1912 the form was slightly modified with headmasters being 
asked to compare candidates with those from their school on that or any 
previous occasion.36 
The minimum age for entry into Osborne had originally been set at 
twelve and a half. In 1906 it was raised to twelve years and nine or ten months, 
and in 1913 it was raised again to thirteen years and four to eight months. This 
brought the colleges into line with the normal age for boys go to public school 
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and so suited the prep schools better. Prep school headmasters were able to 
give a more accurate opinion of older boys who had more influence in the 
school than their younger fellows and were more likely to have occupied a 
position of responsibility.   
The candidates who did best in the interview would enter the Royal Navy 
provided they passed the qualifying examination and medical tests. To make 
the examination qualifying rather than competitive served two purposes. Firstly 
it favoured boys who, although less academic, were perceived to be good 
leaders or who had other desirable qualities. Secondly, it was hoped to 
dramatically reduce ‘cramming’, the process by which candidates suffered an 
intensive spell of study in preparation for examinations. Cramming was detested 
(Fisher was a particularly strong opponent) for it exhausted and soured boys, 
many of whom took a long time to recover. It was among the most disliked 
aspects of the previous system of entry.37 The new scheme appears to have 
been successful in this respect as no boys from crammers were among the 
initial candidates. This may be due to the earlier age of entry  potential 
candidates had not yet been sent to crammers. Alternatively one may accept 
Jones’ explanation, that certain schools may have conducted a hasty 
rebranding exercise.38 
 The subjects included in the examinations balanced the normal curricula 
of contemporary prep schools against the specific demands of the naval 
curriculum. They were English, history and geography (with special reference to 
the British Empire), arithmetic and algebra, geometry, Latin, and French or 
German. There was no attempt to make the examination suitable for boys who 
had been educated by the state, and this made the undemocratic nature of the 
scheme plainly obvious. 
Jones provides data on candidates from 1860-1880, 1903 and 1905. In 
the early period, 28.5% of candidates had fathers in the Army, 20.5% in the 
Church, 15.1% in the Royal Navy, 13.5% of independent means, 7.1% in 
commerce and 0.9% had fathers who were engineers.39 By 1903 these figures 
had radically altered: 25.6% were in commerce, 16.7% in the Army, 14.4% of 
independent means, 10% in the Royal Navy, 7.8% in the Church and 5.6% 
engineers. The 1905 figures are not dissimilar to those for 1903  commerce 
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24.7%, Army 16.2%, Navy 14.3%, independent 10.4, engineers 5.3 and Church 
3.9%.40  
This suggests that the Royal Navy had succeeded in attracting the 
desired type of boy. All the fathers’ professions offered some claim to 
gentlemanly status; although income and prestige varied considerably there 
were no sons of manual workers, servants or shop assistants. The interview 
process appears to have been fair to candidates from all backgrounds. Jones 
provides figures which show that the proportion of those appointed cadet from 
each background in 1905 was generally more or less equal to the proportion of 
candidates. The occupation groups with a difference over 2% are Army (16.2% 
of applicants but 27.8% of cadets), Civil Service (3.9% of candidates, 11.1% of 
cadets), commerce (24.7% of candidates, 11.1% of cadets), and legal (7.8% of 
candidates, 5.6% of cadets).41 
For the Special Entry scheme, introduced in 1913, a revised system was 
adopted. The naval authorities opted to make the Special Entry selection 
process more or less the opposite of that for the Fisher-Selborne scheme. It 
consisted of competitive examinations followed by a qualifying interview, with a 
view to eliminating weak candidates as early as possible and securing those 
most likely to meet the academic demands of the service.  
The Admiralty opted to make use of the Civil Service examinations 
already used by the Army to select officer cadets.42 This decision had several 
great advantages. Firstly, the Navy was spared the difficulty and expense of 
constructing and maintaining a suitable system of testing. Secondly the Civil 
Service examinations could be taken at centres all over the country. This, 
combined with the relative lack of special preparation needed, promised to 
make the Special Entry attractive to both boys and their schools; especially as 
candidates needed only to take the examinations once to be considered by both 
services.43 In particular, it offered the prospect of tapping into the so called 
‘Army sides’ of many public schools. 
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 From the mid nineteenth century onwards, most public schools divided 
their pupils between a classical side, focussed on Greek and Latin, and a 
modern side focussed on English and history.44 Following the introduction of the 
Civil Service examinations for army officer cadetships in 1870 some schools, 
most prominently Cheltenham and Wellington, developed specialist Army sides 
focussed on preparing candidates for these examinations and requiring them to 
participate in the Officer Training Corps (OTC).45 Candidates with this 
educational and military background were clearly desirable, as were those from 
the science and engineering sides at schools such as Clifton and Oundle. 
The cost to parents of supporting a Special Entry cadet through his 
training was lower than that for a Fisher-Selborne scheme cadet but the 
scheme was not intended to democratise the officer corps  the vast majority 
were expected to be recruited from fee paying schools. In any case few parents 
could afford to support their sons beyond the age of eighteen. Far from seeing 
the scheme as an opportunity to widen the social base of the officer corps the 
Royal Navy was anxious to secure the products of famous public schools.46  
The 58 candidates for the first Special Entry in 1913 were drawn from 
much the same background as those applying for Osborne; 17 fathers had 
commercial backgrounds, 6 were in the Army and 2 in the Royal Navy (they 
were a vice-admiral and a rear-admiral), 5 were involved in the law and 7 
employed by the government in a wide variety of roles. The remaining 20 
candidates included the sons of 5 doctors, 3 clergymen and 2 university 
professors. Although thirty to forty of the candidates were from well known 
schools (or at any rate schools the interviewers considered to be well known), 
none came from Eton, Harrow, Winchester or Rugby which were considered the 
top schools by the Admiralty.47  
The Civil Service examination for Special Entry candidates carried a 
maximum mark of 16200 allocated as follows  English 2000, history and 
geography 2000, French, German, or Latin 2000, elementary mathematics 
2000, intermediate mathematics 2000 (candidates must score 600 to gain 
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entrance), optional higher mathematics 2000, physics and chemistry 2000, 
optional English paper 2000. Holders of Certificate A, an examination taken by 
OTC members which was designed as a test of military proficiency and 
leadership ability, received 200 bonus marks. The minimum acceptable total 
mark was 5600 although, as the examination was competitive, it was hoped that 
those who were successful would score far higher.48 
By 1924 the system of selection for the Special Entry had been changed. 
The exact timing of these changes is unknown and it is unclear what prompted 
them although the School Certificate may have been a factor  the new rules 
required candidates to have passed the certificate or an equivalent qualification. 
Candidates were now marked out of 1750 and the interview mark was included 
within this. The examination was divided into two parts. All subjects in Part I 
were compulsory  they were English worth 150 marks, general knowledge also 
worth 150, interview and record worth 400 and a modern language or British 
history since 1714 worth 100. Part II was comprised of optional subjects. There 
were compulsory papers in lower mathematics and physics and chemistry, both 
worth 300 marks  to secure entry candidates had to achieve a certain mark but 
were not told what it was. They then chose a further paper also worth 300 
marks from a choice of French, German, Latin, Greek, higher mathematics, 
modern history and biology. 
 Candidates could not take history in both parts I and II or take the same 
language twice. Part I offered a wider range of modern languages than Part II, 
in addition to French or German, candidates could opt to be examined in Italian, 
Spanish, Russian, Arabic or Urdu.49 Finally papers in freehand or geometric 
drawing could be taken, both being worth 50 marks. No science subject could 
be taken unless a candidate could prove they were competent in a laboratory 
environment (such confirmation being sought from their school, unless the 
reputation of the school was such that competency could be assumed). Points 
could be deducted for poor handwriting, or where a candidate’s knowledge of a 
subject was deemed superficial  a measure designed to defeat cramming.  
The examinations taken by Special Entry candidates had changed in a 
variety of ways. The range of subjects available increased noticeably, reflecting 
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not only the increasingly diverse curricula of public schools but also the 
willingness of the Royal Navy to accept a wider variety of candidates  its 
acceptance that supply officers did not require expertise in science and 
engineering, and its growing desire for skilled communicators and potential staff 
officers. The increasing separation of the engineering and executive branches 
also made this change more palatable. The backgrounds of those becoming 
naval officers was also beginning to change as the campaign for 
democratisation gathered force. 
 
Democratisation 
 
The appointment of Winston Churchill as First Lord in 1912 turned out to be a 
major boon for pro democratisation campaigners. Churchill was heavily 
influenced by Fisher and Yexley. Yexley was particularly critical of the lack of 
opportunities for talented young ratings to gain commissions and, with Fisher’s 
help, succeeded in converting Churchill to his cause. The result was the Mate 
scheme introduced in 1912, giving men under twenty-six the chance to gain 
commissions.  
It had numerous faults  the ex-ratings were given the rank of mate 
rather than sub-lieutenant, thus differentiating them from ex-cadets, and 
marking them as inferior; and because they did not become lieutenants before 
they were twenty-eight they had no hope of promotion above commander. Men 
were unlikely to be selected unless they were both unmarried and teetotal. 
Potential candidates received little encouragement or assistance. Carew 
describes the scheme as ‘deliberately sabotaged’; certainly more could have 
been achieved in the short term given the increasing demand for officers and 
the prevalence of experienced ratings.50 
 The democratisation of the Royal Navy’s officer corps did not become a 
prominent issue until well into the inter-war period, but by the end of the First 
World War various fee reduction schemes had been put in place  slightly 
widening the entry and enabling young officers whose families had become 
impoverished to remain in the service. Although there were those who 
advocated a greater degree of democratisation, their efforts were thwarted by 
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the Treasury and by those who felt that the Royal Navy was not responsible for 
the finances of its officers.  
 By 1911 most parents were paying fees of £75 a year for their sons to 
attend Osborne or Dartmouth. Reduced fees of £40 per year were available 
only to the sons of naval officers, army officers, and Admiralty civil servants  
approximately 5% of the current cadet body benefited from this concession. 
Imposing fees at this level meant that officer entry to the Royal Navy was 
effectively closed to civilian parents with an income under £600 per year. This 
limitation was of sufficiently widespread concern for the matter to have been 
raised in Parliament but, although sympathetic, the Admiralty was powerless to 
act. The Admiralty wished to extend the reduced fees to all candidates, but with 
a maximum of 10% of the cadet body in receipt of such a concession, the 
additional cost of doing this was estimated at £1085 a year.51  
 The Treasury refused to extend the reduced fees, arguing that, as the 
quantity and quality of the cadets already serving was sufficient, fee reductions 
were unnecessary.52 Instead, it argued that £75 was too little and a fee of £84-
100 would be more realistic given the high running costs of the colleges and 
quality of their teaching staff.53 It seems that the Treasury was concerned not 
with the democratisation of the officer corps but with the extent to which the 
state was subsidising the education of the sons of the wealthy.  
Had the Treasury acquiesced, the Admiralty scheme would probably 
have been of little impact  only 27% of those eligible held reduced fee places, 
suggesting that their parents could afford the £75 a year fees.54 It is unclear 
how well publicised the fee reductions were although they are mentioned in the 
1907 edition of How to Become a Naval Officer.55 Widening access to the 
reduced fees would not have brought in many boys from poorer backgrounds as 
even fees of £40 would have limited entry to boys from moderately wealthy 
families given the need for expensive uniforms, the payment of a personal 
allowance, and the requirement to support the boy until the age of twenty-one. 
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 The number of cadets taking up reduced fee places did not increase. For 
example amongst the 61 new entries of January 1914 only 15 were paying the 
reduced rate. Over the history of the scheme of reduced fees, only 7% of those 
eligible had benefited.56 By 1913 the size of each term had increased but the 
number of candidates had not; in April it was reported there were 200 
candidates for 75 places, and that the main factor in limiting candidate numbers 
was felt to be the cost of a cadet’s education.57 To address the shortage of 
candidates the Admiralty proposed to lower the standard fee to £50 a year. The 
Treasury refused to allow this concession but did agree to extend the £40 a 
year fees to all poor cadets, irrespective of their parentage.58  
 Relief was granted to parents solely on financial grounds. The poorest 
cadets in each term received the greatest fee reductions, irrespective of their 
place in the term or promise as an officer. This was a remarkably egalitarian 
system, most public schools gave the largest scholarship to the highest placed 
candidate  irrespective of his familial income. However the new system still did 
nothing to benefit boys from working, or lower middle, class families for whom 
the expense remained far too great. 
 Once a boy had joined the Royal Navy financial concessions might be 
made to allow him to remain should the circumstances of his family change 
unexpectedly. There were sound economic reasons for this  in 1914 it was 
calculated that the education of a cadet cost his parents £560 and the country 
£500. Once he reached the rank of midshipman it was cheaper to continue his 
education at no cost to his parents than it was to replace him.59 In July 1914 the 
Treasury was forced to concede that, in exceptional and unforeseen 
circumstances, it would meet the full cost of a young officer’s education.60  
 This decision owed something to political considerations. Winston 
Churchill, wrote to a Treasury minister reminding him that the pressure to 
democratise the officer corps of the Royal Navy would not be alleviated by 
ending the careers of midshipmen whose families could no longer support them. 
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Churchill provided a driving force for democratisation, noting that: ‘Democratic 
England still preserves even at a heavy financial loss, the poverty bar’. This 
situation compared unfavourably with Germany where the Kaiser’s Fund 
supported the sons of state servants.61  
 Despite this concession there was no question that boys whose families 
had no hope of paying their fees would be allowed to enter Osborne.62 This 
policy already applied to commissioned officers who had fallen into debt. At no 
stage of his career, once expected to support himself, would a Royal Navy 
officer receive financial assistance from the state.63  
 The fees and allowances paid by cadet parents were clearly understood 
to be supporting their sons in their careers as students, rather than as naval 
officers. When the Dartmouth cadets were sent to sea in 1914 their parents 
were no longer charged fees  their sons were doing the work of midshipmen in 
the fleet and were treated as such. In July 1917 the importance of cadets 
serving in the wartime fleet was further recognised when the requirement for 
parents to provide a £50 annual allowance for their sons was waived.64 
By 1916 fees at the cadet colleges had increased to £110 a year and 
action was clearly necessary to alleviate financial distress amongst current and 
future cadets, especially as many families had been impoverished by the death 
of the main earner. The Army already had a scheme for supporting the sons of 
deceased officers and the introduction of such a scheme in the Royal Navy was 
supported by the Treasury. The result was the introduction of King’s 
Cadetships, scholarships covering the cost of cadet uniforms, fees and 
allowances  a total of £648 of the estimated £700 cost of supporting a cadet. A 
maximum of 100 cadets could hold Kings’ Cadetships, which could be allocated 
at any time in a cadet’s career.65 Although limited to officers’ sons whose 
fathers had been killed or disabled on active service, the King’s Cadetships did 
provide for a small number of boys from impoverished families to become naval 
officers. 
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 The Admiralty’s fight for financial support for cadets illustrates a number 
of issues that recurred throughout the inter-war period. The cost of supporting a 
young officer was beyond most parents and so many capable boys had no hope 
of becoming naval officers. Whilst the Admiralty appears to have been willing to 
accept cadets from a wider variety of backgrounds any attempt to do so was 
thwarted by the Treasury, which felt that cadet education was already costing 
the country too much. Where relief was available, it was generally confined to 
the sons of military officers, clearly indicating the desirability of officer recruits 
from military backgrounds as well as the Royal Navy’s determination to look 
after its own.  
 The fast expanding wartime fleet required enormous numbers of officers, 
the vast majority of whom were recruited through existing sources and given 
permanent commissions. Osborne terms had typically entered with 70-80 
cadets but in 1914 this increased to over 100, peaking at 122 in January 1915.66 
By the end of the war 371 seamen ratings and 161 ERAs had become 
lieutenants.67 In 1917 a second annual entry of Special Entries was introduced. 
In the 1920s the fleet shrank, first in response to peace and then in 
response to international treaty and Treasury parsimony. Consequently the 
period was characterised by mass redundancies of officers. A 1919 report 
declared a surplus of 95 captains, 189 commanders, 283 lieutenant-
commanders and lieutenants, and 1000 officers of more junior rank. In April 
1920, 407 officers of varying rank were voluntarily discharged. In 1925 around 
200 lieutenants resigned while a further 350 were selected to leave, followed in 
1926 and 1929 by reductions in the number of lieutenant-commanders.68  
The reduced strength of the officer corps meant that far fewer new 
officers were needed, consequently recruitment through all channels was 
dramatically scaled back. This in turn retarded the progress of democratisation 
 not only was there no need to exploit new sources of officers, there was also 
a desire to retain the loyalty of the existing sources so as to ensure a continuing 
supply of good quality material.  
 In spite of the myriad difficulties (not least impoverishment) facing navy 
and nation, the prospect of democratising the officer corps arose in 1918. That it 
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did was not entirely surprising given the prospects for change that peace 
seemed to offer. The war had created a climate in which the stranglehold of the 
traditional elite over positions of power could be questioned and in which some 
concession to the masses might be made in the interests of deterring 
communism.69 In 1919 the Admiralty received reports from two separate 
committees appointed to consider the possibilities for democratisation  the 
Anderson Committee to investigate the fees paid by cadets’ parents, and the 
Ricardo Committee to consider promotion from the lower-deck.  
 The Anderson Committee was headed by Sir Alan Anderson, a civil 
servant, and contained representatives of all three services. The committee was 
appointed in September 1918 and was tasked with investigating whether the 
costs of supporting a cadet deterred many suitable candidates and, if so, with 
suggesting affordable steps to alleviate the situation.  
 The committee decided that suitable candidates were coming forward in 
large enough numbers  Osborne attracted on average 2.2 candidates for 
every place, far greater than Woolwich and Sandhurst which averaged only 1.6, 
despite giving candidates a window of one year to apply in comparison to 
Osborne’s four months. Although an increase in candidates was desirable, a 
large increase in numbers would necessitate the entrance examinations being 
held before the interview and cramming would inevitably occur. The 
examinations favoured boys who had attended more expensive prep schools 
and this, together with the high cost of supporting a cadet, ruled out boys from 
poorer middle class families  a fact deplored by the committee, which 
considered such boys to ‘compare very favourably in all respects’ to those from 
richer families.70  
 The Osborne entry could be democratised relatively simply and cheaply 
by altering the examinations to make them fairer, and ensuring that families 
were aware of the reduced fee places on offer. Clearly the committee did not 
intend that the Osborne entry should be totally democratised; their suggested 
measures were designed only to admit poorer members of the middle classes. 
In contrast the committee advocated the Special Entry as a means of genuinely 
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democratising the officer corps, noting that it: ‘seems to be the opportunity for 
giving a chance to native ability at present excluded from the Navy’.71 
The committee felt that ex-elementary school boys would be able to 
compete on equal terms with their public school counterparts at the age of 
seventeen, having been to grammar schools or attended public schools on 
scholarships. However their parents would be unable to afford to support them 
as cadets and, in many cases, they could not even afford to keep them in 
school until they were old enough to take the entrance examinations. The only 
solution was to institute a system of scholarships to support boys from the age 
of sixteen until they became sub-lieutenants. This proposal found no favour with 
the naval authorities, presumably owing to the cost and the difficulties in 
arranging for boys to be educated for eighteen months before entering the 
Navy.72  
In June 1919, largely as a result of parliamentary pressure, the Admiralty 
appointed a committee headed by Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Ricardo to consider 
the possibility of boy seamen becoming officers. The committee submitted its 
report in November, with its members unanimously agreeing that very few boy 
seamen were suitable for promotion to officer. Those who were suitable should 
be identified during their initial shore training and should not go to sea with the 
rest of their class as living on the mess deck would be fatal to the development 
of officer-like qualities. Instead those who passed an interview and educational 
examination (the latter at a lower standard than that for Special Entry 
candidates) should be sent to the Special Entry training ship for two and a half 
years before passing out as midshipmen; thereafter they should follow the same 
path as the Special Entry and be expected to achieve the same standards.73  
The report was passed around various Admiralty departments for 
comment and the readers were generally of one mind. They agreed that the 
boys selected must not serve as ratings, that to be commissioned they must 
meet the same standards as other officers, and that those who failed as cadets 
should be allowed to leave the service.74 Ultimately the Ricardo scheme was 
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rejected as unworkable as the annual entry of boy seamen to the training 
cruiser was impractical and alternatives such as a separate training 
establishment too expensive. Whatever the nature of the scheme, the small 
number of officers produced would not justify the cost of at least £300 per boy. 
Furthermore the scheme was not genuinely democratic, it would not help boys 
already serving, and few boys of high ability were going to join the Navy for a 
very limited chance of achieving commissioned rank.75  
The impact of these two committees was very limited. No change was 
made to the entrance examinations, and numerous letters to the Treasury failed 
to win any further concessions on fees. Their lordships were informed that 
King’s Cadetships and the existing system of discounting went: ‘as far as public 
sentiment can reasonably demand’.76 Many within the Treasury were still of the 
opinion that the fees at Dartmouth were so low as to constitute public subsidy of 
private education. An internal memorandum noted that Dartmouth was ‘far 
cheaper than any normal middle class education’.77  
The minimum age for ratings to enter the Mate scheme was lowered 
from twenty-four to twenty-one, improving the career prospects of those who 
graduated from it.78 More importantly, the Special Entry gradually became a 
mechanism for the democratisation of the officer corps  in direct contrast with 
the original enthusiasm of the Royal Navy for recruiting boys from the top public 
schools. 
The reform of the Direct Entry system in 1924 reflected this change. The 
Direct Entry had its origins in 1903 and provided a chance for boys at nautical 
training establishments to become naval officers. The original scheme had 
placed these boys in the fourth term at Osborne but the revised system trained 
them alongside the Special Entry.  Some of these boys came from the Conway 
and Worcester but the majority came from Pangbourne Nautical College.79 
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Aligning the Direct Entry with the Special Entry meant that more attention could 
be given to these cadets and also reduced the cost to their parents of entering 
them into the Navy. In 1933 an additional entry was introduced, bringing boys 
from Worcester and Conway into the sixth term at Dartmouth; this too was an 
equalising measure as Pangbourne had come to dominate the revised entry.80 
Any desire for democratisation was not reflected in How to Become a 
Naval Officer. The 1927 Special Entry edition referred to ‘public school cadets’, 
and noted that smaller schools were most prone to exaggerating the 
achievements of their candidates. A list of sample interview questions included: 
‘which do you consider to be England’s best public school’, and ‘name any 
famous men educated at your school’. If the interviewers were unfamiliar with a 
candidate’s school, they might gauge its status through asking who it played at 
games.81 The cadets continued to be colloquially known as ‘pubs’  reflecting 
their perceived origins. 
The 1924 Dartmouth version was more subtle  reminding readers that 
the Navy was officered by gentlemen, and listing social activities such as 
shooting. It also stated that for an officer to change ship was ‘as if his quarters 
had been moved to another wing of the family mansion’.82 Neither publication 
gave any encouragement to candidates from poorer backgrounds. 
The increased growth and parliamentary strength of the Labour Party 
had the potential to force democratisation on the Navy. The party was 
reconstituted in 1918, and in the same year committed itself to a statement of 
policy Labour and the New Social Order which took as its first resolution a 
commitment to ‘the gradual building up of a new social order based [….] [on] 
healthy equality, the widest possible participation in power, both economic and 
political’.83 In 1928 this was replaced by Labour and the Nation, a more 
generalised statement committing the party to promoting education and 
opportunity.84 
The Labour government elected in 1929 planned to dramatically change 
the recruitment and education of Royal Navy officers, giving those who had 
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benefitted from the improvements to state education a chance of entering the 
service. The new First Lord, Albert Alexander, told the Commons that ‘I want 
those who go through the national system of education, as apart from private 
and public school education, to have an equal opportunity of entering that 
Service’.85 On 11 July 1930 the Board of Admiralty discussed Alexander’s 
proposal that at least 50% of officers should be Special Entry, and that 
bursaries should be made available to enable less well off boys to become 
cadets. Two objections were raised  the cost would be enormous, and there 
was concern that democratising entry would lead to a decline in the quality of 
candidates.86  
 Alexander was concerned about the lack of opportunities for state school 
boys to become naval officers. He believed they were disadvantaged by the 
interview system because they lacked the manners and polish of public school 
boys, and at a disadvantage in the examinations owing to their comparatively 
weak Latin and French. He was firmly convinced that some secondary school 
boys were entirely suited to being naval officers. Alexander was also concerned 
about the high cost of Dartmouth, especially as there was some evidence that 
Special Entry officers were better than those produced by the college.87 
Admiral Sir Charles Madden, the First Sea Lord, was dubious but not 
hostile. He reminded his colleagues that naval officers were obtained at 
reasonable cost to their country and that there was no lack of volunteers. Royal 
Navy officers enjoyed the confidence of their men who, as a result, were well 
behaved and lightly disciplined. Because the officers lived in close confines and 
tended to be from similar backgrounds the existing ex-rating officers struggled 
socially. They also struggled professionally as ratings did not respect them. 
Madden was concerned that to extract fees from the parents of some boys 
whilst providing bursaries for others was unfair, and would cause considerable 
upset in the fleet. Finally the Army recruited the vast majority of its officers from 
the pool the Special Entry was drawn from, and it struggled to find sufficient 
good quality candidates. On the other hand a small number of secondary school 
boys, around 5-7% of each entry, could be absorbed into the officer corps. This 
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was, in Madden’s view, preferable to extending promotion from the lower-
deck.88   
 The Second Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Michael Hodges, did not offer 
Alexander a great deal of encouragement. Although he would not object to the 
field of entry being widened if the current standards were maintained, he felt the 
current system of entry and training at Dartmouth worked well. Schools did not 
encourage pupils to become Special Entry officers, many of those who joined 
aged seventeen had wanted to join aged thirteen. Meddling with the Special 
Entry was especially undesirable as a shortfall of these officers could not be 
addressed. Hodges too was concerned about the quality of potential candidates 
from the lower classes.89 
The Board decided to appoint two committees. One was to concern itself 
with the prospect of promoting more ratings to officer status. The other was to 
consider the prospect of democratising the officer entry. It was headed by the 
MP Sir Ernest Bennett and the other members were Admiral Sir Osmond de B 
Brock, Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax (hereafter Drax), Sir 
Edmond Phipps, and Mr Francis Dale, Headmaster of the City of London 
School. They were charged:  
‘To consider whether the present system of entry of naval cadets and 
naval cadets Special Entry are such as to give candidates of the requisite 
standards from all types of schools and belonging to all classes of the 
community a fair opportunity of being considered on their merits for entry 
as cadet, and if not, to report what changes are recommended in order to 
extend the field of selection, subject to the requirements of the naval 
service’.90 
The committee interviewed a variety of witnesses before preparing its 
report, which was submitted on 29 June 1931. Various themes emerge from the 
committee’s work: democratisation of the officer entry, the selection process, 
the relative merits of Dartmouth and the Special Entry, and the number, nature, 
and suitability of existing candidates.  
Most of the witnesses examined by the committee were in favour of 
some degree of democratisation. Mr Orme, Headmaster of Reigate Grammar 
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School, explained that the parents of his boys could not afford to enter their 
boys except as paymaster cadets. Although they aspired to public schools, and 
would doubtless like their sons to become executive officers, this was 
impossible for them. Whilst he thought his own boys were suited to becoming 
naval officers he doubted that those from state schools would be sufficiently 
responsible.91 
Three representatives of the state education system were consulted. Dr 
Woosnam was the Headmaster of Howard Gardens School in Cardiff. He 
thought that working class boys would only enter the Navy if they were 
confident of job security. He considered his sixth formers responsible, 
disciplined and serious minded boys who were good leaders.92 Mr Tresader, 
Headmaster of Devonport High School, thought the ex-elementary school boys 
amongst his students worked harder than those who had gone to private 
schools. He claimed that humble homes could produce responsible boys, 
strongly supported by their parents. His school had produced twelve paymaster, 
three engineering, and one executive midshipmen since 1918; he was confident 
that he could provide five good candidates every year.93 Mr Williams, Director of 
Education for Cardiff, thought that secondary school boys were capable of 
becoming naval officers if given the chance. However their parents expected 
them to become self supporting soon after leaving school.94  
Naval opinion was positive. Most of those consulted believed that, whilst 
complete democratisation was both impractical and unwise, a limited number of 
working class boys could be integrated into the officer corps. Admiral Sir 
Herbert Richmond, who had long campaigned for reform of officer entry, was in 
favour of democratisation. He believed that secondary school boys were 
perfectly capable of fitting in amongst public schools boys and of achieving the 
required standards.95  
Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Astley-Rushton did not doubt the cleverness of 
lower class boys, but he did question their social suitability. He thought them 
less morally sound than boys from the upper classes and commented ‘you 
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cannot make a brotherhood of people with different ethical standards’.96 Astley-
Rushton’s comments in this respect are the most negative by any witness.  
Three former Dartmouth cadets now at Greenwich were consulted. They 
thought that working class boys could be integrated into the officer corps if they 
spent four years at Dartmouth. On the other hand most young officers had 
private allowances from their parents, and would struggle without them, 
meaning that poorer boys would struggle socially once they left Dartmouth.97 
Two Dartmouth Captains were consulted, Captain Sidney Meyrick and 
Rear-Admiral Sir Martin Dunbar-Nasmith. Both said they did not know the 
personal circumstances of the cadets under their command. Although virtually 
all the existing Dartmouth cadets had been to prep school Meyrick believed a 
small number of secondary school boys could be successfully absorbed.98 
Dunbar-Nasmith thought it was rather strange that national servants should 
have to pay to learn their profession. However he believed the lower-deck 
would be hostile to the widening of the officer entry, and he doubted ratings 
would want their sons to become officers. He thought that working class boys 
could be integrated into the officer corps but that their career prospects might 
be damaged by marrying working class women, who would be uncomfortable in 
the social circles frequented by naval officers.99  
Eric Kempson, the Headmaster of Dartmouth, considered that although 
in theory open to all, officer entry was in reality limited to boys from wealthy 
families. He thought that the entrance examinations favoured prep school boys; 
secondary school boys would not know enough Latin. The examinations were 
based on the curricula of prep schools so little change could be made, although 
perhaps French could be offered as an alternative to Latin.100 
Alexander McMullen, the Admiralty Education Advisor, did not think that 
merely removing fees would widen the variety of applicants. He thought that the 
Navy would have to offer scholarships and strengthen its links with state 
schools. However he did think suitable candidates could be found in the state 
sector  Devonport High School, for example, had produced many paymasters. 
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If nothing else, the Navy should broaden the officer entry to include the sons of 
professionals who could not afford a public school education.101  
Commander Peter Berthon had been on the staff of the Royal Naval 
Engineering College Keyham for three years. His midshipmen varied 
considerably in social class although the majority were from the south of Britain. 
Class was no barrier to success although the former artificer apprentices from 
HMS Fisgard tended to be quiet and lack initiative. Whilst the boys from the 
better public schools tended to be better leaders they did not tend to be the 
hardest working or the cleverest. He favoured recruiting more sons of 
servicemen.102 
Captain Moore of HMS Erebus reported that Special Entry cadets were 
drawn from an increasingly wide range of schools. Many warrant officers sons 
had been successfully integrated, and he thought former boy seamen could be, 
although working class boys with no naval background would struggle.103 
Captain Hamilton, also representing Erebus, agreed that boy seaman could be 
made into officers. He noted that many warrant officers’ sons had become 
capable paymasters.104 
Overall witnesses favoured some form of democratisation. All apart from 
Astley-Rushton thought that a limited number of boys from lower class 
backgrounds could be successfully integrated into Dartmouth and subsequently 
the officer corps. However they disagreed over who was suitable. Everyone 
thought the sons of poorer professionals could be integrated, but opinion 
differed as to the suitability of working class boys.  
Irrespective of their class the Royal Navy was determined to secure the 
best possible candidates. Witnesses were therefore questioned about the 
various aspects of the selection process. The committee was particularly 
interested in the interview process but was also concerned about the academic 
examinations, in particular whether candidates were cramming for them.  
Mr Fletcher, the Headmaster of Charterhouse, had previously served as 
an interviewer of Dartmouth candidates and could suggest no improvements to 
the process.105 He offered no comment on whether or not candidates had been 
crammed. The state school representatives had the most negative views of the 
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current system. Dr Woosnam thought the fact that the examination centres were 
mainly in public schools would put off poorer boys. He doubted his pupils would 
do well in the interview  although the equal of public school boys in other 
respects, they could not compete on manners.106 Mr Williams said that state 
schools were not accustomed to preparing thirteen year olds for 
examinations.107 
Another civilian who had sat on an interview board, this time for Special 
Entry candidates, was the civil servant Roderick Meiklejohn. He thought the 
interview was essential as Royal Navy officers were Britain’s representatives 
abroad. Interviewers most prized tact and alertness although it was also 
important for the candidate’s appearance to be acceptable (it is unclear whether 
this referred to his clothing and manners or his skin colour).108 Clever boys 
generally passed, although the interviewers were not looking for great 
intelligence. Candidates from state schools often performed very well. 
Interviewers were heavily reliant on headmaster’s reports; those written by the 
headmasters of major public schools being most reliable.109 
Naval opinion overwhelmingly favoured retaining the interview. The sub-
lieutenants thought the interviewers were fair, and were confident that state 
school boys would be judged on their own merits.110 Astley-Rushton’s response 
to the prospect of the interview being removed was forthright  ‘god forbid’. He 
admitted that interviewing thirteen year olds was not an exact science however 
it did enable the Navy to ‘reject the absolute wasters and select the fliers’.111 
Meyrick was similarly blunt ‘one does not take a gardener without interviewing 
him’.112 
 The naval witnesses were universally opposed to cramming, but divided 
as to whether it took place. Kempson said that around half the cadets had been 
crammed in order to pass the entry examinations but that most remained lively 
and interested.113 Vincent Baddeley thought that many Special Entry candidates 
were crammed to remedy their deficiencies in mathematics although public 
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schools did not arrange special classes as they did for Army candidates.114 
Dunbar-Nasmith said that crammed boys had been a rarity at Dartmouth during 
his time as captain.115 McMullen reported that the Board of Admiralty was firmly 
opposed to competitive entrance examinations and, by extension, to 
cramming.116 
The Royal Navy was not getting enough officer candidates and a variety 
of explanations were offered. Moore suggested that the considerable variation 
in the number of Special Entry cadetships offered on different occasions 
hampered the scheme, as did the limited number of executive cadetships on 
offer.117 Astley-Rushton thought continual defence cuts had made boys 
uncertain of their prospects in the service, especially as they feared that naval 
training would not fit them for a change of career.118 
 McMullen thought anti-war sentiment was strong throughout Britain and 
that parents did not wish their sons to enter the armed services. Schools had 
never been happy to lose their best boys to the Navy and were now even less 
enthusiastic.119 Orme thought that independent schools were reluctant to lose 
their best boys at a younger age than normal.120 Fletcher disliked pupils leaving 
before the age of seventeen, feeling they lost two-thirds of the value of being at 
a public school.121 Dale said that he encouraged pupils to stay until they were at 
least seventeen, preferably eighteen.122 
 The committee also prepared a list of the schools and father’s 
occupations of the 546 successful Special Entry candidates from the 
examinations held between June 1925 and November 1929.123 The list suffers 
from various weaknesses, including duplicate entries and typing errors, which 
the historian must attempt to overcome. Its value as a source is negated by it 
only including the successful candidates. It suffers other problems common to 
all candidate lists. Some of the descriptions are quite vague  engineers, for 
example could vary greatly in income and social status.  It is possible that some 
of those attending independent schools had won scholarships or had their fees 
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paid by relatives or godparents. Some fathers, although in relatively low paying 
posts, may have other incomes not mentioned. 
Of these cadets 94 had fathers in the Royal Navy  of which 74 were 
officers, 10 warrant officers and 7 ratings (all petty officers or chief petty 
officers). There was 1 chaplain, 1 father listed as ‘RN retired’, and 1 lieutenant 
in the Royal Naval Reserve for whom no other profession was listed  almost 
certainly a merchant navy officer. The largest group of officers  (including 
warrant officers) came from the executive branch and comprised 40 men; there 
were also 3 shipwrights, 5 medical officers, 5 paymasters and 31 engineers. 
Those who were, or had begun their careers as, ratings were generally amongst 
the most skilled and best educated men of the lower-deck such as artificers, 
although there was also a master at arms.  
 From this it can be seen that the sons of naval personnel were keen to 
become Royal Navy officers via the Special Entry scheme and that they were 
successful in their efforts. However, there were only 5 sons of Royal Marines, 
which even allowing for the small size of the corps must be seen as 
disappointing. Of these, 3 were officer’s sons, 1 a warrant officer’s son, and for 
the other there is no rank listed.  
The second largest group was those whose fathers were engaged in 
business, numbering 93. The Royal Navy was an attractive option for the sons 
of men in commerce  perhaps because naval officers were undoubted 
gentlemen, and to become one would set the seal on the upward mobility of 
one’s family.  
 The next largest group was rather smaller, the 54 sons of army 
personnel. There were 49 officers from the British Army, 5 of whom are listed as 
generals and 1 as a doctor. There were the sons of 3 Indian Army officers, 1 
retired United States Army officer and 1 warrant officer (a master artificer). It is 
unclear whether army personnel, of similar wealth and social status to the naval 
ratings whose sons became cadets, were unaware of the opportunities 
available or if they considered cadetships out of reach either financially or 
socially. 
 The table below compares the cadets in the Bennett sample to earlier 
entries; the Bennett Committee made no such comparison. Lists of candidates 
are available for the first Fisher-Selborne entry in 1903, for a subsequent entry 
in November 1905 and for the first Special Entry in 1913. Comparisons to the 
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Bennett data must be made with caution given that the earlier three lists are of 
all candidates rather than just those that were successful and that they 
concerned far fewer boys. However the proportion of boys from various 
backgrounds can be compared. 
 
Table 1  Percentage of candidates or selected candidates from various 
backgrounds 1903-1929.124 
 
Profession 1903 
(193 
Candidates) 
1905 
(167 
Candidates) 
1913 
(57 
Candidates) 
1925-1929 
(546 
Cadets) 
Naval Officer 8.3 14.3 5.3 17.2 
Royal Marines 
Officer 
0.6 0 0 0.7 
Army Officer 16.7 16.2 8.8 9.7 
Gentleman/ 
Independent 
Income 
14.4 10.4 5.3 3.5 
Business 25.6 24.7 29.8 17 
Law 6.7 7.8 8.8 3.5 
Medicine 6.7 7.5 8.8 7 
Church 7.8 3.9 5.3 4.9 
Engineering and 
Science 
5.6 5.2 1.8 10.1 
 
It is immediately apparent that cadet entry to the Royal Navy consistently 
attracted the sons of military officers  they made up more than a quarter of the 
candidates in 1903 and 1905 (27.5% and 30.6% respectively) and 25% of those 
selected for the Special Entry between 1925 and 1929.  
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This suggests that military officers viewed a naval cadetship as offering 
their sons good career prospects, although this supposition is somewhat 
undermined by the lack of sons of Royal Marines officers from all the samples 
and the lack of RAF officer’s sons amongst the Special Entry candidates. The 
high proportion of Special Entry cadets from military backgrounds suggests that 
the scheme increasingly enjoyed the confidence of military families  boys from 
military backgrounds had made up only 14.1% of the first pool of applicants. 
 Overall the data suggests that naval officers came from much the same 
backgrounds in the late 1920s as they had before the First World War. The 
armed services and businessmen still fathered the majority. The most dramatic 
changes were the decline in businessmen and legal professional’s sons, and 
the rise in engineers’ sons. Officer recruitment still overwhelmingly favoured the 
sons of the upper classes, in particular the upper middle class. 
 The lower proportion of fathers engaged in business was perhaps 
because of the failing state of the economy but more likely businessmen’s sons 
were more interested in other careers. The high proportion of Special Entry 
cadets from engineering backgrounds may be misleading  the majority of 
Royal Navy engineering officers entered via the Special Entry and these boys 
may have been more interested in being engineers than in being naval officers.  
 The successful Special Entry candidates attended 195 different schools, 
of which I have identified 56 as state funded and 112 as independent (although 
many of them received government grants in some form). Not only did the 
independent schools dramatically outnumber the state, they individually 
supplied more cadets. Devonport High School, praised by McMullen for its pro 
naval stance, was comfortably the most successful state school supplying 8 
cadets; the next most successful, Reading School, managed only 5. In contrast 
12 independent schools each supplied at least 10 cadets: 
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Table 2  Independent schools producing ten or more Special Entry 
cadets between June 1925 and November 1929 and military professions of 
these cadet’s fathers. Derived from TNA ADM 116/2791.125  
 
School name Total  
cadets 
Royal 
Navy 
Royal 
Marines 
Army 
Officers 
Admiralty/ 
Dockyard 
Portsmouth 
Grammar 
18 11 0 0 1 
Cheltenham 
 
17 2 0 7 0 
Eton 
 
15 0 0 6 0 
Plymouth 
College 
14 6 0 0 2 
Bedford 
 
13 2 0 0 1 
Christ’s 
Hospital 
13 2 0 1 0 
Blundell’s 
 
12 3 0 1 1 
Marlborough 
 
12 2 0 1 0 
Oundle 
 
12 5 0 1 0 
Clifton 
 
10 0 1 4 0 
Imperial 
Service 
College 
10 3 1 3 0 
Rugby 
 
10 0 0 0 0 
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It will be seen that two of these schools were situated in naval home 
ports and that the majority of the cadets they supplied (17 out of 32) had fathers 
in the Navy. Many of the other schools supplied large numbers of cadets from 
military backgrounds. The large number of Blundell’s boys is particularly 
interesting as the school was Dartmouth’s main sporting rival  suggesting that 
Blundell’s students had a positive view of the college and had been impressed 
by their contact with the Royal Navy (which although limited was greater than 
that of pupils at other schools).  
The Royal Navy had hoped to draw Special Entry cadets from top public 
schools and to some extent it did so with Marlborough, Bedford and 
Cheltenham all well represented. However the most famous schools of all did 
not produce as many officers as the Royal Navy would have liked. True Eton 
supplied 15 cadets and Rugby 10 but Harrow only 7 and Winchester 5. The 
other Clarendon schools were similarly under-represented. The lack of boys 
from the very top schools was perhaps because the pupils of these schools 
generally had the connections and financial backing to pursue any career they 
chose. 
The data collected by the committee gave no indication of when 
particular cadets had entered the service. Consequently, it is impossible to tell if 
there was an increasing trend towards democratisation in the period from 1925-
1929. Nor is any data provided about the unsuccessful candidates. The cadets 
selected at this time were a more democratic group than those from earlier 
samples, but this was achieved largely through entering the sons of lower paid 
civil servants and naval ratings  the very groups most favoured by pro-
democratisation campaigners within the service.  
The other committee set up at this time was the Larken Committee which 
was charged with investigating promotion from the lower-deck. The committee 
reported that few ratings were aware of the opportunities open to them and that 
the examinations for mate were too hard, especially given the lack of tuition. 
The title of mate carried a considerable stigma, and ex-rating officers struggled 
socially  the committee suggested they receive a first appointment to the 
Mediterranean to maximise their chance of finding a suitable wife.126 
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  110 
Some action was taken to meet these concerns. Greater efforts were 
made to encourage suitable boy seamen to aim for a commission. Educational 
opportunities for candidates were improved. The system was modified to 
improve a man’s chances of succeeding and commission him at a younger 
age.127 There was a real desire to improve the prospects of the best and 
brightest ratings in the Navy and these measures did constitute a genuine 
improvement. Little could be done whilst demand for officers remained so 
limited but by the late 1930s things were starting to improve.128 
The detested title of mate was abandoned in favour of sub-lieutenant in 
1932; candidates were referred to as ‘upper-yardmen’ who in the days of sail 
had been the smartest and bravest of the seamen. Adopting this title served to 
reinforce the superiority of the officer candidates to the rest of the lower-deck 
and suggested officer-like qualities of courage and seamanship skill. It also 
provided candidates with a link to the heritage of the service, albeit one which 
did not provided them with an explicitly officer identity.  
In 1933 the Admiralty attempted to reduce the fees paid by the parents of 
Dartmouth cadets. The proposed reduction was prompted partly by demands 
for democratisation (including the recommendations of the Bennett Committee), 
but mainly by the shortage of candidates and the reduced fees being charged 
by other schools. Dartmouth fees were set at £150 a year (although the parents 
of 30% of the cadets paid less, some as little as £40), but thirty-four public 
schools were charging under £100.129 The annual cost of running the college 
had been reduced by £32,000 and the Navy was hoping to pass some of these 
savings on to parents.130 
 The Finance Committee of the Admiralty considered the current fees to 
be reasonable, in line with good schools and the cost of launching a boy into 
another career. A rising number of serviceman’s sons were entering Dartmouth 
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 suggesting that the shortage of candidates was caused by concerns about 
career prospects, rather than the cost.131 
 A note from the First Lord’s private office supported this argument. It 
stated that pre-war Dartmouth entries had attracted around 150 candidates, 
early 1920s entries about 100, and recent entries around 70. The note 
considered disarmament to be the main cause of the candidate shortage; the 
axing of so many officers had created a feeling that the Royal Navy could not 
guarantee a full career. However the inflexibility of the system for allocating 
reduced fees meant that the income of the families receiving the reductions 
varied considerably from term to term, which was off-putting to poorer families 
as well as being unfair. The First Lord wanted more control over the allocation 
of reduced fee places and a kit purchase allowance for the poorest cadets.132 
 Further investigation revealed that the very cheap public schools were 
small and had many day boys. Dartmouth was charging similar fees to the 
schools it hoped to compete with. The Board of Education supplied the following 
data: 
 
Table 3  Annual cost to parents of selected public schools in 1933. 
Reproduced from TNA ADM 1/8767/102.133 
 
School Annual boarding 
fees (£) 
Annual fees for 
tuition (£) 
Total (£) 
Charterhouse 87 63 150 
Westminster 84 60 144 
Clifton 100 50-60 150-160 
Cheltenham Not given Not given 150-160 
 
Ultimately, the Admiralty decided that normal fees could not be reduced 
below £150. However the Treasury was asked to remove the fee of 8s a term 
for bedding, to give an allowance of £40 to purchase the kit of the poorest 
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cadets, and to give control of fee reductions to the Admiralty.134 The Treasury 
agreed to most of these requests. Bedding charges were removed and kit 
allowances granted. The Admiralty was given control over the reduced fees and 
the kit grants, but the lowest fees of £40 were now limited to King’s Cadets 
except in exceptional circumstances.135 
This episode was significant for several reasons. Firstly it demonstrates 
that the Navy was, by this time, committed to allowing boys from relatively poor 
families to become naval officers. Secondly it shows that ambitions for 
Dartmouth had not changed, it was still intended to complete with top public 
schools. Thirdly it demonstrates the control the Treasury was able to exert over 
officer selection. By refusing to give the Admiralty full control of cadet fees it 
ensured they remained at a level which excluded the poor but did not unduly 
subsidise the wealthy. Significantly, control of discounted fees was ceded only 
once it was proved that the normal cost to parents of Dartmouth was similar to 
that of sending a boy to a well regarded public school. 
The expansion of the fleet from 1935 onwards meant that large numbers 
of officers were required. In 1936 it was decided to transfer up to three-hundred 
Reserve officers to full time Royal Navy service, to retain officers approaching 
retirement, and to recall some of those who had retired.136 In 1939 Volunteer 
Reserve officers were offered three year full time appointments, and a scheme 
was put in place to promote young warrant officers to commissioned status.137 
There was a dramatically increased demand for junior officers, and this finally 
created an opportunity for large-scale democratisation.  
The increased demand for officers was met through increasing the 
numbers entered through all three commissioning sources. By far the greatest 
increase was in the number of Special Entries because this scheme could be 
expanded quickly and simply and produced officers relatively quickly. Although 
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Dartmouth was still seen as the best chance of securing top quality candidates, 
numbers increased less dramatically owing to the long training time.138  
The picture for lower-deck promotion via the Mate scheme was more 
complicated, efforts at expanding it were hampered by the low numbers of 
ratings recruited in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and by the rising demand for 
senior ratings. Consequently, the mid 1930s were the low point for 
advancement, only 3 men being promoted in 1935. Numbers improved as the 
demand for officers and supply of candidates increased.139 
As the table below demonstrates, the expansion of the officer corps was 
characterised by increasing emphasis on the Special Entry as opposed to 
Dartmouth; as the Special Entry was the more democratic of the two, some 
progress in democratisation was inevitable. This progress cannot be accurately 
measured owing to the lack of available data. Naval ratings continued to 
comprise a very small proportion of those becoming executive officers. 
 
Table 4  Executive officers entered per year, 1930-1939. Derived from 
TNA ADM 116/4734.140 
(cadets entering Dartmouth and Special Entry, ratings promoted to sub-
lieutenant via the Mate scheme).  
Year Dartmouth % of 
total 
Special 
Entry 
% of 
total 
Lower- 
Deck 
% of 
total 
1930 112 86 12 9 6 5 
1931 97 80 12 10 12 10 
1932 100 78 20 16 8 6 
1933 104 77 25 16 6 4 
1934 100 75 29 22 5 4 
1935 124 78 32 20 3 2 
1936 135 64 72 34 4 2 
1937 145 56 100 39 13 5 
1938 130 53 100 41 17 7 
1939 129 51 100 39 24 9 
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Numerous difficulties were experienced in increasing promotion from the 
lower-deck, most of them outlined in a series of reports compiled in 1937. 
Respondents reported that the examinations were too difficult, study facilities 
too few, and that men were discouraged by the cost of living in the wardroom 
and the fact that candidates could not be married. It was reported that whilst 
boy seamen were ambitious, once settled into the fleet as able seamen these 
ambitions disappeared. Candidates who persisted received little 
encouragement from their messmates or their officers, rumours abounded of 
high failure rates and unfair interviewers.141 
These complaints were much the same as had been voiced in 1931, 
indeed many had surfaced in 1912. Little action was taken to resolve them, 
possibly the will did not exist, certainly there were enormous practical difficulties 
to be overcome  in particular providing the appropriate environment and 
support for the development of promising young ratings. 
A further factor also intervened  the serious and increasing shortage of 
senior ratings. From 1935 onwards the recruitment of ratings was gradually 
increased to meet demand, but this did nothing to ease the increasing shortage 
of experienced or senior ratings.142 By May 1939 the Admiralty was forced to 
reduce the qualifications required for promotion to leading seaman owing to a 
severe shortage of candidates.143 The promotion roster at Portsmouth was 
practically empty and there was a lack of candidates at both Devonport and 
Chatham; this when over a thousand additional leading seamen would be 
required in the following financial year.144  
The problem was not likely to be eased in the near future  the 
Department of Personnel Services estimated that there would be no substantial 
increase in the number of men with at least three years service as able seamen 
(the minimum required for promotion to leading seaman) until 1941.145 Under 
these circumstances the best and brightest ratings, especially those with 
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several years of experience, were desperately needed on the lower-deck; junior 
officers could be produced from scratch more quickly than senior ratings. 
The shortage of candidates for promotion illustrates the fact that naval 
preparations for a future war could not be limited to the construction of new 
ships. Manning these ships posed also posed considerable difficulties  
arguably greater than those involved in ship construction  because the 
required men had to be entered and trained before the new ships were 
commissioned. 
Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that ratings continued 
to make up a very small proportion of those becoming officers. There was in 
fact a substantial increase in the number of men promoted; the 24 men 
promoted in 1939 represented a four-fold increase on the 6 promoted in 1933 
and a six-fold increase on the 4 promoted in 1936. This increase in numbers 
represented a genuine improvement in the commissioning prospects of ratings, 
even as they continued to constitute less than 10% of those becoming officers. 
 The problems caused by First World War policies were the guiding force 
behind new wartime manning policies developed during the inter-war period. 
The Royal Navy needed a system that would deliver sufficient personnel of all 
ranks for wartime without requiring excessive redundancies or massive 
education programmes in the subsequent peace. There was no question of 
Dartmouth cadets being sent to sea early but they were to be left ashore to 
complete their education, not because of their youth.146 Other youth entries 
continued in their peacetime form  sixteen year old boy seamen and Royal 
Marine buglers continued to serve at sea in wartime.  
 The extra officers needed by the wartime fleet were, in the main, to be 
chosen from amongst the volunteers recruited for temporary, wartime only, 
service. They were identified during their training as ratings and sent for officer 
training after they had gained practical experience. Typically, they became 
officers within a year of joining the Royal Navy  following ten weeks of basic 
training, three months of sea time as ratings, and twenty weeks of officer 
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training.147 Under this system service as a rating was the proving ground for 
potential officers  a complete reversal of the normal policy of removing 
potential officers from the mess decks as soon as possible. Despite these 
changes commissioning opportunities for regular ratings remained very limited.  
The Volunteer Reserve, into which wartime officers were entered, had 
initially served ashore during the First World War because Churchill did not 
believe it would be of any use at sea; many of its members fought ashore 
throughout the war.148 In the Second it was entrusted with sea service, even to 
the extent of being given command (initially in trawlers and other small vessels, 
later in corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and submarines). The wartime Royal 
Navy was extremely successful  the hastily trained wartime recruits performing 
well in the most arduous conditions. This success was only possible because all 
but the smallest ships had a backbone of experienced, fully trained, regular 
personnel. All this lay in the future, in the mean time the entry of Fisher-
Selborne and Special Entry cadets continued and both schemes struggled to 
attract sufficient candidates. 
 
Fisher-Selborne Scheme Selection in the 1930s 
 
The extra places at Dartmouth were increasingly taken up by the sons of naval 
officers. The increased willingness of naval officers to send their sons to 
Dartmouth appears to have been due to the fee concessions available and 
increased confidence in the prospects of a naval career. It attracted adverse 
opinion:  Mr Parker, MP for Romford, complained in March 1937 that the 31% of 
Dartmouth cadets were officers’ sons and that the college was becoming a 
dumping ground for naval offspring with no other prospects. Parker believed this 
was damaging the Navy  making reference to ‘educational inbreeding’.149 
Parker’s comments had no effect; in May 1938, 155 of the 496 cadets at 
Dartmouth (31.25%) were the sons of officers in the Royal Navy or Royal 
Marines.150  
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There is nothing to suggest that the interviewers were actively 
encouraged to favour boys from service backgrounds. But they would have 
been well aware that many families had a tradition of naval service, and in some 
cases would have served with relatives of the boys they were interviewing. 
Furthermore the Admiralty’s efforts to expand the provision of King’s 
Cadetships, and the 1925 suggestion by DTSD Captain Hugh Tweedie that the 
sons of naval officers should automatically pass the selection interview,151 
suggest that a substantial number of senior officers did favour recruiting boys 
from naval backgrounds. There were solid grounds for doing so, these boys 
might have been brought up to love and revere the Navy and would certainly be 
familiar with the realities of naval life  in particular the long periods spent away 
from home. Their decision to join the service was more informed than that of 
other candidates and they could be expected to adjust to naval life more 
quickly. 
Perhaps the large number of officer’s sons entering Dartmouth was 
symptomatic of difficulties in recruiting sufficient good quality cadets from other 
backgrounds. Official files offer some evidence of serious difficulties in 
Dartmouth recruiting in the late 1930s. The first concerns surfaced in 1936, and 
were an important factor in the subsequent adoption of the house system. The 
Second Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Martin Dunbar-Nasmith, wrote to the Captain of 
the College, Rear-Admiral Reginald Holt, stating that there was ‘very 
considerable concern’ at the shortage of candidates. Dartmouth was attracting 
around two candidates for every place, the Admiralty wanted three.152 
 Holt replied that the parents of potential cadets generally preferred the 
Special Entry. He cited the later age of entry (enabling boys to attend their 
father’s old public school and then make an informed choice about their career), 
the possibility of being forced into engineering, and opposition from prep school 
headmasters (they were wary of the interview and thought the curriculum only 
suitable for the Navy) as the key reasons for this.153 
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 Supporting remarks by the Headmaster, Eric Kempson, suggested that 
the lower cost of the Special Entry was attractive to parents. He accused the 
Admiralty of failing to defend Dartmouth against attacks made in the press. He 
thought that prep school headmasters should be invited to hold their annual 
conference at the college so that their views might be changed.  
 Kempson also offered remarks on the quality of entrants to the college. 
The marks obtained in the entrance examinations were not being kept secret. 
Obliged to take candidates who had scored poorly in the examinations, the 
reputation of the college suffered. Cadets who had done badly in the entrance 
examinations openly referred to themselves as ‘charity cases’. On the other 
hand, the boys entering Dartmouth were almost all far cleverer than those 
entering Sandhurst.154 
Dartmouth was far from alone in struggling to attract sufficient 
candidates. The late 1930s were a difficult period for the public school sector, 
with many schools struggling against a lack of pupils and rising costs. There 
was sufficient alarm to prompt a series of investigations by the HMC in the 
1936-1940 period. At a meeting held at the Board of Education on 24 October 
1938 the problem was laid out in detail. After the First World War there had 
been a boom in independent schooling and many new schools had opened, 
demand had now fallen and schools were struggling to find enough pupils to 
survive. Many headmasters had taken to recruiting in prep schools  this was 
so widespread that close relations with prep schools were now a factor in the 
appointment of public school headmasters.155 
 No action was taken following this meeting, despite the emergence of 
some alarming facts during an earlier meeting of the HMC. Pupil numbers had 
dropped from 1931 onwards; this decline looked set to continue, in 1925 a 
reduction in elementary school pupil numbers of around 800,000 over the next 
ten years had been predicted. This did not necessarily translate to a 
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proportionate decline in public school entrants, but it was clear that public 
school enrolment was unlikely to rise in the near future.156 
 Surprisingly the HMC largely ignored the obvious cause of the decline in 
public school enrolment  the economic depression of the 1930s, which had 
destroyed the fortunes of many families meaning that they could no longer 
afford private schooling.157 There is no evidence of the number of families that 
were affected but the evidence gathered by the HMC suggests that financial 
struggles may have been a significant factor in declining enrolment. A survey 
conducted in 1940 found that the schools struggling most were those charging 
middling fees. The most expensive schools attracted the richest parents and 
their prestige meant that parents were willing to make sacrifices in other areas 
in order to pay the fees.  The cheapest schools had undoubtedly gained pupils 
who would previously have been sent to a more expensive establishment.158  
 The struggles of the public schools in the late 1930s are interesting for 
several reasons. In the first place, there was undoubtedly a decline in the 
number of boys available to attend any public school, a fact overlooked by the 
Royal Navy when debating the decline in applications for Dartmouth. The 
increasing tendency of prep schools to direct their pupils to particular public 
schools may have been greatly detrimental to naval recruitment. Similarly, the 
willingness of headmasters to target individual parents in an effort to snare their 
sons gave their schools an advantage over Dartmouth which could not recruit 
pupils in the same way. It must be born in mind however that Dartmouth was 
not merely a public school, but the gateway to a naval career with its own 
particular attractions and drawbacks, and therefore unique problems of pupil 
recruitment. 
 Secondly, the public schools were increasingly democratic institutions. 
Although the top schools remained the exclusive preserve of the rich (except 
perhaps for a few scholarship boys) those at the bottom of the pecking order 
were increasingly turning to public funding and were therefore contributing to 
the rise in poorer but well educated boys seeking entry to the Royal Navy.159 
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These boys had a particularly strong claim  they had received the academic, 
social and moral education of a public school boy and lacked only his financial 
backing. The success of the elementary school boys sent to these schools 
reinforced the argument that they could succeed at Dartmouth if given the 
chance.  
The Royal Navy took no immediate action to meet concerns about the 
quality of those entering and leaving Dartmouth, or even to investigate how far 
these concerns were justified. Instead the naval authorities replaced terms with 
houses and, in 1940, adopted the Common Entrance examinations in an effort 
to make the college more attractive to parents. No systematic investigation into 
the results achieved by cadets was undertaken until 1944.160   
 Two sets of examination results for Dartmouth candidates are available  
those from March and July 1939. Dartmouth candidates were interviewed 
before being examined and those receiving low interview marks did not take the 
examination. Dartmouth candidates received interview grades, ranging from A1 
to C3, rather than marks. B2 was generally the minimum grade from which 
candidates would progress to the examinations.  
In July 1939, 98 candidates were interviewed, 64 progressed to the 
examinations and 43 were ultimately accepted.161 The interview grades were as 
follows A1 6 candidates, A2+ 8 candidates, A2- 8 candidates, B1+ 6 
candidates, B1 7 candidates, B1- 7 candidates, B2+ 9 candidates, B2 13 
candidates, B2- 8 candidates, B3+ 4 candidates, B3 5 candidates, B3- 2 
candidates, C1 6 candidates, C2 3 candidates and C3 1 candidate. On this 
evidence, although the pool of candidates was not large, it was of good quality 
with 22 of the 64 who progressed securing A grades of some kind.  
A total of 600 examination marks were available to Dartmouth candidates 
and the minimum needed to secure entry was normally 310 although 
candidates scoring above 290 might be taken. The marks were allocated as 
follows: English 100, history 50, geography 50, French dictation 70, French oral 
30, arithmetic 75, algebra 50, geometry 75 and Latin 100.162 This mark scheme 
reflects the priorities of both prep schools and the Royal Navy. 200 marks were 
available for mathematics of various forms, reflecting the course at Dartmouth, 
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but 100 were available for Latin  a key subject in prep schools. The 100 marks 
available for English reflected both its important place in the naval curriculum, 
and the increasing emphasis the Royal Navy placed on communication skills. 
A total of 124 candidates took part in the examinations in March and July 
1939, 73 scored at least 310. In the two exams concerned, 11 candidates 
scored under 310 but over 290. The lowest scoring entrant from the March 
examinations had a mark of 302, while in July a score of 291 secured 
admission. Mark distribution for the two examinations combined is as follows: 
500-600 marks 2 candidates 
450-499 marks 4 candidates 
400-449 marks 8 candidates 
350-399 marks 34 candidates 
300-349 marks 32 candidates  
250-299 marks 19 candidates 
200-249 marks 15 candidates 
150-199 marks 5 candidates 
100-149 marks 5 candidates 
Under 100 marks 0 candidates.163 
High marks were rare, of the 124 candidates only 2 scored above 500 
and the best of these scored only 511; further, of those scoring under 500 the 
best score was 465. This suggests that the Dartmouth examinations were hard, 
possibly too hard. Had the examinations been slightly easier, more candidates 
would have scored high marks, and there might have been more separation of 
the bulk of candidates who scored between 300 and 400. Easier examinations 
would, however, also have raised the marks of those who scored 250-299 
marks and such candidates might have struggled at Dartmouth if, as can 
reasonably be assumed, the minimum score of 290 had been arrived at as the 
result of years of experience. As the following table shows, interview marks 
were not always a good guide to examination marks: 
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Table 5  Comparison of interview and examination performance of 
Dartmouth candidates March and July 1939. Derived from TNA ADM 
116/6354.164 
 
Grade Number of 
candidates 
Highest 
mark 
Lowest mark 
 
Average 
mark 
Number 
admitted 
 A1 11 412 243 359 10 
 A2+ 11 511 295 355 11 
 A2 12 465 255 366 11 
 A2- 18 458 185 331 15 
 B1+ 16 504 136 312 9 
 B1 9 455 219 344 7 
 B1- 10 384 143 313 6 
 B2+ 14 368 129 287 9 
 B2 23 407 126 255 6 
 
As the table shows, candidates with high interview grades were more 
likely to secure a pass mark in the entry examinations. Of the 52 candidates 
given A165 grades in the interview 47 secured admission; while of 37 with B2166 
grades only 15 were admitted and the average mark was too low to secure 
admission. 
 Although the average marks for candidates graded A2 and B1 are higher 
than might be expected, both averages benefit from the lack of very low scoring 
candidates. Whilst there are clear patterns, candidates of each grade scored a 
wide variety of marks. Overall, analysis of the results from the examinations of 
Dartmouth candidates held in March and July 1939 supports the view of the 
Royal Navy that interviews were a good way to assess a potential officer. Most 
of those who gained high interview grades also did well in the examinations and 
very few candidates with high interview grades failed to secure a pass mark.  
The lists of successful candidates from these examinations are 
dominated by the sons of military personnel, and in particular naval officers. Of 
the 89 candidates, 32 had fathers in the armed services, whilst another was the 
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son of a former RAF chaplain. 18 had fathers in the Royal Navy (20%), 10 in the 
Army (11%), 2 in the RAF, and 1 each in the Royal Marines and Royal Fleet 
Auxiliary.167 The naval officers ranged in rank from lieutenant to rear-admiral 
and 3 were paymasters although none were engineers.  
 Of the other candidates, 24 had fathers involved in the commercial world, 
6 in law, 3 employed by the government (all of them holding high level 
positions),168 6 in agriculture and 9 engineers, a further 9 candidates cannot be 
placed into any of these groups. There were also 2 doctors and 4 clergymen. 
Aside from the vast growth in the number of officer’s sons, perhaps 
prompted by the increased confidence arising from rearmament, the 
background of those selected for Dartmouth was much as it had been in 1903. 
The large number of officer’s sons suggests that the college was more 
affordable than it had once been, but it clearly remained the domain of wealthy 
families from the upper and upper middle classes. The makeup of the cadet 
body did not reflect the increasing keenness of the Royal Navy to recruit boys 
from state schools, largely because the Special Entry remained the preferred 
route to democratisation. 
 
Special Entry Selection in the late 1930s 
 
In 1937 a note by the Head of the CW Branch called attention to the high 
academic standards and increasingly public school-like atmosphere of many 
state schools. He was a civilian but nobody challenged his assertion that: ‘The 
Navy would lose little or nothing by obtaining an increasing number of Special 
Entry cadets from secondary schools’.169 
Whilst nobody in the Admiralty objected to increasing the number of 
secondary school entrants, they were still limited in number and were not 
universally appreciated. After a visit to HMS Erebus, Captain Harold Burroughs 
of HMS Excellent wrote a letter to C-in-C Portsmouth, Admiral the Earl of Cork 
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and Orrery, in which he stated that eight of the sixty-eight cadets aboard Erebus 
had pronounced regional accents . In Burroughs’ opinion these cadets would 
not be respected by ratings and as such were unsuited to becoming officers.170 
His letter was unofficially forwarded to the Second Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Martin 
Dunbar-Nasmith,  Cork and Orrery commenting that whilst such accents were 
undesirable they were remediable, and did not make a boy unsuited to being an 
officer.171 Dunbar-Nasmith apparently shared his views for he took no action on 
the letter. Whilst Burroughs’ letter offers strong evidence of class bias amongst 
some officers there is no evidence it was typical of naval opinion. 
 The source of candidates was less important than their quality, and in 
1936 this was a matter of concern. The Air Ministry had decided to alter the 
marks available for the RAF officer entry interview from a maximum of 250 to 
300.172 This proposal did not directly affect the Navy, which marked candidates 
out of 400 and was not bound by joint service policy, but it did result in 
substantial Admiralty discussions  not least as the proposed move would have 
resulted in a pass range for naval candidates of 260 and for the other services 
250, these ranges were close enough to consider forming a joint policy.173 
 The CW Branch had noticed that while candidates had historically 
averaged around 650 to 1050 marks out of 1750 available for the combined 
academic testing and interview, they were now averaging 850 to 1150.174 This 
substantial increase clearly had to be investigated  were the standards of the 
examiners slipping or was the quality of the candidates rising? If this was the 
case, was the standard rising across the board or was there a new group of 
very good candidates? Two tables were produced, detailing the highest and 
lowest marks of successful candidates and the marks of candidates taking 
various places. 
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Table 6  Highest and lowest marks of successful candidates for Special 
Entry cadetships, selected years 1928-1936. Reproduced from TNA ADM 
178/210.175 
 
Date Highest Mark Lowest Mark 
November 
1928 
1273 700 
June 1931 1311 723 
November 
1933 
1212 718 
June 1935 1270 688 
June 1936 1267 650 
 
Table 7  Marks obtained by candidates taking particular places in Civil 
Service examinations 1934-1936. Reproduced from TNA ADM 178/210.176 
 
Date 1st 
place 
11th 
place 
21st 
place 
31st 
place 
41st 
place 
November 
1934 
1236 1071 1019 967 902 
June 
1935 
1306 1111 1013 994 972 
November 
1935 
1234 1099 1022 984 941 
June 
1936 
1269 1096 1046 1023 999 
November 
1936 
1305 1158 1103 1064 1055 
 
The first of these tables demonstrates that the highest scoring candidates were 
still at around the same level marks. However, the marks obtained by the lowest 
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scoring entrants were steadily falling. This suggests that although the standard 
of the better candidates was much as it had been, they were in short supply and 
so the Royal Navy was increasingly obliged to take those with poor marks. 
Confusingly, the evidence from this table does not support the statement that 
average mark was increasing.  
 However the table includes only the best and worst marks and ignores 
those in between. This suggests that whilst the highest scoring candidates were 
of the same standard and the lowest scoring candidates slightly worse, those in 
between had improved. This suggestion is borne out by the second table, which 
includes the marks of all those taking the examinations, rather than being 
limited to those wishing to enter the Royal Navy or Royal Marines. 
 In this table the marks obtained by the first placed candidates show no 
particular pattern. The highest mark was obtained in the second examination, 
and thereafter the standard fell again although the first examination was still the 
second lowest score. The candidates finishing eleventh seem to have improved 
slightly, the earliest exam seeing the poorest score of the five. However, unless 
November 1936 was the start of a new leap in standards, the improvement was 
small, only around twenty marks. The candidates finishing twenty-first were 
initially of very similar standard, the twenty-first placed candidates in the first 
three examinations were separated by only nine marks. Thereafter the standard 
appears to have improved, most noticeably in the November 1936 examination.  
 Only among those in lower positions was there a marked improvement. 
The first examination saw the weakest score of those in thirty-first and forty-first 
places and the standard thereafter improved noticeably. Overall, there is no 
clear proof that the quality of candidates was improving. Whilst the examination 
scores of those placing first to forty-first were improving, this improvement was 
uneven and unreliable. However, the November 1936 examinations did see 
scores considerably better than those in the two examinations beforehand. In 
general candidates in the first exam recorded the worst scores.  
 Clearly scores in the Civil Service examinations taken by candidates for 
Special Entry cadetships in the Royal Navy did improve in the mid 1930s. 
However, this improvement was uneven, suggesting that it was not the result of 
improved educational standards or of schools directing their best boys towards 
the armed services. Rather it suggests that as rearmament began so public 
confidence in the armed services as a career rose and they were able to attract 
  127 
better quality candidates  especially as they were now offering more 
vacancies. Alternatively, continuing economic hardship may have reduced the 
career options of many boys  some would then be encouraged to join the 
Royal Navy, a profession that could be entered relatively cheaply and at the 
early age of seventeen.  
 These results also suggest that high scores among candidates in the 
Civil Service examinations were rare and that the best candidates taken by the 
Royal Navy were amongst the best overall. However they also show that the 
lowest scoring candidates taken by the Royal Navy had quite poor results, with 
many scoring under 50%. That the Royal Navy accepted candidates with 
comparatively low scores, suggests that the examinations were harder than 
they need have been. This suggestion is supported by a 1939 claim that 
cramming was almost universal among Special Entry candidates and that at 
least 69% had attended specialist coaching establishments.177  
 In considering the selection system as a whole it is important to compare 
interview and examination marks. This comparison is vital given the emphasis 
placed by the Royal Navy on the interview stage of the selection process. Given 
that the Special Entry examinations preceded the interviews it was not 
uncommon for candidates who had scored very highly in the examinations to be 
rejected. 
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Table 8  Candidates for Special Entry Cadetships who passed the 
examination but failed the interview 1938-1940. Reproduced from TNA 
ADM 1/20540.178 
 
Date Number of 
candidates 
Interview 
failures 
Would have entered if had 
not failed interview. 
3.40 375 7 0 
11.39 475 30 1 
6.39 350 43 4 
3.39 220 10 1 
11.38 307 33 4 
6.38 Not given 19 3 
 
This table shows that the number of Special Entry candidates who 
passed the examination only to be denied entry to the Royal Navy by their 
interview scores was low, only 13 out of 143 failures in 6 examinations. None 
the less, this represents the loss of 13 very intelligent boys to the Royal Navy. 
The results were released to the public making it readily apparent that the Royal 
Navy was rejecting some of the very clever boys it claimed to be keen to recruit.  
 Evidence suggests that the Special Entries interviews of the late 1930s 
may not have provided an accurate picture of the candidates, and that class 
bias played a significant role in these failings. Few interviewers passed on 
detailed comments to the Admiralty, only a list of interview grades and some 
reasoning behind them. One exception was Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer who 
was on the interview board for Special Entry candidates in February and March 
1939.179 Dreyer was well qualified for his appointment  not only had he risen to 
high rank in the Royal Navy but he also had three serving sons and both his 
daughters had married naval officers. 
 Dreyer reported that of the 200 candidates only 6 had failed, the 
remainder having received marks between 50 and 380; 50 being a very low 
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pass and 400 the maximum attainable mark. Unsurprisingly, Dreyer recorded 
that ‘The general impression was that they were fine young fellows’. Around 
40% of the candidates appeared to come from the better public schools, these 
proving easier to assess than the remainder. Dreyer was an enthusiastic 
supporter of the candidates from poorer backgrounds. He did not agree that 
ratings would refuse to be led by those who were not gentlemen by birth; not 
only did he believe the suggestion ‘scandalous’, he also thought that, were they 
to hear it, naval ratings would conclude that the interviewers were not 
themselves gentlemen! In any case, these candidates should not be rejected by 
a navy that would promote their rating brother to officer status. 
 Dreyer had a further complaint, alleging that some lower class 
candidates had been given higher marks than they might otherwise have 
received because they had expressed a preference for engineering. This, 
Dreyer believed, was the executive branch looking after its own  attempting to 
retain its own exclusiveness whilst reducing that of the engineering branch. 
 Aside from these controversial remarks Dreyer suggested several 
refinements. In his opinion boys who had not reached public school leaving age 
were inferior to those who had  he proposed raising the age limit and limiting 
candidates to one attempt at securing entry. He suggested that as the 
representatives of the engineering and paymaster branches and the Royal 
Indian Navy were not concerned with all the candidates they should not 
question any of them.  
 Dreyer’s views are those of a man who had vast experience of his 
service, and was intensely loyal to it, yet was not afraid to criticise. However his 
opinions were not necessarily shared by the majority of his colleagues. Dreyer’s 
career had not been without its controversies and he was not particularly 
popular; the First Lord Alfred Duff-Cooper described him as ‘universally disliked 
and distrusted’.180  
Dreyer’s view of lower class candidates was very positive yet his views of 
the engineering branch appear strangely mixed. On one hand he complained 
that lower class candidates were being pushed towards the engineering branch, 
suggesting a conspiracy to ensure the continuing low status of this branch. On 
the other he did not feel that an engineering officer could fairly question all 
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candidates and this suggests he considered engineer officers poor judges of 
character and, by extension, officer-like qualities. 
 On occasion the conduct of the interviewers was questioned, particularly 
in the late 1930s when more candidates emerged from state schools and the 
lower social classes. There had been isolated complaints on previous 
occasions, but from 1938 onwards a series of complaints thrust the Special 
Entry into the public eye. 
 In January a complaint was received from Lieutenant Colonel RM 
Raynsford on behalf of his son, who had been rejected by the Royal Navy after 
the November 1937 interviews.181 Raynsford complained that the naval officers 
among the interviewers were too old, and suggested the interview board should 
include a psychologist and a headmaster. He felt that too little attention had 
been paid to the school record of his son (who had attended Repton) or his 
passing of Certificate A, in which he had finished first of fifty candidates. 
Further, his son had been asked questions which required only monosyllabic 
answers and did not allow him to do himself justice. Additionally his son had 
been criticised for stating his brother’s job in the Royal Navy rather than his 
rank, and most of the general knowledge questions he had been asked were 
irrelevant.182 
 The CW branch said that it took great care to appoint naval officers of 
appropriate experience and that a psychologist would be unhelpful. It did 
concede that a headmaster would be a useful addition, but felt it would be 
impossible to find anyone with no connection to any of the candidates. Internal 
correspondence confirmed the suitability of the interviewers. None the less, 
more care would have to be taken to keep the identity of the interviewers secret 
(numerous enquiries were received from potential string pullers) and it was vital 
that those appointed be of sufficiently high standing that, if recognised, their 
appointment would be beyond criticism.183 
 Here matters rested until July when a complaint was received from the 
father of AEC Griffith, a candidate rejected by the Royal Marines. He 
complained that having gone to the expense of sending his son to famous prep 
and public schools the boy ‘in work and games must have had a standard far 
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above the ordinary candidate’. His demands for an explanation of his son’s 
rejection were refused, although the Admiralty assured him there was no slur on 
the boy’s intelligence.184  
 These candidates came from typical backgrounds  they were from 
wealthy families and had been educated at expensive schools. Their complaints 
might therefore be seen as a product of increasing democratisation, although in 
neither case did the complainant suggest that their boy had been rejected in 
favour of somebody from a poorer background in order to pacify politicians or 
public opinion (although this suggestion is not far from the surface).  
 Both these candidates can be perceived as being the unlucky, if 
justifiable, victims of interviewers who  although fair  were faced with a 
multitude of suitable candidates. By contrast the November 1938 interviews 
appear to have gone badly wrong. The first complaint arrived soon after the 
results were announced and came from the godfather of PG Hurford-Jones, 
denied entry to the Royal Marines.185 The complaint was not unreasonable  on 
his previous attempt the boy had scored 300 out of 400 for the interview but on 
this occasion he had failed to secure a passing mark. 
 The situation would have been prevented had the November 
interviewers known Hurford-Jones’ earlier mark. Hurford-Jones had not failed 
on the second occasion because of his performance, but because he had been 
judged to be of Negroid appearance; when questioned the chairman of the 
interview board explained that ‘from his appearance he is unsuitable to be a 
naval officer’.186 This was not something that the Admiralty wished to raise with 
the boy’s family. Fortunately Hurford-Jones had done badly enough in the 
academic tests to put himself out of contention, and so the matter did not 
become public, and the need to explain the interview mark did not arise. 
 Entry to the officer corps of the Royal Navy was limited to white men. 
Within the service it was believed that ratings would not willingly serve under an 
ethnic minority officer.187 The Royal Navy was probably no more racist than the 
rest of British society at the time, although it did offer racial exclusivity as an 
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inducement to join; How to Become a Naval Officer promised that ‘your 
messmates will all be white men’.188 
The interviewers were not only biased against candidates who did not 
appear to be of the desired ethnicity. Engineer Commander PF Griffiths wrote to 
complain about the treatment of his son who, like Hurford-Jones, had made a 
second appearance before the interviewers.189 On his first attempt the boy had 
scored 250 interview marks but failed the educational examinations; on his 
second his exam marks had risen but his interview mark fell to 80. This fall was 
mysterious given that the boy was praised by the military side at Cheltenham 
where he was a member of the upper sixth form, a prefect, and a sergeant in 
the OTC. In this case the Admiralty could only conclude that the interview 
committee had been biased against the boy.190  
After eight more complaints the Admiralty ruefully concluded that 
‘evidence is accumulating that the November interview committee did not 
handle their job too skilfully’.191 The preferred solution was that interviewers 
should sit on multiple boards to introduce some consistency and it was agreed 
that a headmaster would be a useful addition to the board. To this end 
correspondence was opened with the HMC via Claude Elliott, the Headmaster 
of Eton, who suggested that a university don or retired headmaster might 
provide an acceptable solution.192  
By now however the attention of Their Lordships had been distracted by 
a case than had become embarrassingly public. The case of GWM Morgan had 
been raised in parliament by his MP, James Griffith, and the Admiralty had to 
move to fight the fire. Morgan had finished 18th in the academic examinations, 
beating 79 successful applicants, but received a failing mark of 40 for the 
interview. This, Griffith suggested, was a clear case of class bias. Morgan was 
captain of the school rugby team, a member of the cricket team, and clearly the 
leader of the boys in his school. Unfortunately for Morgan, the school in 
question was the decidedly obscure Amman Valley County School in Llanelli.193   
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Griffith complained that Morgan’s interview had lasted for only five 
minutes. He had been asked about his reading of the work of WH Davies but 
felt that the interviewers knew nothing about Davies or Welsh culture. Apart 
from being Welsh, Morgan felt he had been discriminated against because his 
school was co-educational. Griffith complained that only six of the successful 
candidates had not come from well-known public schools and was firmly of the 
opinion that the interviewers were biased in their favour. Griffith was followed by 
the MP for Brigg, who alleged that his constituent had been denied entry 
because his father drove a bus.194  
These allegations were met by Mr Shakespeare, Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Admiralty. He reminded the House that the Royal Navy had an 
important diplomatic role for which not all boys were suitable. He explained that 
boys from smaller, less known, schools were much harder to judge than those 
whose schools were larger or better known. These schools were an unknown 
quantity and the judgement of their headmasters not always reliable. Of the 75 
HMC member schools attended by successful applicants, 20 were grant aided 
and so the successful candidates came from a less exclusive background than 
might be assumed at first sight. Finally, the questions Morgan had been asked 
were, like those asked to all candidates, designed to draw him out of himself 
and help him to talk to the interviewers.195  
Following this embarrassment the Admiralty and the Civil Service worked 
to avoid a repeat. It was generally agreed that whilst the Special Entry 
interviews would benefit from the introduction of a headmaster, continuity was 
more important. Therefore either the senior civil servant or the flag officer, if not 
both, must serve on consecutive boards. Whilst the autonomy of the 
interviewers was important, the Admiralty decided it had a right to demand 
explanations of surprising verdicts and was keen to make available the marks 
achieved by candidates on previous attempts.196  
Action was slow in coming  after the November 1939 interviews three 
candidates who had failed were admitted to the Royal Navy on the personal 
insistence of Winston Churchill, now First Lord. These candidates had finished 
fifth, eighth, and seventeenth in the examinations but had been rejected. One 
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was the son of a chief petty officer, another the son of a merchant navy 
engineer, and the third had a slight cockney accent. Churchill concluded they 
had been rejected for no good reason but as a result of class bias ‘wholly 
contrary to the principles approved by parliament’.197 
Clearly many Special Entry candidates felt that they had been rejected 
unfairly. They criticised the interviewers who they felt had questioned them 
unreasonably, paid them little attention, or discriminated against them. They 
were sufficiently angry to mobilise the support of their fathers, guardians and 
MPs in support of their cases. Several came to public notice to the considerable 
embarrassment of the Admiralty. In many cases their complaints were justified. 
The November 1938 interviews appear to have gone badly wrong, with the 
interviewers demonstrating poor judgement and bias.  
The Admiralty was certainly willing to tackle the issues raised by these 
complaints. Efforts were made to improve the composition of the interview 
boards and great emphasis was placed on the appointment of the best possible 
interviewers. That complaints were received from candidates from a variety of 
schools and backgrounds suggests that even a perfectly composed and entirely 
unbiased interview board would have attracted some level of complaint. Overall, 
whilst the Special Entry interviewers of the late 1930s may not have treated all 
candidates fairly, there is no evidence of any bias on the part of the Admiralty or 
the Royal Navy as a whole. This argument is borne out by the experiences of 
candidates from the period. 
 
Candidate Experiences 
 
The March 1939 Dartmouth examinations provide an interesting opportunity to 
compare a candidate’s perceptions to his performance. Philip Seymour’s 
autobiography includes a detailed description of his experiences at the 
interview. Seymour, whose father was in the Colonial Service, had been born in 
Ceylon and had lived in Fiji before being sent to prep school in England aged 
eight. His father had no firm ambition for his son but, hoping he would become a 
classical scholar, entered him for Winchester and sent him to a prep school 
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specialising in this area. Seymour however determined on joining the Royal 
Navy and his parents acquiesced.  
 Seymour suffered from the same interview nerves as other candidates 
but with several complicating factors. The Admiralty building where the interview 
was held was a completely alien environment; so too was London itself to the 
self described ‘boy from the South Pacific’. Seymour’s prep school might have 
given him some preparation for the sights of London, but as nobody in its sixty 
year history had ever asked to take the naval examinations it was unable to 
help him with practical preparation.198  
 Unsurprisingly Seymour felt that his interview started badly. The 
questions ranged from the reasonable  ‘Why do you want to join the Royal 
Navy?’ to the more bizarre, such as being asked to outline a plan for finding a 
cricket ball lost in a field of long grass. He was he felt saved by the questions on 
the First World War. By outlining most of the Royal Navy’s major exploits in the 
conflict he did at least convince the interviewers of his interest in the Navy. He 
played an accidental trump card when he mentioned the exploits of HM ships 
Broke and Swift. The reaction of the interviewers to this was ‘astonishing. The 
entire committee let out a guffaw, the chairman slapped his side and roared with 
laughter’.199 It transpired that the civilian clothed chairman of the interview board 
was Admiral Sir Edward Evans  better known as Evans of the Broke, and the 
commander of the destroyers in this action.  
 Seymour concluded that ‘my board decided this candidate was not as 
dim-witted as he appeared. Clearly, he had taken the trouble to find out who 
would be in charge of his interview panel. He had looked up his story and had 
an ace to play’.200 In reality this was not the case. Not only were the identities of 
the board unknown to Seymour they were also supposed to be secret. Further, 
Seymour’s A1 grading suggests that his performance generally impressed the 
board.201  
 This is evidence of a gap between the perceptions of a candidate and 
those of the interview board. Writing in early 1990s Seymour’s recollections 
may not have been entirely accurate, but none the less here is a candidate who 
felt that his interview performance was generally poor and yet received the 
                                               
198
 Seymour, Africa, p.6  
199
 Seymour, Africa, p.7 
200
 Seymour, Africa, p.8 
201
 TNA ADM 116/6354 Note from the Oxford and Cambridge Examinations Board ‘Naval 
Cadetships Examination March 1939: List of Candidates in Order of Total Marks’ un-dated 
  136 
highest possible grade. Unfortunately no official notes on Seymour’s interview 
have survived, only the note of his grade on the list of examination results.  
In 1938 Robert Clarkson felt that another war with Germany was 
inevitable and decided to join the Royal Navy rather than go to university where 
his studies would likely be interrupted. Facing the Civil Service examinations in 
March 1939 he was ‘given a refresher course in mathematics and told that the 
history and English ought to be a pushover’. The history examination did go 
well, but Clarkson was later to discover he had finished sixth from bottom in 
English, which he had planned to study at Oxford  illustrating the gap between 
the functional role of the language in the armed services and the more literary 
bent pursued by most educational institutions. 
 Many of the interview questions he remembers concerned his school 
career. Although his school was four hundred years old he suspected that the 
interviewers were not familiar with it; he was closely questioned as to the fixture 
list and prowess of the cricket and rugby teams of which he was part. Clarkson 
was also asked what he thought his role in the Royal Navy would be  he was a 
candidate for paymaster so perhaps the role of the executive officer was 
thought to be clearer.202 
 One candidate who failed the interview did record his experiences in his 
autobiography. RB Crosley did not enter the Royal Navy in 1937 but joined the 
Fleet Air Arm in 1940, and made his career there rather than return to his 
peacetime profession the police force. Seeking advice about the interviews 
Crosley was informed that candidates were examined by around twenty 
admirals, and that it was essential to arrive with a taxi number memorised  
even if one had not travelled by taxi; an acquaintance claimed he had only 
passed after noticing the collar of one of the interviewers was undone.  
 Initially Crosley’s interview went well. He was questioned on his hobby of 
sailing and on being a member of his school cricket team. Ultimately however 
he failed by thirteen marks which he suspected was as a result of perceived 
communist tendencies. Despite this slight Crosley does not suggest that the 
interviewers were unfair or that the process itself was wrong.203 
 The experiences of Seymour, Clarkson and Crosley would have been 
recognised by any candidate for a naval cadetship from the 1903-1939 period. 
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The stability of the selection process was a tribute to those who had originally 
developed it. Although far from perfect, it served to identify the boys who 
became the officers that led the Royal Navy to victory in the Second World War. 
This continuity was in contrast to the change in the type of boy thought suitable. 
Throughout this period the main practical officer selection concern of the 
Royal Navy was to find enough suitable candidates. However from a historical 
view point the over-arching theme is democratisation, the gradual process of 
which was helping to shape the future of the officer corps of the Royal Navy. 
Whereas changes to officer education and training were driven almost entirely 
by naval concerns, democratisation was driven largely by politicians, in 
particular Churchill and Alexander. 
During this period a measure of genuine democratisation occurred. 
Commissioning prospects for ratings were improved, a system of reduced fees 
was introduced, and the democratic possibilities of the Special Entry exploited. 
It is true that the impact of these measures was very limited but it is a gross 
injustice to accuse the Royal Navy of actively opposing democratisation. 
Despite vocal protestations to the contrary, by the Labour Party and others, 
there was genuine enthusiasm for democratisation within the officer corps. 
While it is true that many officers wished to retain the exclusivity of the officer 
corps; others were in favour of change. Their efforts to produce it were 
generally frustrated by changing naval manpower requirements and Treasury 
parsimony rather than their colleagues. 
 Although it generated a great deal of hot air and paperwork, in practical 
terms, democratisation was a lesser concern to the Royal Navy than 
maintaining an adequate supply of suitable candidates. Throughout the inter-
war period the Royal Navy struggled to secure the boys it needed  potential 
candidates were put off by the disapproval of schoolmasters, the high cost of 
entry, opposition to war, and the prospect of being axed from the service. Their 
parents were alarmed by these factors and also by the strenuous lifestyle of 
cadets and the narrowness of a Dartmouth education. 
 The factor that is easiest to overlook is the changing manpower demands 
of the Royal Navy, the impact of which is mentioned above. The shrinking Royal 
Navy of the 1920s simply did not need extra officers promoted from the lower-
deck, even if it could have afforded to train them. Conversely, the Royal Navy of 
the late 1930s was in desperate need of both trained ratings and junior officers 
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 the latter could be produced in less time and so democratisation was 
sacrificed to meet operational requirements.  
Increased manpower requirements also helped to make the Special 
Entry more attractive than Dartmouth to the naval authorities; it offered a shorter 
training period and a lower cost per officer. The Special Entry also became the 
chosen means of democratising the officer entry and perhaps more boys from 
working and lower middle class backgrounds should have become Special 
Entry cadets in the late 1930s. However to have recruited these boys in large 
numbers would have required modified selection and educational schemes, 
which were neither practical nor advisable when the Navy was already in a state 
of flux and might have discouraged candidates from the existing sources. By 
adhering to its existing practice the Royal Navy ensured the continuation of an 
already successful system.
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Chapter Two  The Royal Naval Colleges Dartmouth and Osborne 
 
Most naval officers of the 1903-1939 period began their careers at the Royal 
Naval Colleges Osborne and Dartmouth. These institutions, central to the officer 
education process, operated in a unique dual role as both public schools and 
naval establishments. They provided cadets not only with an academic 
education, designed to be the equal of that provided by a top public school, but 
also with a thorough indoctrination into the ways of the Royal Navy. 
 Numerous aspects of the college experience were designed to develop 
officer-like qualities. The entire experience was calculated to produce devotion 
to the Royal Navy. The academic curriculum was tailored to the demands of the 
naval profession. There was an emphasis on self-discipline, obedience and 
physical and mental hardening. However cadets had little opportunity to develop 
a sense of responsibility, learned little about seamanship, and had very few 
leadership opportunities. 
 Of the two only Osborne was the direct product of the Fisher-Selborne 
scheme. Construction of Dartmouth Naval College had begun in 1898, the 
college replaced the existing ship based facilities, providing better living 
conditions and improved educational facilities. Cadet training had taken place at 
Dartmouth since 1863 in which year HMS Britannia had first anchored in the 
River Dart. In 1864 Britannia was joined by HMS Hindustan; and in 1869 Prince 
of Wales took over both Britannia’s name and duties. Thereafter training took 
place aboard the two ships, the establishment being known as Britannia or, 
more informally, ‘the ship’. 
 Dartmouth had many advantages as a location for officer training. The 
town itself was relatively small and isolated, meaning that the cadets could be 
raised away from disease and shore side temptation. The sheltered waters of 
the Dart were ideal for pulling and sailing, cadets could also venture out into the 
open sea. There were some disadvantages, including a lack of flat, well 
drained, land for playing fields and being away from any major naval base. A 
railway was under construction, opening in 1864 and providing a direct link to 
London. In 1877 Britannia Halt was built to serve the ship. Later a through 
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service to London was introduced, cutting the journey from Paddington to 
Dartmouth to under six hours.1 
 Certainly Dartmouth was far superior to Portsmouth and Portland which 
had previously been used for cadet training. Portsmouth, although a great naval 
base, offered far too much by way of temptation and a great risk of disease. 
Portland was unpleasantly isolated and suffered from poor weather. So great 
were the advantages of Dartmouth that the decision was made to build the new 
naval college there rather than move to another location; Gosport, Hayling 
Island, Devonport, Weymouth and Milford Haven were among the alternatives 
considered.2 When the first Fisher-Selborne scheme cadets arrived at 
Dartmouth in 1905 a clear effort was made to separate them from the cadets 
still serving in Britannia and the scheme that had produced them. 
 Only one term of cadets moved from the ships into the newly opened 
college; where they were out-numbered by, and carefully segregated from, 
those who had joined via the Fisher-Selborne scheme. The remainder were 
sent to Bermuda to complete their training. Many of the staff, both naval and 
civilian, were replaced. The name Britannia was retained until 1908 when the 
college was re-designated as HMS Espiegle  a clear effort to break with the 
past. None the less, many at the college retained a love of the ship which 
remained in the Dart until 1916. Her departure did not result in the end of her 
traditions; for example ‘ship’ remained the rallying cry for college sports teams. 
 The Fisher-Selborne scheme required a course lasting four years rather 
than its predecessor’s two; consequently extra accommodation for cadets was 
needed. Rather than greatly enlarging Dartmouth it was decided to provide 
separate facilities for cadets in the first two years of the course. It was 
suggested that these cadets be housed aboard ships; the three-deck screw ship 
Marlborough and the 1875 built barque rigged battleship Superb were 
earmarked for the task. The use of these vessels would have been somewhat 
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ironic given Fisher’s enthusiasm for modernity and, unsurprisingly, on his 
insistence it was decided to build a junior college ashore instead.3 
 The decision was made to construct the junior college at Osborne on the 
Isle of Wight, King Edward VII having no use for his mother’s favourite 
residence. Victoria’s house went untouched; the new naval college took shape 
in the outbuildings and grounds. The site offered various advantages  whilst 
secluded it was reasonably accessible, and was close to the naval base at 
Portsmouth. This was especially advantageous as Fisher left the Admiralty to 
become C-in-C Portsmouth and was able to keep a close eye on his creation.4 
Otherwise, Osborne was not particularly well suited to naval training  facilities 
for boat work were few and poor, and the climate was not seen to be particularly 
healthy.  
 The two colleges contrasted greatly in construction, and this reflected the 
differing circumstances of their creation. Osborne was hastily constructed to 
meet an urgent need for new facilities; many of the buildings, including all of the 
cadet dormitories, were constructed of uralite, a compressed felt-like material 
which was attached to wooden frames in two layers with asbestos insulation in 
between. The projected life span of these structures is unclear. Although the 
Admiralty strenuously denied that they were temporary, it admitted they were 
not expected to last a hundred years.5 
 Dartmouth on the other hand was a deliberate statement of British naval 
mastery and tradition. The college sat on a hill above the town of Dartmouth, its 
presence both dominating and protective of the town and its merchant shipping. 
The college was of grand construction, the architect Aston Webb had previously 
designed the Victoria and Albert Museum and the Birmingham Law Courts. 
Webb was one of the most respected architects in Britain and the obvious 
choice for a prestigious public building.6 
 The design also reflected the values and aspirations of the inhabitants. 
The college was of similar appearance to the great country houses of the late 
nineteenth century, such as Kinmel, Bryanston and Ditton Place. The domestic 
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tone of the architecture promoted feelings of family and fellowship and thus 
loyalty to the service. At the same time, its grandeur reflected the social 
aspirations of the Royal Navy’s officers and reinforced their upper class status, 
providing them with the grand family home most of them lacked. The college 
was also architecturally similar to many contemporary public schools which 
helped reinforce its status as an educational establishment. In the words of 
Quintin Colville, it ‘allowed naval officers to consolidate and internalise a further, 
and vital, component of middle and upper class status’.7 
 The way in which the colleges were promoted reflected the aspirations of 
their owner rather than the facts of their appearance. Successive issues of How 
to Become a Naval Officer emphasised the beauty and grandeur of the colleges 
as part of their efforts to attract boys from middle and upper class backgrounds. 
Needless to say these opinions were not universally shared. When the designs 
for Dartmouth were released in 1900 Truth magazine informed its readers that 
the building ‘appears to be a combination of a workhouse and a stable’.8 This 
decidedly unflattering description was, unsurprisingly, very different from that 
later applied by How to Become a Naval Officer which discusses the 
‘magnificence’ of the ‘truly beautiful’ college. Perhaps the author was aware of 
Truth’s remarks for he also stated that ‘Dartmouth College is that rare product of 
modern architecture on the grand scale, in that on first sighting the building, the 
visitor feels instinctively that it is neither - one- a lunatic asylum, two- a prison, 
or three- the house of a profiteer’.9 
Osborne generally did not attract such favourable comment. How to 
Become a Naval Officer was favourable enough, describing the surroundings of 
the college as ‘truly Arcadian’ and the bungalow style of the buildings as 
‘picturesquely beautiful’.10 Presenting the college as a desirable rural residence 
likened it to a country house, reinforcing its upper class status. It conveniently 
ignored the nature of the buildings, whilst at the same time suggesting Osborne 
was a suitably inspiring setting for naval training and a healthy environment for 
young boys. Those who actually experienced the college were less favourable, 
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in later years former cadets ungenerously referred to ‘cardboard huts’ and 
‘chicken brooders’.11 
 During the First World War Dartmouth was considerably expanded. 
Osborne on the other hand began to fall into disrepair and disrepute. The uralite 
buildings were fast falling apart and the college was also dogged by poor 
health. The end of the war, and with it the decline in cadet numbers, offered the 
possibility of training all cadets in one place. The decision was taken to close 
Osborne and the last cadets left the college in May 1921. Thereafter Fisher-
Selborne scheme cadets did all their training at Dartmouth; those in their first six 
terms being referred to as the junior college and those in the upper five terms 
as the senior college. The junior and senior colleges had separate mess rooms 
and sporting competitions, and only senior college terms acted as the guard for 
divisions (the guard was required to carry rifles which were too large and heavy 
for most junior cadets to handle properly), there were also some variations in 
the daily routine to allow the younger cadets more rest. 
 The colleges were foremost naval establishments  they carried the 
names of ships, flew the white ensign and had large naval staffs. At the head 
stood the captain, who normally was a captain although he might be a rear-
admiral. As in a ship he had a second in command, who was a commander, 
and a ships company of officers and ratings. This extended to the employment 
of marine sentries rather than civilian watchmen, and naval pensioners who 
variously worked as servants and gave instruction in engineering.  
The college captains were always well respected officers; many had 
distinguished themselves in one or more areas. Hugh Evan-Thomas was a 
personal friend of the King and Martin Dunbar-Nasmith a Victoria Cross winner. 
All the captains of Dartmouth subsequently served as flag officers: Rosslyn 
Wemyss, the first Captain of Osborne, became First Sea Lord.12 They enjoyed 
considerable freedom, and although nominally a subordinate of their local C-in-
C, (Plymouth for Dartmouth and Portsmouth for Osborne), they often 
corresponded directly with the Second Sea Lord. 
 Day to day control of the cadets was largely in the hands of the term 
officers who were normally lieutenants. When the Fisher-Selborne scheme was 
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introduced each term had one engineer and one executive term officer, this was 
later abandoned in favour of a single executive officer. The term officer had a 
range of responsibilities, variously acting as teacher, surrogate father, 
disciplinarian and naval exemplar.13 He was assisted by a petty officer, who 
responsible for keeping the cadets and their belongings clean and tidy and 
providing friendly guidance.14 The naval hierarchy was completed by the cadet 
captains who were similar to public school prefects. 
 The colleges had large civilian academic staffs, although naval officers 
were supplied to teach navigation and mathematics. The headmaster of each 
college reported directly to the captain and oversaw his own staff of masters.15 
The civilian educational staff was given considerable freedom in developing and 
teaching the academic curricula of the colleges. This freedom stemmed from an 
early decision to place the educational side of the Fisher-Selborne scheme in 
the hands of James Ewing. A distinguished scientist and engineer, previously 
professor of engineering at Cambridge University, Ewing was given the newly 
created role ‘Director of Education’ and employed at the Admiralty.16 
Ewing was assisted by two groundbreaking educators Cyril Ashford and 
Charles Godfrey; the former was Headmaster of Osborne from its opening in 
1903 before moving to Dartmouth when it opened in 1905, he was succeeded 
at Osborne by Godfrey. These three men, together with their assistants and 
successors, created a unique and noteworthy system of education. 
 
Educational Origins and Curriculum Development at the Naval Colleges 
 
This system had its roots in the perceived failure of nineteenth century public 
schools to produce men who knew anything about science, mathematics and 
engineering. Such men were essential to maintain the industrial pre-eminence 
of Britain which was considered to be under threat, particularly from Germany 
and the USA. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, there was a variety of 
vocal and influential lobbyists for scientific education, some of them individuals 
but others acting in groups such as the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science.  
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The influential individuals included eminent astrophysicist Sir Norman 
Lockyer, founder of the journal Nature. Lockyer argued that scientific education 
was essential to maintaining British pre-eminence. For instance, in 1901 he 
wrote ‘our intellectual resources are not sufficiently superior to those of other 
nations to enable us to retain our position by brains alone’.17 To maintain 
superiority he believed that ‘the scientific spirit must be applied in England as 
elsewhere’.18 Lockyer quoted a letter written by the chemist Sir Henry Roscoe 
which put the case even more firmly ‘upon education, the basis of industry and 
commerce, the greatness of our country depends’.19  
The views espoused by Lockyer, Roscoe, and their friends had some 
basis in fact; Britain had fallen behind the USA and Germany in developing the 
most advanced science and technology.20 However they also owed much to the 
movement known as Social Darwinism. Darwin was not the originator of this 
movement, but his ideas on evolution became the rallying point for a variety of 
disparate groups; Oldroyd suggests that Social Darwinists variously subscribed 
to ‘conservatism, militarism, racism, rejection of social welfare, eugenics, 
laissez faire and unfettered capitalism’.21 Some Social Darwinists argued that 
nations and races were locked in a perpetual struggle which Britain would lose 
unless her citizens were healthier, fitter, better educated, morally sounder, and 
braver than the rest.  
Searle argues that both the scientific education lobby and the Social 
Darwinists were part of the wide-ranging national efficiency movement; a loose 
organisation of disparate interests united by a feeling that Britain’s international 
pre-eminence was in danger of being lost. Searle traces the origins of the 
movement to the 1870s but states that it became most prominent and influential 
after the Boer War which was seen as clear evidence of general national 
weakness. The panic arising from British failure in the Boer War helped ensure 
enthusiasm for the Fisher-Selborne scheme along with a variety of other 
reforms; amongst which Searle lists the establishment of a national physics 
                                               
17
 Norman Lockyer, ‘Education in the New Century’ in Education and National Progress, Essays 
and Addresses, 1870-1905, ed. by Norman Lockyer (London: Macmillan and co, 1906), pp.118-
130 (p.122) 
18
 ibid, p.126 
19
 This letter is quoted ibid, p.122 
20
 For example see Kennedy, Decline and Fall, pp.187-190 and Robbins, Eclipse, pp.142-147. 
This view has been challenged by authors such as: Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp.11-14 
and Thorpe, Britain in the 1930s, p.67 
21
 Oldroyd, Darwinian Impacts, p.212 
  146 
laboratory, the expansion of secondary and higher education, Haldane’s Army 
reforms, and the establishment of the Committee of Imperial Defence.22  
Under the stimulus of the national efficiency movement British scientific 
education had improved dramatically during the later nineteenth century. The 
first polytechnic opened at Finsbury Park in 1883 and spawned many imitators, 
elsewhere mechanical institutes, evening colleges, and other organisations 
offering classes to working men flourished. University science departments 
expanded and developed improved facilities. The teaching of science and 
mathematics in public schools improved dramatically under a variety of 
influences. In addition to pressure from parents seeking improved educational 
standards, Oxford and Cambridge Universities complained about the standard 
of entering undergraduates. Finally, the introduction of competitive entrance 
examinations for the Civil Service and the Army forced schools to raise their 
standards.23 Money was available for improvements to be made, grants from 
the Department of Science and Art being available to build laboratories and buy 
equipment.24 
These changes occurred gradually and were faster in some schools than 
others. One of the first schools to emphasise science was Clifton College, 
founded in 1862. The school’s early headmasters were a stream of men set on 
reforming scientific education and by 1877 the school had its first laboratory and 
boys studied the subject for ten hours a week. The science and mathematics 
masters employed by the school in its early days included John Perry and 
James Wilson, major forces in revolutionizing the teaching of mathematics.25  
It is unsurprising that a new school such as Clifton should adopt science 
as a major subject.  There was after all no great school tradition in the classics 
and the parents may have favoured a more practical, modern, education. 
Rather more surprising is the revolution in the teaching of mathematics which 
occurred at Winchester College, a far older school (founded in 1382), with a 
great tradition of classical scholarship. However it was in this confident and 
wealthy institution that the future Headmaster of Osborne, Charles Godfrey, 
revolutionized mathematics teaching between 1899 and 1904.  
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Godfrey, a disciple of Perry, believed that mathematics education for 
most boys should be of a practical and simple nature. He attempted to link the 
mathematical theory he taught to its practical utilities and abandoned many 
traditional methods such as Euclid, previously the standard textbook of 
geometry in British public schools. The practical nature of Godfrey’s course 
extended to the use of laboratories, in which mathematics could be applied to 
simple scientific problems. Godfrey’s ideas for teaching mathematics to boys of 
secondary school age were fully implemented at Osborne, of which he said 
proudly ‘all the main functions of differentiation and integration are exemplified 
without using any function more abstruse than xn’..26 In short Godfrey had 
created a system of teaching practical mathematics, designed for functional use 
by engineers and scientists.  
Godfrey and Ashford represented opposing viewpoints on scientific 
education. Godfrey represented the methods pioneered at Clifton, which 
emphasised accuracy, discipline, concentration and factual recall; while Harrow, 
where Ashford had been Head of Science, favoured a method in which scientific 
facts and laws were derived from known facts and observed results.27 Although 
the Clifton approach was probably more attractive to the Royal Navy, not least 
as it offered physics as a disciplinary substitute for Latin, the naval colleges 
appear to have adhered more to Harrovian methods.  
Still another system developed at Oundle under the guidance of 
Frederick Sanderson headmaster from 1892 to 1922. At Oundle boys were 
given basic instruction in science and engineering and then more or less left 
alone to work on the projects of their choice. The well equipped laboratories and 
workshops were always open, with only the most dangerous chemicals locked 
up. Most of the work was done in groups and there was an emphasis on 
communal achievement. Many projects focussed on real world problems such 
as casting replacement parts for farm machinery or investigating the best ways 
of growing wheat.28 Needless to say there was no suggestion that the happy 
hedonism of Oundle had a place in naval education. 
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The syllabus adopted by the two naval colleges was highly innovative. A 
great deal of time was devoted to engineering; at Osborne fifteen out of the 
thirty-eight periods each week.29 The engineering syllabus was not confined to 
the study of naval machinery, instead a wide ranging course was designed with 
a view to providing a more general educational experience. Engineering was 
expected to demonstrate the principles learnt in science and mathematics, as 
well as to educate cadets in patience and the arts of tool use.30 
The wide range of craft skills taught ensured that cadets became capable 
handymen, competent to undertake a wide variety of simple maintenance tasks, 
and confident in taking on other practical problems. This was a useful precursor 
to a career in a highly mechanised service, not unlike the education earlier 
generations of officers had received in the maintenance and handling of ropes 
and sails, and thus the academic curriculum played a role in the development of 
officer-like qualities.  
Mathematics and science were also prominent in the curriculum, 
occupying nine and a half and five and a half periods respectively at Osborne.31 
Like engineering they were studied not only for their utilitarian value but also as 
a means of encouraging cadets to think. This was an educational system in 
which, rather than relying on proofs and rules, cadets were taught a variety of 
practical skills and could choose which to apply to any problem. They did not 
waste time on hypothetical problems but instead applied their knowledge to real 
world situations, especially those they could expect to encounter as naval 
officers. This alternative approach was summed up by TW Mercer who wrote 
that: ‘An appalling amount of time used to be spent on […] ingenious puzzles 
about cows engaging in contests with uniformly growing grass’.32 
The innovative mathematical curriculum was not anticipated; indeed the 
proposals for the Fisher-Selborne Scheme indicated that cadets would study 
Euclid.33 When questioned in the House of Commons in March 1903 the 
Secretary to the Admiralty, Arnold-Foster, explained that the exact nature of the 
curriculum was being discussed by experts and that consequently the syllabus 
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would not be revealed for some time.34  Ashford later stated that the objectives 
of the course were always very clear and, although given considerable freedom, 
his staff was closely observed by the demanding naval authorities.35 Although 
the teaching at Osborne and Dartmouth has attracted little attention from 
educational historians, it is held to have been both innovative and of high 
quality.36 
Attempts by the teaching staff of the colleges to create a liberal 
curriculum, in which cadets were taught to think and experiment, were often 
thwarted by the naval authorities who emphasised utilitarian, professional 
learning. This clash of values was largely the result of the attempt at the 
foundation of the colleges to combine the two schools of thought. The plans of 
the civilian staff were effectively thwarted by their limited power to oppose the 
naval, and by the appointment of a largely naval staff to teach the civilian 
designed engineering course. The engineering part of the syllabus was quickly 
hijacked and used to create competent technicians rather than as a means for 
understanding scientific principles as cadets devoted their time to studying 
naval equipment and developing craft skills.37  
Doubtless many engineers serving at the Colleges thought the interests 
of their profession were best served by introducing cadets to the delights of 
practical naval engineering. In spite of repeated naval interference, the 
educational authorities did succeed in retaining the spirit of the original 
curriculum if not the letter. The masters also retained their pioneering spirit and 
reputation for innovation and quality; in 1932 it was suggested that the college 
should produce a series of physics textbooks.38 
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 Despite the provision of large numbers of quality teachers many cadets 
still failed to meet the required standards and were discharged as a result. 
Parents were warned a term in advance if their son was failing; a policy 
designed to ensure that failing cadets were pressured by their parents to 
maximise their efforts, at the same time allowing for provisional planning of their 
education elsewhere.  
The Annual Report of the Director of Naval Education for 1913 noted that 
between September 1903 and December 1913, 2239 cadets had entered 
Osborne and 50 had joined Dartmouth from various training ships, principally 
the Conway; 999 were still cadets, 1086 were now midshipmen and 204 had 
been withdrawn.39 In January 1913 a total of 914 cadets had been in training at 
the two colleges, over the course of the year 53 had been withdrawn; 24 for 
insufficient academic progress, 26 for medical reasons, 1 for misconduct and 2 
at their parent’s request.40  In the same year, 3 cadets had died and 67 had 
been put down a term.41 That 67 cadets were put down a term but only 24 
discharged for academic reasons suggests that putting cadets down a term was 
a successful measure, enabling them to reach satisfactory academic standards. 
Most of the cadets discharged were in the bottom terms at Osborne, 
withdrawals amongst the higher terms and at Dartmouth were comparatively 
rare, suggesting that many boys initially struggled to adapt to naval life. 
 These problems may have been eased as the staff of the college grew 
more adept at integrating new arrivals. The Custance Committee found that 
whereas originally 10% of entries had been discharged as unsuitable for various 
reasons, by 1912 this had been reduced to 3-4%.42 The early high drop out rate 
had been ensured by so called ‘weeding committees’ which had examined the 
records of cadets at the end of their first year at Osborne and discharged those 
failing to meet requirements.43 Once the weeding committees had been 
abolished, drop out rates had stabilised at around 3-4%. 
 In the early 1920s the curriculum was partly dismantled in response to 
changing circumstances. With common training and inter-changeability being 
abandoned, there was no need for executive officers to have an extensive 
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engineering education. Since most Dartmouth cadets were expected to become 
executive officers, it made sense to reduce the engineering content of the 
course. At the same time, the Navy was anxious to increase the emphasis on 
English, foreign languages and history. What might have been a simple, if 
painful, adjustment became rather complicated as curriculum reform became a 
battle ground between naval and civilian educators. The situation was not 
helped by the Navy partially abandoning its commitment to innovative and high 
quality education. 
One clear sign of changing naval policy regarding the education and 
employment of the officer corps came with the appointment of Alexander 
McMullen as Admiralty Education Advisor in 1919. Although McMullen was 
Ewing’s successor, he did not receive Ewing’s title Director of Naval Education. 
This reflected the control the newly created DTSD exercised over naval 
education  and thus the reduced power of the civilian head of naval education. 
It also symbolised the scaling back of the Royal Navy’s educational aspirations. 
The appointment of Ewing in 1903 had signalled the intent of the Royal Navy to 
provide a revolutionary, engineering focussed, system of education. Replacing 
the eminent engineer with the former Dartmouth Head of Science demonstrated 
that the Royal Navy was now anxious to forego educational innovation in favour 
of consolidation, economy, and tradition.  
 McMullen’s appointment had much to recommend it beyond economy. 
He had been Head of Science at Dartmouth from its opening until the outbreak 
of war and had then served at sea  an attractive combination which also gave 
him invaluable experience of working with ratings, the education of whom was 
also part of the Admiralty Education Advisor’s responsibilities. 
 McMullen took the role up on 20 March 1919. His brief was to give 
‘sound and responsible advice on the question of education’ and his 
responsibilities extended to all Royal Navy and Royal Marine personnel, as well 
as the civilian workers educated in dockyard schools.44 The work was important 
and McMullen’s role was potentially vital. But he was hamstrung by being a 
civilian employed as an advisor and therefore lacking any real power over naval 
policy.  
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 McMullen’s lack of influence became apparent when the issue of 
reforming the college curriculum arose in the early 1920s. Engineering had 
originally been intended to provide the cadets at the naval colleges with a 
general education  it would teach them not only practical skills but also 
patience and precision and give them a deeper understanding of the science 
and mathematics learnt in the classroom. Instead cadets spent most of their 
workshop time learning the practical work of the naval engineer in preparation 
for their future careers. With the requirement to produce naval engineers 
removed, the way seemed clear for the educational authorities to re-appropriate 
the engineering curriculum and re-impose their original aims and ideals.  
 The educators were thwarted and the time allocated to engineering 
instruction was reduced from 1270 to 470 hours, a maximum of 371 of which 
were spent in the workshops. This allowed more time to be devoted to English, 
French, and history  undoubtedly benefitting the general education of the 
cadets.45 That the time was not reallocated to science and mathematics is 
evidence of a change in naval thinking  an increased emphasis on the ability 
of officers to solve tactical rather than mechanical problems and to effectively 
communicate their solutions. 
As First Sea Lord from 1919 to 1927 David Beatty utilised the talents of a 
number of senior officers who favoured radical changes to naval education.46 
Beatty’s fleet tactics had emphasised the need for initiative on the part of ship 
commanders, which was more likely if they clearly understood the aims of their 
commanding officer.47 Beatty also realised that the shrinking Royal Navy was 
increasingly reliant on its dominion partners and so a shared doctrinal and 
tactical base was needed.48  
 Beatty was bolstered by Herbert Richmond who loyally supported him 
whilst serving as DTSD in 1918, much to the distress of the then First Sea Lord 
Rosslyn Wemyss.49 A Richmond article in the May 1919 Naval Review 
commented that the Royal Navy was an organisation ‘in which peculiar danger 
                                               
45
 TNA ED 109/821 Schools Inspection of  Dartmouth 1926 p.3 and p.12 
46
 Kenneth Dewar served in the plans division at the Admiralty, Roger Bellairs as Beatty’s Naval 
Assistant, and Drax as the Director of the Staff College. All had been among the founders of 
The Naval Review and had been brought to the Admiralty, albeit on sufferance, by Beatty’s 
predecessor Rosslyn Wemyss see: Hunt, Richmond, p.90  
47
 Gordon, Rules of the Game, pp.55-56, pp.382-383 and pp.527-528 
48
 Bryan Ranft, ‘Admiral Earl David Beatty (1919-1927)’, in The First Sea Lords: From Fisher to 
Mountbatten ,ed. by Malcolm Murfett (London: Praeger, 1995) pp.127-140 (p.131) 
49
 Hunt, Richmond, p.90 
  153 
is run of stifling initiative, both of thought and action’.50 It is true that Richmond 
was a man of extreme views, which The Naval Review tended to reflect, but 
there is clear evidence that many serving Royal Navy officers had similar 
concerns. 
 In early 1918 Admiral Sturdee invited Grand Fleet officers, whether or 
not they served in his own 4th Battle Squadron, to submit essays on ‘what is 
considered the best education and training for developing in a naval officer, 
character, initiative, power of rapid decision and ability to command in peace or 
war?’.51 Significantly, Sturdee chose to concentrate on personal qualities rather 
than professional skills and made no mention of technical ability.  
Unfortunately there is no evidence of how many essays were submitted, 
or what they suggested, let alone what Sturdee did with them. However that the 
question was asked demonstrates interest in the subject amongst serving 
officers, as well as a willingness to question the existing structures and 
procedures for officer training and education. 
One of the most pressing educational questions was what to do with 
those officers whose education had been seriously disrupted by the First World 
War. The decision was made to send these officers to Cambridge University 
where they were able to study a variety of subjects rather than being put 
through the Navy’s science and mathematics based course at Greenwich. The 
origins of this decision are unclear, Arthur Marder suggests that Richmond was 
responsible, although there is no evidence to support this and the scheme did 
not meet with Richmond’s full approval.52 
The Navy attempted to make this scheme permanent, telling the 
Treasury that it was necessary to counteract officer’s ‘tendency to lack the 
imagination, versatility, breadth of vision and independence of thought which a 
wider field of training would serve to develop’. Naval officers were also 
hamstrung by their ‘deficiency in power of expression and general literary 
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ability’.53  These failings were satisfactorily addressed by the Cambridge course 
and within the Admiralty, there was some feeling that all sub-lieutenants should 
continue to be sent to the university.54 
Ultimately it was proposed that 25% of sub-lieutenants should attend the 
university for a year and that they should be selected on the basis of their ability 
at English and history.55 This demonstrated an aspiration, alas thwarted by 
Treasury parsimony, to produce an elite corps of officers who were not 
scientists but were skilled in tactical and strategic thought and communication  
officers who would excel in staff work rather than in technical roles.56 
Richmond also attempted to reform the higher education of officers. The 
War Staff was extensively and effectively reorganised.57 Richmond then 
became Director of the Senior Officer’s War course, Beatty gave him a free 
hand in developing it and he was able to act in concert with Drax who was 
Director of the Naval Staff College.58 Richmond reduced the number of lectures 
and placed more emphasis on reading, writing and the study of history rather 
than technology. His impact was limited, not least because most of his staff and 
students fell foul of redundancy, but he moved on to the creation of the Imperial 
Staff College.59 
Officers were given greater freedom to contribute to publications such as 
The Naval Review.60 Attendance at the Imperial Staff College was increasingly 
essential for promotion to the highest ranks of the service.61 Technical courses 
for officers were shortened by removing unnecessary mathematics and 
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science.62 The impact of all these reforms was limited but they represented 
genuine progress in moving officer education away from the purely technical.63  
  Whilst the academic staff of Dartmouth may have appreciated the 
improved balance of the curriculum; they did not appreciate the determination of 
the naval personnel who remained within the engineering department to 
continue teaching naval engineering, presumably hoping to foster enthusiasm 
for the subject or at least produce officers who would understand the difficulties 
faced by their engineering staff. The 1926 inspection of Dartmouth revealed that 
the naval lobby had emerged victorious  the course being described as 
professionally useful (at any rate to the operator or maintainer of machinery 
rather than the designer) but unlikely to develop the intellect.64 
Conflict over the engineering curriculum reached critical point late in 
1925  the exact causes are unclear but it is obvious that some on the naval 
side had come to resent the influence of Cyril Ashford; so much that they 
sought assistance from the C-in-C Plymouth, Admiral Sir Richard Phillimore, 
who brought the matter to the attention of Their Lordships. McMullen reported to 
the Board of Admiralty that the recently revised engineering curriculum sat well 
beside the science courses offered by the college; both the engineer 
commander (who remained responsible for teaching) and the headmaster were 
happy with progress. McMullen could see no basis for the complaints made by 
the naval staff about Ashford’s influence. But he was mindful of the potential for 
damaged relations and remarked that care must be taken to avoid Admiral 
Phillimore appearing to be against the civilian staff of the college.65 
 How powerful Ashford actually was is a matter of debate  especially in 
light of the school inspectors’ report. McMullen himself complained that the 
engineering curriculum was still based around marine engineering. This, 
McMullen stated, was because Ashford lacked the power rather than the will to 
make further reforms. McMullen emphasised the importance of the 
headmaster’s independence, for only by being fully independent could he 
ensure the highest possible educational standards.66 
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 McMullen was, at the time, engaged in debating various academic 
matters with the naval authorities. It is clear that he saw himself as the 
spokesman for the civilian members of the naval educational establishment and 
was determined to act in the best educational interests of the cadets, rather 
than in accordance with prevailing naval opinion. McMullen complained that 
naval opinion was ‘a fickle jade in educational matters’ and perceived that he 
himself acted as ‘flywheel to the fluctuations of the training division’. He also 
complained about the lack of resources the Navy devoted to education, noting 
that the cost of naval education had increased 30% since 1913 but that the 
budget had not been increased to match; and this at a time when both the state 
and the Army had tripled their educational expenditure.67 
These episodes illustrate several points. Firstly the naval authorities were 
anxious to retain as good a relationship as possible with the civilian staff at 
Dartmouth. Secondly the power of the civilian staff was strengthened by their 
long tenure at the college, and by the freedom given to the headmaster to run 
his side of the establishment, and by his reporting directly to the captain. 
Thirdly, whilst the importance of the independence of the civilian masters was 
recognised, there was a determination that the college should be dominated by 
the Navy. Finally it is clear that the early 1920s were a time of curriculum 
upheaval at Dartmouth, the masters remaining true to the educational origins of 
the Fisher-Selborne scheme in the face of naval pressure. It is probably not a 
coincidence that the conflict reached its height at the time when the Royal 
Navy’s engineer officers were being stripped of their rights and privileges. The 
masters enjoyed the support of McMullen who seems to have been largely 
responsible for the maintenance of peaceful relations between the naval and 
educational authorities. 
Despite the reforms that followed the abandonment of inter-changeability 
the college curriculum remained rather narrow. Although there was more time 
for history, English and French, other subjects such as art, music and drama as 
well as classical languages were totally absent. In 1914 parents had been told 
that ‘the aim of the course as a whole is to provide as far as may be possible a 
liberal education’, however ‘the claims of the technical subjects are so strong 
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that the curriculum inevitably leans towards the side of mathematics and 
science and their applications’.68 In 1924 the situation was much the same, 
whilst the cadet ‘should be made as cultured as possible’ professional subjects 
inevitable predominated.69 Whilst How to Become a Naval Officer did not give 
many details of the curriculum, it did give a list of studies which made clear the 
educational bias of the college.70  
Masters and naval officers were aware of the gaps in the education of 
the cadets and went to considerable effort to fill them. Extra-curricular activities 
involving the arts were both common and popular. The college authorities were 
keen supporters of such activities, providing space and some facilities. Visiting 
speakers were entertained by the captain or the headmaster; and, on some 
occasions, the college was opened for visitors to view the artistic efforts of the 
cadets. Art clubs were organised and there were competitions for both art and 
photography. Each term kept a log (sometimes known as a line book), a kind of 
collective diary, recording the key events of each day and showcasing the 
creative talents of the term’s members  logs featured poems, photographs, 
drawings and jokes.  
Theatrical productions were a popular activity and included a variety of 
plays as well as musicals. Musically inclined cadets could join college choirs 
and some terms had bands, although these do not seem to have been 
organised on a college wide basis.71A limited amount of musical tuition was 
available but few cadets took advantage and the standards achieved were not 
high. One cultural event is well recorded, the performance of a translated Greek 
play Iphigenia in Aulis in 1932. Recorded in the Blake Term Log, this play 
illustrates the sophistication of some extra-curricular activities (the props, 
costumes and performance were agreed to have been of a very high standard), 
the level of interest in the classics and the theatre amongst cadets, and the 
support of the authorities for their efforts.72 Visiting school inspectors saw the 
play as evidence of a strong, and successful, effort to provide a balanced 
curriculum noting that ‘the course of study is far from being purely vocational’.73 
                                               
68
 James A Ewing, The Entry and Training of Naval Officers (London: Admiralty, 1914) pp.21-22 
69
 Gieves, Naval Officer (1923), p.16 
70
 ibid, p.51 
71
 RNM 1989.394 Records the activities of the Blake Term band including its amalgamation with 
that of Hawke Term (the Blake’s immediate juniors) in May 1931. 
72
 ibid, Entry of 16 June 1932 
73
 ED 109/823 Schools Inspection of the Royal Naval College Dartmouth 1932 p.4 
  158 
 Most public schools offered a wide-variety of extra-curricular activities 
with a varying degree of supervision. Official clubs operated under the 
leadership of masters who aimed to educate boys in matters such as music and 
art. Otherwise masters and boys might work together, for instance in repairing 
an old car. Many activities were pursued by boys with little supervision  
building small boats was quite a popular activity to which many boys devoted 
their free time over several years, doing most of the work themselves but relying 
on masters for advice and occasional assistance.74 
 At Dartmouth this type of unsupervised activity appears to have been 
rare  most extra-curricular activities were led and supervised by masters. 
Dartmouth offered a variety of voluntary subjects, cadets were obliged to pursue 
at least one for most of their time at the college. These subjects consisted 
mainly of lectures from masters but there was some scope for practical 
participation. Subjects included music, Spanish, astronomy, heraldry, and a 
course on medieval siege-warfare enlivened by the teacher’s collection of 
working models. The instruction seems to have been of high quality as these 
lectures were repeatedly praised by the school inspectors.75 More active 
participation was required by a variety of clubs  including model-boating, 
dinghy sailing and gliding. Unsurprisingly there was a place for engineering and 
science, with voluntary attendance at the Sandquay workshops being a 
favoured wet weather activity. In 1928 cars powered by signal rockets were built 
and raced before a number of explosions saw the project abandoned.76 
 One long standing Dartmouth institution, more in keeping with the public 
schools of the early nineteenth century than the twentieth, was that of the senior 
college visiting farms. On Sunday afternoons groups of senior cadets visited a 
variety of households in order to eat a large tea. Originally local farms had been 
visited and the term ‘farms’ was retained although the cadets graced an 
increasing variety of households  including council houses in Dartmouth. The 
teas had to be paid for and, although a farm could be bequeathed or 
abandoned, it was seen as unacceptable to force out the current visitors by 
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offering more money. Farm visits allowed cadets, who were not normally 
allowed to leave the college, a degree of freedom and relaxation they otherwise 
lacked. 
When Cyril Ashford retired in 1927 he was replaced by Eric Kempson 
who had been a member of staff at Dartmouth before the First World War. 
Kempson had then served in the Royal Engineers, winning the Military Cross, 
and had subsequently become senior science master at Rugby. Ashford’s years 
of devoted service were rewarded with a well deserved knighthood. Kempson’s 
appointment reaffirmed the educational principles of Dartmouth. He was a 
scientist and had been present in the early days of the Fisher-Selborne scheme 
and so was familiar with the educational ideas behind the curriculum. His 
wartime service ensured the respect of the naval staff and provided him with 
useful experience. However his post-war experience at Rugby meant that he 
brought fresh ideas to the college and was able to view it more objectively than 
a long standing staff member might have.  
The Royal Navy was determined to appoint Kempson; having identified 
him as the best candidate, the Board of Admiralty sought an increased salary of 
£1800 per annum  more than any grammar school and also in excess of some 
well regarded public schools.77 The Treasury acquiesced duly recognising the 
importance of the Dartmouth headmaster in producing the best possible officers 
for the fleet.78  
Kempson may well have been responsible for the alpha scheme, 
introduced at Dartmouth in 1928. The scheme was a product of long standing 
concerns about the suitability of the academic curriculum. Academic standards 
were enforced more rigorously in the naval colleges than in most public schools, 
and for cadets the price of failure was more likely to be dismissal. Consequently 
the efforts of the academic staff were largely concentrated on ensuring the 
weakest cadets passed out of Dartmouth successfully. The 1926 inspection of 
Dartmouth had noted a lack of provision for the brightest cadets  a situation 
the Navy determined to remedy. 79 By examination of the eighth term and 
passing-out examinations, schools inspectors were asked to report on the 
academic standards at the college. 
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 The inspectors were generally impressed by the standards obtained by 
the cadets. They reported that the weakest cadets were well ahead of the 
weakest boys in public schools. The passing out examination was far more 
difficult than the School Certificate  a mark of 33% being equivalent to a 
School Certificate pass. All 101 cadets who had taken the passing out 
examination in the period reviewed would have passed the School Certificate; 
all but 18 cadets had scored at least 50% in all the non-science subjects. True 
the cadets were seventeen, slightly older than the boys taking the School 
Certificate, but at least a fifth of them were agreed to have reached a good sixth 
form standard. Having examined the marks of the eighth termers, the inspectors 
reported that a substantial number would have been promoted to the lower sixth 
form.80  
 This in itself justified the existence of some kind of sixth form at the 
college. However the inspectors also reported that, despite the selection 
process and the college curriculum, cadets  like public schoolboys  were not 
equally good at all subjects. Although the top 4 eighth termers were in the top 5 
for maths, science, history, French and English, the rest of the top 10 in each 
subject were no higher than 16th overall.81 This study formed the basis of the 
alpha scheme which enabled cadets to undertake extended studies in 
mathematics, science, history, English or French. 
 The alpha scheme was the closest approach to a sixth form at Dartmouth 
and was introduced in September 1928  the inspectors having submitted their 
report in April. The cadets involved were selected by a committee; selection 
was based on marks and reports made by masters and term officers. In the 
summer of 1932 there were 35 alphas out of the 130 cadets in their last three 
terms. Alpha class cadets normally had to be good at three subjects out of 
maths, science, history, English and French but might be selected if 
exceptionally good at two. They benefited from an altered curriculum which 
allowed them time for independent study and to reduce their studies in science, 
history, English or French to subsidiary level. They did not take the normal 
academic pass-out papers but special ones  alongside the professional 
subjects of engineering, seamanship and navigation. If they passed the alpha 
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papers they were given a first class pass-out grade.82 The alpha scheme was 
recorded by the 1932 inspection of the college as a positive development which 
encouraged thinking, time-management and self-education  thereby 
benefitting the cadets, the college and the Navy.83 
 That the alpha scheme was not introduced until 1928, and was then 
limited to academic studies rather than conferring full sixth form style privileges, 
illustrates the differences between Dartmouth and the public schools of the day. 
Most sixth formers enjoyed considerable levels of freedom and power, often 
accompanied by special items of uniform.84 Alpha class cadets did not have 
these benefits. Although they might be envied, if not admired, by their term-
mates they were not expected or empowered to influence them. Other than a 
reduced class schedule and more freedom in their studies the alphas had no 
special privileges.85  
 The alpha scheme seems to have arisen entirely as a result of evidence 
that the college curriculum did not stretch the brightest cadets enough. However 
by allowing cadets to specialise in non-science subjects it also fitted in with the 
Royal Navy’s post-war educational policies. Like the revised Dartmouth 
curriculum, the alpha scheme sacrificed the development of potential scientists 
and engineers in order to produce better communicators and staff officers. The 
alpha scheme also allowed specialisation in mathematics and engineering, 
enabling cadets talented in these subjects to develop their skills and interests. 
Separating the alpha cadets from the rest also reduced the pressure on less 
able cadets and allowed them more time to develop. The increasing variation in 
the curriculum was at odds with the general emphasis on the college on all 
cadets learning the values and behaviours demanded by the Navy. 
 
Naval Culture, Indoctrination, Discipline and Control 
 
The lives of all cadets were dominated by the Royal Navy rather than by their 
civilian teachers, this was reflected in every aspect of their existence including 
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their surroundings, behaviour and activities. Mary Jones suggests that cadets 
actually followed two curricula  a visible one in which they attended lessons in 
school type subjects; and an invisible one in which they absorbed the culture 
and traditions of the service and learnt to behave as young naval officers rather 
than schoolboys.86 
 Jones’ argument is borne out by examination of the role that history 
played in the lives of cadets. The subject was taught by civilians as a normal 
school subject, but the course was heavily based around the history of the 
Royal Navy and related subjects such as war and diplomacy. The importance of 
the subject was recognised in 1922 when various officials discussed how it 
should be taught at Dartmouth and Greenwich. Richmond, President of 
Greenwich Naval College, was a great advocate of history, describing it as: ‘The 
true means of learning what war is and how it is conducted, and of determining 
the principles of war and impressing them upon officer’s minds’. In his view, it 
was through studying history that officers learnt how to study war, and to look 
beyond the work of their own ship to that of the Navy as a whole.87 
 Although McMullen and DTSD Captain Hugh Tweedie agreed that 
history was important, they were divided as to why. Tweedie saw it as a means 
of looking beyond tactics and so studying wider strategic, social and political 
issues.88 McMullen however considered this ‘nothing less than the prostitution 
of history’ and thought the subject should be studied for its own sake.89 This 
would encourage officers to study in their free time and to develop their abilities 
to think and write.  
 A small committee was appointed to consider the matter; it agreed with 
Tweedie  history was a tool, a precursor to the study of war and to the staff 
course. Thus the history course at Dartmouth should be a precursor to that at 
Greenwich. The latter should be as wide as possible and cover a period from 
the Tudors to the present. It was to be used to illustrate the principles of war, 
and those who excelled should be recommended for staff duties.90 
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 This policy was never successfully implemented. Roskill later told a 
friend ‘I don’t think it was at all well taught’ although he did praise the efforts of 
Michael Lewis at Greenwich.91 Although the school inspectors who visited 
Dartmouth in the inter-war period praised the history teachers, they thought the 
curriculum overcrowded and too biased towards the naval side.92  
Aside from the syllabus the choice of textbook must also be questioned. 
The main history textbook was Sea Kings of Britain by Geoffrey Callender who 
was a master at Osborne before moving to Greenwich and subsequently to the 
fledgling National Maritime Museum.93 Sea Kings took the form of three 
volumes, the first of which was published in 1907, detailing the lives of Britain’s 
great admirals. Aside from conveying historical facts, Callender tried to inspire 
his young readers with tales of the achievements of these officers, the good 
qualities of whom were highlighted at length. Of Anson he wrote: ‘Heroism, 
pluck, endurance, perseverance, seem but soiled labels for the virtues that 
Anson carried. In the blackest depths of adversity he never for one moment 
abandoned the hope of accomplishing his purpose. So motherly was his 
compassion that he felt the death of every man as a personal loss; but he 
turned to the survivors and infused new courage into them by the intense reality 
of his faith’.94 
  Callender’s eulogies were not entirely appreciated by the cadets, one of 
who later recalled having to: ‘wade painstakingly through sycophantic 
appraisals of various British admirals. Their battles were splendid victories 
attributable to infallible skill and courage, the only exception being the 
unfortunate Byng and he must have been included to show all the others in a 
relatively glorious light’.95 
 This lack of enthusiasm was contrary to the expectations of the 
committee on the teaching of history which had argued that the emphasis on 
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biographical studies of great naval officers was essential for ‘bringing 
prominently forward, […], the more romantic side of naval life, which is the 
aspect that appeals most naturally to boys of the Dartmouth age’. This 
romanticism should be capitalised on – ‘glamour […] should invest a cadet’s 
first reading of naval history’.96 
 The emphasis on the great admirals of the past was not confined to the 
classroom; instead they were part of daily life at the college. Each term (and 
later house) of cadets carried the name of a famous British admiral and was 
thus provided with a direct link to naval heritage. These admirals were St 
Vincent, Drake, Blake, Hawke, Greynville, Exmouth, Anson, Benbow, Duncan, 
Rodney and Hood. The term names were a new innovation, Britannia terms had 
been defined by seniority as ‘news’, ‘threes’, ‘sixers’ and ‘niners’. Although 
cadets did not study ‘their’ admiral in any particular detail, he was still intended 
to be an inspiration, and quite often was. One former cadet described Drake as 
the ‘patron saint’ of his term.97 
 One name was conspicuously absent  Nelson. This greatest of heroes 
had not merely a term but instead something of a cult devoted to him. Osborne 
had Nelson Hall; enhanced with a picture of the great hero, underneath which 
was written in enormous letters ‘There is nothing the Navy cannot do’. Osborne 
cadets were sent to visit Nelson’s flagship HMS Victory and attended Trafalgar 
Day church services aboard her. Dartmouth cadets had to make do with half 
holidays to mark his victories, the raising of his famous England expects signal 
every Trafalgar Day, and a variety of Nelsonian portraits and artefacts. The 
veneration of Nelson did not always have the desired results; one cadet was 
heard to remark ‘No! Not another picture of the death of the immortal Nelson!’98 
Physical reminders of the Royal Navy’s illustrious past lay all over the 
colleges which were littered with naval relics, including weapons, paintings, and 
uniforms  in stark contrast to the bareness of the cadet accommodation. Many 
of these items were donated or paid for by naval officers, serving or retired, and 
anxious to ensure their veneration of the service was continued.99 Cadets were 
probably more appreciative of the half holidays granted on the anniversaries of 
famous Royal Navy victories. 
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Even the fabric of Dartmouth had a message to offer. For the most part 
this message was delivered subtly, decorative motifs of the Tudor rose, the 
cypher of Edward VII, and the naval and English crowns (frequently intertwined) 
appeared around the building; emphasising the links between navy, nation and 
monarchy. This symbolism was particularly potent in the Senior Gunroom, 
which was decorated with the dates of famous Royal Navy victories along with 
paintings of the actions and the victorious naval officers, and on the 
quarterdeck.100 
The quarterdeck was hallowed ground on any Royal Navy ship. 
Historically the area from which command was exercised it had gradually 
become the shipboard centre of ceremonial activities and the space from which 
access to the ship was controlled. Personnel entering the quarterdeck area 
were required to salute.101 The quarterdeck of the college, two stories high and 
decorated with the motifs described above, occupied a central space and was 
used to assemble the cadets en-masse. It was a secular space devoted to the 
Navy but it, rather than the chapel, lay at the heart of the college.102  
The exterior of the college was deliberately calculated to inspire cadets. 
The college faced out over the town and River Dart and towards the sea. 
Inscribed on the façade were the words of Charles II ‘It is on the Navy, under 
the good providence of God, that our wealth, prosperity and peace depend’. 
Living links to the past were also provided. The Captain of Osborne from 
1909 to 1913 was Horace Hood, the latest in a long line of distinguished naval 
officers whom subsequently gave their name to the battle cruiser Hood. In the 
1930s Dartmouth enjoyed the services of English master Guy Pocock, a direct 
descendant of Admiral Sir George Pocock, whose impressive naval career had 
culminated in the capture of Havana in 1762.103 Inevitably the colleges acquired 
cadets and term officers from famous naval families, hearing their family names 
provided a daily link with the Navy of the past. 
The history of the Royal Navy with which cadets were presented was 
carefully managed, with disaster and defeat generally absent. This was in no 
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way unique  perceptions of the history of the Royal Navy were carefully 
managed both inside and outside the service. The drill shed at HMS Ganges 
housed a range of naval artefacts for the inspiration of boy seamen, who were 
members of divisions named after famous admirals. The public image of the 
service was managed through events such as Navy Days, the selection of ship 
names, and media manipulation.104 
This careful use of history extended to the way in which the First World 
War was commemorated at Dartmouth. Many British war memorials celebrated 
masculinity, soldiers being portrayed as men in their prime. Images of the dead 
and maimed were often excluded; although relatives of the latter could take 
comfort from memorials such as the cenotaph which were of a more tomblike 
appearance.105 Armistice Day increasingly became a day of solemn 
remembrance offering little space for veterans to renew, let alone celebrate, 
their comradeship.106 These trends were reflected in the way that the war was 
absorbed into Dartmouth’s existing system rather than set aside for special 
attention. 
The many successes of the wartime Royal Navy were a new chapter in 
the history of the service and the college celebrated them as such. The naval 
heroes of the war took their place in the Royal Navy’s pantheon  new battles 
were added to the list commemorated in the senior gunroom and new relics 
found their resting places in the college. Many decorated officers served at the 
college in the years after the war, providing cadets with naval heroes to model 
themselves upon. 
The Royal Navy war memorials constructed in Plymouth, Chatham and 
Portsmouth were topped with images of sailing ships, placing the sacrifices of 
the First World War as a continuation of the traditions of the service. Perhaps 
therefore it is unsurprising that Dartmouth, already filled with the history of the 
service, opted for a small memorial shrine rather than a more substantial 
construction.107 
                                               
104
 Rüger, Naval Game, pp.24-27, pp.73-82 and pp.165-182 
105
 Gabriel Koureas, Memory, Masculinity, and National Identity in British Visual Culture, 1914-
1930: A Study of “Unconquerable Manhood” (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) p.5, p.79 and pp.28-33; 
Richard Van Emden, The Quick and the Dead: Fallen Soldiers and Their Families in the Great 
War (London: Bloomsbury, 2011) pp.260-262 
106
 Todman, Myth and Memory, p.55 and p.58; Koureas, British Visual Culture, p.33; Van 
Emden, Quick and the Dead, pp.270-271 
107
 Howard, Porter, Royal Naval College, pp.38-39 
  167 
There was little space for the war in the college curriculum. The history 
course was not altered to include it, and there was no great effort to teach 
cadets how it had been fought. German was dropped from the curriculum, 
removing any opportunity young officers might have had of making a 
comparison of the accounts of the war produced by the two sides.108 This lack 
of focus reflected wider ambiguity surrounding the war, most boys knew 
something of its horrors and their distaste was reflected in a dramatic decline in 
OTC membership.109 Casting the war as part of Britain’s naval heritage rather 
than an international cataclysm discouraged such distaste amongst cadets. 
 The use of history to both control and inspire cadets was typical of the 
naval aspects of the colleges. Control, in various forms, was a key aspect of the 
cadet experience. The college differed greatly from the average public school in 
that cadets were subject to enormous supervision and had very little personal 
freedom. Control was exercised by masters, naval officers, cadet captains and 
by the cadets themselves.  
The frenetic pace of life at the colleges was key to ensuring that cadets 
remained within the boundaries set for them. The early days of the colleges 
were characterised by ceaseless activity, in part because of the enormous 
range of activities that were packed into them. On the recommendations of the 
Custance Committee of 1912 and the Osborne Committee of 1917 some effort 
was made to relax the daily routine.110 The regime at the colleges was generally 
softened, with more sleep being allowed and use of the cold plunge baths 
restricted. These changes had a noticeable impact on the colleges, in particular 
upon Osborne. Hughes admitted that, with hindsight, ‘cadets were hustled too 
much’ until ‘common sense crept in’.111 On the other hand, Stephen King-Hall 
considered that Osborne cadets were ‘looked after frightfully carefully 
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nowadays’. As he was revisiting Osborne less than three years after passing 
out of the college his remarks should not perhaps be taken too seriously.112 
However cadets of the inter-war period later recalled a tiring, strictly 
scheduled existence. Frank Twiss remarked that life at Dartmouth was ‘very 
regulated and disciplined’ and that ‘it was always a tremendous rush’. 
Consequently ‘there was very little time to think about very much except actually 
getting through the day’.113 This is supported by Edward Ashmore who recorded 
‘almost ceaseless activity’ and that ‘we hardly ever walked’.114 
 This was not the situation at any public school where, normally, boys had 
a reasonable amount of freedom and the day proceeded in a fairly relaxed 
manner. Certainly public school boys were not routinely required to run from 
one class to the next, let alone to do it as a group, as was normal at Dartmouth 
and Osborne. Public schools also lacked the punishment meted out to any term 
judged to be ‘slack’  inefficient, lazy, untidy or ill-disciplined. Such terms would 
be subject to ‘slack-parties’ or ‘strafes’  these would involve a series of rapid 
changes of uniform, runs to distant parts of the college, beatings for minor 
misdemeanours, and even less freedom than normal.  
The brisk routine at the college ensured that there were few opportunities 
for cadets to make trouble. It also suggested an atmosphere of urgency and 
efficiency reflective of that to be found in the fleet. There was certainly some 
value in cadets becoming accustomed to a lack of free time and rest, constant 
difficulties in wartime. The desire to prepare cadets for life at sea was also 
expressed in conditions at the colleges. The furnishing of the colleges was 
generally utilitarian and this too was a deliberate device, designed to accustom 
cadets to a life of relative hardship.  
The colleges were never intended to be luxurious, in 1905 the Osborne 
and Dartmouth Committee was informed that ‘it is of great importance that 
young naval officers be brought up in habits of frugality and simplicity, and that 
nothing should be done during their college career to render their future life 
afloat irksome and distasteful’  sound reasoning, although the Spartan 
conditions at the colleges must also have been attractive financially.115 Cadets 
                                               
112
 Stephen King-Hall diary entry of 17 May 1910, Sea Saga, p.345 
113
 Howard-Bailey, Social History, pp.8-9 
114
 Edward Ashmore, ed. by Eric J Grove, The Battle and the Breeze: The Naval Reminiscences 
of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Edward Ashmore (Stroud: Sutton, 1997) p.8 
115
 TNA ADM 268/38 ‘Report of the Osborne and Dartmouth Committee’ (Fawkes Committee) 
May 1905 pp.3-4 para.5; Admiralty Letter N-1778/05 giving instructions to the committee from 
  169 
lived in dormitories, bedded down in alphabetical order, a term typically 
occupied two. Each term had a gunroom which functioned as a common room, 
as well as studies for working outside school hours, central dining facilities 
catered for all cadets. 
These basic facilities, combined with the lack of privacy and stringent 
regime, reinforced the strict discipline of the college and the control exercised 
over every aspect of cadet’s lives. This control was further reinforced by the 
lack of personal freedom and great emphasis on conformity. The personal 
possessions of cadets were strictly limited and liable to be inspected, they were 
not allowed to decorate their accommodation, and wore uniform at all times. 
Regimentation extended to toothbrushes being stored in a certain way and 
windows opened to a prescribed degree.  
The cadets themselves emphasised conformity, seniority was measured 
through the length of one’s lanyard and the wearing of outgrown clothes, and 
conformity was also a theme of jokes and cartoons produced by cadets.116 
There was also the matter of ‘guff’, for which cadets could be beaten by cadet 
captains. Guff was a failure to abide by the unwritten rules that defined 
conventional cadet behaviour; or, as described by Courtney Anderson, ‘Mortal 
Sin’.117  
This control was accepted by cadets because it emphasised their 
collective and, by extension, their naval identity. When a new term joined the 
service it was membership of the Royal Navy that first drew its members 
together. Courtney Anderson describes how, on the night of their arrival, his 
term: ‘had new values and expressions. We were mentally and physically 
exhausted and yet exalted too. We were suddenly no longer children. We were 
in the Navy now’. Immediately the cadet’s individual identities were consumed 
by that of the Royal Navy, and while the prospect was frightening it also held 
infinite promise  ‘all life ahead was our chosen adventure’.118  
 This collective identity, established through wearing a naval uniform, 
using naval slang, and behaving in a certain way was reinforced throughout a 
cadet’s college career. Naval tradition and spirit was imbued in cadets so that it 
provided idealism and a manner in which to act, along with a shared identity 
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with something of a family spirit about it. Jones suggests that pride in being part 
of the Royal Navy kept cadets at Dartmouth who might otherwise have left 
because of bullying or academic difficulties. They might have been amongst the 
weakest in their term, but they were still part of an elite.119 She emphasises the 
role of Dartmouth’s invisible curriculum in developing cadets and so shaping the 
identities of naval officers.120 Colville argues that this identity was shaped 
through the whole college environment rather than merely through dressing and 
behaving in a certain way.121 
The naval identity, and adherence to the proud history of the Royal Navy, 
established by the naval colleges stayed with cadets throughout their lives; and 
it also had an important role in shaping the mentality of the rest of the service. 
In particular, it was a factor in the ability of Fisher-Selborne scheme cadets and 
midshipmen to influence Special Entries when serving with them at sea. The 
shorter training period of the Special Entries, carried out in a functional 
shipboard environment, did not allow them to be imbued with the same 
behavioural norms and ideals. Therefore, as described by the captain of HMS 
Valiant, ‘the Dartmouth boys provide the solid and essential core of custom, 
tradition and system round which the public school boys exist’.122 
On a more formal level, and via the rules of the college, control was 
exercised by masters, cadet captains and term officers. The relative status of 
these groups was reflected through the authority they each exercised, as 
explored below. The general orders issued for Dartmouth in 1914 made clear 
the behaviour expected of all members of the college community.  
The cadets themselves were expected to behave obediently and as 
gentlemen. When on duty they were required to be silent and orderly, and to 
proceed around the college at the double. Skylarking, or messing around, was 
not permitted in the dormitories or in the mess  which cadets were not to enter 
unless properly dressed and with clean hands and tidy hair. Gentlemanly 
conduct extended to the prohibition of familiarity with servants or the ships 
company; and of selling or bartering clothes, watches and jewellery. As cadets 
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were gentlemen, and therefore trusted to behave as such, they were not subject 
to surveillance when outside the college. 
Staff members had varying punishment powers, with executive officers 
being able to award harsher punishments than engineer officers or masters. 
Term officers could punish all minor offences in an appropriate manner and did 
not need to refer to higher authority unless the punishment lasted for more than 
an hour. Masters could give minor punishments but were otherwise to refer 
miscreants to the commander. More serious punishments could be awarded by 
the commander or the captain. Extra school work could be given by the 
headmaster. Whilst lists of duties were provided for all members of the naval 
hierarchy, the civilian side of the establishment was left to its own devices.123 
A revised set of orders was issued in 1934 which largely copied its 
predecessor. To the existing rules about the deportment, cleanliness and 
general behaviour of cadets were added further restrictions banning buying, 
writing to, or writing for, any journal or periodical without permission. The status 
of the masters was raised by passing cadets being required to salute them as 
they would officers; this reinforced the authority of the masters, and emphasised 
the importance of their work.124 The most noticeable change was in the 
formalisation of the powers given to the cadet captains. 
Cadet captains pre-dated term officers, having been introduced to 
Britannia in the earliest days of her life as a training ship. They were responsible 
for keeping order and maintaining discipline and were supposed to report any 
misdemeanours committed by the cadets in their charge. In reality however, the 
maintenance of discipline had generally been left to the Royal Marines who 
acted as cadet corporals.125 By 1890 the position had been modified, like the 
prefects in public schools, the cadet captains were increasingly regulated and 
their role more closely defined. The position of the cadet captains also differed 
from that of normal prefects in that they were likely to be closer in age to their 
charges. 
An article written by Britannia’s captain listed their responsibilities as 
protecting and guiding new cadets, maintaining discipline and acting as 
intermediaries between cadets and officers. So great was their influence over 
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the other cadets that ‘the tone depends very much on them’.126 An 1898 article 
described them as an ‘admirable institution’ and discussed their privileges and 
the special insignia worn on their sleeves.127 
Little changed in the early years of the colleges. In 1914 the Dartmouth 
general orders required cadet captains to maintain order and prevent bullying. 
They were told that ‘to a large extent, the discipline, comfort, and well-being of 
the college is in their hands, and that the great freedom from restrictions which 
is enjoyed by all cadets, is only possible if the cadet captains do their duty in an 
efficient manner'.128 Each term had two captains, selected from among the 
senior terms of the college.  
From the cadet captains were selected two chief cadet captains who 
were ‘to do their utmost to uphold the discipline of the college and to see that 
the cadet captains do their duties properly’. The chief cadet captain of the day 
was responsible for saying grace before meals and maintaining discipline during 
them. Otherwise his duties were similar to that of an officer acting as officer of 
the day aboard a Royal Navy ship; he was to attend the parade of defaulters, 
making sure the relevant cadets were present, and attend the commander 
during evening rounds.129 
The cadet captains were expressly required to maintain order when 
officers and masters were not present. This not only gave them scope for 
bullying their fellows, but also ensured that the remainder of the cadets were 
rarely required to organise or take responsibility for themselves, let alone 
anyone else. In 1932 the Captain of the College, Captain Norman Wodehouse, 
wrote to a variety of officers in the fleet asking them for their opinions of the 
products of the college. Almost without exception, these officers reported the 
cadets to lack self-discipline and the required sense of responsibility. Amongst 
the respondents were the captains of Valiant and Resolution. The Captain of 
Valiant suggested these failing arose from the ‘exceptionally sheltered life’ lived 
by cadets, who had neither responsibilities nor duties. The reply from 
Resolution suggested they were ‘too much chased and herded and nursed’.130  
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Given the lack of responsibility given to cadets, it is hardly surprising that 
cadet captains seem to have been frequently been chosen as a result of their 
sporting prowess  the playing fields gave them their only opportunity to stand 
out as leaders. The Blake Term Log for 1929-1932 records that the first four 
term members picked to be cadet captains include the cadet highlighted as best 
at soccer, the first to play for the first rugby XV, and another with a generally 
distinguished sporting record.131 
The cadet captains themselves enjoyed a variety of privileges and 
powers, most of them unregulated. The college regulations quoted above did 
not regulate the punishments given by cadet captains, nor give other cadets any 
right of appeal against them. These punishments were typically canings, 
administered at night; with no officers present there was little restriction on how 
hard victims could be beaten. It was not announced in advance who would be 
beaten and potential victims waited in painful suspense.  
Furthermore, comparison of a record of official punishments and 
anecdotal evidence from cadets suggest that cadets received the vast majority 
of their beatings from cadet captains rather than through official channels. 
Unsurprisingly, cadet captains seem to have had great influence over the 
cadets in their charge, but this influence rested largely on their ability to punish 
rather than inspire. Jock Gardiner noted that cadet captains had more influence 
than term officers. Douglas Dickens recalled the punishments inflicted by cadet 
captains in more detail than the work of his term officers.132 The importance of 
the cadet captains was reflected by the prominence given to them in official 
college publications. 
The Blue Book listed every cadet in the college and made their relative 
status very clear. The terms were listed by order of seniority, and the cadets 
within them listed in order of merit; except for the cadet captains who appeared 
first in their terms and with their names in capital letters (chief cadet captains 
had their names in bold). An alphabetical list of all cadets was included; again 
the cadet captains were marked out. A list of cadet captains was also included 
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in Britannia Magazine, Dartmouth’s missive to the outside world. The 1908 
summer issue included the first full page group photograph to appear in the 
publication  of the cadet captains. The following term a photograph of the first 
rugby XV appeared, but it was not until 1910 that photographs of entire terms 
appeared.133 
The 1934 college regulations suggest that Wodehouse had decided to 
make the position of the cadet captains closer to that of public school prefects; 
perhaps in response to the criticisms he had received from the fleet, perhaps as 
part of the College’s general drift towards being more public school-like. The 
revised regulations reduced the power of the cadet captains but also gave them 
more of the privileges they would have had as public school prefects. Their 
responsibilities remained much the same, maintaining order in messes and 
gunrooms and when no adult was present. In return for these duties they were 
given extra freedom to leave the college, could employ junior cadets as fags to 
clean their shoes and tidy their possessions, and could eat tea in their cabins  
which junior cadets could be ordered to prepare. However all beatings were to 
take place after breakfast or dinner and must be reported to the recipient’s term 
officer. The recipient had to be given advance notice of the punishment and 
could appeal to his term officer if he felt it unfair. Cadet captains could also 
award up to four days of ‘slack party’ the recipient of which was given extra 
work and similar harassments.134  
These changes meant that cadet captains finally had lesser powers of 
punishment than masters and were firmly subordinated to term officers. Their 
lack of disciplinary powers was one of the disadvantages faced by masters at 
the colleges, which were otherwise reasonably attractive employers. Unlike 
many public schools the naval colleges did not particularly struggle for pupils or 
finance, thus granting masters security of tenure (although there was constant 
pressure from the Treasury to reduce the number of staff). Wages and working 
conditions were broadly similar. However masters could not achieve the normal 
goal of becoming a housemaster. To become a housemaster was viewed as a 
prize for many reasons. It carried less responsibility than being headmaster but 
still offered a man great power over the members of his house and great 
influence over their development. Housemasters could build a lasting reputation 
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and earned enough money to support a family. At Dartmouth, where terms and 
later houses were led by naval officers, there was no place for civilian 
housemasters. 
Tutor sets, led by masters, contained boys from a number of terms; one 
of few opportunities for cadets of different ages to mix. They met weekly and 
had little practical function beyond giving each cadet a master to take some 
interest in his academic progress. This should have given cadets advocates or 
help when they were struggling or faced undue criticism but in fact tutors and 
tutor sets seem to have made little impression.135  
 Otherwise many masters followed public school practice by taking an 
interest in their pupils outside working hours. They aided term officers in 
organising and refereeing sporting fixtures and organised many voluntary 
activities such as plays, lectures and clubs for hobbies. This was particularly 
valuable as the masters probably had a wider range of interests than the term 
officers, and certainly had more opportunity to develop them. The devotion to 
duty of the masters at the colleges was, by most measures, impressive and all 
the more so in the light of the conditions under which they operated. 
The masters occupied an awkward position. Their disciplinary powers 
were quite limited and they did not have as much influence over their pupils as 
they might in another school. This was compensated for by the good working 
conditions and security of tenure. Certainly the masters appear to have been 
happy enough, long careers at the college were common. Although he did not 
provide any evidence, Pack wrote that at least a quarter of the Dartmouth 
teaching staff of 1921 were still at the college in 1941.136 Stability in the 
master’s common room ensured the smooth operation of the college and also 
gave the masters more influence than they might otherwise have had.  
  Although the term officers did not have enormous influence over naval 
policy, and did not exercise control to the same extent as the cadet captains, 
they were still expected to be the most important people in the lives of their 
cadets. They had been introduced in 1895 to counter the perceived failure of 
Britannia’s officers to take any interest in the cadets (the duty officers were 
rumoured to relieve each other on Paddington station). They were not an 
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enormous success; one Britannia cadet later complained that he had never 
heard a term officer lecture his cadets on any subject other than games.137 
 The term officers were retained in the new colleges and given an 
impressive variety of responsibilities. They were responsible for practically 
every aspect of their cadet’s performance including sports, discipline, 
academics, and general behaviour. They taught seamanship and boat work to 
their cadets. They were thus required to act as father figures, teachers, and 
exemplify officer like qualities and behaviours. The 1922 Stanley Committee 
noted that ‘in particular, it is his duty to impart to the cadets of his Term the 
customs and traditions of the service, and to endeavour to mould their 
characters and personalities so that they may ultimately become efficient 
officers , fitted in every respect to take their place in the naval service’.138 
Under the Fisher-Selborne scheme each term had two officers, one from 
the executive branch and the other an engineer. This was designed to ensure 
that cadets were equally enthusiastic and well informed about both areas, and it 
also signified the new found parity of the two branches. 
The Stanley Committee stated that although the term officer system 
generally worked well it had several drawbacks. The reduction in term strength 
meant that term officers were now under-employed. They tended to obsess 
about games which tended to produce games obsessed cadets. They were 
devoting too much attention to individual cadets resulting in the cadets being 
too well looked after and thus irresponsible. The proposed solution was to make 
each term officer responsible for two terms instead of one; with around forty to 
forty-five cadets in each term this would make the individual term officers 
responsible for about as many cadets as they had been in the period of naval 
expansion before and during the First World War.139 
 In spite of the term officer’s vital role in cadet development the Admiralty 
accepted this recommendation. Economy measures also spelt the end of the 
engineer officer term lieutenants, who had in any case tended to disappear to 
seagoing appointments during the war. This change of policy was doubtless 
lamented by the engineering branch but was in many ways a practical step. The 
administration of the college was simplified by there being one officer in charge 
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of each term while the decline of inter-changeability, and consequent loss of 
interest in engineering at Dartmouth, meant that the engineering officers were 
increasingly redundant. 
 Whilst relations between officer and cadets might not have been as close 
as they had been, the reduction in staffing did not mean a reduction in 
supervision. On the contrary, in 1936 the Captain of the College, Captain 
Reginald Holt, wrote to the Second Sea Lord that ‘the cadets are under more or 
less constant supervision and do not have to think for themselves’. This was 
largely the work of term officers and had a positive effect on both the cadets 
and their parents who felt that their sons were unusually well looked after.140 
Captain Holt apparently did not believe that being in the habit of not thinking for 
themselves would hamper the subsequent careers of these officers. 
 As these two letters suggest, the relationship of a cadet to his term 
officer was a critical fact in his development and, as such, the matter is worthy 
of further consideration. In his study of Osborne, Michael Partridge examined 
the relationships of cadets with their term officers. He wrote that ‘those who 
thought most highly of their officers were those whose general memories of 
their time at Osborne were most favourable’.141 Partridge suggests that the 
experience of cadets during the First World War when masters served as term 
officers was quite different from that of those who had naval officers as their 
term lieutenants; the masters generally being kinder and more understanding 
although less naval minded.142 
 A picture of good and bad term officers and their effects on cadets can 
be drawn from the autobiographies of Louis Le Bailly and Courtney Anderson. 
In general Anderson appears to have enjoyed Dartmouth rather more, and his 
recollections of his term officers are far more favourable than those of Le Bailly. 
Le Bailly suggests that the term officers were driven by a desire to boost their 
own careers, frustration at separation from their wives (who were not allowed to 
live within fifty miles of the college), and naval traditions of driving leadership.143 
Whilst there is undoubtedly some truth in these claims, regard should be given 
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to Le Bailly’s dislike of Dartmouth and later transfer into the engineering branch, 
along with his disdain for the executive branch which he perceived as elitist and 
less professional. 
 Anderson recorded that after their first encounter with their term officer 
‘Poop’ Edwards, ‘every new Exmouth felt he had a substitute father in this 
strange and frightening place’.144 This impression proved correct for when the 
Exmouths entered the senior college in their sixth term and gained a new term 
officer Anderson noted that ‘the obvious kindliness and sympathy of the man 
had been our shield in our early terms’.145 However under their new term officer 
St John Cronyn ‘Exmouth Term took a great leap upwards in performance and 
morale. He made us really good and we knew how good we were’. Cronyn’s 
methods were almost the opposite of those of Edwards  he demanded the 
highest possible standards and punished defaulters severely (although he 
limited beatings to those who had ‘really asked for it’).146 
 Anderson’s experiences, even if recalled through rose-tinted lenses, 
demonstrate the effect of good term officers. Under the sympathetic leadership 
of Edwards the term established themselves in the college and came to feel at 
home in the Royal Navy. Under Cronyn the emphasis was on performance, self-
confidence and self-discipline  officer-like qualities. 
 There is little evidence of what the term officers themselves thought 
about their work and the cadets entrusted to them. One of the best pieces of 
evidence is the diary kept by Exmouth term officer, Lieutenant-Commander 
Louis Hamilton at the start of 1920. Hamilton’s diary is especially valuable 
because it sheds light on the collective psyche of the college at a time when 
there was great upheaval in the Navy and the near certainty that many of those 
at the college would be forced out of the service.  
 Before the start of the college term in January, Hamilton had visited 
Captain Bertram Thesiger and discussed a mutual friend’s prospects of leaving 
the service. Thesiger, he recorded, was ‘all for it if he could get a job outside, 
but of course that is the difficulty’.147 Reductions in the strength of the service 
unquestionably weighed heavily on the college. In early March, Hamilton was 
told his own term was to be reduced from 106 to 65 with the survivors to be 
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selected on the basis of their officer-like qualities, a definition of which was 
provided by the captain of the college.148  
 Some of the cadets must have been delighted to leave; Hamilton 
recorded discontented cadets who had only joined the Royal Navy in the hope 
of getting to take part in the war and had no wish to be part of a peacetime 
force. These feelings were heightened by the fact that, with the war over, cadets 
were being treated more like schoolboys and less like young men; this was 
particularly galling to those affected by the general ‘unrest and craving for 
pleasure’ of wider society. Morale was undermined by poor quality staff 
members, recruited out of wartime necessity, so much so that ‘the fashion of 
criticising the capabilities of the officers has been fairly general’.149 
 Hamilton was perturbed by this undercurrent of discontent but he made 
no concession to it. He appears to have been a sporting obsessive  he kept a 
diary for only two months but in that time he went walking four times, riding 
twice, and hunting ten times. He was regularly involved with the sporting 
activities of his term and was clearly of the view that cadets benefitted from 
exercise. Early in the term he took some of them running ‘just to keep the boys 
on the move’.150  
Later entries rage about the inadequacies of the term rugby team, the 
poor performances of which evidently enraged Hamilton who ‘gave a short 
discourse on the putrid exhibition of rugger this afternoon’.151 It was not for lack 
of practise  twelve days later, and with only twenty-five members of the term 
fit, Hamilton enlisted two masters and two Drake term cadets so that a game 
might take place.152 This was one of a number of occasions on which Hamilton 
himself played, especially relishing the prospect of officers versus cadets 
matches as ‘the latter look on us all as cripples’.153 This view must have been 
reinforced when Hamilton was off duty for four days after spraining his ankle in 
a game.  
Hamilton himself had flourished as a cadet athlete, representing the 
college at rugby. However the extensive games programme that he enforced 
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was not driven by visions of glory, or by an obsession with physical fitness. 
Rather it was the cornerstone of his policy of driving cadets hard to prepare 
them for later life.154 Others ascribed the sporting success of his term to his 
allowing them the freedom to organise their own sporting activities, suggesting 
that Hamilton’s diary may have exaggerated the exhortations given.155   
Hamilton was undoubtedly a man accustomed to success. His cadet 
career had been highly successful, culminating in his becoming chief cadet 
captain. He had won the DSO in the First World War.156 Perhaps he was not the 
most obvious choice for nurturing the weaker cadets of Exmouth term; but he 
was a suitably brave and dashing role model. His spell as a term officer did him 
no harm, he became the first ex-Osborne cadet to reach flag rank and retired as 
an Admiral having been Chief Naval Advisor to the Australian government, 
effectively the Australian First Sea Lord.157 
All the authority figures at the colleges had something in common – they 
were men. Women were deliberately excluded from positions of authority. 
Those employed as nurses were able to demonstrate feminine qualities of care 
and compassion but were directed by naval surgeons who decided what 
treatment sick cadets should receive. Those employed as domestic servants 
had little contact with cadets, who in any case were not allowed to speak to 
them.  
This reflected the situation in most public schools, there being a widely 
held view that manliness could only be learnt in an environment from which 
women were excluded.158 In a public school the housemaster’s wife might take 
a caring interest in his charges; at Dartmouth and Osborne terms were supplied 
with petty officers who dispensed advice, ensured cadets were properly dressed 
before going on parade, and generally acted as guides and guardians. Cadets 
were thus provided with a role model who, although compassionate and caring, 
was indisputably masculine. The removal of women from a cadet’s normal 
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environment removed an obstacle to the development of the manly attributes 
required as officer-like qualities. 
Given the variety of authority figures at the colleges, there was inevitably 
considerable variation in the punishments awarded to erring cadets. There was 
also a need to ensure that punishments were appropriate, given the colleges’ 
dual identities as naval establishments and public schools, and the cadet’s dual 
identities as school boys and young naval officers. 
The 1914 Dartmouth regulations laid out seven different punishments. 
The most minor, and the only one that masters could award, was fifteen 
minutes extra drill on one day. Commanders could award an hour of extra drill 
for four days. Punishments involving extra drill were designed as a response to 
misbehaviour, especially in the classroom. Other punishments included 
forfeiture of a half holiday and confinement to the college grounds  responses 
to more serious offences such as leaving the college without permission or 
insubordination. The final option was forfeiture of pocket money (cadets were 
not paid but instead received one shilling a week in pocket money paid for by 
their parents)  largely to pay for damage to naval property.  
These punishments reflected the naval nature of the college. Cadets 
could not be given lines or assigned manual work as they might be in a public 
school. Extra drill was a punishment entirely military in nature and was used in 
other naval training establishments. The regulations did not lay down any scale 
for giving extra work which was the provenance of the headmaster; nor, as 
discussed above, did they give any guidance to cadet captains. They also did 
not cover expulsion and certain other punishments which only the captain 
himself could award.159 
The majority of the punishments recorded in a sample list of offences for 
May 1925 were of a minor nature, and given for offences that might occur in any 
public school. Eight cadets were punished for breaking fixtures or fittings, all of 
them with a small fine, which varied according to the item involved  breaking a 
pane of glass carried a fine of 9d, the destruction of a gunroom light fitting one 
of 2s. Twenty-six cadets received minor punishments for various 
misbehaviours, varying from two days of thirty minutes extra drill for talking, to 
                                               
159
 BRNC College General Orders 1914, Chapter 32 
  182 
the loss of two half holidays for undefined misbehaviour. One cadet was 
cautioned  he had been caught ‘interfering’ with junior cadets.160 
The only cadet punished for a serious offence was Cadet Johnson, top of 
the tenth term and only months away from passing out, who was punished for 
making a grossly impertinent remark to a master. His punishment, of unlisted 
duration, was designed to cause him maximum inconvenience and to 
emphasise his subordinate status. Johnson was required to report to the main 
office every thirty minutes outside working hours and to go to bed early.161 This 
punishment did not have the desired result. Far from falling into line with the 
behaviour expected of cadets he and three others stole a master’s car  for 
which they each received twelve cuts of the cane. Johnson was removed from 
the college at the end of the term, his naval career at an end.162  
Johnson’s motivations are not recorded, but it may be that he found 
serious misbehaviour to be his only way of escaping from the college. Amongst 
the complaints received by Wodehouse in 1932 was a remark, from a recent 
cadet, that ‘Once in Dartmouth College, it is extraordinarily difficult and 
expensive to get out’.163 These difficulties had not been resolved by 1939; 
Captain Frederick Dalrymple- Hamilton recorded asking Admiral Barrow to 
remove his son after the boy had committed a string of offences culminating in 
running away from the college.164 
There were many reasons why, despite the exhausting regime, strict 
discipline, and hard classes, the drop-out rate from the naval colleges remained 
reasonably low at around 3-4%. Jones, as noted above, suggested that cadets 
were reluctant to surrender their elite identity. 165 Cadets who enjoyed being part 
of the Navy had no hope of finding the same atmosphere and opportunities 
elsewhere. Cadets who disliked the Navy may well have wished to leave the 
college, which after all led automatically to a naval career, but were prevented 
from doing so largely through pressure on their parents. 
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Cadets remained the responsibility of their parents or guardians rather 
than the state. If their cadet chose to leave they were obliged to pay the naval 
authorities an extra payment for every term he had completed  thus repaying 
the money the state had spent on him. In 1924 this extra payment was £40 per 
term passed.166 Given that the normal college fees were £50 a term, and that 
many parents were paying a reduced rate, it can be seen that that withdrawing 
a cadet nearly doubled the cost of his naval education. There was also the cost 
and effort of getting him into another school, providing him with a new school 
uniform, and launching him into another career. Failure might also leave a boy 
feeling humiliated, especially at being found unfit to defend King and Country. 
The humiliation, and parental recriminations, might be even greater if the boy 
came from a naval family or had joined because his parents wanted him to.167 
Under these circumstances parents had no incentive to withdraw their 
sons or to allow them to leave the colleges. On the contrary they were the 
natural allies of the naval authorities who were naturally anxious to retain the 
services of their future officers. If his parents would not allow him to leave, the 
cadet could escape only through continually failing examinations, or through 
behaving so badly that his parents would be asked to withdraw him. This 
method of departure had one advantage  cadets who left at the request of the 
naval authorities did not incur the additional payments. 
The difficulties associated with leaving the college, along with the young 
age of entry, ensured that there was a wider range of personalities and interests 
amongst the cadets than there would otherwise have been. This variation, 
which could have produced a corresponding range of interests and specialist 
talents in the officer corps, was stifled by the lack of freedom cadets had to 
associate with each other and, in particular, by the term system. 
The unusual conditions at the colleges arose partly from the fact that 
cadets of different ages were separated from each other as terms, rather than 
being mixed up in houses as they would have been in a public school. The term 
system was the natural product of the Navy entering multiple batches of cadets 
each year; it meant that cadets of the same seniority were always together, 
greatly simplifying college administration.  
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The major disadvantage of the term system was the isolation it produced. 
Living, working, and playing with members of their own term, cadets had no 
opportunity to mix with those in others. This natural isolation was compounded 
by the efforts of the college authorities to ensure that cadets did not mix outside 
their own terms. There were very few opportunities to interact, even brothers 
required permission to speak to each other. This separation was designed to 
prevent the older cadets from interfering with the younger and thus to preclude 
bullying, fagging and sexual assault.168  
There was even segregation within terms. Cadets slept in, and were 
often seated or lined up in, alphabetical order; thus they developed the closest 
relationships with those closest to them in the alphabet. Terms were split 
between two or more dormitories; cadets knew term-mates in their own 
dormitory far better than the others, with whom they frequently competed in 
games and other activities.169 The life of a cadet who was an outcast in his own 
term, or was habitually bullied by his term-mates, must have been very 
unpleasant. 
The isolation of terms interfered with one of the stated objectives of the 
Fisher-Selborne scheme  to create a corps of officers with a shared 
background and lifelong friendships. It also meant that cadets who were not 
cadet captains had very few leadership opportunities. One later complained that 
‘for four years we milled about as a herd, supremely and smugly proud of 
ourselves and hopelessly unaware of our own defects’.170  Finally, it tended to 
produce officers who were inward looking and cliquish.  
The lives of cadets were greatly changed by the adoption of houses in 
place of terms in 1937. The possibility of introducing the house system had 
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been mooted as early as 1920,171 but it was not until 1936 that it was seriously 
investigated. The term system was a legacy from the Britannia and it persisted 
partly because of tradition and partly because it was seen as successful. 
Although inward looking, the terms tended to be closely bonded and welded to 
their ideals. Largely invulnerable to external malevolent influence, they 
benefitted from a close relationship with their term officer. The strict segregation 
of terms, whilst limiting leadership opportunities, did mean there was very little 
bullying of younger boys by the elder although the potential existed for very 
nasty bullying within a term.  
In 1936 the Captain of the College, Rear-Admiral Reginald Holt, argued 
that the term system encouraged self-discipline, limited the spread of disease, 
and safeguarded the morals of the younger cadets.172 Holt presented this as an 
advantage, but to many officers continual supervision was amongst the worst 
features of the term system. They believed it stifled initiative, forced cadets into 
a mould, and prevented them from developing as leaders. 
 Advocates of the house system, including Drax and McMullen, pointed 
out that it would not be used by almost every public school were it 
unsuccessful.173 They argued that the house system would give older cadets 
more opportunity to practise leadership without any great increase in immorality 
or bullying  thus linking it to the drive for initiative that was reforming officer 
education. Whilst there would be more chances for disease to spread, public 
schools were generally healthy places and there was no reason to suppose 
Dartmouth would be otherwise. Sporting contests between houses would be 
more even than those between terms and this would improve morale. House 
traditions could be built up, and this would ease the lot of new officers at the 
college who currently found it very hard to earn the trust of an established term.  
 The move from terms to houses involved a conscious effort to make the 
college more like a public school. Captain Frederick Dalrymple-Hamilton, who 
replaced Holt at the end of 1936, noted in his diary ‘I have been told to make it 
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into a public school’.174 The aim was to give cadets more of the responsibility, 
freedom, and variety of friendships they would have had in a public school and, 
at the same time, to make the college more attractive to parents and prep 
school headmasters. Those involved in drawing up the plans visited a variety of 
prominent public schools including Sherborne, Marlborough, Radley, Wellington 
and Winchester.175 
Under the scheme drawn up in late 1936 there were five main houses  
Blake, Grenville (the spelling modernised from the previous Greynville), St 
Vincent, Exmouth, and Rodney. Cadets in their first two terms were in Drake 
house, a measure devised to maintain some of the old traditions and closeness 
of the term system.176 House officers were in much the same position as term 
officers, although they were now responsible for the condition of their house’s 
accommodation as well as the lives of its cadets.177 
A complete change of policy encouraged senior cadets to take an active 
interest in their juniors, and it was hoped that bad behaviour would continue to 
be discouraged by peer pressure rather than the fear of punishment.178 Houses 
followed public school practice in having a senior room, but the senior cadets 
lost many existing privileges. Cadets in their last term gained cabins, they were 
very small spaces and shared by three cadets but they gave their occupants 
privacy and freedom unknown to their juniors.179 
 The house system was introduced on a trial basis in the summer term of 
1937. The official report submitted by Dalrymple-Hamilton suggested that most 
of its problems and successes were as predicted  demonstrating the 
thoroughness with which the issue had been considered. He reported that, in 
general, the cadets were now both happier and livelier. However the younger 
cadet captains were struggling to exert authority over older cadets  a situation 
not helped by senior cadets resenting their loss of privileges and refusing to rise 
to the occasion. This in turn had resulted in worse behaviour amongst the 
younger cadets and the house officers being over-worked. On the other hand, 
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games matches were now more evenly and keenly contested, and senior 
cadets had begun to coach their younger housemates.180 
 His satisfaction was not shared by the rest of the college, both the 
masters and the senior college cadets were disgruntled by the changes. The 
masters had legitimate cause for complaint  standards of order and discipline 
had slipped, and their pastoral role within the college had not been properly 
redefined. The headmaster complained that whereas formerly ‘order kept itself’ 
there was now indiscipline. He still supported the changes, recognising that ‘the 
prestige of seniority has gone, it will have to be replaced by the prestige of 
character’.181 
 Dalrymple-Hamilton recognised the difficulties and opted to address both 
the masters and the senior college cadets to encourage them to support the 
changes. He told the masters that the house system was proving to be a 
success  ‘the spirit of initiative engendered is what is being asked for in the 
fleet’ but recognised their difficulties, telling them that the decline in discipline 
had been inevitable, and that they should do more to punish transgressors and 
encourage self discipline.182 He showed less sympathy to the senior college 
cadets, and instead urged them to behave responsibly and to help the cadet 
captains. Those who had been helpful and responsible he thanked for their 
efforts.183 
 His remarks seem to have had a positive impact. By the end of the 
following term the novelty of the changes had worn off and they had won almost 
unanimous approval.184 Having gained experience, senior cadets and 
housemasters alike were performing better while the younger cadets had 
settled down. House spirit had risen, the cadets were happier, and games 
matches were ever more keenly contested. Several problems remained  the 
senior cadets did not have time for the additional responsibilities taken by public 
school boys in their position (who were in any case older). Cadet Captains were 
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still chosen in a quota from each term, resulting in good candidates losing out 
while poorer cadets were promoted. Whilst academic standards had generally 
been unaffected, the lack of supervision of younger cadets was resulting in 
cheating at prep, (which would be better undertaken in supervised groups).  
 In spite of these difficulties the house system had proven so successful 
that no suggestion was made for it to be discontinued, it remained in place until 
the last Fisher-Selborne scheme cadets passed out of the college in 1953. The 
removal of the term system resulted in a loss of adult supervision, some 
reduction in discipline, a generally more relaxed atmosphere, and less insularity 
amongst cadets. That standard public school practice should be successfully 
adopted demonstrates the similarity of Dartmouth to public schools, as well as 
the similarity of cadets to public schoolboys. 
This positive impact is illustrated by the autobiography of Phillip Seymour 
which discusses his friendships with cadets from other terms and important 
lessons of leadership and man-management learnt at the college. The change 
in the atmosphere of the college can be evidenced by a single quote: ‘qualities 
instilled in us were Honour and Respect for Tradition  but not at the expense 
of innovation or initiative nor even a sense of humour’.185 Whilst the college had 
never lacked a sense of humour, respect for naval tradition and one’s superiors 
had very much been instilled at the cost of lost initiative. The house system was 
not a panacea for all the college’s ills. One cadet subsequently recalled having 
little contact with cadets outside his own house and stated that bullying took 
place within his house.186 
The available evidence suggests that, teething problems aside, the 
introduction of the house system at Dartmouth was entirely successful. It 
improved the lives of cadets at the college by relaxing the restrictions placed 
upon them, allowed them to broaden their horizons, and it also sent them to sea 
as more capable young officers with increased leadership experience.  
Given the great emphasis on loyalty to the Navy and the effort to control 
cadets through secular means, it is perhaps unsurprising that religion played a 
relatively limited role in the life of the colleges. Whereas the physical health of 
cadets was a constant concern of the naval authorities, the question of spiritual 
health arose only once. On this occasion the naval authorities engaged in a 
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prolonged conflict with the local Catholic authorities regarding provision for 
Roman Catholic cadets.187  
 The Royal Navy was an overtly Christian organisation  religious 
attendance was more or less compulsory and special provision was made for 
Catholics and non-conformists. Morning divisions included prayers and church 
attendance was compulsory on Sundays while some official encouragement 
was given to religious organisations that targeted sailors. At Dartmouth classes 
in scripture were included in the curriculum. Terms were normally confirmed 
together  a process which reaffirmed their group identity but may not have 
aided their spiritual development. 
 The religious instruction provided at the colleges was designed to 
promote certain Christian ideals. The Michaelmas 1927 issue of Britannia 
Magazine carried a transcription of Ashford’s address to the passing out term in 
which he told the cadets why they had been given so much religious instruction. 
He told them that religion was an important part of life at all public schools  
and part and parcel of being a gentleman. Only through devotion could men 
reach the moral standards desired by Christ. He advised them to watch and 
pray, and that a good leader was guided by his faith in his treatment of his 
subordinates.188 Britannia Magazine made clear the emphasis placed on 
Christianity at Dartmouth, it always contained a report on religious activities at 
the college. 
This functional approach to religion was reinforced by the circumstances 
under which cadets worshipped and received religious instruction. The hectic 
routine of the colleges was not conducive to deep thought and religious 
contemplation. Cadets were given time to pray before going to bed  but given 
the limited amount of time available it is unlikely that much deep thought was 
involved. A former Osborne cadet recalled: ‘Then suddenly the orders came 
‘say your prayers’. One fell to ones knees and rattled off a prayer or two’.189 For 
some, prayers offered a head start at undressing: ‘while he was kneeling down 
there he was fiddling with his tie all the time and loosening the knot [...] so that 
the moment the gong went for the finish of prayers after ninety seconds off it 
came over his head’.190 
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Nor was the atmosphere of the colleges calculated to inspire religious 
devotion  the loyalties of cadets were directed towards the Navy and 
arrangements made this clear. At Dartmouth the chapel, magnificent in itself, 
was tucked away at the end of a corridor whilst the quarterdeck stood at the 
centre of the college. Osborne did not have a chapel, cadets attended services 
in Nelson Hall  a general purpose space devoted to a naval hero. The interior 
of these spaces reflected the profession of those who worshipped within and 
the links to naval heritage that pervaded the colleges. On leaving Dartmouth in 
1928, Captain Martin Dunbar-Nasmith gifted a model of the first Britannia to the 
chapel; the model was suspended from the ceiling, thus placing the Royal Navy 
and its traditions at the centre of the College’s religious space.  
 Sport too was pursued as a route to becoming a better naval officer 
rather than for its own sake. This approach owed much to the way in which 
sports had developed in British public schools during the nineteenth century. 
Organised games offered a variety of positive effects. They could be used to 
occupy large numbers of boys for long periods of time, provided a release for 
frustrations and high spirits, and taught teamwork, self-sacrifice, and self-
discipline. In this way they could be an excellent tool for crushing individualism 
and vices such as gambling, laziness, alcoholism and masturbation, or other 
threats to discipline. Finally, games were a vehicle for self-improvement, 
producing a healthy mind and a healthy body ready to serve God and nation.  
 It has been argued that the growth in games was largely the result of the 
popularity of the concept of ‘muscular Christianity’. For muscular Christians to 
be physically fit was to glorify God’s work and to equip oneself to spread his 
word throughout the world. The importance of muscular Christianity has been 
over-emphasised for a number of reasons. Mainly it seems to be the product of 
over-emphasising the influence of Thomas Arnold, portrayed by his early 
biographers Hughes and Stanley as a great advocate of muscular 
Christianity.191 Arnold was unquestionably a devout Christian, but he rarely 
referred to games in his sermons and did not take an active role in them or their 
promotion.192  
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 Edward Thring, who as Headmaster of Uppingham transformed it from 
small local institution to great public school, is also cited as a key advocate of 
muscular Christianity. Thring certainly advocated both Christianity and sport  
however he used sport as a tool for school unity, encouraging the masters to 
play alongside the boys. He actually resisted the growth and worship of school 
sport because it detracted from his aim of giving all boys an equal chance to 
thrive.193 
 The pro-games movement was partly driven by a fear of vice, particularly 
that connected to sexuality. This fear appears to have been widespread, even 
among those with more practical concerns about the future of young Britons. 
James Wilson, Headmaster of Clifton School, was a major force in modernising 
the teaching of mathematics. Yet, in 1881 he declared ‘There is amply sufficient 
ground for alarm that the nation may be on the eve of an age of voluptuousness 
and reckless immorality’.194 Among Thring’s greatest concerns was the ‘large 
percentage of temptation, criminality and idleness in great schools’.195 
 Although sport was seen to be morally beneficial its institution was 
largely a result of practical concerns. Schools had few staff therefore it was 
essential to have activities which engaged large numbers of boys under minimal 
supervision, and for this sport was ideal. This view was crystallised by Thring 
who wrote that ‘each boy being fully occupied is thus preserved from 
innumerable evils’.196  
At Harrow the development of organised games followed the formation of 
the Harrow Philathletic society in 1853. The society was started by thirty 
members of the fifth and sixth forms and one of its stated aims was to improve 
order in the school. The society collected subscriptions, organised house 
matches and campaigned for the building of a gymnasium, ultimately it 
‘organised, coerced and flattered the bulk of the school into a complicated 
system of regimented games playing’.197 Whilst the Philathletic Society 
members may have been concerned about Empire, Christianity, or 
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masturbation, it is clear that they were mostly concerned with their own position 
and power within the school. 
 Many of these attributes were attractive to the naval authorities. 
Extending the strict control of cadets to their hours of leisure was an entirely 
logical step. Laziness, immorality, and criminality were undesirable 
characteristics in young naval officers; physical fitness, determination, and 
teamwork were desirable. Sport was also one of the few areas in which officers 
and ratings participated at as equals  as such it was excellent for building 
morale  indeed sporting success was seen as a sure sign of a happy ship. 
 Hardly surprising then, that sport was an important part of life at the 
naval colleges. They offered a wider variety of sports than most public schools, 
with rugby, soccer, hockey, tennis, cricket, rowing, sailing, athletics, squash, 
gymnastics, swimming and beagling available. Few public schools offered 
sailing, let alone included it in the curriculum, but otherwise the sports on offer 
were fairly typical. Rugby, as in most public schools, was the dominant winter 
game but it was felt important that cadets should play and understand soccer  
the game preferred by ratings.198  
 Cadets made a daily report on their activities known as a log  some 
activities counted as a whole log, others as only half a log meaning that more 
than one had to be undertaken in the course of the afternoon. Log activities 
generally involved sport but getting a haircut or taking a music lesson were also 
acceptable.  It was expected that cadets would make an honest report on their 
activities  liars were severely punished. 
Hardly surprising then that, according to How to Become a Naval Officer, 
the sporting facilities at Dartmouth ‘challenge comparison with any school in the 
world’199 This was an exaggeration  the college had insufficient pitch space 
resulting in cadets travelling to off-site pitches owned by the college, and all the 
pitches were liable to be closed due to water-logging in the winter. Although 
Dartmouth had an excellent outdoor (and later indoor) swimming pool, Osborne 
had no swimming pool at all. However, the quality of the coaching was 
impressive  rugby initially being in the hands of former Welsh international 
HGW Hughes-Games, succeeded by former Ireland player Mark Sugden, who 
was in charge between 1931 and 1964. The sporting record of Dartmouth was 
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impressive, especially given the relative youth and high turnover of its senior 
teams. The college produced eleven international rugby players  ten 
representing England and one Ireland.200  
 The Blake Term Log for 1929-1932 provides a useful picture of how sport 
was viewed by cadets. Being a contemporary record, produced by a variety of 
cadets, it can be considered fairly representative of cadet opinion. The log 
records the term’s own sporting results and those of the college. Particular 
athletic achievements by term members are marked out and are clearly a 
source of pride for the entire term, so too are the sporting achievements of the 
term  which included victory in the senior college athletics championships and 
providing all the finalists in the college tennis championships. A poem salutes 
the leaders of the term in each sport.201 
 In the early days of the Fisher-Selborne scheme particular emphasis was 
placed on the participation of all members of the college community. This was 
partly a hangover from Britannia, which had traditionally fielded teams of the 
best men available  be they cadets, officers or masters  and partly a desire to 
emphasise the democratic nature of service sport. It was also part of a 
conscious effort to build team spirit  Ashford played in the earliest hockey 
fixtures.202  Fielding teams of this nature, rather than purely composed of 
cadets, improved chances of victory and so helped to develop winning 
traditions.  
However this inclusive spirit did not extend to the ship’s company and 
college servants; the 1907 Dartmouth sports day featured one set of events for 
these employees and another for officers and masters.203 The exclusion of 
these men emphasised that college sport was not a purely athletic endeavour 
but was also part of the gentlemanly lifestyle of the naval officer. In later years 
there were soccer fixtures between cadets and ratings, and ratings were 
included in college teams competing against adults rather than other schools. 
 In the inter-war years the colleges placed more of an emphasis on 
participation by all cadets. Britannia Magazine was careful to report on all inter-
term fixtures, even those at third team level. It also reported on the 90% boxing, 
introduced in 1920 this event excluded the 10% of cadets most skilled in boxing 
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and so produced a competition in which any cadet had some hope of victory. 
Participation secured a point for the cadet’s term, regardless of how soundly he 
was defeated. One of the major disadvantages of the term system was that 
sporting events, especially rugby and soccer matches, tended to be very 
uneven contests. 
 Although intramural sports were a key aspect of college life, there was 
also an emphasis on competing against outsiders and the choice of opposition 
reflected the public school-like nature of the colleges. Dartmouth cadets played 
public schools such as Sherborne, Blundell’s and Taunton. These schools, 
although well respected, were not amongst the foremost in the country. They 
were also all in the South West; Dartmouth’s commitment to sports did not 
extend to sending teams long distances to play. Pangbourne Nautical College 
was only added to the schedule in 1938; the Conway, (anchored in the Mersey), 
and the Worcester (in the Thames) did not feature at all. The opportunity for 
cadets to meet their peers in the merchant navy did not outweigh the cost and 
difficulties associated with travelling between the two. Nor was there any 
suggestion that cadets should play their social inferiors. 
 Finding appropriate opposition for Osborne was a constant difficulty. The 
cadets were too old to play against the first teams of prep schools, and far too 
young to play against the first teams of public schools. There was no question 
of them playing against state secondary schools. The result was a great 
emphasis on competition between terms and tutor sets, and a succession of 
sporting contests against Winchester’s junior sides.204 
 The colleges competed mostly in rugby and cricket, and to a lesser 
extent in hockey, soccer, swimming, athletics and tennis. There was relatively 
little emphasis on the more professionally useful sports of pulling and sailing. 
Competitive sailing races between terms were not reported on by Britannia 
Magazine until 1908, in which year they seem to have been a new 
development.205 Colours were not awarded to the most proficient performers 
until 1912, long after their institution for other sports. No trophy was provided for 
the term that enjoyed most success on the water until 1913. 
 The Drake Term Line Book for 1929-1932 also demonstrates where 
these sports fell in the college pecking order. It shows that during the summer, 
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the best time of the year for pulling and sailing, these sports came a very poor 
second to cricket. The log noted that the term was not very good at pulling on 
account of the time dedicated to cricket. On another day it declared that ‘the two 
teams sailed as they do not get much chance otherwise’.206  The Drakes were 
not the only cadets who struggled on the water. Some of Wodehouse’s 
respondents reported poor standards of boat handling amongst cadets who had 
recently passed out of the college.207 
 Poor standards of boat handling were just one sign of the college’s 
failure to teach seamanship well. The neglect of the subject is rather surprising, 
it was after all a key aspect of the executive officer’s professional expertise, and 
one of the things that separated him from other officers. It was also one of the 
few subjects in the curriculum that provided cadets with a constant reminder of 
their future profession. The academic demands of the colleges meant that little 
time was available for seamanship  only one or two hours a week were 
devoted to the subject.208 Under these circumstances it was essential for the 
subject to be taught well if good results were to be achieved.  
Unfortunately the training was left in the hands of term officers, petty 
officers, and various retired ratings  none of whom was trained to teach. The 
poor quality of the seamanship training was criticised by many of Wodehouse’s 
respondents who placed most of the blame on the instructors, describing them 
as old and poor at teaching.209 
It is unclear why the teaching of seamanship at the colleges was so poor. 
The subject did not fit in with Fisher’s agenda of modernity and science but it 
was still useful professional knowledge. In a way, the lack of seamanship 
training at the colleges was symbolic of the way in which knowledge and duties 
required of the professional naval officer had changed. Neither the students nor 
the teachers seem to have been particularly unenthusiastic. The problem 
probably stemmed from the lack of emphasis on the subject at this stage of the 
officer’s education. With three years of sea training lying ahead, which for most 
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Dartmouth cadets started with eight months in a dedicated training cruiser, 
seamanship cannot have been a very pressing concern  especially given the 
great demands college life made of cadets.  
Nor did the college place much emphasis on military behaviour beyond 
that normally expected in the Navy. No effort was made to teach anything about 
the practicalities of land warfare. New cadets joined the college a day before the 
remainder and were immediately taught enough drill to take part in the daily 
parades. Older cadets periodically practised drill, especially when it was their 
turn to form the guard for Sunday divisions. In 1926 the gardens at the front of 
the college were dug up and replaced by an expanded parade ground. It is 
unclear why this was done but there does not seem to have been a greatly 
increased emphasis on parades and ceremonials. The change did however 
offer reduced maintenance costs and more room in which to hold divisions  
although the terms were far smaller than those of the pre-war period; there were 
now eleven of them rather than six. 
Rifle shooting was also part of a new cadet’s introduction to the Royal 
Navy. The Drake Term Line Book for 1929-1933 records that cadets were sent 
onto the rifle range two days after joining the college and that the shooting 
competition was the first intra-mural event they took part in.210 Thereafter they 
spent little time on the range, and seemed to have viewed shooting as a 
recreational activity rather than a professional accomplishment.  
The lack of military emphasis reflected the fact that the colleges were 
schools as well as naval establishments. This side of their nature should also be 
explored and the obvious point of comparison is with the public schools which 
were responsible for producing most of Britain’s leaders including the bulk of 
her military officers. 
 
The Naval Colleges as Public Schools 
 
Superficially the naval colleges had much in common with the public schools  
they recruited from the same pools of teachers and potential pupils, and were 
members of the HMC. Official committees compared the colleges to high 
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ranking public schools such as Cheltenham, Westminster and St Pauls.211 
Sports and many other college recreational activities were similar to those found 
in public schools. 
The colleges also shaped their students in much the same way as the 
average public school, the crucial difference being that the schools did not 
prepare all their pupils for service to the same employer. Although the degree of 
segregation achieved by the term system was probably unique, it should not be 
thought that the average public school allowed its students to mix freely. Frank 
Fletcher recommended that Dartmouth adopt the house system but, in his 
autobiography, admitted that it frequently produced ‘extreme tribal 
separation’.212 Shrewsbury pupils were forbidden from being seen in public with 
members of other houses.213 
 Nor did the public schools allow their pupils freedom in behaviour, dress 
or association. They demanded that individual identities were subordinated to 
that of the school; this subordination was marked by unique slang, customs and 
uniforms. New boys were expected to learn these things quickly  some 
schools such as Winchester and Eton required them to take a test in school 
knowledge within a few weeks of starting. These unique specifications of dress 
and behaviour were part of a socialisation process that aimed to produce pupils 
whose behaviour throughout their future lives was governed by the lessons of 
their schools. Wilkinson noted that public schools, even if established quite 
recently, ‘formed group loyalty by making the individual value himself only as 
part of the group and as part of an historical continuum’.214 
 The public schools of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
increasingly existed to produce a certain type of boy  the type most useful to 
the empire. Such boys should eschew personal profit in favour of entering an 
occupation where they could do public good. They were expected to be brave, 
loyal, gentlemanly, and physically tough. The ideals of the public school 
became increasingly associated with manliness, and thus the public schools 
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rejected femininity  there was an emphasis on toughening sports, a lack of 
material comfort and an almost complete absence of female role models. 
Women were present only as nurses, domestic staff or the dutiful wives of 
masters. Boys had few opportunities to interact with local girls and rarely saw 
their families during term time.215 
Such ideas were expressed in the fiction written for boys in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. British boys of all classes were 
encouraged to be honest, brave and determined, to be good Christians, to play 
fairly, and to do their best for country and empire. The heroes of many stories 
were public school boys or men who had been to public schools.216 In 1954 
Alec Waugh wrote a new forward to his 1917 book The Loom of Youth in which 
he noted that ‘the public school system was venerated as a pillar of the British 
Empire and out of that veneration had grown the myth of the ideal public school 
boy’.217 It was Waugh’s exposure of this myth of idealised and perfected youth 
that gained his book its tempestuous reception. The boys of the fictitious 
Fernhurst are variously games obsessed, selfish, and stupid. Their loyalties are 
to their house rather than their school, let alone their country. 
To ensure that they behaved in the prescribed manner boys were subject 
to surveillance by teachers, housemasters, prefects and each other. Most lived 
in large dormitories, there was little space for personal belongings, and little 
scope for privacy or self- expression. At Wellington the dormitories radiated out 
from a central hub ensuring that comings and goings could be constantly and 
effectively monitored – a variation on Bentham’s panopticon prison design in 
which a central guard tower gave the illusion of constant surveillance even if 
unoccupied.218 
 Wakeford argued that, much like a prison, the public school constituted a 
‘total institution’. The term, coined by American sociologist Erving Goffman, 
described an institution in which large numbers of people were contained for 
long periods of time, having little contact with outside society. The occupants of 
such an institution are all of similar status and both live and work within it, 
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having little control over their daily lives. Inmates are typical stripped of their 
individuality, being required to dress and behave in a certain way.219 
 In this way the naval colleges were essentially no different from other 
public schools. They demanded loyalty to the Royal Navy and adherence to its 
customs and heritage, rather than to a school and its traditions. However this 
loyalty was obtained in much the same manner  through an insistence on 
adhering to rigid custom, an intolerance of individuality, and the forced 
subordination of the boy to the institution. 
The cadets themselves were not actually in the Royal Navy. They had 
signed no contract, taken no oath, and received no commission. Their parents 
were paying not only for their education but also for their keep including their 
uniforms and pocket money. There was no official rank of ‘cadet’, Kings 
Regulations referred to ‘naval cadets’, other documents used the two 
descriptions indiscriminately. Cadets occupied an anomalous place in the naval 
hierarchy, being obliged to obey the orders of ratings who stood below naval 
cadets in the chain of command.220 
When the question arose of whether the boys at Dartmouth should be 
titled cadets or naval cadets, the Head of the CW Branch, JA Phillips, pointed 
out that as they were appointed to the college ‘it would appear they must be 
either officers or misters’. In response the C-in-C Plymouth, Admiral Phillimore, 
stated that ‘they are not even ratings’.221 Within the college the question did not 
occur  the image that cadets were being moulded in was indisputably that of 
the naval officer. 
In reality the naval colleges were not public schools  they were naval 
establishments. They existed solely to produce naval officers and this 
requirement dictated their curricula and atmosphere. Their resemblance to 
public schools was the result of a shared agenda of producing a certain type of 
boy  gentlemanly and physically and mentally robust. If the Navy had desired 
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young officers of a different type it would have followed a different pattern; life at 
Dartmouth and Osborne was very different from that at the training 
establishments for boy seamen. 
It must be asked how successful Dartmouth and Osborne were, both as 
schools and as naval establishments? From an educational viewpoint, they 
were enormously successful. They were repeatedly praised by school 
inspectors, both for the quality of the teaching, and for the innovation of their 
curricula. Many modern teaching methods were pioneered or developed at 
them. However the existed solely to produce officers for the Royal Navy, and in 
this respect they were less successful. 
Their products were frequently described as lacking in one aspect or 
another of officer-like qualities, be it seamanship, initiative, or self-discipline. 
The term system tended to produce cadets who were insular and inward 
looking.  Few of them had much practical leadership experience. 
On the other hand, the colleges produced the majority of the Royal 
Navy’s executive officers and these officers were undoubtedly successful. The 
early products of the scheme acquitted themselves well in the First World War, 
a particularly great achievement given that many were removed early from 
Dartmouth and sent to sea at the age of fifteen or sixteen. The college supplied 
a high proportion of the professional executive officers who served in the 
Second World War, including many flag officers and captains of ships. The 
success of the Navy in this war undoubtedly owed much to the skill, 
determination and spirit of these officers  ideals they had absorbed at 
Dartmouth. 
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Chapter Three  The Special Entry 
 
By 1913 it was clear that the Fisher-Selborne scheme could not meet the 
demands of the ever-expanding fleet. More officers were needed and they must 
be produced with relative haste. The Navy adopted a variety of solutions to the 
problem. The need for officers undoubtedly acted as a spur to the Mate 
scheme; although the type of officer it produced  old, junior, and under-
educated  was not ideal. A number of men entered from the merchant navy 
bringing practical seagoing experience but lacking in naval upbringing and 
scientific knowledge. Neither of these groups represented a long term solution 
to the Royal Navy’s problems  what was needed was a permanent system of 
entry for young men educationally qualified to become naval officers, the 
professional and social equals of their Fisher-Selborne scheme colleagues. 
 The solution was the Special Entry scheme which entered its first cadets 
in September 1913. Recruited largely from the public schools, these seventeen 
year olds were intended to spend eighteen months aboard a dedicated training 
ship before joining the fleet as midshipmen. As midshipmen and sub-lieutenants 
they were to follow the same curriculum as Fisher-Selborne scheme officers 
but, because of their age on entry, would be slightly older when commissioned. 
Although these officers would not have the engineering and scientific 
background of those who had been at the colleges, they were none the less 
expected to conform to the same principles of inter-changeability.1 
 The idea came from Churchill, inspired by a visit to the new Royal Marine 
officer training school at Walmer – the officer production system that the Royal 
Marines had chosen in place of the Fisher-Selborne scheme. Churchill wrote to 
Prince Louis of Battenberg, the Second  and soon to be First, Sea Lord 
suggesting an annual entry of twenty boys from the ‘great public schools’. Such 
boys could ultimately form about 15% of the officer entry, with 70% through the 
Fisher-Selborne scheme and the remainder from the lower-deck.2 
 In early 1913 the scheme began to take shape, driven by Churchill but 
with the enthusiastic support of Battenberg and the new Second Sea Lord, Sir 
John Jellicoe  who, as will be shown, had his doubts about the officers 
produced by the Fisher-Selborne scheme. Initial plans were produced by Ewing 
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but finalisation of the scheme was left to a committee of which he was a 
member. The committee was headed by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, a 
former captain of Dartmouth.3 
 The final plans for the Special Entry revealed several clear objectives. 
Firstly it was hoped that the cadets would be recruited from the top public 
schools  the scheme was not intended to be democratic.4 Although the 
scheme was advertised in thirty-three local and national newspapers, liaison 
officers were sent to only a few schools.5 
Secondly the education of Special Entry cadets placed a heavy 
emphasis on naval subjects. The academic curriculum had little space for 
normal school subjects but concentrated on seamanship, engineering and 
navigation. It was hoped that the cadets would have acquired sufficient general 
education at their schools.6 This was, in some ways, an acknowledgement that 
Osborne and Dartmouth and their engineering based curricula were 
unnecessary and that naval officers could be produced by normal public 
schools. However the entrance examinations sought a degree of scientific and 
mathematical knowledge that was not acquired in the course of a normal public 
school career. 
 Thirdly the plans placed enormous emphasis on Special Entry cadets 
being absorbed into naval life as quickly and fully as possible. The construction 
of Dartmouth and Osborne was part of a trend to move naval training ashore 
and had been followed by the opening of HMS Ganges to train boy seamen in 
1905. This policy was reversed with the Special Entry. The decision was made 
to train the cadets in a ship, the aim being to fully immerse them in naval life. It 
was hoped that this total immersion would compensate for the relative 
shortness of the training period.7 The Special Entry training ship also enabled 
cadets to quickly put into practise what they had learnt; and she was to 
undertake a programme of instructional cruises.  
This effectively combined the first two stages of the Fisher-Selborne 
cadet’s naval career, providing theoretical education and an introduction to 
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seagoing life. But whereas the two colleges were shared academic and naval 
territory, the ship was indisputably naval  there was no question that the boys 
aboard her were anything other than embryonic naval officers. There was no 
need to stuff her with naval relics or go beyond the normal range of naval ritual. 
The officer status of the cadets was reinforced by calling the midday meal 
luncheon rather than lunch or dinner.8 
 The Special Entry training cruiser was not a normal warship; she had a 
reduced complement, altered accommodation, and her own programme which 
kept her separate from the normal activities of the fleet for much of the time. 
She was manned by active service officers and ratings and ensured that cadets 
had some exposure to the real navy rather than the sanitised version 
experienced by their Osborne and Dartmouth brethren. In general Special Entry 
cadets were rather less isolated than those at the colleges and their experience 
was broadening rather than narrowing. They were less physically isolated and 
the shortness of the training, combined with the older age of cadets, meant that 
patterns of behaviour could not be forced to the same extent.  
Training Special Entry cadets in a ship also meant that their education 
was liable to be disrupted by wider events and concerns and this makes for a 
complex chronology which deserves to be examined in some detail. A detailed 
consideration is possible given the limited number of Special Entry cadets in 
training at any time and the availability of source material.  
 
Chronology of Special Entry Training 
 
There was to be only one Special Entry per year, the cadets joining in 
September. This meant that the training periods of successive entries would 
overlap which, in turn, dictated a requirement for two training cruisers. The ship 
chosen for the first entry was HMS Highflyer, a Highflyer class cruiser first 
commissioned in 1899. After refitting for her new role she commissioned on 27 
August as a Devonport based ship commanded by Captain Buller.9 On 15 
September the first cadets joined.10 
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 As at the colleges, Highflyer’s officers had been carefully chosen for their 
role. One cadet later described the First Lieutenant, Commander John 
Casement, as paying ‘an enormous amount of attention to the cadets’; he ‘set 
an example of smartness and leadership, which really set us on our way’. The 
senior ratings were also impressive  the cadet gunner Robert Haydyn was 
‘always immaculate, a great disciplinarian, a born leader’.11 
 Highflyer spent most of the next few months in Devonport but made 
several short cruises visiting Torbay, Dartmouth and Penzance. When she 
visited Dartmouth her interaction with the college was quite limited.12 A rugby 
match was played and a Highflyer correspondent appointed for the Britannia 
Magazine but the two groups of cadets do not seem to have had much contact 
with each other.13 There was one consolation for the cadet inhabitants of the 
college, although Highflyer’s crew were allowed to go ashore in Dartmouth her 
cadets were not! This visit set the pattern for the relationship between the two 
groups of cadets  which thereafter tended to be a sporting rivalry, tinged with 
mutual curiosity, rather than a close professional association. Highflyer visited 
Dartmouth again the following February having in the mean time visited 
Portsmouth.14  
Highflyer’s trip to Portsmouth remains shrouded in mystery, with no 
record of what the cadets did whilst they were there; they may have gone to see 
the future of the Navy in the form of the submarine service, or the history in the 
form of HMS Victory  perhaps both. In any case this series of short trips 
introduced the cadets to seagoing life and also provided them with a glimpse of 
their future colleagues. 
 In late March, and with the cadets accustomed to naval life, Highflyer 
sailed for the Mediterranean where she remained until July. The Mediterranean 
was an ideal place for Highflyer, the cadets and her company had access to a 
wide range of facilities ashore in Gibraltar and Malta, the spring weather was far 
more suited to sea training than that of the UK, and the powerful Mediterranean 
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Fleet provided a range of training opportunities. The shore leave of cadets was 
strictly limited but they were still exposed to a range of cultures and conditions.  
 Highflyer returned to Devonport to give summer leave and thereafter took 
part in the fleet review and test mobilisation. She seems to have been 
successful in her training role  official files offer no hint of any disquiet. 
However on the outbreak of war Highflyer immediately became an active unit of 
the fleet leaving the Special Entry cadets without a ship or a training 
programme.15 
 By the time the new entry joined in September an emergency 
programme had been put in place for their training. They joined the Royal Naval 
Engineering College at Keyham where Engineer Captain Taylor was instructed 
to prepare a three-month course covering seamanship, signalling, navigation 
and boat handling. Significantly engineering was not included in the curriculum 
 and whilst a three-month course could hardly have been expected to teach 
more than the bare essentials, this was none the less a clear sign that in the 
future inter-changeability would be sacrificed on the altar of operational 
expediency. Taylor and his instructional staff were to ‘find the cadets work to do 
and to encourage them to instruct themselves in every possible way’. Cadets 
who learnt quickly could be sent to sea early.16 The emphasis on self-education 
ran contrary to just about every other naval educational programme but it was 
probably a response to the shortage of instructional staff rather than a change 
in policy. Certainly the whole scheme appears to have been hastily thrown 
together in response to the emergency situation. 
 This state of affairs could not be allowed to continue. The Admiralty was 
hardly likely to allow an old style engineer to conduct the training of executive 
officers. An executive replacement was appointed on 14 September. Training 
took place at Keyham throughout the war, the number of recruits much 
exceeded pre-war plans and in 1917 a second entry per year was added. 
Inevitably the plans originally made for the Special Entry were abandoned as 
the Navy struggled to produce officers as quickly as possible. However, 
Highflyer’s work had evidently been considered a success, for in January 1919 
sea training was resumed for Special Entry cadets. 
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 The following five years were a period of confusion and uncertainty for 
the Special Entry. There was never any question of ending it but the declining 
strength of the Royal Navy was reflected in the continual changes to the 
scheme. These changes affected all aspects of the scheme  how many cadets 
joined and when, how long they were trained for, and what their training 
involved. There were two entries in 1919 but thereafter only one per year until 
1925. From 1926 onwards there were two entries per year, and from 1937 
three. 
 In 1921, in view of the increasing re-segregation of the engineering and 
executive branches, it was decided to shorten the Special Entry training course 
to one year. This course, with minimal engineering content, consisted of two 
terms in a static training ship followed by one at sea in HMS Thunderer. This 
was followed by two years and four months as a midshipman and then the 
courses appropriate to the officer’s chosen career.17  
 The introduction of this course spelt the end of inter-changeability for the 
Special Entry. The midshipman serving ashore could not hope to develop the 
skills and experience needed by an executive officer at sea. In 1924 the 
decision was made to separate Special Entry cadets from the moment of entry. 
Special Entries subsequently entered as executive or engineer cadets; the 
executive and engineering branches had a shared one year course in HMS 
Erebus, after which the former went to sea and the latter to Keyham.18 
Separate engineering and executive cadetships were introduced at the 
behest of the Engineer in Chief, Engineer Rear-Admiral Robert Dixon, who was 
concerned at the lack of candidates for his branch and feared that if the 
shortage of cadet volunteers continued parliament would force ‘dilution’ via the 
promotion of men from the lower-deck.19 By the end of 1925, a clear line had 
been drawn between the two groups of cadets, at least in the minds of many at 
the Admiralty. When the question of training the two branches separately from 
entry arose DTSD, Captain Hugh Tweedie, commented that the engineering 
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cadets were, ‘actually commencing to learn another profession’.20 Nobody cared 
to disagree with him. 
Thus the abandonment of inter-changeability affected the Special Entry 
rather more than Dartmouth. The latter changed its curriculum but continued to 
train all its cadets with one aim in mind, whereas the Special Entry was obliged 
to produce a variety of officers to pursue separate professions. The abolition of 
inter-changeability also condemned the engineering branch to a lower social 
status than the executive, if only because the vast majority of executive officers 
were educated at Dartmouth  which required greater parental resources than 
the Special Entry which produced the overwhelming majority of engineers.21 
In the early 1920s Special Entry training was seriously disrupted by the 
continual decommissioning of ships axed from the ever shrinking fleet. The 
tendency to conduct cadet training in older vessels was particularly damaging in 
this respect, resulting in the frequent movement of training activities from one 
ship to another. In January 1919 the new and existing Special Entries went to 
sea in HMS Carnarvon; in September she was joined by HMS Cumberland, the 
intention appearing to be that the two cruisers would accommodate alternate 
new entries. Cumberland paid off in May 1920 leaving Carnarvon to soldier on, 
able to accommodate all the cadets now that their numbers had been 
dramatically reduced. Carnarvon herself paid off in July 1921. 
The 1920 entry started their careers in HMS Temeraire, and that of 1921 
in HMS Antrim. The 1922 and 1923 entries started their careers in HMS 
Courageous flagship of the Reserve Fleet at Portsmouth. All these cadets did 
the second part of the training in the seagoing cadet training ship HMS 
Thunderer.22 This larger ship was able to accommodate both the Dartmouth and 
Special Entry cadets and did so until May 1924 when the decision was made to 
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abandon cadet sea training. Thunderer was reduced to Reserve Fleet status 
and remained at Devonport, still housing the Special Entries, until she herself 
was decommissioned to meet treaty obligations in the summer of 1926. 
 The Admiralty wished to continue with shipboard training and eventually 
opted to house cadets aboard the monitor HMS Erebus. So desperate were the 
circumstances that the cadets did not have the ship to themselves; she was 
also used for gunnery training  but was moored in an isolated area of 
Devonport dockyard thus preventing the cadets from contamination but 
requiring gunnery trainees to make a daily return journey by boat.23 Erebus 
often served as the flagship of the Reserve Fleet, the resultant hustle and bustle 
disrupted both groups of students, and her remote location dislocated the 
smooth running of the Reserve Fleet. The minesweeper HMS Carstairs was 
attached to Erebus and provided short training cruises for cadets similar to 
those undertaken by Highflyer in the autumn of 1913. 
 This system persisted until the end of 1932. The decision having been 
made to revive sea training, HMS Frobisher commissioned as cadet training 
cruiser in January 1933. Erebus was moved to Portsmouth where she 
continued her gunnery training role, now as a tender to HMS Excellent. As ships 
were in short supply, Frobisher was obliged to carry both Dartmouth and 
Special Entry cadets, meaning that the latter could expect to depart on a long 
training voyage within a week or so of joining the Navy! The shared training 
turned out to be of benefit to both groups, as detailed in the chapter on the 
training cruisers. 
 In 1937 Frobisher was reduced to reserve status awaiting a refit; she was 
replaced by her sister Vindictive. However at this time, the Special Entry was 
expanded to three entries per year, and a new entry of air branch midshipmen 
introduced. Frobisher’s refit was inevitably cancelled; through much of 1938 she 
housed the air midshipmen whilst Vindictive was used for all cadet sea training. 
Erebus accommodated the newly joined Special Entries; executive cadets spent 
one term aboard her followed by two in Vindictive. With war on the horizon the 
fleet needed every available ship. It was decided that Frobisher was to be 
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remilitarised, and Erebus refitted as a harbour defence ship for use by the Royal 
South African Navy.24 
 In May 1939 Special Entry training finally moved ashore. It did not return 
to Keyham (from where the over-crowded Royal Naval Engineering College was 
in the process of moving to Manadon) but instead went to Dartmouth where the 
cadets occupied what had been the ship’s company barracks and were referred 
to as ‘Frobishers’. The change was doubly fortuitous, not only did it mean that 
the three ships were available for war service more quickly than would 
otherwise have been the case; it also enabled Princess Elizabeth to meet her 
future husband  Prince Phillip of Greece, a Special Entry cadet, whom she first 
encountered on a visit to the college in the summer of 1939. 
 The Special Entry cadets at Dartmouth were largely segregated from 
their Fisher-Selborne scheme colleagues. This was more or less inevitable 
given that the two groups were studying different curricula and were 
accommodated separately (given the expanded numbers in both groups, and 
the reorganisation of the college accommodation necessitated by the house 
system, the college could not house all the cadets). However there was some 
social contact, largely on the sporting field. Special Entry cadets quickly started 
appearing on college teams and, had the war not intervened, their presence 
might have heralded a golden age of college sport. As it was, in the summer of 
1939, the athletics team (consisting of three college cadets, three Frobishers 
and one Royal Marine) took joint first place in the naval athletics championship, 
and the college swimming team won the naval championships which had 
previously been utterly dominated by the naval barracks.25 
 The good relations between the two groups could reasonably have been 
expected given that Special Entry officers had long been serving successfully 
as term officers at the college, and that the two groups of cadets had very much 
benefitted from each other’s company aboard the training cruiser. However they 
also reflected the shared outlook and values that the Navy had inculcated into 
both groups and the homogeneity of the young officers the Royal Navy 
produced. None the less there were differences between the two entries and 
these differences must be explored. 
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Comparison of Dartmouth and the Special Entry 
 
The curriculum for Special Entry cadets was virtually unaltered throughout the 
inter-war period. Even after inter-changeability had been abandoned, 
engineering and executive cadets continued to follow a common course in the 
training ship. Once the difficulties associated with the abolition of inter-
changeability had been overcome the training of Special Entry cadets attracted 
little official interest. The system was generally viewed as very successful and 
this was reflected in articles submitted to the Naval Review and comments 
made to official committees. 
 This was in great contrast to the continual debate surrounding Dartmouth 
and inevitably comparisons between the two were frequently made. The subject 
was amongst the most dominant in the Naval Review. The merits of the two 
systems were debated continually from 1920 to 1926 although neither side 
seems to have had much success in converting their opponents or expanding 
their repertoire of arguments. The subject was absent in 1927 but reappeared in 
1928  a string of articles on Britannia, the Dartmouth term system and other 
aspects appearing. Vigorous debate on the entry and training of officers was 
rejoined in 1933 but by the end of the following year it had disappeared and 
thereafter few articles appeared. 
 If submissions to the Naval Review are any guide the selection and 
education of officers was a subject in which many officers were interested but 
not one on which there was a great deal of revolutionary thought. It was only 
raised through specific stimuli  in the early 1920s debate centred on which 
group of officers was most likely to win the next war. In the early 1930s it was 
prompted by Invergordon and by Richmond’s book Naval Training. The 
arguments being raised in favour of one scheme or the other were largely the 
same in 1934 as they had been ten years before. 
As viewed by Naval Review contributors the Special Entry had much to 
recommend it, not least the lower cost and greater flexibility that resulted from 
the shorter training period. It was also suggested that Special Entry officers, at 
least as midshipmen and sub-lieutenants  were more enthusiastic, more 
mature, learnt faster, showed more initiative and generally out performed their 
  211 
ex-Dartmouth colleagues. The variety in their school education was also seen 
as an advantage as it offered a wider variation of outlook and experience. 
 Dartmouth was criticised for forcing boys into a mould and so turning out 
a never-ending stream of officers with the same ideas, opinions and failings. It 
was also considered unfair to enter boys at the age of thirteen and keep them in 
the service irrespective of how suitable they turned out to be.26 Some officers, 
most prominently Richmond, thought that the Special Entry (or some other 
scheme involving the entry of boys aged seventeen or so) could supply all the 
Royal Navy’s officers and urged the abolition of the thirteen year old entry.27 
 The thirteen year old entry had many adherents and they tended to 
dominate discussions about officer training (perhaps because officers who had 
entered the Royal Navy as seventeen year olds were greatly outnumbered by 
those who had joined at a younger age). They argued that the thirteen year old 
entry attracted more talented candidates and that the officers it produced had a 
wider variety of hobbies and interests and a deeper attachment to the Navy.28 
Dartmouth turned out cadets to the standard required by the Navy  many 
schools delivered a poor or patchy education. Furthermore, whereas the public 
schools tended to be lukewarm at best about the Special Entry, the prep 
schools supported Dartmouth and directed some of their brightest pupils to the 
college.29   
Much the same arguments were heard by the two committees that 
considered the relative merits of the two schemes  the Bennett Committee of 
1931 and the Watson Committee of 1938. The Bennett Committee asked its 
naval witnesses to compare the two schemes. Captain Hamilton, formerly 
captain of Erebus, considered Special Entry midshipmen to be livelier, worldlier, 
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and better leaders than their contemporaries from Dartmouth.30 Rear-Admiral 
Astley-Rushton, who had no strong links to either scheme but a marked 
preference for Dartmouth, thought Special Entries more self-reliant.31 
Commander Berthon, who had been on the staff at Keyham for three years, 
thought the two groups equally capable, but generally preferred Dartmouth 
midshipmen; he thought officer-like qualities were particularly important in the 
engine room and so wished more Dartmouth products would take up 
engineering.32 
Admiral Richmond who had long campaigned against the thirteen year 
old entry held the strongest opinions. He thought Dartmouth did not give cadets 
sufficient general education or prepare them for promotion to high rank. Apart 
from having more initiative, he considered Special Entry cadets more 
enthusiastic, faster at learning, and more responsible.33 
Three ex-Dartmouth sub-lieutenants thought that both groups were 
equally happy with service life but that the Special Entries had a broader 
outlook and were definitely at an advantage on first going to sea. They thought 
Dartmouth would be improved by doing away with the term system and so 
making it more public school-like and providing more leadership opportunities.34 
Conversely the former captain of the college, Dunbar-Nasmith, suggested that 
public schools would introduce the term system if it were practical for them to do 
so.35 This contradicted the evidence given by Charterhouse Headmaster Mr 
Fletcher. 
Fletcher was also asked when boys should enter the service. He thought 
that by entering boys at thirteen the Royal Navy got better candidates than it 
would if it relied on the seventeen year old entry. The best seventeen year olds 
were directed to university or to other more lucrative careers. On the other hand 
some boys developed later than others.36 The naval officers generally agreed  
their main argument against extending the quantity of the Special Entry was a 
predicted decline in quality. 
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Astley-Rushton, thought seventeen year olds were less attracted to naval 
service  ‘brass buttons are not what they mean at the age of twelve’.37 The 
Admiralty Advisor on Education, McMullen, was of the same opinion.38 
Kempson, the Headmaster of Dartmouth, and Captain Meyrick, the Captain of 
the College, offered more practical evidence. Kempson cited his previous 
experience as a teacher at Rugby and as a schools inspector  during which he 
had noted the poor quality of the seventeen year old candidates for Army 
entrance.39 Meyrick thought the Army had become a dumping ground for 
otherwise unemployable public school boys. He worried that public school boys 
might prefer the Army and RAF to the Royal Navy, which would further damage 
the quality of the officer entry.40 The committee did not ask the Army or RAF 
about their situations. 
 Meyrick also cited American experience, saying an American officer had 
told him that twenty-four year old Annapolis graduates entering the fleet were 
‘no damn use to the Navy’.41 Conversely, Richmond cited the United States 
Navy as proof that older entrants could be turned into naval officers.42 
The points raised in discussing the relative merits of Dartmouth and the 
Special Entry are indicative of wider concerns. That ‘initiative’ was mentioned 
with such frequency suggests a feeling within the Royal Navy that the First 
World War might have been fought with more success had more of it been 
demonstrated.43 Concerns about the narrowness of the Dartmouth curriculum 
                                               
37
 ibid, Evidence of Rear-Admiral Sir EA Astley-Rushton p.6 
38
 ibid, Evidence of Mr AP McMullen p.12 
39
 ibid, Evidence of Mr EWE Kempson p. 7 
40
 ibid, Evidence of Captain SJ Meyrick pp.10-12 
41
 ibid, Evidence of Captain SJ Meyrick p.16 
42
 ibid, Evidence of Admiral Sir HW Richmond pp.10-11 
43
 Historians have extensively criticised the failings of the Royal Navy in this area, from 
examples see: JJ Tritten, ‘Doctrine and Fleet Tactics in the Royal Navy’ in A Doctrine Reader: 
The Navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Spain, ed. by L Donolo and JJ 
Tritten (Newport RI: Naval Institute Press, 1995) pp.1-36 (pp.25-27); Higham, Military 
Intellectuals, p.32; Roskill, Naval Policy I, pp.533-534; Barnett, Engage the Enemy, pp.6-7. 
These failings were also recognised by contemporary Royal Navy officers some of whom wrote 
of the need for captains to act on initiative rather than waiting for orders, for examples see: 
Alfred Ernle Chatfield, The Navy and Defence: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Chatfield (London: W.Heinemann, 1942) p.227; Richmond, Naval Policy and National Strength, 
pp.260-261. One might also point to the Royal Navy’s extensive tactical re-thinking during the 
inter-war period most of which tended to emphasise the freedom of action of individual captains, 
these changes are discussed Jon Sumida, ‘‘The Best Laid Plans': The Development of British 
Battle-fleet Tactics, 1919-1942' International History Review 14 (1992) pp.681-700 (pp.690-
696). 
  214 
might have reflected these concerns or a desire for officers better able to fight 
the battles of Whitehall.44 
Significantly, the 1938 Watson Committee declared the products of the 
Special Entry superior to those of Dartmouth, at least as midshipmen and sub-
lieutenants, although Dartmouth products were more likely to be promoted to 
commander.45 Given the Navy’s long defence of Dartmouth against outside 
attack, it is perhaps surprising that the respondents agreed with the committee! 
DTSD Captain William Jackson felt there was a lack of high quality candidates 
for Dartmouth but that the education provided by the college was not at fault. 
On the other hand the Director of the Education Department, Instructor Captain 
Arthur Hall, and the Second Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Martin Dunbar-Nasmith, 
considered the Dartmouth course to be too intense.46 The committee had very 
little impact on the Special Entry, which had already been dramatically 
expanded to meet the increased demand for officers. 
It was difficult to compare the two schemes fairly given that both were so 
new. At the start of the First World War, the oldest Fisher-Selborne scheme 
officers had less than two years seniority as lieutenants, the first Special Entries 
were cadets. Neither group rose to high level command during that war 
although some did command small vessels; it was not until the late 1930s that 
they began to arrive in the higher ranks of the fleet, and only in 1941 did the first 
man reach flag rank. Comparisons therefore focussed on the performance of 
the two groups as junior officers, between the ranks of midshipmen and 
lieutenant, and since the Special Entries generally performed better in these 
ranks they were frequently seen as the better officers.  
In 1946 the Brind Working Party, charged with considering post-war 
officer education, produced an analysis of those executive officers who had 
been appointed as midshipmen in the period from September 1923 and 
September 1927. The results were produced in tabular form, focussing on how 
many officers from each group had been promoted to commander. The table 
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also reported how many men in each category had been lost to the service 
before entering the promotion zone, on one hand through death or incapacity, 
and on the other through resignation, court-martial or redundancy.47 
Commander was the first rank for which promotion was by merit rather 
than seniority, men with between two and six years of service as lieutenant-
commanders being eligible (although some officers who had passed through 
the ‘zone’ were promoted). The oldest officers in this sample became eligible in 
early 1938; the youngest were moving out of the zone as the report was 
compiled. Thus this group of officers had been well placed to take advantage of 
the opportunities offered by the war and, perhaps more importantly, it was the 
generation of officers from which the future leaders of the Royal Navy were 
beginning to be selected.  
Although they were a logical choice, no particular significance was 
attached to the selection of this group of officers as the sample for comparison. 
Whilst the performance of the two groups as combat leaders may have been a 
factor under consideration, no reference was made to the war records of the 
men involved  nor to which of them showed the most promise. There was no 
information as to the seniority of individuals when promoted. Those compiling 
the table did however take account of how the subjects had performed as 
cadets. Fisher-Selborne scheme officers were divided into those who had 
achieved a first or second class pass out from Dartmouth, and so gained time 
enabling them to be promoted early to sub-lieutenant, and those who had not. 
Special Entry officers were simply divided into top and bottom halves. 
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Table 9  Comparison of promotion rates to commander of Fisher-
Selborne and Special Entry officers promoted to midshipman between 
September 1923 and September 1927. Reproduced from TNA ADM 
116/5786.48 
 
FISHER-
SELBORNE 
Original 
no of Mids 
Killed or 
invalided 
Other 
Wastage 
Promoted 
to Cdr 
Not 
promoted 
Gained time 
on passing 
out of 
Dartmouth 
302 45 
(15%) 
59 
(20%) 
151 
(50%) 
47 
(15%) 
Did not gain 
time on 
passing out 
164 23 
(14%) 
62 
(38%) 
42 
(20%) 
37 
(22%) 
 
TOTAL 
 
466 68 
(15%) 
121 
(26%) 
193 
(41%) 
84 
(18%) 
 
 
SPECIAL 
ENTRY 
Original 
no of Mids 
Killed or 
invalided 
Other 
Wastage 
Promoted 
to Cdr 
Not 
promoted 
 
Top 50% 
45 4.5 
(10%) 
5 
(11.5%) 
26.5  
(59%) 
9 
(20%) 
 
Bottom 50% 
45 4.5 
(10%) 
12 
(26%) 
14.5 
(32%) 
14 
(31%) 
 
TOTAL 
90 9 
(10%) 
17 
(19%) 
41 
(45%) 
23 
(25.5%) 
 
These results suggest that the Special Entry was the superior of the two 
schemes, although as there were more than three times as many ex-Dartmouth 
officers in the sample the results cannot be regarded as entirely conclusive. The 
evidence for both groups suggests that performance in training was a 
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reasonable guide to an officer’s career prospects; those that did better were 
more likely to be promoted to commander and less likely to leave the Navy. 
 Retention was better among the Special Entry officers; whereas 41% of 
the Dartmouth men had been lost to the Navy, only 29% of the Special Entry 
had departed. This is not conclusive proof that the Special Entry were superior 
officers; Dartmouth officers were more likely to be killed or invalided, suggesting 
they were more likely to volunteer for hazardous duties such as flying or 
submarines. However the lower rate of Special Entry wastage to other causes 
indicated that these officers were less likely than Dartmouth men to be court-
martialled, selected for redundancy, or choose to leave the service. This 
suggested that the benefits of Dartmouth in inculcating a love of the Navy and 
officer-like qualities may have been overstated. However it might also be that 
the superior performance of Special Entry men as young officers gave them a 
head start in forging a career. 
 The data is somewhat misleading, given that the Special Entries are 
divided into the top and bottom halves whereas the bottom third of the 
Dartmouth officers are separated from the rest. This makes it hard to directly 
compare the two groups, and in particular those who fell into the middle third, 
therefore all conclusions must be tentative. The data shows the Special Entry 
officers to be superior, with a larger percentage being promoted to commander. 
Although the best Dartmouth men significantly out-performed the weaker 
Special Entries, they were out-performed by the top half of the Special Entries. 
The weaker Dartmouth officers were significantly out-performed by the weaker 
Special Entries, although the disparity in the data is probably particularly 
relevant here. 
 Overall the evidence gathered by the Brind Working Party suggested that 
the Special Entry was the superior source of officers. However it had numerous 
weaknesses. It did not consider how likely officers from each source were to be 
promoted beyond commander (inevitable given that the few of the officers 
concerned had moved into the promotion zone for captain) nor did it distinguish 
between the various forms of ‘other wastage’. The data cannot be considered 
representative of other cohorts of officers, as promotion rates for the officers 
concerned must have been particularly influenced by the Second World War. 
 These conclusions are further undermined by the data collected by the 
Watson Committee in 1938; this data was also concerned with promotion to 
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commander but focussed on when men were promoted. It too suffers from 
various weaknesses, although it states that the ex-Dartmouth cadets concerned 
had entered the service between 1912 and 1918 it does not say when the 
Special Entry officers entered. More importantly it gives no data as to what 
proportion of each type of officer was promoted to commander. 
 
Table 10  Table showing the zones from which lieutenant-commanders 
were selected for promotion to commander during the years 1934-1937. 
Reproduced from TNA ADM 116/3763.49 
Percentages refer to the proportion of promotions in each zone, e.g. 33% of the 
ex-Dartmouth officers promoted to commander were promoted with between 3 
and 4.5 years seniority as lieutenant-commanders. 
Zone 
Seniority (years 
as lieutenant-
commander) 
Percentage of total of each type 
of entry 
Dartmouth 
(total promoted 
125) 
Special Entry 
(total promoted 
53) 
Early 
3 
3.5 
4 
4.5 
5 
6    
10  
12             33% 
4 
2 
9 
4                 19% 
 
Average 
5 
5.5 
13.5 
13.5          27% 
19 
9                 28% 
Late 
6 
6.5 
7 
18 
21 
1               40% 
25 
28 
0                 53% 
 
This data suggests that the officers produced by the Fisher-Selborne scheme 
were superior to the Special Entry. Their performance as young lieutenant-
commanders was better which made them more likely to be promoted to 
commander at a young age; which, in turn, suggested they had the greater 
potential. The data concerned promotions from the 1934-1937 period in which 
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there was no opportunity for officers to distinguish themselves in war but, as the 
fleet began to expand, the demand for commanders rose. The performance of 
the Fisher-Selborne scheme officers is particularly impressive given that most of 
their educations had been severely curtailed by the First World War. 
Taken together, these two data sets do not provide clear evidence that 
either entry was markedly superior. To argue over which was better masked the 
truth  that the combination of the two groups was of great advantage to the 
service. Dartmouth produced a steady steam of officers, all of them steeped in 
naval tradition and educated for their future careers. Given the difficulties 
experienced by all three services in recruiting sufficient high quality officer 
candidates in the Special Entry age group there can be little doubt that, had the 
thirteen year old entry been abolished, the Royal Navy would have struggled to 
attract sufficient good quality candidates. On the other hand, the Special Entry 
provided a flexible number of officers who brought variety to the officer corps. 
Keen boys had two chances to join, and the seventeen year old entry also gave 
a chance to those who had not decided on a career at the age of thirteen. The 
variation in the number of entrants was, however, among a variety of factors 
that adversely affected Special Entry recruiting. 
 
Shortage of Special Entry Applicants 
 
The lack of applications for Special Entry cadetships was amongst the problems 
investigated by the Bennett Committee. Captain Moore, then captain of Erebus, 
suggested that the considerable variation in the number of Special Entry 
cadetships offered on different occasions hampered the scheme, as did the 
small number of executive cadetships on offer.50 Astley-Rushton thought 
continual defence cuts had made boys uncertain of their prospects in the 
service, especially as they feared that naval training would not fit them for a 
change of career.51  
 The Royal Navy consistently struggled to attract enough candidates of 
high quality and frequently clashed with the public schools. Additional difficulties 
were caused by the Special Entry becoming the primary vehicle for 
democratisation. The public schools had several grounds for complaint. The 
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most important was the small number of cadetships on offer, typically around 
fifteen executive cadetships each year.52 This caused a number of difficulties for 
the schools which were, after all, businesses and therefore reliant on making a 
profit. 
 Because there were so few cadetships, the chances of a candidate 
failing to secure entry were high, and this discouraged the schools which did not 
wish to be associated with failure of any kind. It also meant that they were likely 
to steer their best boys away from the Navy and towards the more reliable 
prospect of a university scholarship. The Navy also had specific requirements, 
meaning a standard of mathematical and scientific knowledge beyond that 
normally taught in public schools. 
By 1931 the Admiralty was sufficiently concerned that the Bennett 
Committee was required to investigate the success of the Special Entry in 
attracting recruits by means of a comparison with the other services. 
Candidates for all three services took the same Civil Service examinations and 
were entitled to list the different service options in order of preference. These 
options were not limited to choice of service but allowed candidates to choose a 
branch of the Army and Royal Navy. Those wishing to join the Army would put 
either Sandhurst or Woolwich as their first choice, depending on which branch 
of the service they wished to join (cavalry and infantry officers trained at 
Sandhurst, others at Woolwich). Those who wanted to join the Royal Navy 
could choose between executive, engineering, paymaster, and the Royal 
Marines.  
The Bennett Committee compared the number of candidates listing each 
option as their first choice with the number of vacancies advertised.53 In the 
table, reproduced below, abbreviations are as follows: 
Exec- Royal Navy executive  
Eng- Royal Navy engineering  
Pay- Royal Navy paymaster 
RM- Royal Marines 
Wool- Army Woolwich 
Sand- Army Sandhurst 
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RAF- Royal Air Force (all officer entrants trained at RAF Cranwell). The number 
of candidates putting each option as their first choice is in normal text, the 
number of advertised vacancies is in bold.  
 
Table 11  Candidates per advertised vacancy 1928-1930. Reproduced 
from TNA ADM 116/2791.54  
 
 
From this table, the average number of first choice candidates per advertised 
place can be calculated as follows: Executive 6.4, Engineering 1.9, Paymaster 
5.8, Royal Marines 1.8, Woolwich 1.1, Sandhurst 0.9, and RAF 1.6.55 Thus it 
appears that the Royal Navy was a popular option for young men wishing to 
become officers in the armed services; with the number of applicants greatly 
exceeding the number of available places. The Admiralty could be satisfied with 
the competition to become an executive or paymaster officer, although the lack 
of potential engineers was worrying. Young men inclined towards soldiering 
found it harder to enter the Royal Marines than either Woolwich or Sandhurst.  
 However, the Royal Navy was advertising far fewer vacancies than the 
Army, fewer than forty as opposed to nearly three hundred. Consequently, it is 
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 Exec Eng Pay RM Wool Sand RAF 
June 
1928 
60 
9 
21 
12 
42 
7 
12 
9 
104 
80+ 
188 
200+ 
30 
35 
Nov 
1928 
41 
5 
16 
8 
33 
4 
4 
6 
93 
80 
202 
200+ 
53 
35 
June 
1929 
53 
8 
22 
9 
44 
6 
10 
4 
94 
80 
207 
200+ 
56 
35 
Nov 
1929 
32 
4 
19 
8 
42 
7 
7 
4 
84 
73 
176 
200+ 
51 
35 
Jun 
1930 
32 
6 
15 
10 
30 
6 
9 
4 
97 
91 
177 
200 
50 
25 
Nov 
1930 
21 
6 
11 
10 
19 
11 
5 
8 
86 
85 
168 
200+ 
58 
25 
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unsurprising that there was more competition for each place. The lack of places 
offered by the Royal Navy does not appear to have deterred suitable candidates 
from applying, although it doubtless put off weaker boys who would have had 
little chance of success. Whilst candidates did not come forward in vast 
numbers, the competition to join the Royal Navy was still greater than that to 
join any other branch of the armed forces. 
The Bennett Committee suggested that the number of Special Entry 
cadetships should be standardised and that the majority of officers should be 
obtained from this source. Local education authorities should be approached 
with a view to providing scholarships for poorer boys. The curriculum of 
Dartmouth and the term system should be reconsidered and possibly Special 
Entry training should move there.56 None of these suggestions were taken up in 
the period immediately following the submission of the report in June 1932. The 
number of Special Entry cadetships continued to vary as the number of officers 
needed by the fleet changed. 
An additional difficulty was posed by the Navy’s 1932 decision to enter 
boys at the age of seventeen rather than seventeen and a half. Public schools 
generally preferred their boys to leave after their eighteenth birthdays and 
prepared their curricula with this in mind. Consequently candidates for naval 
cadetships missed out on leadership and sporting opportunities and had to be 
crammed to pass the entrance examinations. In 1934 the HMC wrote to the 
Admiralty to express its concerns.57 
 These arguments were not born out by the examinations in 1933. Of the 
thirty-seven successful candidates for the executive and engineering branches, 
thirteen were under seventeen and a half, and on average they outperformed 
their older comrades by sixty-two marks in the academic tests although they did 
one mark worse in the interview.58 Admittedly the younger cadets lacked 
disciplinary and physical training, but early entry was attractive to parents and, 
in any case: ‘A round jacket is not a suitable type of uniform for officers who 
have reached their majority’.59 
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The available evidence suggests that the Navy was not concerned with 
midshipmen’s dress, but with their development and equality; entering Special 
Entry cadets at a younger age enabled them to become sub-lieutenants at the 
same age as Dartmouth entrants. Whilst sympathetic to the headmasters’ views 
Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the Second Sea Lord, told them that naval policy 
would be governed by results  the seventeen year old entry would be retained 
as long as it was successful.60  
 In 1936 the maximum age of entry was raised by six months to eighteen 
and a half. This gave candidates three chances to secure entry and so widened 
the field of selection. The headmasters again requested the minimum age be 
raised and again were rebuffed, younger candidates were still performing best 
in the entry tests.61 No further changes were made. This lack of change was 
fairly typical of the consistency of the means by which Special Entry cadets 
were selected and trained. Having considered this process from an official view-
point it is also necessary to consider the experiences of the officers produced 
by the scheme. 
 
Special Entry Experiences  
  
Relatively few accounts of Special Entry training are available to historians. The 
small number of officers the scheme produced is undoubtedly a factor in this, 
but so too was the nature of the course. The short course did not make as great 
an impression on cadets as four years at Dartmouth, and the memories of 
Special Entries might also be overwhelmed by the associated new experiences 
of shipboard life and travel. Brief accounts are contained in the autobiographies 
of Charles Jenkins and Robert Clarkson, the former joined in April 1919 and the 
latter in May 1939 so neither had a typical cadet experience. 
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 Jenkins found his time aboard Cumberland ‘enjoyable’ but was critical of 
the system of training.62 He complained that: ‘we had neither the advantages in 
education which could have been obtained at a good school nor the broader 
training which would have followed greater freedom to pursue our interests 
onboard’, cadets were frequently treated like children and rarely allowed to go 
ashore unsupervised.63 His complaints suggest that Special Entry training 
suffered from the same weaknesses as Dartmouth  it did not provide a broad 
or high quality education; and cadets had no opportunity to develop leadership 
skills, indeed they were not even required to take responsibility for themselves. 
As later commentators did not voice these complaints, perhaps Jenkins was 
unfortunate. Cumberland spent six months swinging round a buoy at 
Queenstown which cannot have been the most thrilling of experiences. 
 Clarkson had a more enjoyable time, as a paymaster cadet he went 
straight into sea training in Vindictive, and thus straight on a cruise of North Sea 
and Channel ports. He does not say that the training was particularly good, but 
clearly he valued the range of practical experience gained which included 
bridge watch-keeping, boat handling, seamanship and handling ratings. He was 
immediately made to feel part of the Royal Navy, admittedly an insignificant and 
partly trained one.64 
 Much useful information comes from the work of Eric Bush who served 
as a term officer aboard Thunderer. Aside from an autobiography, he also 
produced a Special Entry orientated version of How to Become a Naval Officer 
published in 1927. Although he seems to have enjoyed his time aboard 
Thunderer, Bush’s autobiographical account is brief and concentrates largely on 
sports. He recounts how a cadet who joined late was instantly accepted after 
winning a boxing match, the correction of a wimpish rugby player and the 
importance of cross-country running.  
 His account generally emphasises the importance of manly behaviour  
ignoring pain, seasickness and other difficulties and so producing the best 
possible results. It appears the cult of sports was at least as powerful aboard 
Thunderer as at Dartmouth. Bush seems to have carried out his duties in the 
way that he would have had he been a term officer at Dartmouth, constantly 
interacting with his cadets and consciously providing an example of how to 
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behave; he does not seem to have made much allowance for the greater age 
and maturity of his charges, nor is there evidence that they had much more 
freedom than cadets at Dartmouth.65 
How to Become a Naval Officer (Special Entry) reveals much about the 
tone of the training Bush and his colleagues were providing. The assumption 
was that the cadet came from a public school, he was amongst gentlemen and 
behaved as a gentleman. The good cadet did not need to be academically 
outstanding provided he was good at the practical side of his job  that he 
played hard at every game, helped his colleagues and never shirked. As an 
officer, he was not merely the product of training but also of naval tradition: ‘by 
constant effort and a loyalty founded on pride in the traditions of ten centuries 
you may worthily aspire to bear your portion of that glorious heritage’.66 
These ideas are very much in keeping with ideas about military 
professionalism. Although technical skills were important, it was more important 
to subscribe to the prevailing professional ethic which emphasised the typically 
military values of obedience, loyalty, determination, hard-work, bravery and 
sacrifice. The Special Entry officer was part of a long-standing tradition rather 
than merely a practitioner of a specialised set of skills. His skills, talents and 
outlook entitled him to take his place in the community of naval officers. 
These ideas are very similar to those that dictated training at Dartmouth 
and suggest that the atmosphere and tone of the two schemes was similar and 
that naval history was used in the same way  to inspire cadets to imitate the 
officer-like qualities of their predecessors. Thus was produced an officer corps 
united in heart and mind; the two groups of officers were happy to work together 
and present a united front to outsiders because they had been trained in the 
same way and inculcated with the same ideas and values. This homogeneity 
was further enhanced by the posting of Special Entry officers to Dartmouth and 
vice-versa, which strengthened links between the two. 
The Special Entry might be summed up by the word ‘compromise’. It was 
developed to balance fleet requirements against training ideals, and it evolved 
in response to changing manpower demands, pressure for democratisation, and 
the abandonment of inter-changeability. The number of cadets and the location 
for their training changed constantly and it was vulnerable to any whim of the 
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Admiralty or the Treasury. These varying pressures meant that the scheme was 
subject to constant adjustment, which, combined with the small number of 
officers it produced should have spelt doom. 
 On the contrary the Special Entry scheme had never been stronger than 
in the summer of 1939  it was producing more officers than ever before, via a 
well established system, and was respected by the Navy and by civilian 
educators. The Special Entry was successful in spite of the many difficulties that 
attended it because it was both simple and flexible. By entering cadets at the 
age of seventeen rather than thirteen, the Admiralty avoided the difficulty of how 
to provide a general education geared exclusively to a naval career. Because 
the initial training course was so short, its content was largely confined to 
essentials and therefore less open to debate. The short period of training also 
meant that the number, age, or type of entrants could be varied without undue 
difficulty (although not without a knock-on effect as the fleet subsequently 
experienced a glut or shortage of midshipmen). After the Second World War, 
aided by the raised school leaving age and the changing educational 
aspirations of navy and nation, it was the Special Entry and not the Fisher-
Selborne scheme that provided the framework for training the officers of today’s 
Royal Navy.
  227 
Chapter Four  Cadet Sea Training 
 
Amongst the most difficult problems of officer education was that of introducing 
young officers to seagoing life. Naval life at sea was a unique experience and 
one which very few cadets would have had any experience of prior to joining 
(those with close naval connections may have experienced it for short periods). 
It was, of course, essential for every naval officer to be at home in a seagoing 
environment  both competent and confident; after all the professional expertise 
of the naval officer lay in his ability to function in a warship under any 
conditions. Therefore it was essential that the introduction to sea service be as 
effective as possible. 
 For an introduction to seagoing life in the Navy to be effective various 
conditions must be met. Firstly, it should be enjoyable  a young officer who 
found he disliked going to sea was likely to lose enthusiasm for his future 
career. Secondly it should give confidence, an officer who lacked confidence 
was unlikely to give clear, prompt, and effective orders, or provide inspiring and 
dynamic leadership. Thirdly, it should promote good professional skills, not only 
in terms of seamanship, ship handling, navigation and engineering but also in 
terms of leadership. Finally it must promote a feeling of fellowship with other 
naval personnel, irrespective of their rank or trade. 
 A variety of ways of introducing seagoing life were available and most 
were used or considered by the Royal Navy in the 1903-1939 period. In obliging 
cadets to go through a course of training before joining their first ships the Royal 
Navy had acknowledged that the theoretical and practical stages of an officer’s 
education were best carried out separately. From the 1860s onwards the two 
were slowly separated, with Britannia concentrating on the theoretical side of 
naval officership. This created a new problem, that of providing a uniform 
system for introducing young officers to life at sea. 
 Theoretical education could be provided in a non-seagoing ship, as it 
was in Britannia, but ships had severe limitations as schools given the 
inflexibility of their accommodation, small size, and high maintenance costs. 
Although living in a ship did help to introduce cadets to life at sea, Britannia and 
Hindustan became increasingly anomalous as the fleet was modernised and so 
their educational value was reduced. The opening of Osborne and Dartmouth 
greatly aided the education of the cadets, but although the colleges taught 
  228 
seamanship, navigation, sailing and pulling and were run upon naval lines with 
service routines being observed and naval terminology used, life in them was 
not very similar to life in a ship. 
 The use of Highflyer for the Special Entry cadets did combine the 
theoretical and practical aspects of an officer’s training with a great deal of 
success. However Highflyer was not part of the fleet in the normal sense; she 
had special facilities and a special schedule  she was foremost a floating naval 
college rather than a warship. But she did solve most of the problems of 
introducing cadets to seagoing life  her cruises were enjoyable, and she was 
devoted to education which ensured that cadets got the teaching and support 
they needed. 
It would not have been practical to provide the sort of education being 
provided at Dartmouth and Osborne aboard a ship; the college curricula meant 
that specialist teaching facilities were needed and they had to be ashore. 
Educating cadets ashore also allowed the provision of superior recreational and 
sporting facilities, required fewer naval personnel, and was far simpler from a 
planning and logistical view point. Recruiting and, more especially, retaining 
civilian teaching staff was also simplified by their not being required to live a life 
radically different from that of their peers in other schools. 
 Cadets educated ashore needed a managed introduction to seagoing life 
which had to meet the conditions outlined above. There were essentially two 
options  to send the young man straight into the fleet, or to provide an 
intermediate step in the form of a dedicated training vessel. Such a vessel could 
take one of two forms  either undertaking short training voyages during a 
cadet’s college career, or as a separate stage of training immediately following 
it. There was also the question as to what type of ship was most appropriate, 
options ranging from sailing ships via destroyers and cruisers to battleships. At 
varying times all of these options were used or, at least, considered. 
 
Cadet Sea Training in the Early Years of the Fisher-Selborne Scheme 
 
The original plans for the Fisher-Selborne scheme proposed that those passing 
out of Dartmouth should immediately be promoted to midshipman and serve in 
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the fleet in that rank for three years.1 There matters rested until 1904 at which 
point the Douglas Committee was appointed to consider the question of how 
Fisher-Selborne scheme officers should be educated after leaving Dartmouth. 
The appointment of the committee was indicative of the novelty of the scheme  
yet another aspect of the original plans coming under revision now that 
experience had been gained. 
 However the committee was also a sign of the changing tone of naval 
education. Its terms of reference required it to investigate the role of naval 
instructors in the new scheme; were they still needed and appropriate and if not 
who should replace them?2 Naval instructors were teachers, charged with 
teaching midshipmen subjects such as mathematics and French. The 
availability and quality of naval instructors had traditionally been extremely 
variable, with their duties frequently being undertaken by chaplains as a means 
of supplementing their income.3  
The Douglas Committee saw little place for naval instructors. Instead it 
suggested that the education of young officers at sea should be entirely in the 
hands of commissioned officers. The committee also proposed that Fisher-
Selborne scheme cadets should spend eight months (i.e. two terms) aboard a 
dedicated training cruiser. This ship should have an independent schedule 
calculated for maximum educational value and her officers should be carefully 
selected.4 
 The committee noted that in 1902 HMS Isis had been adopted for use 
by cadets, those in their fourth term taking a cruise aboard her rather than 
remaining in Britannia. Isis had been a great success, she had proved excellent 
for teaching seamanship and navigation, and the cadets who had served in her 
had adapted to life in the fleet far more quickly than was normally the case.5 
The committee hoped to replicate this success and their educational aims can 
be clearly identified. 
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Firstly, educational responsibilities were to be handed almost entirely to 
executive officers. They were expected to pass on their professional skills, and 
to teach the cadets how to behave  whether ashore, on the bridge, or in 
dealing with ratings. The committee did not state what qualities the carefully 
selected officers should have, but as they were expected to teach practical 
professional skills ability in this area was clearly an essential; otherwise self-
discipline, loyalty, bravery, tact and determination were essential 
characteristics. 
The officers would be treading a difficult line. They would have to provide 
gentle encouragement and reassurance whilst ensuring the highest possible 
standards of professional skills and officer-like qualities. Their paternalistic 
responsibilities for the cadets in their charge would have to be balanced against 
their individual styles of leadership which might rely on driving or threatening. 
Their situation would be considerably eased by the fact that the ship was not a 
normal part of the fleet, allowing the normally distant social relationships 
between officers and cadets to be relaxed. 
Cadets were also expected to learn from the ratings aboard the training 
ships, gaining an insight into their lives and work. They were required to work 
alongside ratings at menial tasks such as cleaning and painting, and whilst 
doing so might talk to the men. Relations between cadets and ratings were 
relatively informal and relaxed, allowing much information to be gleaned through 
casual conversation. The training ship provided a unique space for these 
relationships to flourish and for cadets to develop a deeper understanding of the 
men they were to lead. 
The separation of the training ship from the fleet meant that her 
programme could be arranged for maximum educational value, and that time 
could be allowed for recreational activities in desirable spots. Thus the training 
ship had the potential to meet all the demands of successful sea training 
outlined above  enjoyable, encouraging confidence, developing strong 
professional skills, and promoting a feeling of fellowship. 
The ship chosen for the role was HMS Cornwall, a Monmouth class 
cruiser, which took up her training duties when the first Fisher-Selborne scheme 
cadets passed out of Dartmouth in 1907. In 1908 she was joined by sister-ship 
HMS Cumberland, the two sharing duties until the outbreak of the First World 
War. The two ships undertook a series of cruises lasting around three months 
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each and visiting a variety of destinations. Each term of cadets went on two 
cruises, visiting some combination of the Mediterranean, West Indies, east 
coast of North America, Baltic, North Sea and Channel ports as well as various 
parts of Britain. 
This variety ensured that cadets gained a useful introduction to many of 
the ports that they could expect to encounter later in their careers. They 
experienced foreign lands and cultures, which again was useful experience for 
the future. They saw the Navy at work and at play. They were able to sail, swim, 
and undertake practical seamanship and navigation in warm, safe waters. The 
training cruiser thus provided an introduction to most aspects of a naval officer’s 
career, always in an environment where the cadet was supported, encouraged 
and enthused. 
The Custance Committee of 1912 approved of the training cruisers in 
principle but found that, in reality, they were failing in their duties. It suggested 
that the curriculum should be rearranged so that there was more emphasis on 
gunnery, torpedo, and electrical subjects, and less on mathematics. Under this 
proposed scheme, a 27 week cruise would have included 242 hours of 
engineering instruction 121 hours each of navigation and seamanship (with an 
additional 60 hours of pilotage), 81 of torpedo and electrical, and 60 each of 
gunnery and physical training.6 These proposals were largely rejected, although 
the revised orders issued in the response to the committee’s report did place 
more emphasis on practical learning of all types.7 
The proposals produced by the committee demonstrate the difficulties 
associated with the practical implementation of cadet sea training. There was a 
vast array of knowledge and skills to be assimilated, especially given the 
emphasis placed on engineering, and many subjects vied for priority. However, 
the imposition of such a large academic syllabus would inevitably have required 
cadets to devote a great deal of time to theoretical rather than practical learning. 
That these plans were largely rejected demonstrates that the Admiralty viewed 
cadet sea training as a time for developing practical skills rather than theoretical 
knowledge. 
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Cruiser training was suspended on the outbreak of the First World War. 
The cadets serving in Cumberland and Cornwall were sent to the fleet; eight of 
them were killed at the battle of Coronel.8 During the war Fisher-Selborne 
scheme cadets were sent straight to the fleet on completion of their (shortened) 
college course. The cruisers had clearly been very successful, so much so that 
they resumed their work in January 1919. Again Cornwall and Cumberland 
were used, but both were old and small. In 1920 the battleship Temeraire was 
substituted, she was several years younger and was able to carry all the cadets 
which saved money, simplified administration, and ensured a more even 
standard of instruction.9 Temeraire herself was replaced by HMS Thunderer in 
1921, the replacement being necessitated by the reduction in the strength of the 
fleet  treaty restrictions meant that the number of battleships had to be 
reduced and the retention of the obsolete Temeraire clearly could not be 
justified. 
The number of officers under training shrank dramatically during the 
early 1920s so that Thunderer was comfortably able to hold both the Dartmouth 
and Special Entry cadets. When economy measures were made in 1922, there 
was a determination to retain dedicated cadet sea training ships because of 
their essential value in developing seamanship and leadership besides 
developing understanding of ratings (best gained while young) and ensuring 
that the cadets thought of themselves as naval officers rather than school 
boys.10  
Battleships were rather unsuited to cadet training  they were extremely 
expensive to operate, required expert handling, and did not offer any training 
facilities that could not be provided aboard a smaller ship. Training could have 
moved back aboard a cruiser  the smaller vessels were better suited to the 
role, being more economical to operate but large enough to offer comfort and a 
variety of facilities. However the job of policing the Empire fell largely to these 
ships; their bulk, flexibility, and endurance making them well suited to showing 
the flag, protecting trade, and discouraging illegal activities. Large numbers of 
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cruisers were also needed by the battle fleet for tasks such as scouting and the 
suppression of enemy destroyers. They were one of the most important groups 
of ship in the Navy and were in great demand; unfortunately they were also 
expensive to build and operate and, worse still, increasingly restricted by 
international treaty. With ships and money in short supply no cruiser could be 
spared for sea training. 
In 1924, defeated by the increasing reductions in the strength of the fleet, 
the Admiralty reluctantly abandoned dedicated sea training for cadets.11 On 
leaving Dartmouth, Fisher-Selborne scheme cadets now went straight into the 
fleet, serving as cadets for eight months before promotion to midshipman. 
Special Entry cadets were promoted to midshipman on passing out of 
Thunderer and sent to join the fleet. 
The Admiralty remained anxious to provide cadets with some seagoing 
experience before they joined the fleet. It was decided to provide small vessels 
to take cadets on short voyages of up to a week in length. Dartmouth cruises 
were initially made in the old destroyer HMS Sturgeon, which had previously 
taken cadets to sea on trips of a day or so, but in 1925 the minesweeper HMS 
Forres was attached to the college. 
Only the senior college cadets used these ships. This was natural given 
that capacity was limited, and that the older cadets had a more pressing need 
for experience. It also emphasised the prestige of the older cadets compared to 
the younger. Courtney Anderson wrote that cadets ‘came back green with 
seasickness but infused with new glamour’, inspiring younger cadets as well as 
themselves.12 The mere presence of Forres in the River Dart provided all cadets 
with a constant, enthusing, link to their future. 
Most cadets thoroughly enjoyed their trips in Forres  apart from their 
educational value the trips encouraged interest in the Navy besides providing a 
break from routine. Forres cruises are recorded in enthusiastic depth in the 
Blake Term Log, added excitement being provided by the sloop’s trips to 
Devonport where cadets were able to visit a variety of warships.13 It is clear that 
an effort was made to make the voyages as enjoyable as possible as well as 
familiarising cadets with life at sea and with some of the ships and ports they 
would encounter in the future. 
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Special Entry cadets enjoyed similar trips in the sloop HMS Carstairs, 
which carried twenty cadets at a time on voyages lasting one or two weeks and 
going as far afield as Scotland. Executive and engineering cadets could expect 
a Carstairs trip in each of their three terms; paymaster cadets, who spent two 
terms in Erebus, went only once. The focus was very much on the practical; 
How to Become a Naval Officer noted that ‘the theoretical instruction given in 
the classrooms of HMS Erebus is developed under actual seagoing 
conditions’.14 
It is clear that the emphasis of these trips was on seamanship in the 
traditional sense of word – on the craft skills required of the seaman. These 
skills, such as boat work and acting as a look out, remained essential. However 
in the modern Royal Navy ‘seamanship’ had come to embrace the rather 
broader range of tasks that occupied the executive officer on a daily basis such 
as organising seaboats and greeting visitors appropriately.15 It was in teaching 
these skills that Forres and Carstairs failed and thus the revised system of 
cadet sea training proved ineffective. 
 
The Failure of the Revised System 
 
The trips aboard Forres and Carstairs did accustom cadets to short voyages but 
they did not bear much resemblance to the normal work of the fleet. Cadets did 
not experience the daily life of drills, cleaning and watch-keeping, nor the 
monotony of long voyages, or foreign lands and cultures. Most critically, with a 
large number of cadets jammed into a small ship with a tiny complement, they 
had little chance to meet the men of the fleet or learn how to command them. 
Because they were only aboard for a short period they were unable to develop 
strong and trusting relationships with ratings and so missed out on the 
understanding thus gained. 
The weaknesses of the system became apparent when cadets who had 
been through the revised training scheme started to join the fleet. Frank Twiss 
later recalled being repeatedly confused, scared and humiliated. Nobody in 
Revenge seemed to have much time or sympathy for newly joined cadets and 
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the disillusioned Twiss ‘wondered if perhaps I had really made a dreadful 
mistake in joining’.16 Bob Whinney, who first went to sea as a cadet in HMS 
Resolution, found that ‘to start with, life was constant confusion, fear and 
bewilderment’. As a cadet, Whinney was ‘a truly low form of life’; he and his 
colleagues were further disheartened by being beaten for offences which arose 
solely from their ignorance.17 
These difficulties did not go unnoticed but nobody seemed inclined to do 
much to alleviate them. It was not until 1932 that Captain Norman Wodehouse, 
the Captain of Dartmouth, wrote to various officers asking them for their 
opinions of the cadets their ships were receiving. Wodehouse had been in 
command of Dartmouth for two terms and was aware of a certain amount of 
dissatisfaction with its products. 
The Captain of Valiant replied that there was ‘very little wrong’ with the 
cadets when they left the college, but that once aboard ship they suffered 
because of their immaturity, especially when compared to Special Entries. He 
also suggested that the college should place more emphasis on seamanship, 
and that cadets should have more freedom and lead a less sheltered existence 
 with more emphasis on self-discipline. The reply from Resolution was similar 
 Dartmouth cadets were disorganised, lacked motivation, and were poor at 
sailing.18 
These deficiencies did not arise entirely from the lack of a training ship. 
Complaints about the young officers sent to the fleet were hardly a new 
development, midshipmen who had been through the training cruiser had also 
been criticised, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter. Eight months 
aboard the cruiser could not entirely correct any habits of irresponsibility and 
laziness developed over four years at Dartmouth. Whilst it was a good way of 
developing skills of seamanship and boat work, the basics were learnt (or not) 
at Dartmouth. However the training cruiser meant that cadets were eased into 
life at sea, which meant that they developed self-confidence alongside their 
professional skills. Thus motivation could be restored, and cadets could become 
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accustomed to the standards of self-discipline and responsibility expected in the 
fleet. 
By the time Wodehouse sent out his letters a solution was already on the 
horizon  the decision had been made to resume cruiser training at the 
beginning of 1933. This decision arose largely from the naval confidence crisis 
that followed the Invergordon mutiny of October 1931. In the aftermath of the 
mutiny Admiral Sir John Kelly took command of the Atlantic Fleet. Kelly 
produced a long official report on the mutiny. Assisted by Captains Tovey and 
Somerville, he visited all the capital ships and cruisers of his new command 
interviewing officers and collecting the views of ratings.19 The report declared 
the pay cuts and their mishandling the sole cause of the mutiny. Although 
morale had been poor beforehand, relations between officers and men had 
been good. Kelly reiterated an earlier statement that everyone in the fleet held 
the Admiralty responsible, before turning to the events of the mutiny itself. 
 The officers of the fleet had failed to anticipate their men taking 
concerted action but faced with the mutiny had, in Kelly’s view, responded 
sensibly. Despite the high turnover of officers preventing them from getting to 
know their men, discipline in the fleet was generally good both before and 
during the mutiny. However the officers did not have the trust of their men  a 
key factor in their failure to anticipate events. The executive officer complement 
of ships was based on action rather than peacetime requirements, with the 
result that many officers were under-employed and lacked responsibility. Small 
and simple evolutions were supervised by senior officers which limited the 
leadership opportunities for younger men. Kelly pressed for wholesale reform, 
writing that ‘It is abundantly clear that the present system of training and 
appointing officers is in many ways unsatisfactory’.20 
 Senior ratings were also criticised. Kelly thought that three-quarters of 
petty officers were ineffective disciplinarians, with stokers the most deficient. 
Their development was hampered by the prevailing socialist sentiment amongst 
naval schoolmasters, the men responsible for preparing them for examinations. 
The authority of three badge able seamen was far in excess of their rank, senior 
ratings having virtually no control over them.21  
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The Board of Admiralty agreed in part with Kelly. The First Sea Lord, 
Admiral Sir Frederick Field, had long been concerned about the leadership 
abilities of young officers and the mutiny provided momentum for his attempts at 
reform. Field’s reforms were mostly directed at midshipmen, and are discussed 
in length in the next chapter, but they also had important implications for cadets. 
In 1929 Field, then serving as C-in-C Mediterranean, had written a long 
letter addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty which laid out the deficiencies 
of current training practises in excruciating detail. Field and his subordinates 
were of the opinion that cadets were sent to sea too late; if they were six 
months or a year younger they would be more impressionable and develop 
better officer-like qualities. Their development would also be aided by reforming 
the overly detailed and extensive syllabus of classroom education. Field was 
firmly of the view that young officers went at sea to learn seamanship and 
leadership.22 
Field’s paper was circulated for comment; discussions centred around 
the training of midshipmen, but some comments were also made about cadets. 
DTSD Captain Edward Cochrane also criticised the existing system. He felt it 
failed to encourage initiative and that the loss of the training cruiser had resulted 
in more technical instruction taking place in the fleet.23  
 Admiral Sir Alfred Ernle Chatfield was consulted in his capacity as C-in-C 
Atlantic. He thought the cadets coming to sea ‘deficient in personality for their 
age’ and particularly poor at self-education. Although the ex-Dartmouth cadets 
were good men they lacked both personality and self-confidence, and many had 
become bored in their last year at the college. These problems were 
exacerbated by their feeling useless upon joining their first ship. He suggested 
that Dartmouth terms should mix more  older cadets should be given more 
responsibility  and that more care should be taken in preparing cadets to go to 
sea.24  
 Alexander McMullen, the Admiralty Advisor on Education, cautioned 
against sending cadets to sea younger. Learning ability peaked at the age of 
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sixteen to seventeen, meaning that this year was well spent in absorbing theory. 
If sent to sea younger cadets would be less self-confident, adaptable, and 
responsible. They would also be looked down on by the increasingly educated 
lower-deck. The alpha scheme would have to be abolished and the prestige of 
Dartmouth would be reduced; recruitment would inevitably be damaged, for the 
college would be little more than a ‘glorified prep-school’.25 
 The Captain of Greenwich was told to collect the views of his students. 
The sub-lieutenants under instruction felt that Dartmouth cadets needed more 
and better seamanship instruction (including more time aboard Forres) and that 
the training cruiser should also be reintroduced. The lieutenants under 
instruction agreed with the Dartmouth reforms suggested by the sub-lieutenants 
and also suggested that better seamanship instruction was needed aboard 
ships.26 
 Discussions continued but little action was taken until June 1931, by 
which time Field was First Sea Lord (and had been for eleven months). That the 
discussion was revived at this time is evidence that Field was concerned about 
the leadership deficiencies of the Royal Navy’s officers well before Invergordon. 
As C-in-C Mediterranean he had produced a detailed list of these deficiencies; 
as First Sea Lord he sought to remedy them, although there is no evidence in 
the file which explicitly states that Field revived the discussion.  
Amongst the proposals considered was the reintroduction of sail training. 
The proposal had not originally been made in response to Invergordon, but 
stemmed from the London Treaty forced abolition of the Third Battle Squadron, 
which doubled as the training squadron for boy seamen. The squadron 
commander, Rear-Admiral Sir George Hyde, suggested that a squadron of 
sailing ships would provide a cheap replacement, with the added attraction that 
as the ships had no military function they would be unaffected by treaty 
restrictions. In any case: ‘Seamanship  the sea habit  is best acquired in 
youth and under canvas’.27 
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Hyde’s letter was accompanied by a list of suggested training schemes 
submitted by the officers of his flagship Emperor of India. Although various 
training schemes involving sloops or cruisers were proposed, sail found most 
favour. Aside from the advantages listed by Hyde, it was also stated that sail 
was better than steam for developing self-reliance, weather knowledge, 
freedom from seasickness, and good eyesight.28 
Although the London Treaty made sail training more attractive, there was 
already some enthusiasm. In March 1930 DTSD Captain Edward Cochrane had 
advocated sail training as an ‘unfortunately barred’ means of teaching initiative 
to junior officers.29 By May 1931 sail training for boy seamen was being actively 
discussed; a note by Cochrane’s successor Captain James Ritchie suggested 
that if introduced it should be extended to cadets.30 This proposal had the 
support of the Captain of Dartmouth, Captain Sidney Meyrick, who requested 
that Forres be replaced by a sailing vessel (Dartmouth already enjoyed the 
services of the racing yacht Amaryllis).31 
 The proposal to reintroduce sail training was not then the act of a 
desperate navy, reaching out to the past in response to Invergordon, but the 
response to reasoned discussion about the deficiencies of personnel and to the 
strictures of the London Treaty. Even so it does appear to owe more to 
reactionary sentiment than practicality; a view that wooden ships and iron men 
had been succeeded by the opposite  that the men of the old navy were far 
superior to their successors. Whilst there were undoubtedly subscribers to this 
view, both inside and outside the service, there were also strong practical 
arguments for introducing sail training. These were laid out by the unknown 
author of an undated paper entitled ‘The Training of Seamen’, probably written 
shortly after Invergordon by the new First Lord, Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell.  
 Some form of sea training was wanted for both officers and men and sail 
offered a number of advantages over steam. There was no need to refuel 
meaning the vessel could remain at sea for long periods at minimal cost. All 
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hands would be kept busy and would learn seamanship and initiative, as well as 
feeling their efforts were essential to the ship. Going aloft would teach 
resourcefulness and self-confidence, making men less vulnerable to lower-deck 
trouble makers.32 The ships could serve a useful purpose  carrying supplies to 
the Mediterranean or even for the African, West Indies or Cape squadrons.33  
 It was suggested that a sail training squadron would give boy seamen a 
better introduction to seagoing life than the current system of sending them 
straight into the fleet. In the fleet boys tended to become bored and 
discontented  losing enthusiasm for the service. Spending their time in 
classrooms and at menial tasks added to these problems and did little to 
develop smart, practical seamen. The author of the proposal felt that this early 
period in boys’ careers lay at the heart of the Navy’s problems: ‘Disillusionment, 
if it has to come, should certainly be absent from the experience of the first year 
at sea’.34 
Perhaps this argument also applied to young officers. In any case it was 
proposed that cadets should train alongside boy seamen. Their accommodation 
would be the same as that provided for the boys, although separate, and they 
would act as leading seamen  taking charge of groups of boys. This would 
provide cadets with an easier introduction to leadership than pitching them into 
the fleet, and would enable cadets and boys to develop closer relationships and 
mutual understanding. The shared experiences of sail training would ultimately 
strengthen relationships at all levels of the fleet.35  
The proposals were received with some enthusiasm, the Admiralty 
receiving a number of supportive letters.36 The writers varied from long retired 
officers recalling their own experiences to prominent officers of the modern navy 
including Martin Dunbar-Nasmith. Many officers, both serving and retired, 
offered their services as instructors but very few combined youth with 
experience in sailing anything larger than a yacht. The lack of experienced 
personnel posed a particular difficulty; the losses of the training ships HMS 
Eurydice with 376 men in 1878 and HMS Atalanta with 281 men in 1880 
provided ammunition for opponents of the scheme. 
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A meeting held at the Admiralty on 15 March 1932 led to the proposals 
being revised. All those present agreed that both cadets and boy seamen 
needed sea training before joining the fleet. Sail training was thought most 
appropriate for boy seamen and four sailing barques were subsequently added 
to the naval estimates.37 However, at a subsequent meeting held on 26 May, it 
was decided that the cadet training cruiser should be revived, HMS Frobisher 
being chosen for the role.38 
 
The Revival of the Cadet Training Cruisers 
 
This decision effectively rejected the suggestions made by Kelly of deficient 
character amongst some officers, (small ships, and sailing generally being 
viewed as best for character development) and of a widening gap between 
officers and ratings. Although this meeting approved of the plan to build sailing 
barques for boy seamen it did not think it was appropriate for them to train with 
cadets. Instead, the professional and leadership development of cadets was 
judged to be best served by placing them in a vessel similar to those they would 
serve in as midshipmen  a training geared towards the practicalities of the 
naval officer’s profession rather than the more abstract and idealistic approach 
represented by the sail training proposals. 
By the following January, Admiralty attention had shifted to the 
deficiencies of senior ratings. The Second Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, 
suggested sailing ships were the best leadership school for petty officers.39 
Perhaps this suggestion was made in a desperate effort to revive the scheme, 
which had now been rejected by Field’s successor as First Sea Lord, Admiral 
Sir Alfred Ernle Chatfield. Chatfield felt that purchase of four sailing ships was 
hard to justify when personnel were suffering financially. He remembered the 
sail training ships of the 1890s and did not consider that the men who had 
passed through them were superior to those who had not  on the contrary they 
had embraced the easier life of the fleet and thus been outperformed by 
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colleagues who had not gone through sail training. He also thought that 
candidates for petty officer would be put off by the prospect of sail training.  
Chatfield explicitly linked the proposals to Invergordon and rejected them 
on that basis. The senior officers who had presided over the mutiny had trained 
under sail and had still failed to provide the necessary leadership. Chatfield 
firmly supported Kelly’s conclusions  that the fleet suffered principally from the 
surplus of officers, and from the inability of petty officers to lead.40 
 Chatfield’s lack of enthusiasm, combined with the practical difficulties 
and the cost of building the ships, conspired to kill the sail training scheme. 
From the start it had suffered from confusion; the identities of both the proposed 
learners and the proposed teachers was subject to change, and no effort seems 
to have been made to lay down a clear list of training objectives, let alone how 
they were to be achieved.  
However ill thought out, the sail training proposals were a clear rejection 
of the Fisher-Selborne scheme and its emphasis on technology  further 
recognition that the work of the officer revolved around men and not around 
material. Instead they placed an emphasis on providing an environment in 
which seamanship and officer-like qualities could be developed without the 
pressures and strictures of service in the fleet. 
That the training cruiser was revived, in spite of the high costs that would 
be incurred and the ongoing shortage of cruisers, demonstrated that it was seen 
as by far the best way of introducing young officers, especially those educated 
at Dartmouth, to seagoing life. It would have been feasible to use smaller ships, 
but a cruiser offered far greater operational range, a more comfortable (and 
therefore effective) teaching environment, and a greater freedom of movement. 
It also meant that all the cadets under training, both Fisher-Selborne and 
Special Entry, could be contained in one vessel. 
The revived training cruiser had the potential to meet all the requirements 
for successful cadet sea training. Its programme could be arranged to ensure 
maximum enjoyment through the provision of sporting activities and exciting 
port visits. Because the ship was devoted to training, everything necessary 
could be done to ensure that cadets developed self-confidence and good 
professional skills  all the necessary facilities and staff could be provided. By 
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carefully selecting the officers and crew of the ship, and allowing a degree of 
informality, feelings of fellowship could be developed, particularly between 
cadets and ratings.  
After its revival in 1933 the work of the training cruiser went unchallenged 
until 1938 when the Watson Committee examined the training of junior officers. 
The committee took a very favourable view of the training cruiser, feeling that 
the cadets currently under-valued their time aboard. They suggested that 
reallocating the additional seniority Dartmouth cadets could earn through good 
examination marks so that the majority was earned through their cruiser 
performance which would encourage greater application amongst cadets, as 
well as giving a better reflection of their professional merits.41  
The committee emphasised the importance of practical education in the 
training cruiser and argued that cadets serving in her should concentrate on 
practical, rather than theoretical, studies.42 This was particularly important as 
the duration of the course for Dartmouth cadets had been reduced to four 
months in order to speed up the officer production process. The time spent as a 
midshipman was also reduced, meaning that a total of eight months of seagoing 
experience was lost  making it even more important that the training cruiser 
provided high quality practical experience. 
The most remarkable aspect of the training programme introduced in 
1933 was that Special Entry cadets joining the Royal Navy reported straight to 
the training cruiser, with no preliminary training at all. It was true that Special 
Entry cadets had previously joined a ship with no naval experience, but in the 
days of Highflyer they had at least been given some time to adjust gradually 
rather than almost immediately setting sail for foreign climes. The Navy 
eventually thought better of this system, replacing it with one in which executive 
and engineer Special Entry cadets did their first term in the static HMS Erebus. 
The 1933 system placed the Special Entries at a considerable 
disadvantage compared to ex-Dartmouth cadets who had already been in a 
naval environment for almost four years and so adapted more quickly to life 
aboard ship. Tension between the two groups was inevitable. The Dartmouth 
cadets, well aware of the importance the rest of the service attached to 
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seniority, could hardly be expected to welcome being placed on a par with 
cadets who had only just joined. This, combined with the strong bonds formed 
at Dartmouth, might mean adopting a cliquish and superior air. This assumed 
superiority was likely to be resented by the Special Entry cadets who were older 
and had generally led a less sheltered existence. 
Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the two groups 
tended to take an instant dislike to each other. For Edward Ashmore ‘attraction 
was neither instant or mutual’.43 Courtney Anderson recalled that the Frobisher 
went to sea ‘the cadets working ship, or rather the Dartmouth cadets working 
ship after a fashion, the pubs getting in everyone’s light’.44 Charles Owen 
recalled that, in the early days of the revived system, friction between the two 
groups was so bad that Frobisher’s captain threatened to abandon the cruise.45 
Sometimes first impressions were more favourable  John Wells wrote 
that his term was impressed by the wider educational background of the Special 
Entries.46 However, hard work, seasickness, and familiarity soon eased the 
differences between the two groups. Suspicions were inevitably reduced as 
cadets got to know each other better and the two groups came to respect each 
other. This was not always welcomed, some naval officers such as Herbert 
Richmond feeling that  the younger but more numerous Dartmouth cadets 
stifled the Special Entries when they would have benefited from the latter’s 
greater maturity, initiative, and enthusiasm.47  
 The variety of entertainment provided for cadets ashore was impressive 
and ensured they learnt to function in most social circumstances. Robert 
Browne told his parents ‘we have had something arranged for every moment we 
have been ashore’.48 For Courtney Anderson, cocktail parties, balls and drinking 
were part of his education.49 Edward Ashmore remarked that ‘it was indeed a 
cruise and there was much to enjoy’.50 These impressions are strongly 
supported by the reports sent to Admiralty after the cruises of Vindictive in 
                                               
43
 Ashmore, Battle and the Breeze, p.9 
44
 Anderson, Seagulls, p.21 
45
 Owen, Plain Yarns, p.41 
46
 Wells, Royal Navy , p.153 
47
 TNA ADM 116/2799 Evidence of Admiral Sir HW Richmond pp.1-2  
48
 RNM 1981/368-374 Cadet Robert Brown’s letter to his parents  15 March 1936 
49
 Anderson, Seagulls, p.25 
50
 Ashmore, Battle and the Breeze, p.10 
  245 
1938-1939  the ship’s Captain, Henry Bovell, complained about the lack of sea 
time, indicating a full diary of shore engagements.51 
The views older officers expressed at the time tend to support the 
subsequent recollections of the former cadets. The work of the training ships 
was well documented, their captains were required to make regular reports and 
information can also be gleaned from the ship’s logs. The Second Sea Lord, the 
officer in charge of naval personnel, took a particularly keen interest  in the 
period immediately after the First World War the ships were assigned to him 
rather than a port division or fleet. The officers in charge of the cadets were 
required to submit reports on their training. These reports were of particular 
interest to the naval authorities where they involved a direct comparison of the 
performance of the two groups of cadets. 
However enjoyable their time aboard, cadets were reminded of the 
professional purpose of the cruise by the examinations at the end. These were 
relatively simple affairs, with papers on navigation, seamanship, gunnery, 
torpedo, and engineering. Most of the questions concerned themselves with 
practical routine matters. For example in the autumn of 1938 the seamanship 
paper asked who was responsible for: serving the meals of ERAs, seaboat 
readiness, supervising the rum issue, the readiness of rockets at sunset, special 
sea dutymen, the placing of lights, 5.5 inch wire hawsers, and the payment of 
mess bills. Candidates were also questioned about boat handling, the sequence 
of events when abandoning ship, procedures for anchoring and mooring, 
turning over a watch, and fog signals.52 
The Dartmouth cadets generally did better in the autumn 1938 
examinations than the Special Entries, but the latter did better over the cruise 
as a whole  of the 14 prizes on offer 7 went to Special Entries, 6 to Dartmouth 
cadets and one to an Australian. However there were far more Special Entry 
cadets aboard  79 compared to 29 Dartmouth cadets. The captain of the ship 
seems to have regarded the two groups as roughly equal, his report does not 
suggest that one out-performed the other.53 
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The results from one cruise cannot be taken as clear evidence that one 
type of entry was superior to the other and evidence from other cruises 
undertaken by Vindictive suggests that standards varied widely. The captain’s 
report from the summer of 1938 showed the Dartmouth cadets to be ahead of 
the Special Entries. Conversely in the spring of 1939 the Special Entries were 
far better. The performance of the Dartmouth cadets on this occasion was very 
poor indeed, averaging 119 marks worse than the Special Entry cadets in the 
engineering examination, 36 worse in seamanship and 30 worse in navigation. 
The gap for torpedo was only 11 marks and the Dartmouth cadets did better in 
gunnery. Bovell suggested that the Special Entry cadets were advantaged by 
the purely professional nature of their training.54 
In the aftermath of this report the Director of the Education Department, 
Instructor Captain Arthur Hall, was commissioned to produce a comparison of 
the two groups of cadets to be laid before the Second Sea Lord. Hall concluded 
that the Special Entries generally did far better on the training cruiser and that 
there were a number of reasons for this. The Special Entries were older and 
were far more enthusiastic. Dartmouth did not prepare cadets to go to sea; Hall 
suggested that the eleventh term of the college course should focus on 
professional training, with as much time as possible spent aboard Forres.55 The 
naval authorities rejected these suggestions, preferring to keep the existing 
Dartmouth course, to give the two groups different examinations aboard the 
training cruiser, and to leave the final allocation of marks to an independent 
authority rather than the ship’s officers.56 
Overall these reports and the reactions to them suggest that both groups 
of cadets performed satisfactorily aboard the training cruiser. The performance 
of the Special Entry cadets was, on average, better than that of the Dartmouth 
cadets but there was considerable variation in the standards achieved by both 
entries. The shipboard training was most useful to the Dartmouth cadets who, 
although they had been in the Navy far longer, had less practical experience 
than the Special Entries. Aside from data on the performance of cadets, official 
                                               
54
 TNA ADM 116/3962, CW.7190/1939 Vindictive letter No.1\12 ‘HMS Vindictive - Spring Cruise 
1939 - Report on Training’ from Bovell to Evans 5 April 1939 
55
 TNA ADM 116/3962 CW 14715/39 Un-titled paper by Director of the Education Department 
(Captain Arthur E Hall) for the Second Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Charles J Little) 27 June 1939 
56
 TNA ADM 116/3962 Admiralty Letter CW.7190/39, 27 June 1939 is referred to in 
CW.14715/39 Vindictive letter No.1/12 ‘HMS Vindictive - Summer Cruise 1939 - Report on 
Training’ from Bovell to Evans 2 August 1939, there is no copy of Admiralty letter CW.7190/39. 
  247 
reports also offer the historian an account of the events of the cruises; these 
events can also be seen through the eyes of the cadets themselves. 
 
Experiences of Education in the Cadet Training Cruisers 
 
The best documented cruises are those made by HMS Temeraire in the 
summer and autumn of 1920. These cruises were far from typical because 
Prince George, the third son of King George V, was amongst the cadets 
aboard. The prince was aboard to undergo training rather than for royal or 
diplomatic purposes, but his presence still caused some difficulty. 
Prince George and his fellow cadets joined Temeraire on 29 May; two 
days later they were inspected by the C-in-C Portsmouth, after which the ship 
sailed for Ireland  being subject to mock submarine attacks en-route. They 
were thus provided with a brief and exciting introduction to life at sea. The ship 
visited a number of Irish ports including Dunmore, Galway, and Buncrana. A 
great deal of boat work was done in these sheltered anchorages but 
opportunities for shore leave were limited because of the unrest ashore.57 
Temeraire then sailed for Scottish waters, visiting Campbeltown and Scapa 
Flow. En-route the cadets fired the four inch guns and exercised the seaboats. 
They also watched the ship’s company launch torpedoes.58 In contrast to the 
initial trip to Ireland, this leg of the cruise was similar to many normal peacetime 
training voyages undertaken by Royal Navy ships. 
Temeraire then sailed for Norway where she lingered for some days, 
largely for social purposes. Prince George was allowed to stay overnight with 
his cousin King Haakon but was obliged to return aboard for work each day. 
The King visited the ship on several occasions, carrying out an inspection and 
taking in a dance. The cadets were lectured on polar exploration by Captain 
Evans (who was holidaying in Norway) and also enjoyed sailing, picnics and 
various trips ashore.59 Although a great deal of work was done, this visit also 
served admirably to introduce the cadets to the social life of their profession and 
gave them a good idea of how they could expect to be entertained ashore in the 
future.  
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On returning to the United Kingdom the cadets were sent on five days 
leave before rejoining the ship. After being inspected by the First Sea Lord on 
the 9 September, Temeraire left for a cruise of the Mediterranean; she first 
sailed for Vigo, carrying out gunnery exercises en-route. A planned visit to 
Algiers was cancelled because of an outbreak of bubonic plague, Temeraire 
was rerouted to Palermo.60 The ship spent several days at Gibraltar where the 
cadets were occupied with pulling and rifle shooting. More torpedo exercises 
followed, after which Temeraire sailed for Malta, again cancelling a visit to 
Algiers. Malta proved to be an ideal destination  the cadets were able to visit 
many different ships, use the gymnasium ashore, visit historic sites and devote 
hours to bathing and games.61 
Temeraire’s final port visit was to Lisbon, yet another interesting 
experience. The visit was almost cancelled because of bubonic plague but the 
Portuguese naval attaché assured the Admiralty that there was only one case in 
Lisbon and such a thing was only to be expected at that time of year!62 In any 
case, Temeraire’s visit was highly anticipated and would also offer a boost to 
the country’s failing economy. The ship’s week long visit went ahead  her 
officers were well entertained ashore but, in contrast to the Norway visit, no 
entertainment was arranged for the cadets or the ship’s company. This lack of 
entertainment was hardly surprising given the turmoil Portugal was in; two days 
after Temeraire left the government fell  the ship’s presence had done nothing 
to bolster either its popularity or its perceived legitimacy.63 
The day after leaving Lisbon the ship was struck by lightning. No damage 
was done, and she arrived safely at Arosa Bay an anchorage frequently used 
by the Mediterranean Fleet. Arosa Bay offered little by way of entertainment but 
was an ideal venue for the cadet examinations to take place. On 1 December, 
six days after arriving, Temeraire finally sailed for home. She arrived at Torquay 
on the 3 and there the cruise came to an end.64 
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Temeraire’s cruises had been far from normal. Even without the added 
complications of Prince George’s presence, they had been subject to many 
excitements and changes of programme. None the less most of the time was 
devoted to activities designed to benefit the cadets. They saw many of the ports 
they would operate from in the future and many of the ships they would serve 
in. They developed a wide range of practical skills, all of which would be of 
immediate use to them as midshipmen and which must have given them a great 
deal of self-confidence. Finally, they enjoyed themselves, experiencing a 
number of countries and having access to a variety of recreational activities. In 
these respects, Temeraire’s cruises were entirely typical of those made by 
cadet training ships between 1903 and 1939. 
More mundane accounts can be found in the logs of the cadet training 
ships. Whilst these logs do not reveal much about the lives of those aboard they 
do tell us much about the activities of the ships. They can reveal a great deal 
about the training undertaken by cadets. The increased competence of the 
cadets aboard Vindictive in the autumn of 1937 is illustrated by the increased 
frequency with which seaboat exercises were carried out (although it must be 
remembered that not all places were equally suitable for doing this work). 
Otherwise one gains an impression of many hours of onboard instruction, 
combined with sailing and pulling at every available opportunity, although there 
is no detail of what instruction was actually given.65 
Logs provide complete itineraries of destinations visited, along with 
details of how many visitors were entertained aboard. The historian may 
question how much work was done by Frobisher’s cadets on her visits to Narvik 
and Tallinn in June 1937 given that the ship was open to the public at both ports 
and received a combined 1175 visitors. In the same month she visited 
Flensburg, Lappvik, and Copenhagen; if nothing else her cadets got a good 
deal of sea time.66 Unfortunately ship’s logs give little idea of what went on 
actually went on ashore or the significance of any visitors to the ship. The 
summer 1919 cruise of British waters undertaken by Carnarvon may have had 
considerable emotional significance, but again her log is silent.67 
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Frustratingly, there is little evidence from ratings who served aboard 
training cruisers; which is doubly disappointing as ratings were key to the whole 
experience, arguably the most important aspect. This importance derived from 
the fact that cadets  whether at Dartmouth, Osborne, or in a static training ship 
 rarely came into contact with naval ratings and then only in small numbers 
and in a controlled atmosphere. Under these circumstances cadets learnt little 
of the life and mentality of the lower-deck man, let alone how to lead him. This 
was a problem given that, as a midshipman, the young officer was expected to 
lead ratings. 
Service in a training ship provided a convenient halfway house. The ship 
carried many ratings and cadets were constantly thrown into contact with them. 
The two groups worked together, often more or less as equals, and so were 
able to develop friendships that could not have existed under normal 
circumstances. Many cadets acquired a so called ‘sea daddy’  an experienced 
rating who took them under their wing, taught them seamanship, and explained 
the realities of life in the lowest ranks of the service. 
 Sea daddies were common throughout the Navy, and were normally 
older able seamen taking an interest in young ordinary seamen. The younger 
member of the partnership was often known as a ‘winger’  he had been taken 
under the older man’s wing. The relationship between cadets and their sea 
daddies differed from the normal in that it was confined to working hours and 
the instruction was mostly in professional practicalities; there was no protection 
from bullying superiors and no educational runs ashore.68 
Sea daddies also provided advice on leadership, reminding the cadets 
that they would soon be in charge of men who were older and vastly more 
experienced than themselves and who required tactful leadership, rather than 
being machines who would obey unthinkingly. Cadets also became aware that 
any failings of theirs would be picked up on by ratings and either exploited or 
used as an excuse for poor performance. 
The knowledge thus acquired was doubly useful as most cadets, 
especially those from Dartmouth, had grown up amongst boys of their own 
class and so had little conception of the lives, hopes and dreams of working 
class men. Such knowledge was essential if a young officer was to begin to 
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understand the problems of the ratings under his command. These 
conversations also helped to overcome any feelings of hostility derived from 
distrust of the working class. 
Ratings, and especially sea daddies, occupy a key place in 
autobiographical narratives of cadet sea training  reflecting their importance to 
the process. Courtney Anderson wrote that ‘cadets, sailors and marines 
laboured affably together on terms of mutual affection and respect. We talked, 
laughed, argued, questioned and discussed. And all the time we learned about 
the Navy, our job, and the men we should one day lead’.69 This view is 
endorsed by John Wells: ‘It was later apparent that six months in Frobisher was 
better value for cadets than a similar period spent in the gunrooms of the fleet. 
Perhaps the best part was getting to know the ratings, sharing their jobs and 
listening to a caustic view of the Navy from an un-ambitious three badge AB’.70 
Charles Owen described the curriculum meted out by his sea daddy 
thus: ‘the first lesson was in perks, protocols and precedent. This was easy and 
based on simple justice’. When the two set about their normal task of cleaning a 
group of ventilator mouths, Owen did all those that were hard to reach or dirty 
and his sea daddy those that could be done easily! The main lesson, delivered 
in an undertone whilst working, consisted of ‘the philosophy of the seagoing 
underdog’ delivered largely as a commentary on the habits and failings of 
passing officers. Thus was Cadet Owen provided with an ‘invaluable’ education 
in officer-like qualities as viewed by ratings.71 
All the officer autobiographers who served aboard the training cruisers 
describe their experiences in glowing terms. Their enjoyment translates itself 
into romanticised accounts  ratings are sympathetic, social experiences 
exciting, and the overall experience highly rewarding. The overall picture 
presented by autobiographies may therefore be over-positive but it cannot be 
denied that these officers had an enjoyable and educational experience. 
 Their positive recollections are backed up by contemporary sources. 
However the success of the cadet training ships is perhaps best signified by the 
speed with which they were re-instated after the two world wars. In both cases, 
within a few months of hostilities ending, the training ships had again taken up 
their duties. Specialist sea training for officers who had just completed their time 
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at Dartmouth continued in one form or another until 1992. Further positive 
evidence can be seen in the near-unanimous praise expressed for the ships by 
cadets and the naval authorities, both in contemporary and retrospective 
accounts. 
This success arose from the unique combination of circumstances 
aboard the training ship. They employed serving naval personnel and copied 
many of the normal routines and activities of the fleet, thus when cadets joined 
their first ship they felt at home. However the training ships were devoted to 
education, imparting a great deal of useful information and skills, and increasing 
the self-confidence as well as the competence of cadets. The newly promoted 
midshipman who had served in training ship was a far more capable, confident, 
and prepared individual than the cadet sent straight to the fleet. The success of 
the teaching aboard the training ship owed much to the atmosphere aboard. 
Cadets were relatively relaxed and were supported in their attempts to learn 
rather than being punished for their ignorance. Aside from producing better 
young officers, this supportive atmosphere ensured that cadets retained or 
increased their enthusiasm for their chosen career. 
At the start of this chapter various conditions for an effective introduction 
to seagoing life were listed. As has been seen, some training systems were 
pursued which did not all meet these conditions. Only the provision of a 
dedicated training ship ensured that cadets combined enjoyment of seagoing 
life, self-confidence, good professional skills, and a feeling of fellowship with 
other naval personnel. When there was no training ship these conditions were 
not met, cadets instead found themselves disillusioned, lonely, and confused. 
For these reasons, the training ship was a highly effective aspect of naval 
training and ensured that the transition from early training to life at sea was 
extremely well handled by the Royal Navy.
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Chapter Five  The Education of Midshipmen 
 
In many ways the most crucial stage of the officer education process was the 
time spent as a midshipman. This period, normally lasting two years and four 
months, focussed on the development of professional skills and leadership, and 
as such was the primary means of developing officer-like qualities. It was the 
key to producing a practical naval officer. As a midshipman the young officer 
was, for the first time in his career, expected to demonstrate effective leadership 
of naval ratings. He was also expected to develop the social skills and graces 
required of a naval officer. The education of midshipmen was a contentious 
issue, and one to which many naval reformers devoted their efforts. 
 Most of the difficulties and debates associated with the education of 
midshipmen arose, at least in part, from disputes over what midshipmen should 
be expected to learn. These debates centred around professional function  if 
the naval officer was to be an engineer, then the midshipman must learn 
engineering; if he was to be a seaman, the midshipman must learn seamanship. 
There was also disagreement as to the type and the extent of knowledge 
needed. The professional functions of an executive officer clearly required 
knowledge of gunnery, but should midshipmen concentrate on the aiming, firing, 
or maintenance of guns?  
The education of midshipmen was based on immersion  they were 
placed in a fleet ship and set about their duties. Midshipmen served mostly in 
the largest ships of the fleet  apart from a four-month spell in destroyers  they 
served in battleships, battlecruisers or cruisers. A ship could have up to twenty 
midshipmen, living together in the gunroom under the command of a sub-
lieutenant. 
Aboard ship midshipmen were occupied by a wide variety of tasks. They 
were expected to take part in the work of the ship including drills and 
maintenance, keep watch on the bridge and in the engine room, and were 
responsible for operating the ship’s boats. There was some formal instruction, 
including lectures on various subjects, a navigation work book and the 
requirement to keep a journal. Thus midshipmen gained knowledge through 
instruction, observation, and practical experience. 
There were numerous difficulties in providing effective training for all 
midshipmen. Firstly they served in widely varying conditions and in a variety of 
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ships, some of which lent themselves to a balanced education and some of 
which did not. Maintaining consistent standards across the fleet was a constant 
difficulty. Secondly there was considerable conflict as to exactly what 
midshipmen should study. This conflict centred on how much theoretical content 
there should be and how much practical experience. Thirdly midshipmen 
occupied an awkward position in the Navy, they were certainly not ratings, but 
neither were they commissioned officers and their appropriate treatment was a 
matter of debate. 
 So great were the difficulties associated with the education of 
midshipmen that it was subject to frequent re-examination. The reforms in 
midshipmen’s training that occurred in the 1903-1939 period generally served to 
greatly increase the emphasis on professional skills, particularly seamanship 
and navigation, at the expense of theoretical knowledge and engineering. 
 
Early Difficulties 
 
As originally implemented, the Fisher-Selborne scheme required midshipmen to 
complete an extensive academic syllabus the subjects of which included 
engineering, seamanship, torpedo, gunnery, navigation, signalling, 
mathematics, science, French, English, and naval history.1 They were expected 
to become competent assistant watch keepers on the bridge and in the engine 
room, to be capable boat handlers, to be capable of taking charge of various 
seamanship evolutions, to master the basics of navigation, and to pass 
numerous examinations. Examination passes were awarded in three classes  
from first to third; those gaining first class passes received accelerated 
promotion to lieutenant and emerged as early front runners in the race to 
highest ranks of the service. 
 It may come as no surprise that this workload proved beyond most 
midshipmen, there were simply not enough hours in the day for them to master 
the required theoretical knowledge and gain sufficient practical experience. 
Stressed and exhausted, many midshipmen presented a poor appearance, at 
odds with any conventional definition of officer-like-qualities. In 1912, Admiral 
Sir Herbert King-Hall wrote privately to his brother, Admiral Sir George King-
Hall, that the latter’s son, twenty year old Midshipman Stephen King-Hall was: 
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‘Like many midshipmen very boyish for his age […] They are a mixture of 
fashionable young men and unsophisticated children. In our generation we were 
grown men by that age’.2 
Such criticism of a younger generation is hardly unique, and one 
midshipman cannot be said to represent his entire generation of naval officers. 
None the less, Herbert King-Hall’s comments do suggest that the Fisher-
Selborne scheme was not producing mature and capable young officers. This 
criticism is born out by comments made through official channels. 
In May 1912 Vice-Admiral Sir John Jellicoe wrote to the Admiralty 
revealing many of the problems posed by Fisher-Selborne Scheme 
midshipmen.3 Although more knowledgeable than their predecessors they were 
not capable of, or responsible enough to do, the work of a lieutenant. They had 
not absorbed the lessons of the colleges or training ship and were especially 
poor at navigation. Their education had been disrupted  some of them had 
been in six ships in two years. They knew little of specialist work, having often 
being put to typing or similar tasks by the very officers supposed to be teaching 
them.  
 This letter demonstrates widespread failings. Possibly the selectors were 
not always choosing suitable boys  allowing the irresponsible to enter the 
Navy. Certainly the colleges were failing to ensure their students absorbed the 
required knowledge, acquired the habit of studying in their spare time, or 
obtained any sense of responsibility. The system of educating midshipmen was 
unsatisfactory  they were not learning science, seamanship, or leadership. 
The training of midshipmen, and associated issues such as the examinations 
for promotion to lieutenant, were key subjects for the Custance Committee 
appointed in early 1912. 
 The committee was so concerned about the examinations for lieutenant 
that it quickly produced a first report. The committee was of the opinion that 
these examinations were the root cause of most of the problems in educating 
midshipmen. Midshipmen were entirely pre-occupied with study and were 
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neglecting their practical training as a result.4 This tendency was encouraged by 
officers who were anxious for their midshipmen to pass as well as possible and 
midshipmen were examined weekly in many ships.5 This pre-occupation 
stemmed from the fifteen months seniority to be gained from the examinations 
and the inclusion of voluntary subjects. These subjects were designed to 
promote habits of self-education, but in fact were neglected apart from pre-
examination cramming.6 The examinations themselves were a frightening 
prospect  twelve three-hour papers over six days, followed by a further five 
days of oral examinations.7  
 The performance and behaviour of midshipmen provoked particularly 
adverse comment from witnesses. Captain Richard Phillimore of HMS Inflexible 
complained that the midshipmen of his ship were anxious and obsessed with 
examinations. The volume of information they were required to absorb meant 
that they had a wide range of superficial knowledge, but lacked detailed 
knowledge of any subject except engineering. Additionally, they were incapable 
of carrying out independent research or learning without supervision and were 
deficient as seamen and leaders.8 Lieutenant Humphry Walwyn, gunnery officer 
of HMS Neptune, complained that midshipmen took six months to become at all 
useful and that constantly moving between ships and departments harmed their 
development, as well as hindering the ship.9 
 The committee recommended that seamanship and navigation 
examinations should take place at sea and should be largely oral.10 Gunnery, 
torpedo, and engineering examinations should take place ashore after a further 
period of preparation.11 The committee felt that languages and history were not 
essential and should be learnt elsewhere. The function of the examinations was 
to test professional knowledge and not to cultivate learning  therefore they 
should concentrate on professional subjects. By reducing the amount of 
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seniority available to eleven months the pressure to study was reduced, and the 
time spent as a sub-lieutenant increased to at least thirteen months.12 
 The orders subsequently issued to the fleet stated that, whilst 
midshipmen in their first year at sea should prioritise attendance at instruction, 
older midshipmen should gain as much practical experience as possible. To 
ensure that midshipmen were gaining the required experience, and being taught 
properly, one lieutenant in each ship was detailed to take charge of them  this 
officer subsequently became known as the ‘Snottie’s Nurse’. Although 
midshipmen would be periodically examined in various subjects, they were only 
to take two major examinations. These were in seamanship and navigation (the 
latter counting for only 70% of the final mark in the subject) and were to be 
taken at the end of the midshipman’s training period. After three months at sea 
as an acting sub-lieutenant the young officer was to sit preliminary papers in 
gunnery and torpedo. All these examinations were to be taken whilst serving at 
sea; the acting sub-lieutenants were to move ashore before taking their 
engineering examination. After short shore courses in gunnery, torpedo and 
navigation the young officer would proceed to sea as a fully fledged, 
commissioned, sub-lieutenant.13 
These recommendations were the precursors of inter-war change; 
setting a pattern of reducing the scope and importance of academic study and 
emphasising the practical. However, the abolition of the naval history 
examination effectively removed tactics and strategy from the curriculum. The 
abolition of the examinations in English and foreign languages also had a 
negative impact, making the curriculum extremely narrow and technical. The 
removal of these subjects also took away much of the scope for self-education. 
Instead of having some freedom to read, write and think midshipmen were now 
required only to conquer a mass of technical detail. 
The First World War prompted several changes to the education of 
midshipmen. It was impossible to implement the full training programme under 
wartime conditions; many ships were constantly at sea and often at action 
stations. Classroom instruction was inevitably curtailed and it was hard for 
midshipmen to gain experience in all areas of their duties. In particular the 
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requirement for midshipmen to spend a third of their time in the engine room 
was proving impossible to meet. 
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe wrote to the Admiralty in August 1915 
discussing the problems faced by the Grand Fleet which he commanded. 
Midshipmen were making satisfactory progress in some areas of the syllabus 
but not in navigation or engineering. Because they were constantly needed on 
deck, midshipmen were not spending sufficient time in the engine room to 
become competent watch keepers. Their roles in the action organisation of the 
ship also prevented midshipmen from practising navigation. Although peacetime 
routine was being followed in harbour, midshipmen were not completing the 
academic syllabus.14  
 The logical solution was to reduce the time devoted to engineering which 
would not be the future career of most midshipmen. In November 1915 the 
proportion of time midshipmen were required to devote to engineering was 
dropped from one-third to one-eighth. However midshipmen were able to 
choose to specialise in engineering with a view to becoming engineer officers in 
the future. Midshipmen who chose to specialise in engineering were able to 
devote most of their time to the subject, becoming part of the engine room 
complement for watch-keeping and action stations.15 Those midshipmen who 
did not wish to specialise in engineering were able to devote more time to 
seamanship and executive specialist subjects such as gunnery. However only 
with the abolition of inter-changeability in the 1920s was the Navy able to really 
address the deficiencies in the education of executive midshipmen. 
 
Inter-War Reform – Focus on Executive Skills 
 
There was no doubt that reform was needed, the Goodenough Committee 
report of 1918 painted a sorry picture of midshipmen: ‘memories overtaxed, 
minds insufficiently active and without a notebook, slide rule and a book of 
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logarithms they are lost’; midshipmen were bad at mathematics, incapable of 
self- education and irresponsible.16 A 1920 letter to the Treasury admitted that: 
‘No satisfactory method has ever been devised for continuing afloat their 
general education’.17 
In February 1923 new orders for midshipmen’s training were published in 
the form of AFO 442/23 which clearly stated the purpose of the training: ‘The 
primary object of midshipmen serving at sea is to enable them to obtain 
experience in their duties as officers. Training based on formal instruction is a 
secondary objective’. This AFO required midshipmen to devote two out of every 
three months to seamanship and the remainder to technical subjects. The 
development of officer-like qualities was to take priority over instruction  all 
midshipmen were to take as full a part as possible in the work of the ship. 
Officer-like qualities were to be developed through boat work and assisting 
specialist officers. Executive officers were all to aid in the development of these 
qualities, although the snottie’s nurse and the ship’s captain retained overall 
responsibility.18  
A clear picture of how midshipmen actually spent their time is provided 
by a 1923 report from HMS Queen Elizabeth. The report stated that the average 
midshipman served two years and two months in the fleet, spent as follows: 
Weekends 200 days, 
Fleet exercises etc 123 days, 
Formal instruction 122 days, 
Leave 91 days, 
General drills 49 days, 
Regattas and sporting contests 39 days, 
Boat work 36 days.19  
These numbers suggest that the practical work done by midshipmen 
tended to be heavily supervised and there was not a great deal of it. No 
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comparative figures exist and so comparisons cannot be made to either later 
periods or ships excluded from the Queen Elizabeth survey. 
As part of their training midshipmen spent four months in destroyers, and 
undertake a two week course in signalling  which always took place ashore. 
Although executive midshipmen were no longer expected to master the details 
of engineering, they were still required to spend two months working in the 
engine room. This more specialised training all took place in the final year of the 
young officer’s time as a midshipman. The senior midshipman’s duties generally 
included acting as assistant officer of the watch and assisting specialist officers. 
Junior midshipmen concentrated on gaining as much practical experience as 
possible, taking part in all manner of drills and other activities. Theoretical study, 
boat work, and practising for the examinations in seamanship and navigation, 
occupied all midshipmen.  
 It is hardly surprising that, despite the best efforts of the reformers, the 
exhaustion amongst midshipmen remarked upon by the Custance Committee 
still existed. In 1923, the commanding officer of HMS Carysfort complained that 
midshipmen needed to be ‘shaken into shape’; while the commanding officer of 
HMS Dragon remarked that they were ‘tame’ and lethargic.20 While many 
officers were sympathetic, some were not  although few approached the 
venom of Rear-Admiral Thesiger who, in 1922, wrote that: ‘If a midshipman 
does not get a second, he is wanting in ordinary intelligence’.21 
In 1925 the task of reforming midshipmen’s training fell to DTSD Captain 
Vernon Haggard. He thought that officer-like qualities were best developed by 
midshipmen filling responsible roles and taking a full part in the running of their 
ship whilst undertaking an academic syllabus of limited scope.22 Haggard 
succeeded in getting the academic syllabi for midshipmen dramatically reduced, 
but nothing else was done to ease the situation  
Despite these concerns, Haggard’s reforms seem to have been 
reasonably satisfactory for no more reform occurred until the early 1930s. By 
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1929 however it had become clear that AFO 442/23, although an improvement 
on previous systems, was not a cure for all evils. In this year Admiral Sir 
Frederick Field, C-in-C Mediterranean, wrote a long letter laying out the 
deficiencies of the revised system. Field was entirely sympathetic with the aims 
of AFO 442/23 but thought that it had not gone far enough in reducing the 
academic workload of midshipmen: ‘The very comprehensive and detailed 
syllabus must if carried out practically defeat the primary object’.23 
Field considered most of the technical information learnt by midshipmen 
to be of little practical value; especially as the sub-lieutenants courses covered 
the most important information  that needed by an officer on a daily basis. He 
particularly criticised the ship construction and signal courses. In Field’s view, 
midshipmen should devote a great deal of time to working with boats, especially 
under sail or oar. A certificate of boat handling proficiency should be introduced. 
Midshipmen should also spend more time practising navigation. To ensure high 
standards there should be fewer midshipmen in each ship (currently there were 
up to twenty in a capital ship and twelve in a cruiser) and the captain of the ship 
should be personally responsible for their development. Fleet education officers 
should visit each ship, advising the captain and inspecting the work of the 
instructors.24  
 Field’s paper was circulated around the different Admiralty departments 
for comment. The Director of Tactical Division, Captain Henry Thursfield, was 
cautiously in favour of change. Although he agreed that improvements were 
needed, he thought constant changes to the curriculum would cause more 
damage than the existing shortcomings. Any new system should be left in place 
for five years. Perhaps the solution lay in a change of routine, midshipmen 
could do the work of the ship during the day and study in the dog watches 
rather than playing sport or going ashore.25  
 The Captain of the Portsmouth Signal School, Captain WB Mackenzie, 
agreed that the signal course was too technical. He suggested that midshipmen 
should spend a month attached to the signal division, learning its work and the 
signalling required of the officer of the watch. However the nature of the work of 
the specialist signal officer should not be covered until the sub-lieutenants 
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course. He favoured the appointment of a committee to consider the training of 
cadets and midshipmen.26  
 Opinion was firmly in favour of reforming the syllabus for midshipmen. 
Whilst it was agreed that midshipmen must devote most of their time to practical 
work, argument raged over what amount of academic work was necessary or 
desirable. Although the Advisor on Education, Alexander McMullen, continued 
to argue in favour of academic work, his was an increasingly isolated opinion.27 
Opposition to McMullen’s views was encapsulated by Captain James Ritchie: 
‘DTSD entirely concurs that it would be disastrous to allow the young officer’s 
brains to rust at this period, but parts company with him when he implies that 
rusting can only be prevented by the contemplation of non-corrosive ink applied 
to paper’.28 
Further discussion ultimately resulted in the promulgation of AFO 
2315/32 on 30 September 1932. The AFO took four months to draft  
illustrating the importance attached to it. This AFO gave each period in the 
education of the junior officer a clear purpose, thus providing officer training with 
a structure it had previously lacked. Cadets were to be educated  absorbing 
the theoretical and background information needed later in their careers  and 
Dartmouth should provide both general and professional education; Special 
Entry cadets required only professional education. Midshipmen were to acquire 
officer-like qualities including leadership and seamanship. Finally, sub-
lieutenants were to enhance their professional knowledge  learning the details 
of their profession.  
 For midshipmen there was a greatly reduced academic syllabus which 
excluded all material covered by the sub-lieutenants courses. This syllabus, 
unlike its predecessors, did not require a set number of hours; instead it 
required around two hours of lectures or classes per week. Officers were to 
supervise all the instruction midshipmen received aboard their ships. Efforts 
were made to reduce the number of midshipmen in each ship, and to keep 
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midshipmen in the same ship for long periods and so ensure continuity of 
learning.29  
 AFO 2315/32 tackled most of the deficiencies in the early career 
education of Royal Navy officers. As well as the concerns raised by Field, it also 
addressed most of the concerns raised by the Invergordon mutiny; indeed the 
Watson Committee subsequently saw it as the direct product of the mutiny.30 
The new regulations ensured that once at sea young officers were provided with 
the time and help they needed to learn the practical duties of their profession. 
Further discussion stemmed from a submission made by the C-in-C 
North America and West Indies, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Drax, in September 
1934 suggesting that, owing to the harsh climate, only older midshipmen should 
be sent to his station and even they should not stay longer than a year.31  
 It is unclear what prompted this suggestion as the healthiness of the 
West Indies station does not seem to have been a concern at the time. DTSD, 
Captain Geoffrey Arbuthnot, agreed with Drax  he thought that midshipmen 
should not serve in the West Indies, East Indies or African squadrons. Apart 
from health concerns he also cited the small number and limited variety of ships 
on these stations (which limited professional experience of carrier, destroyer, 
and battle fleet operations), and the disruption caused by travelling to and from 
the station. He favoured confining midshipmen to the Home, Mediterranean, 
and China stations. The inclusion of China is slightly puzzling given that it is far 
further from the UK than the West Indies but presumably the distance was 
compensated for by the variety of ships on the station. Arbuthnot also 
suggested that there should be fewer midshipmen in each ship and wanted 
midshipmen to spend all their time in one ship (other than destroyer and 
aviation time).32 
 These suggestions were ultimately rejected and the reasons for their 
rejection indicate the changed attitude towards midshipmen. Naval Assistant to 
the Second Sea Lord, Captain George Edward-Collins, stated that experienced 
midshipmen were needed by all ships including those newly commissioned; 
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changes of ship were essential.33 Director of Naval Ordnance, Captain Bruce 
Fraser, stated that midshipmen did responsible work and that moving them 
between ships impaired efficiency.34 Director of Personnel Services, Rear-
Admiral Sir James Somerville, remarked that if midshipmen were removed from 
ships they must be replaced by senior ratings, which were in increasingly short 
supply.35  
 Although they did not agree with each other as to how long midshipmen 
should serve on a ship, all three respondents felt that they were an important 
part of the ship’s company and doing vital work. These sentiments were entirely 
in line with AFO 2315/32. Thus the requirement for midshipmen to do the 
practical work of their profession prevented the removal of midshipmen from 
certain stations and dictated the frequency with which they must change ship  
meaning that no formal policy changes could be made. The number of 
midshipmen in each ship was being steadily reduced as the fleet began to 
expand. 
 Many officers outside the Admiralty were concerned about the education 
of officers in one way or another  there was an increasing recognition that the 
existing system was far from satisfactory, and a quantity of official 
correspondence on the subject. In 1934 a letter from the C-in-C Home Fleet, 
Admiral Sir William Boyle, proclaimed that ‘The most important activity of the 
fleet in peacetime is the training of officers’.36 This letter was concerned 
primarily with ignorance of strategy and tactics, and it was to these subjects that 
naval attention turned in 1935. 
In 1935 the James Committee was appointed to consider what education 
officers should receive in strategy and tactics. This committee was not 
concerned with questions of seamanship, technical knowledge, or leadership, 
but purely with the neglected areas of tactical and strategic knowledge  what 
might be termed the arts of war. The James Committee concerned itself with 
officers ranked sub-lieutenant and above and consequently its work is largely 
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outside the scope of this thesis. However, it is worth noting the committee’s 
conclusion that the only education in strategy and tactics that cadets received 
was the study of naval history, while midshipmen received none at all.37  
Midshipmen did in fact receive a limited education in tactics and strategy, 
as discussed below, but it was delivered in a piecemeal style and varied 
enormously in both quality and quantity. Such negligence was to some extent 
unavoidable. Midshipmen’s training was increasingly geared towards 
seamanship and leadership; a midshipman could not simultaneously stand at a 
plotting table studying an exercise and develop his leadership skills in a gun 
turret or range finder. Despite the reduced curriculum, midshipmen still had a 
great deal to learn, and many officers would have agreed with Andrew 
Cunningham who  as Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff  wrote: ‘There is in my 
opinion a danger that young officers will attempt to run before they can walk if 
they start to think about policy and higher strategy before they have a sound 
knowledge of their profession’.38 
Cunningham’s comments illustrate that this was not really a new 
dilemma. Although the problem of teaching young officers the arts of war was 
newly a matter of concern, it was, like the teaching of academic studies, 
seamanship and leadership, compromised by the vast amount of information 
that midshipmen were required to absorb. The James Committee realised that 
midshipmen knew very little of tactics and strategy but significantly offered no 
remedy. It suggested a war course for sub-lieutenants but no changes to the 
training of cadets and midshipmen.39 This policy was in accordance with AFO 
2315/32  by now firmly established as the guiding policy in the early career 
education of officers  which prescribed that such education should be left until 
officers reached the rank of sub-lieutenant. 
The final inter-war committee to consider officer education was the 
Watson Committee of 1938. It had a wide remit, concentrating on the courses 
undertaken by sub-lieutenants, but also including the training of midshipmen, 
cadets, and specialist officers. The membership of the committee was 
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exclusively naval; it was not intended to make an in-depth study of the 
academic curricula studied by junior officers, but to concentrate on their 
professional education and in particular the development of officer-like 
qualities.40 The Watson Committee was the first since the Custance to enjoy 
this wide remit  and it enjoyed freer rein than its predecessor, which had been 
concerned with tweaking the Fisher-Selborne scheme. 
 The formation of the Watson Committee was prompted by the increasing 
shortage of junior officers in the fleet and the consequent desire to reduce the 
length of their training. However it also reflected the dissatisfaction of many 
officers with the existing scheme of education  this being illustrated by the fact 
that the committee was appointed only after the decision had been made to 
shorten the course by a total of thirteen months (the time spent on the training 
cruiser was halved to four months, the time spent as a midshipman reduced by 
four months to two years, and the Greenwich course for sub-lieutenants cut 
from six months to one). The committee’s work concentrated on the problems of 
scientific and mathematical education  how much was needed, when it should 
be received, and how courses ashore should be balanced with gaining practical 
experience.41 It was therefore entirely in keeping with the bulk of the Royal 
Navy’s inter-war educational debates. 
 The Watson Committee published its report on 30 June 1938; a 
summary of the findings was circulated for departmental comment by the 
Second Sea Lord on 16 July.42 The committee declared the existing scheme of 
junior officer education essentially sound, although some changes were 
needed. The problems raised by the committee were to be expected; the course 
as a whole was too intense and did not encourage self-education, midshipmen 
did not derive enough value from their time at sea, and the technical courses for 
sub-lieutenants were too hard.  
 For a solution the Watson Committee looked to the First World War. It 
argued that the war had been won by officers who were not trained scientists, 
but were keen, motivated, and self-educated. Much of the equipment they used 
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they had themselves developed. On the other hand the pre First World War 
Royal Navy had emphasised technical development at the price of training in 
fighting. Therefore, self-education must be encouraged, technical courses made 
simpler, and midshipmen should do no schoolwork except that required for 
navigation. All officers should be encouraged to study the wider aspects of their 
profession rather than technical minutiae.43  
 The Watson Committee’s findings and suggestions demonstrate the lack 
of progress made in reforming the early career education of officers by the inter-
war Royal Navy. The concerns raised by the committee were much the same as 
those raised by earlier committees indicating that many problems, although well 
known, went unsolved. However the rejection of the committee’s suggestions, 
and the feeling that excessive change had contributed to the difficulties, was 
recognition that the problems the Royal Navy faced were insoluble  at least as 
long as it persisted in entering officers who had not completed their general 
education. These insoluble problems, combined with the demands of finance 
and fleet growth, meant that the Watson Committee had very little practical 
impact. 
 Reforming the education of midshipmen would have been far easier had 
they all been serving in near identical circumstances. Instead there was 
enormous variation arising not only from changed syllabi and changing 
regulations but also as a result of varying circumstances  service aboard 
different types of ship, in different parts of the world, sometimes at war and 
sometimes not. Midshipmen were also prey to the whims and character flaws of 
those set in authority over them. 
 
The Realities of Midshipmen’s Education 
 
As with almost everything aboard ship, responsibility for the education of 
midshipmen rested on the captain, he was expected to take some interest in the 
midshipmen under his command but his role was ill-defined. Day to day 
authority rested with the snottie’s nurse. This officer, normally the navigator, 
was required to oversee the midshipmen, making sure that they progressed in 
their studies and ensuring that discipline and humanity reigned in the gunroom. 
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Within the gunroom authority rested with the sub-lieutenant although 
senior midshipmen had some power over the junior. The sub-lieutenant 
dispensed justice, kept order, and ensured that midshipmen carried out their 
duties. For the purposes of instruction midshipmen were subordinated to other 
officers, petty officers, or ratings. In theory, this system exposed the 
midshipman to a variety of influences, each of which had its own specific role to 
play. 
 The instruction of midshipmen was carried out in various ways. For most 
subjects there would be a programme of lectures, normally delivered by an 
officer with appropriate specialist qualifications, private study such as reading or 
essay writing, and some opportunity to see or use the equipment in question. 
Because ships often carried large numbers of midshipmen, assigned to a 
variety of duties, theoretical instruction might not be in tune with practical. A 
midshipman might find himself first drawing the steering gear, then assigned to 
a party maintaining it, before finally being lectured on how it worked.  
 Midshipmen were supposed to be available to take part in the work 
aboard ship as required and were generally given specific duties such as 
navigator’s assistant, bridge watch keeper, or being in charge of a boat. In 
these situations, how much the midshipman learnt depended on how willing the 
officers in charge of him were to give him responsibility, what teaching he was 
given, and how much he understood of what was going on.  
At all times midshipmen were required to keep journals. Time was 
allotted every Sunday for writing-up journals which were expected to contain an 
entry for almost every day. Journals were essentially diaries, recording the 
progress of the ship and the activities it carried out as well as the personal and 
professional lives of the writers. Additionally they contained essays written on a 
huge variety of topics, observations on current affairs, and a wide variety of 
artwork. They were articles of importance  the snottie’s nurse inspected them 
monthly and the captain of the ship occasionally. A journal could earn up to fifty 
marks when the midshipman came to be examined for the rank of sub-
lieutenant.  
 All journals contained a sheet of instructions laying down the value of the 
journal in examination, the penalties for losing or abusing it, and the frequency 
with which it was to be examined. From 1928 onwards there was a list of the 
objects of writing it. Journals were intended to train young officers in 
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observation, self-expression, and habits of orderliness. These objects were 
never challenged officially but instead we find Field writing that journals: ‘Should 
be regarded as a means of providing opportunities for young officers to write 
clear and intelligent accounts and appreciations of current events including fleet 
exercises’.44  
Many record the details of the daily evolutions of the ship, as well as the 
subjects being studied by their midshipman author. The production of the 
journal seems to have ensured that lessons were well learned, also 
demonstrating how much midshipmen understood of what was happening 
around them. Although they rarely reveal their author’s emotions, journals are 
an excellent source for the historian  providing great insight into the daily lives 
and education of midshipmen. 
Daily drills are often recorded in detail and accompanied by sketches. 
Journal entries reveal the benefit midshipmen derived from these evolutions, as 
well as how far they understood them. For instance, one midshipman recorded: 
‘I find it useful and at the same time quite interesting to be on the bridge as a 
special sea dutyman’.45 
 In addition to drills and evolutions, journals reveal their owners grasp of 
shipboard life and organisation. Whilst the finer details of such things escaped 
many midshipmen, it is clear that most had a good understanding of the 
principles. Within days of joining Royal Oak in the Mediterranean, Midshipman 
Mackeown recorded the following observations: ‘It is useless to expect anyone 
to work hard in the heat of the day’ and ‘It is a sound idea to encourage anyone 
to apply to sickbay at once for minor things’.46 Such simple observations formed 
the base of an officer’s ability to effectively run a ship and lead her company. 
Midshipmen’s journals are littered with discussions of fleet exercises, 
tactical diagrams, and discussions of the use of various weapons. They are 
therefore the best available means of gauging the tactical and strategic 
knowledge of midshipmen and also give some indication of how these subjects 
were taught. 
 Examples include the journal of Frank Twiss, which contains a 
discussion of the role of the cruiser in trade protection, along with a map of 
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trade routes, and the realisation of ‘vast ocean areas, the responsibility for the 
policing of which is thrown on our much reduced cruiser squadrons’.47 John 
Worth recorded a lecture and demonstration of the uses of star shell.48 Henry 
Brooke recalled attending a tactical course in Malta where he studied the 
functions of different types of ship.49 
 Journal entries suggest that midshipmen generally had a sound grasp of 
tactical and strategic theory  at least on a basic, and somewhat fragmented, 
level. They also suggest that midshipmen rarely received any practical 
experience, despite the availability of suitable facilities and opportunities. 
Although midshipmen were obliged to work in every department of their ship, 
their journals rarely consider the difficulties posed by logistics or the limitations 
of equipment. Midshipmen rarely participated in the planning of exercises, or in 
tabletop explorations of tactics and strategy, other than as observers  senior 
officers choosing to exclude them. 
 One of the few exceptions to this appears to have been Captain Kenneth 
Dewar of the Royal Oak. Dewar took the flagship’s midshipmen ashore to the 
tactical exercise table at the Fleet Education Centre in Malta (presumably the 
venue of the course attended by Brooke) and actively encouraged them to role 
play as commanders of cruisers and destroyers. Dewar insisted on all his 
executive officers taking part in these exercises, some of which anticipated 
future events with impressive accuracy. The Royal Oak’s officers brought 
urgently needed stores convoys through enemy waters and Commander Wake-
Walker masterminded the escape of his small scouting force from a superior 
enemy.50 
 Journals also offer a useful insight into the instruction midshipmen 
received whilst on the aviation courses provided for them. By the mid 1920s the 
Royal Navy was sufficiently convinced of the importance of the aircraft to make 
aviation part of every executive officer’s education. Royal Navy aircraft carriers 
made visits to Torbay in the course of which their aircraft visited Dartmouth 
where a landing strip had been specially prepared. AFO 1382/25 of May 1925 
provided for all midshipmen to spend a fortnight in an aircraft carrier. 
Midshipmen were not compelled to fly, but there was a syllabus designed to 
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introduce them to all aspects of naval aviation and their attendance was noted 
on the E190 forms which provided a record of their training.51  
 Midshipmen seem to have enjoyed their aviation training, writing 
positively of the experiences in their journals. However whereas most of the 
fourteen journals I have read contain discussions of the strategic and tactical 
use of destroyers, cruisers, or submarines, very few consider the value of 
aircraft  suggesting that the course did not have the intended effect. Of the 
four journals I particularly studied for reactions to the air course, two contain a 
detailed account of the course itself but no indication as to how much 
information had been absorbed.52 In both cases, the course had been very busy 
with multiple lectures on many days. One writer showed a marked lack of 
interest in the course.53  
Only one of these journals contained a detailed discussion of the role of 
aircraft in naval warfare, advocating their potential for controlling narrow seas 
and carrying out reconnaissance. The author stressed the need for air and sea 
services to co-operate closely and the potential for shore-based aircraft to 
disrupt civilian life. However this midshipman’s experiences were unusual  he 
had served in Royal Oak and Captain Dewar had taken care to ensure his 
midshipmen were well versed in strategy and tactics.54  
Carrier service often provided an introduction to the perils of naval 
service  fatal accidents were a common occurrence. Flying accidents were the 
first exposure that many young officers received to violent death and they learnt 
to react calmly and stoically as they must in action. One cadet’s letter to his 
parents contained the bland remark: ‘Rather an unfortunate smash occurred 
between two of the machines landing on Courageous and both pilots were killed 
and I believe both planes sunk’.55 
Midshipmen seem to have enjoyed the aviation course provided for them 
but it does not appear to have achieved its educational aims  perhaps owing to 
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its extensive syllabus and the general unfamiliarity of midshipmen with tactical 
and strategic thinking. Carrier service was also valuable because it taught the 
importance of equipment maintenance, correct drills, and maintaining 
performance in the face of death or serious injury. Finally, all exposure to 
military aviation served to open midshipmen’s eyes to the changing nature of 
naval warfare. 
Another eye opener was the time midshipmen spent in destroyers. 
Midshipmen spent four months in destroyers and most remembered the 
experience fondly and considered it a vital part of their training. Destroyers were 
small and tended to be cramped and uncomfortable but there were numerous 
compensations. Midshipmen lived in the wardroom, benefiting from spending 
time with the officers, and they had more responsibility than aboard big ships 
while the atmosphere was generally more relaxed and informal.  
Henry Mackeown benefited from his time in Witherington, noting that 
fleet exercises looked very different when viewed from a destroyer.56 Edward 
Ashmore found that his service in Dainty ‘was tremendous fun and less 
uncomfortable than I had expected. All we midshipmen wanted to be in 
destroyers when we became sub-lieutenants, and it was good to have a little 
practical experience which bore out all our expectations  few officers, plenty of 
action and easier relations than those in bigger ships’.57 In fact autobiography 
writers appear unanimous in praising their destroyer time. 
Older officers were more divided in their opinions. In preparing AFO 
442/23, Haggard sought the views of many officers serving in the fleet. One of 
the most divisive issues was the value of service in destroyers. The C-in-C of 
the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Sir John de Robeck, felt that service in destroyers 
bred self-reliance, self-confidence and initiative.58 The fleet instructor captain 
felt it bred over-confidence, slackness, self-importance, and a tendency to 
imitate the Navy’s more idiosyncratic officers who tended to gravitate to small 
ships.59 
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Aside from service in destroyers, midshipmen gained most of their 
practical experience in ship handling and responsibility through boat work. 
Handling powered boats gave early lessons in ship handling, teaching the 
importance of alertness, forethought, maintenance, and intimate knowledge of 
how an individual craft handled. Sailing craft were particularly valuable in 
teaching young officers to react quickly in order to avert disaster. Being 
responsible for the smart appearance and work of any boat taught the 
importance of attention to detail. These lessons were better learnt whilst in 
command of a motor boat rather than a destroyer, and in a situation in which 
the inefficiency or incompetence of a crew member primarily imperilled a 
midshipman’s leave rather than a ship and her men. 
Great emphasis was placed on boat work by many naval officers. The 
Goodenough Committee of 1918 declared that if a boat was moving a 
midshipman should be in it and that the young gentlemen ‘must command their 
boats on all occasions’.60 Field’s emphasis on boat work is described above. 
Perusal of The Naval Review suggests a great enthusiasm for boat work, but 
considerable debate as to what form it should take. 
Debate centred on the relative value of sailing and powered craft. 
Advocates of the former pointed towards the development of teamwork and 
endurance, along with seamanship skills, in particular the ability to anticipate 
and react to difficulties.61 Advocates of the latter pointed out the obsolescence 
of sail, the dangers it posed to inexperienced personnel, and that making trips 
under sail condemned men to a longer, colder and wetter journey than was 
necessary.62 It was also suggested that modern ship handling skills were better 
developed in powered craft, one writer noting that many officers ‘acquired any 
ability we may have to think quickly and to keep calm in an emergency from the 
handling of powerboats and cars or motorcycles’.63 
 Generally, the normal work of the fleet was done in powered boats, 
ranging from small motor boats to large steam powered drifters. The experience 
of working in powered boats fulfilled the expectations of midshipmen; it was a 
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responsible and exciting role offering variety, the chance to build a strong 
relationship with ratings, and some degree of danger. The challenge was 
heightened by the tendency to judge a ship by her boats, highly visible symbols 
of her smartness and general efficiency. Doubtless many midshipmen would 
have agreed with Ian Balfour who, after his first day running a boat, admitted 
that it ‘is not as easy as it looks’.64  
 Managing a boatload of drunken sailors was a critical test for the 
midshipman, who had to ensure the safe and orderly arrival of the boat. This 
could only be achieved if the passengers were quiet and orderly, frequently 
bringing the midshipman into conflict with argumentative and violent drunks. 
The good behaviour of the passengers was in any case essential as the small, 
heavily laden boats were at risk in bad weather. Undoubtedly, the rewards of 
successful boat handling were great. For Charles Owen it was ‘an opportunity to 
demonstrate dash, style and competence’.65 For Edward Ashmore, whilst 
irrelevant in war, smart boat handling became a means of instilling pride in a 
peacetime fleet.66  
Under these circumstances midshipmen were heavily dependent on their 
boat crews, in particular the leading seaman who acted as coxswain. Apart from 
ensuring the safety of the boat the coxswain played an important role in keeping 
it clean and seaworthy. He played a particularly important role in quieting 
drunken and fractious libertymen. It is hardly surprising that officers who later 
wrote autobiographies placed great emphasis on these relationships. 
In hindsight the relationship between midshipman and boat’s crew seems 
to take on a great significance. Boat’s crews are portrayed as taking a paternal 
interest in ensuring the success of their midshipmen, and images are presented 
of a strong and happy relationship between midshipman and crew.67 Courtney 
Anderson had much cause to be grateful to his boat crew remarking ‘over and 
over again they saved me from my own incompetence’.68 Conversely Charles 
Owen found there was ‘no prouder participant or onlooker than his own crew 
when a midshipman pulled off a really smart manoeuvre’.69  
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Boat work was all the more attractive to some midshipmen because it 
had played a significant role in attracting them to the Navy. Many had been 
inspired by tales of midshipmen; or by the sight of these young men, seemingly 
little older than themselves, carrying out glamorous and responsible tasks. As a 
young Ludovic Kennedy stepped out of HMS Nelson’s boat, he was consumed 
by envy and desire: ‘I thought, I want to be you, I want to wear a uniform like 
yours, I want to command a boat like yours, to belong to a ship like yours, like 
you to be part and parcel of the Navy’.70  
 Joining their first fleet ship meant that midshipmen at last became part of 
the real navy  rather than being a species of schoolboy  the transformation 
being confirmed by the state actually paying them for their services. How to 
Become a Naval Officer differentiated between sea service as a cadet and as a 
midshipman  noting that for cadets joining the training cruiser ‘the Promised 
Land has at last hove in sight’71 thereby implying that it was only entered on 
becoming a midshipman. How to Become a Naval Officer reinforced the image 
of midshipmen as responsible naval officers  promising that ‘a snottie is an 
indispensable unit in a big ship’.72 Certainly the time for school boyish attitudes 
and actions had gone  ‘the midshipman should cloak himself in a mantle of 
humble and respectful awe for all things and all men’.73 This advice was echoed 
by officers at Dartmouth  one cadet was told ‘the lowest form of life at sea was 
a snottie’.74 
 Potential young officers were left in no doubt as to the importance of their 
time as midshipmen. The gunroom, they were promised, was the centre of 
shipboard mischief, noise, and high spirits  an unequalled environment for the 
making of a boy.75 Despite the known attractions of picket boats to small boys, 
How to Become a Naval Officer did not place emphasis on this activity. Instead 
readers were informed that midshipmen take part in the work of the ship  
gaining experience in areas including boat work, drills, watch-keeping, and the 
duties of divisional officers. If they were selected to enter the Navy the 
education they received as midshipmen would emphasise the practical  
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academic work being less important than learning the duties of an officer and 
developing officer-like qualities.76  
The initial experiences of most midshipmen met their expectations and 
fulfilled the promises of recruiting literature. Many ships greeted new 
midshipmen with a promise that if they behaved like responsible adults they 
would be treated as such. On joining Valiant in 1940 Adrian Holloway was 
informed that he would only be treated like an officer if he behaved like one.77 
Jock Ritchie was of the opinion that midshipmen, such as his colleagues in 
Queen Elizabeth, who were treated as responsible adults performed far better 
than those who were treated as children.78 
 New arrivals were typically given twenty-four hours to acclimatise, as well 
as a guided tour, but there was still much to become accustomed to. Seven 
days after joining Royal Oak, Henry Mackeown  having joined in the work of 
his division  admitted in his journal that: ‘This was my first general drill and so I 
was astonished at the shouting, running and amount of gear left lying around’.79 
The ship itself was not the only new experience; at Dartmouth and in the 
training cruiser the cadets had out-numbered the officers (and at Dartmouth 
they had also out-numbered the naval ratings). Most of the naval personnel they 
had come into contact with had been hand-picked. On joining the fleet 
midshipmen were exposed to a full range of personnel  including men of all 
ranks who were unsympathetic, bloody minded, incompetent, or alcoholic. 
Some midshipmen must have been over-awed by their first sightings of the 
mess desks where the ratings lived, and intimidated by their occupants. It was 
only in the fleet that midshipmen were fully exposed to issues such as sex and 
alcohol consumption, let alone behaviour forbidden by the law or naval 
regulations such as sodomy and drunkenness.  
 For some joining was swiftly followed by disappointment. The Royal 
Navy seems to have failed to prepare its young entrants for the realities of 
active service. Bertram Ramsay complained that almost all midshipmen and 
boys deteriorated rapidly on going to sea  becoming slovenly, undisciplined, 
and disinterested  although within six months 90% of them had recovered 
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sufficiently to be a credit to the service.80 In both cases this behaviour must 
have owed something to the young man finding himself suddenly free, not only 
of the stifling discipline of Dartmouth or the boys training service, but also of the 
close supervision of the training ships. None the less it is clear that many young 
men struggled to adapt.  
 The primary cause of disillusionment was the realisation that the 
midshipman was not, after all, ‘indispensable’. Many midshipmen found they 
were dividing their time between academic studies, menial uninteresting duties, 
and watching officers do things they did not understand. Some travelled long 
distances to join their ships only to find them elsewhere. 
  Many midshipmen were given very little real responsibility, even if 
nominally in charge of something they might be subject to constant supervision. 
Often the coxswain of a boat was actually in charge of the midshipman and 
would take responsibility for the safety of the boat, correcting the midshipman’s 
mistakes and discouraging stupid or irresponsible behaviour. Whilst this 
undoubtedly saved many a boat from disaster, it also meant that midshipmen 
did not gain as much experience as they might have in either handling boats, or 
in anticipating and responding to responding to dangerous situations, and thus 
the educational value of boat work was diminished. 
One midshipman wrote to the Naval Review suggested that this was 
symptomatic of a wider malaise, it was generally unclear whether midshipmen 
were supposed to be treated as officers or not, they were frequently treated as 
subordinate to senior ratings, and were punished as if they were children rather 
than naval officers. When they were given duties, such as assistant officer of 
the watch, they tended to be treated as students under instruction rather than 
being given responsibility. Under these circumstances it was hardly surprising 
that they behaved irresponsibly.81 This article crystallised the views expressed 
by many officers in writing to both the Naval Review and to the naval authorities 
but does not seem to have had any impact. 
 Above all, the midshipman’s enjoyment of his service depended on the 
atmosphere in the gunroom. This in turn depended on the character and 
leadership abilities of the sub-lieutenant. The difficulties faced by sub-
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lieutenants were great especially when they had not had much leadership 
experience. One Naval Review writer complained that newly appointed sub-
lieutenants ‘lose all sense of proportion’. 82 This was perhaps not surprising 
given that a sub-lieutenant was ‘an absolute ruler’.83 
Despite being in their first appointment as commissioned officers, sub-
lieutenants were placed in charge of midshipmen little younger than 
themselves, of equal social status, and perhaps not as amenable to discipline 
as most ratings. An inexperienced sub-lieutenant, lacking in self confidence, 
was vulnerable to the combined weight of the senior midshipmen who ‘had 
gone through the often highly unpleasant experiences themselves and probably 
looked forward to their own little 'kingdoms' later on’.84 Under these 
circumstances much rested on the ability, and willingness, of the snottie’s nurse 
to intervene in a timely and appropriate manner  or alternatively order the sub-
lieutenant to cane the recalcitrant midshipmen. 
The extreme youth of the cadets sent to sea during the First World War 
stirred the paternal tendencies of some sub-lieutenants. Stephen King-Hall, 
sub-lieutenant of HMS Southampton in 1914 recorded in his diary: ‘We have 
two young officers from Dartmouth on board, whom I chase always and beat at 
times in a fatherly manner. I have assured them that, as far as lies in my power, 
they shall die as an adornment to their profession’.85 
 Bullying tendencies amongst sub-lieutenants could be checked by the 
presence of Special Entry or Royal Navy Reserve midshipmen, often older than 
the sub-lieutenant himself. One former officer, himself a product of Dartmouth, 
suggested that Special Entry midshipmen had no interest in violent gunroom 
games, doubtless regarding such things as beneath them.86 However these 
midshipmen did not always have a positive influence. They could also be a 
disruptive element and, during the First World War, some officers saw their 
presence in the gunrooms of the fleet as detrimental.87 
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  The authority of the sub-lieutenant could be overthrown if sufficient force 
could be mobilised against him. In 1917, Sub-Lieutenant JPF Turner was 
convicted of claiming to have committed sodomy with another cadet whilst at 
Dartmouth. Diligent investigation by Turner’s mother revealed that he was the 
victim of a conspiracy by six Royal Naval Reserve midshipmen and a Royal 
Naval Reserve lieutenant. The allegations arose from resentment of the 
discipline enforced by Turner although there is no evidence this was unusually 
harsh.88  
 There is evidence that there was a substantial amount of bullying in the 
Grand Fleet. This bullying probably resulted from the conditions under which the 
fleet operated  it spent much of its time in the barren and isolated Scapa Flow 
preparing for an encounter with the elusive German High Seas Fleet. An inquiry 
held in January 1917 concluded that the junior midshipmen aboard HMS 
Benbow had been bullied by their seniors and the sub-lieutenant in charge of 
the gunroom. Although the bullying activities had taken the form of normal 
gunroom ‘evolutions’, they had been distinguished by the degrading, 
humiliating, and punishment-like way in which they had been inflicted. In the 
aftermath of the inquiry, an Admiralty circular letter informed the captains of 
ships that they were responsibly for supervising their gunrooms and ensuring 
that bullying did not occur.89 
Bullying was not a wartime phenomenon but rather a constant feature of 
gunroom life. In some ships senior officers became aware of bullying in the 
gunroom and rebellions which should  under naval law  have been severely 
punished, went completely unremarked, or even resulted in the swift removal of 
the bully from the ship.  
In 1921 the midshipmen of HMS Repulse had ‘the most ghastly time’ and 
the reason for this is clear  ‘the bullying was absolutely unspeakable’; the 
perpetrators included the sub-lieutenant of the gunroom and a senior 
midshipman. Frustrated, and otherwise helpless, the junior midshipmen reacted 
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violently against their tormentors. An attempt was made to murder the 
midshipman by setting an up-turned dirk under his hammock and then setting 
fire to the nettles in the hope that he would land on the dirk. This creative 
scheme failed when the falling midshipman missed the dirk, but the incident 
went un-investigated and unpunished. When six midshipmen physically 
attacked the sub-lieutenant he was immediately withdrawn from the ship. 
Instead of being punished, the midshipmen responsible were sent to HMS 
Dragon, the best appointment they could have hoped for.90  
The concerns of wider society were directed towards Royal Navy 
midshipmen by the publication of Charles Morgan’s The Gunroom in 1919. The 
novel, written during the author’s time as a prisoner of war, dealt with the 
experiences of the fictitious Midshipman John Lynwood aboard HM ships 
‘Arthur’ and ‘Pathshire’. It was in fact semi-autobiographical, discussing 
Morgan’s own service aboard the Good Hope and Monmouth. Morgan’s 
wartime experiences undoubtedly contributed to his bitterness towards the 
Royal Navy, he was captured in 1914 and spent the rest of the war as a 
prisoner. However the book focuses on the frustrations and disappointments of 
his pre-war service, experiences so disillusioning as to have prompted his 
resignation from the service as a midshipman in 1913. 
 The book discussed the life and education of midshipmen in the fleet, as 
well as their relationships with their seniors and subordinates. It highlighted 
gunroom evolutions (dangerous, and sometimes degrading, games played by 
junior midshipmen for the amusement of their elders), the bullying of junior 
midshipmen by their seniors, the disinterest of some officers, the exhausting 
regime and the boredom of seagoing life, as well as unfair discipline and a lack 
of culture (poetry, literature and the arts). It was deeply critical of the Royal 
Navy, and had it come to widespread public notice some reforms may have 
been forced. 
The Gunroom made little impact, perhaps because after the initial run in 
1919 no further copies were produced until 1968. It has been suggested that 
the book was suppressed by the Admiralty but this seems unlikely and no 
evidence can be found. In fact it appears that Morgan himself was responsible 
for the book not being republished in his own lifetime. The Gunroom appeared 
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on a list of the top boys books of 1920 and was advertised in the national 
press.91 Louis Le Bailly mentions that ‘like most of my generation, I had read 
Charles Morgan’s The Gunroom’, this may be an exaggeration, but does 
suggest that copies were to be found in many private or prep school 
collections.92  
 The Gunroom certainly was widely read by naval officers. A review of the 
book appeared in the Naval Review of February 1920, the author noting that the 
review may be superfluous  most officers in home waters having read the book 
already.93 Correspondence about the book appeared in the Naval Reviews of 
May and August 1920 and February 1921, confirming that interest was 
widespread within the fleet. 
 The reviewer, Lieutenant CH Drage, noted that since the end of the war 
‘a series of literary attacks had been made on existing institutions, by authors 
who nursed grievances against the institutions in question’.94 So clear was the 
sense of grievance in The Gunroom that no official response was needed and 
none had been made. Drage made a number of attacks upon the book. In the 
first place, he suggested that Morgan ‘makes the natural operation of a bracing 
and essentially human discipline appear to be the brutal grinding of a heartless 
machine’.95 The characters of the book generally combined negative 
characteristics such as laziness and cruelty, almost all being completely 
uncultured  the major exception being Lynwood himself, whom Drage 
considered to lack both thickness of skin and a sense of humour. 
 Two of the three correspondents agreed with him. However the first 
published response, printed in May 1920, was opposed to his views. This writer 
stated that the review author ‘must be congratulated on his selection of 
passages to pillory’ and suggested that the Royal Navy was not above criticism, 
in fact it was the duty of all officers to criticise if the service benefited as a result. 
Whilst he criticised the ‘morbid atmosphere’ of the book, the writer declared ‘in 
no other book of naval fiction has so much truth appeared’. In particular the 
book demonstrated the petty tyranny and stupidity ‘which undermine true 
discipline’. This author insisted that it was time for the Royal Navy to re-examine 
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itself and its system of officer education  going so far as to state that perhaps 
the Lynwood type would make an excellent officer if given the chance.96 
 The second letter largely ignored the charges made against the 
commissioned officers of the Navy, instead concentrating upon Morgan’s attack 
on the midshipmen. This writer insisted that Lynwood’s life on the China station 
before the war could not have been any more monotonous and unpleasant than 
patrolling the Red Sea in wartime as the letter writer had done. The writer noted 
that, far from midshipmen feeling degraded and demoralised and their minds 
turning into cesspools, a debate club had flourished and at one stage three 
gunroom magazines had competed with each other. In this writer’s eyes the 
problem lay not with the bulk of midshipmen but with Morgan himself, a man 
clearly unsuited to naval service and given to self pity.97 
 This opinion was matched by the final correspondent who had been an 
officer during Morgan’s time aboard the ‘Pathshire’. He complained that Morgan 
had produced ‘a mass of gross exaggeration, insinuations, omissions of good 
points and even misrepresentations’. The ship had been extremely happy and 
Morgan’s sole motivation must be bitterness at his own failings.  Certainly 
Morgan had been something of a misfit, neglecting his work in order to write 
and taking little interest in his budding career.98  
 Taken together these writings present a reasonably clear picture. Morgan 
was undoubtedly a misfit and his leaving the Royal Navy was probably 
beneficial to both parties. Although lacking refinement, culture was certainly 
present in the gunrooms and wardrooms of the fleet. The system of educating 
midshipmen, in particular the arrangements for their supervision, was imperfect 
but was generally viewed as satisfactory. Overall reactions to The Gunroom as 
expressed in The Naval Review suggest little appetite within the fleet for reform 
at this time.  
The lack of public criticism of the Royal Navy resulting from the book, 
along with the willingness of boys to serve despite having read it, suggests that 
the general public too was happy with the status quo. The book had little 
immediate impact on the fleet. John Hayes thought The Gunroom an accurate 
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account of his own experiences as a midshipman aboard Royal Oak in 1930.99 
He states that conditions for midshipmen did not substantially improve until the 
mid 1930s  perhaps, not coincidentally, the time at which officers who had 
read The Gunroom as boys began to reach positions of influence. 
The harsh conditions in the gunrooms of the fleet were not representative 
of the service’s normal treatment of midshipmen  which was generally 
benevolent. Although the Repulse case seems exceptional it was not 
uncommon for midshipmen who had committed quite serious crimes to be 
treated with considerable leniency. In 1923 a paymaster midshipman of HMS 
Malaya, already criticised for his spending habits and poor choice of friends, 
was convicted of stealing £25 from the gunroom wine accounts of which he had 
charge.100 His actions were held to be the result of weak mindedness rather 
than criminality but there were still ample grounds for his dismissal. Instead he 
was punished with three months loss of seniority, the withdrawal of his wine and 
extra bills, and dismissal from his ship. Quarterly reports from his next ship 
HMS Emperor of India revealed his determination to improve101  until he was 
assigned to work unsupervised in the Captain’s Office, where he proved himself 
irresponsible, careless, and lazy as well as prone to keeping bad company and 
living beyond his means.102  
 Even so, had he received a satisfactory report from his next ship he 
would have been promoted to sub-lieutenant and continued his career. Instead 
it was reported that although capable, popular, and dedicated to the service, he 
needed constant supervision, could not be trusted with money, was 
irresponsible, and suffered from an ‘utter lack of moral stamina’.103 Only now 
was he discharged from the service, twenty-two months after his initial offence, 
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the authorities having demonstrated remarkable patience and faith in his 
improvement.104  
 Generally, the Royal Navy appears to have treated midshipmen 
benevolently. Punishments for serious offences were often quite light, 
demonstrating forgiveness for youthful lapses. Midshipmen who wanted to be 
discharged were, whilst others were retained at the cost of, or risk to, the Royal 
Navy. This treatment was something of a contrast to the tough conditions 
prevailing in the fleet and so indicates that the Royal Navy as a service 
respected midshipmen and valued their services. 
Toleration of the abuse of midshipmen probably owed something to a 
general belief within the Royal Navy that it was acceptable for midshipmen to 
suffer; according to Courtney Anderson junior midshipmen were the ‘only 
section of the whole Naval community who had no rights at all’.105 Few people 
in the service argued in favour of their having an easier existence, nor did they 
take any action to ease their lot. Frank Twiss considered the caning of 
midshipmen  a punishment that was often ordered by officers, to be ‘almost 
part of the daily life’.106  
That this harshness was accepted owed much to tradition, or at any rate 
habit, and something to ideals of masculine endurance. The Royal Navy had 
never been given to the mollycoddling of juveniles; countless accounts speak of 
poor food, bad living conditions, and harsh treatment. Many older officers felt 
that as they had suffered as midshipmen, the younger generations should also 
suffer. Others saw practical merit  one officer argued for the beating of 
midshipmen to be encouraged as a way of instilling manliness and self-
control.107 
Many midshipmen were treated kindly by ratings, especially the older 
men. It was not unknown for midshipmen to have sea daddies, and the 
importance of their relationships with their boat crews has already been 
discussed. However the kindness of ratings towards midshipmen was tempered 
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by the fact that many of them had endured a tough upbringing in the service 
and expected their officers to be as tough, or tougher, than them. According to 
Harry Wardle, a seaman rating of the period, ‘there was no question of their 
having an easy ride’.108  
Under these circumstances, the harsh treatment of midshipmen could be 
viewed as a way for naval officers to retain the respect of their men. It also 
ensured that midshipmen were aware of the potential for junior members of the 
service to be made miserable by their seniors. Charles Owen thought that 
ratings attached great importance to midshipmen being required to prove 
themselves: ‘the lower-deck, through fellow feeling, and a fascination in the 
moulding process taking place before their eyes, having enjoyed the Roman 
holiday, were well satisfied with such a ‘democratic’ officer making ritual’.109 
Another officer thought that the caning of midshipmen increased the respect 
ratings had for officers.110  
Midshipmen certainly felt some pressure to prove themselves to ratings, 
feeling the need to somehow compensate for their youth and inexperience. The 
pressure to prove oneself is seen in a letter written by Brian Jones, who 
appreciated being attached to the boy’s division of HMS Norfolk because: ‘I’d 
sooner have to give orders to chaps about the same age as myself than have to 
boss about men old enough to be my father’.111 
The midshipmen themselves rarely complained about their treatment, 
they did not complain to senior officers, write to their parents, or leave the 
service in droves. Nor were the boys who joined the service as cadets 
necessarily ignorant of the miseries of life as a midshipman. Midshipmen may 
have accepted the indignities of their life as the price to be paid for the future 
career. In some cases they may also have relished the toughness, feeling that it 
strengthened their connection with the Navy’s past, their authority over the 
ratings, or their chosen masculine identity. Unfortunately, their journals, letters 
and autobiographies remain largely silent on the matter. 
The world of the midshipman was overtly masculine. The living spaces 
provided for naval personnel were impersonal, generally Spartan, and 
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deliberately masculine. Furniture and fittings were standardised across the fleet, 
wardrooms resembled sections of gentleman’s clubs; gunrooms were more like 
public school common rooms  sparsely furnished they offered little comfort and 
no privacy. The décor was both functional and masculine; frills and frivolity were 
absent but sporting magazines were supplied and the display of trophies 
encouraged.112 
  Whereas the commissioned officer was able to decorate his cabin with 
reminders of his home and family the midshipman had to keep almost all his 
possessions inside his chest  a large trunk of standardised pattern. Family 
photographs could be pinned to the inside of the lid but space was limited and 
the chest subject to inspection. There was neither room for personal items nor 
time or peace in which to enjoy them. 
 Women were rarely to be found aboard His Majesty’s warships, they 
were occasionally carried as guests or as refugees but most came aboard as 
visitors. Commissioned officers entertained female visitors in their cabins, a 
privilege denied to those who lacked these private spaces. The absence of 
women helped to strengthen the masculine identity of naval personnel and 
further discouraged any attempt at softening living conditions. The lack of 
female contact did not mean that midshipmen had no social lives, on the 
contrary they were engaged in a wide variety of entertainments. Most of this 
activity was officially condoned, and in some cases it was compulsory.  
Gunrooms were lively places, their furniture rarely in good repair. 
Gunroom social activities focussed around relaxation but also enabled the 
senior members to reinforce their authority over the junior. Midshipmen played a 
great deal of sport; pulling and sailing were seen as essential accomplishments, 
while team games maintained fitness and developed skills of teamwork and 
leadership. They were expected to take an intelligent interest in the places they 
visited, and many visited historic sites or toured on bicycles or on horseback. 
However it was also important for midshipmen to develop social skills and 
cultivate gentlemanly characteristics  consequently attendance at balls, parties 
and other social events was always encouraged and sometimes compulsory.  
Midshipmen’s social lives were entirely at the mercy of the senior 
officers. Leave could be stopped for even minor misdemeanours. They might be 
ordered to attend specific events, preventing them from spending their time as 
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they wished and occasionally disrupting their entire schedules. In some cases 
particular activities were encouraged, often to the point of being compulsory.  
Many officers firmly believed that midshipmen benefited from physical 
exercise  the most notorious among them was probably Rear-Admiral Sir 
Robert Arbuthnot. In January 1914 his flagship HMS Orion was refitting in 
Devonport and during this period her midshipmen rose at 0600, ran a mile and 
a half, and swam three lengths of the swimming baths before returning aboard 
to start work at 0730.113 Arbuthnot was a great advocate of motorcycling and 
insisted his midshipmen take up the sport.114 While the ship was at Scapa Flow, 
where shore facilities were very limited, Arbuthnot required the midshipmen to 
undertake daily boxing sessions under his personal tuition - those perceived to 
be slacking were obliged to fight him.115  
 In the late 1920s the enthusiasm of C-in-C Mediterranean Roger Keyes 
for polo spread throughout the officers of the fleet, percolating as far as 
midshipmen. Keyes’ enthusiasm for polo was shared by several subordinates 
who viewed polo as a suitable activity for the development of young officers. 
Prominent amongst them was Lord Louis Mountbatten who remarked: ‘I have 
never met a keen, dashing polo player who was not also a good officer’.116 As 
desirable as polo might be, the cost of playing regularly was beyond the means 
of most midshipmen. Peter Gretton, who kept two polo ponies as a sub-
lieutenant, had little social life outside the sport.117 Some senior officers 
preferred cheaper activities. Chatfield was an advocate of fishing: ‘Catching 
salmon or trout requires a tactical mind, judgement and patience, all naval 
qualities’.118 
There was a widespread belief within the Navy, as demonstrated through 
The Naval Review, that sport contributed to the development of officer-like 
qualities. One letter writer suggested that games were a useful vent for energy 
and far preferable to the development of vice. They helped to develop initiative, 
                                               
113
 Harry PK Oram, Ready for Sea (London: Seeley, 1974; repub.d. London: Futura, 1976) 
pp.78-79 
114
 ibid, p.94 
115
 ibid, p.113 
116
 Phillip Ziegler, Mountbatten The Official Biography (New York: Knopf, 1985) p.79 
117
 CCA GRTN Reminiscences of Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, Unpublished Reminiscences 
of Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, p.52 
118
 Chatfield, Navy and Defence, p.27 
  288 
self-confidence, and rapid decision making.119 One article author thought that 
they developed fast thought, loyalty, and obedience. However he criticised the 
tendency of officers to neglect work in favour of games, and also thought that 
sporting ability played too great a role in promotion.120 Another writer suggested 
that games were a useful way of demonstrating courage, endurance and 
determination. He also thought that participation in sports such as cricket, 
tennis, golf, and shooting should be encouraged as they marked the officer out 
as a gentleman. He urged that midshipmen be required to box and ride.121 
Various other articles appeared, pressing the claims of sport in general, or 
specific activities such as boxing or hiking.122 
 The officers that wrote to the Naval Review had certain shared ideas 
about the role of sports in the lives of officers. They argued that physical fitness 
was highly desirable and that sports were also useful in developing officer-like 
qualities, particularly of courage and endurance. Whilst most authors argued 
strongly that sporting ability should play no role in promotion, all thought that 
participation was highly desirable. The sports they favoured were those most 
closely allied to officer-like qualities  boxing which required courage, rugby in 
which teamwork and courage were essential, and sailing which was 
professionally useful. There was also great enthusiasm for sports such as 
hunting, polo, and flying which, whilst developing useful qualities (speed of 
thought and courage), were generally associated with the upper classes. 
 Most midshipmen would have participated keenly in sport and other 
social activities had they not been compulsory. The Royal Navy aimed to recruit 
young men who were physically active and sociable. Sporting and social 
activities were emphasised in recruiting literature. The 1927 Special Entry 
edition of How to Become a Naval Officer informed its readers that: ‘You will 
also have the entrée, almost without exception, to every club in the world, and 
wherever you may be sent there is sure to be plenty of sport of every kind. 
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Incidentally the Navy is very hard to beat at most games’.123 The Dartmouth 
edition of 1923 also emphasised the social and sporting possibilities of the 
Navy, giving particular regard to hunting ‘the Englishman’s inborn instinct’.124 
Owing to their lack of liberty and money midshipmen were not full 
participants in the social life of the fleet. In fact, if restricted to their official 
annual allowance of £20, the social activities of midshipmen were very limited. 
One report found that a midshipman serving in the Mediterranean could not 
survive on this allowance. The social costs of a midshipman including 
membership of the Malta Junior Officers Club and the Marsa Sports Club in 
addition to transport, civilian clothing, on board entertainment, and attendance 
at parties, totalled around £25-30 a year.125  
 In addition midshipmen had to pay the various costs associated with 
living in the gunroom. Monthly expenses included a mess bill of around £1 17s 
6d, a wine bill up to 15s, extras up to 10s, subscriptions 10s, laundry and 
hammock boy £1, and 10s of incidental expenses, a total of around £5 2s 6d. 
Midshipmen could meet their onboard expenses from their daily pay of 5s, but 
could not live in any degree of style. However, as a memorandum informed 
parents, ‘officers in the Royal Navy are not encouraged to cultivate expensive 
tastes’.126 In fact many penniless midshipmen rarely went ashore. Courtney 
Anderson and his friends occasionally went to the cinema but otherwise: ‘There 
was nothing for us to do but sit on board in the sweltering heat and yellow glare 
of Grand Harbour in summertime. It was not a very pleasant existence’.127 
 Many parents provided their sons with additional money. Amongst those 
making these (officially forbidden) arrangements were naval officers  including 
Edward Ashmore’s father who ‘knew the form, and made me an allowance of £5 
a month’.128 Even with these unofficial allowances few midshipmen appeared to 
be rich. Phillip Seymour, who himself received an annual allowance of £50, 
wrote that ‘I really have no idea how many of my comrades received any 
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subsidy from their parents. It may be said that none was perceived to be 
wealthy’.129  
 Their lack of money encouraged many midshipmen to play team sports  
which apart from occupying their time often ended in free meals. Sport was an 
important part of life for many midshipmen; young, fit, and well trained they 
were a key component of many ship’s teams. Those who did not represent their 
ships were frequently involved in contests between gun-rooms; such matches 
could be fiercely competitive, although skill was rarely a major component and 
one-sided results were common. Competitive pulling and sailing were held to be 
very important. Traditionally a midshipmen’s gig race took place before the main 
regatta and the winning ship received a great boost in confidence before the 
main event. 
 Preparing for the Atlantic Fleet regatta in 1933 Hood’s gun-room crew 
trained two or three times a day and enjoyed improved food (subsidised by the 
ward-room). For their efforts they received an afternoon off in which the 
wardroom officers first played them at golf and then took them to the pub.130 
Victory for the gun-room, and subsequently the ship, was rewarded with a case 
of champagne. Similar preparations were recorded by Henry Brooke serving 
aboard HMS Devonshire in the Mediterranean in 1934. Rejoining the ship at 
Trieste after a trip to Rome the midshipmen were immediately sent out in the 
boats and soon after were training twice a day.131 In this case they were training 
not for the regatta but for obstacle races in which boats had to be both sailed 
and rowed. 
 As naval officers midshipmen were expected to be gentlemen  and 
developing gentlemanly attributes was an aspect of their education. In addition 
to formal dinners and other events which taught them to function in naval 
society, midshipmen attended many events ashore. They also socialised with 
friends, relatives or the population of the places they visited. It was entirely 
acceptable for midshipmen to socialise with girls of suitable background and 
manner although such socialisation was normally undertaken in groups or with 
chaperones.  
For Dartmouth graduates reasonable freedom to associate with the 
opposite sex was a new experience. There were dances on the college 
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quarterdeck several nights a week, but with very few women available cadets 
partnered each other or danced with masters. Women were largely excluded 
from Dartmouth and cadets received very little sex education beyond being 
actively discouraged. The strict separation of terms combined with constant 
supervision hindered any homosexual activity or ‘corruption’ of younger cadets 
by their elders.  
The situation was not improved by the inexperience of some term 
officers; John Hayes generally had a very positive opinion of ‘Dippy’ Evans but 
thought he would have been utterly useless if confronted with a sexual 
question.132 House officer Peter Gretton later admitted it was ‘a case of the blind 
leading the blind’, and opted to illustrate his talks on the subject by referring to 
the more familiar sex lives of dogs.133 
Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that most midshipmen 
appear to have been more or less celibate. They danced with, courted, and 
occasionally kissed, ‘suitable’ girls but their relationships were rarely 
consummated. Strict supervision, the need to be a gentleman, and a certain 
amount of fear served to keep young officers away from brothels. John Hayes 
did reach the doorway of Annie, a Maltese prostitute recommended by an able 
seaman of Royal Oak, but there his nerve failed him. Hayes is more 
forthcoming than most about his sexual experiences; he also recalled being 
repeatedly invited into the cabin of a bachelor instructor officer at Dartmouth.134 
Often the worst social activity for most midshipmen was dining with the 
captain of their ship or the admiral of their squadron. This was acknowledged by 
many senior officers, some of whom tried to ease the situation by inviting a 
number of guests, while one greeted midshipmen with a cheery ‘this evening 
you are going to be subjected to ordeal by dinner’.135 This situation hints at a 
wider problem  that relations between midshipmen and commissioned officers, 
especially in big ships, were generally distant. This distance had a number of 
negative implications. 
Firstly professional  if midshipmen did not trust their senior officers and 
feel comfortable around them, they were unlikely to ask questions or venture 
opinions. This particularly hampered midshipmen working on the bridge or in 
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the plotting room who did not gain as much knowledge of tactics and strategy 
as they might have. More contact with senior officers would also have taught 
midshipmen more about social and diplomatic situations. Secondly, a lack of 
interest and supervision contributed to other difficulties faced by midshipmen, in 
particular it allowed bullying and other unpleasantness to flourish in gunrooms. 
Finally it discouraged midshipmen, exacerbating any suspicions that the wrong 
profession may have been selected. 
Sometimes the normal rhythms of a midshipman’s life were disrupted. In 
particular, the First World War posed considerable difficulties for naval training. 
The changes made to midshipmen’s training during the war were outlined 
above. The end of the war did not spell the end of the difficulties in training 
midshipmen. Whilst some ships returned to peacetime routines, including the 
completion of the midshipman’s syllabus, others remained on wartime duties 
such as minesweeping, or were supporting operations in Russia. Large 
numbers of ships spent long periods of time in Scapa Flow guarding the 
surrendered German ships. All this meant that the practical experience and 
educational levels of midshipmen continued to vary widely.  
 Some ships found that although there was now time to hold lectures for 
midshipmen there were no suitable facilities available. Such a problem was 
faced by the Grand Fleet’s destroyers based at Port Edgar. Although eighty-six 
midshipmen were present there was nowhere suitable for instruction to take 
place and no instructor. A building was converted into a classroom, furniture 
borrowed from Rosyth, and an instructor officer provided.136 
Other problems were posed by the reduction in fleet strength. Many 
instructors were discharged to return to their civilian occupations. The reduction 
in the strength of the active fleet meant that large numbers of midshipmen found 
themselves serving in the Reserve Fleet. They could not gain seagoing 
experience in ships that never left harbour and the much reduced crews limited 
learning and leadership opportunities.  
 One solution to these problems was pursued in the Reserve Fleet at 
Devonport where the sloop HMS Zinnia was used for midshipmen’s training. 
Zinnia made fortnight long cruises, during which she was underway almost 
every day and sometimes at night. The training was almost entirely practical  
midshipmen practised navigation and acted as officer of the watch, but they 
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also did all the work of the crew apart from stoking the boilers. In many ways, 
this scheme imitated the peacetime training cruiser, even to the extent of 
providing opportunities for social development with midshipmen being granted 
leave on the same terms as young ratings.137  
 The Zinnia scheme demonstrates how wartime experience was applied 
to officer training early in the inter-war period. There was an emphasis on 
practical skills, but also upon the midshipmen doing the work of ratings. This 
suggests that officers who had served in wartime thought it very important that 
midshipmen should understand their men. Although successful the scheme was 
cancelled because of the costs that would be incurred in altering the ship to 
better fulfil her role; an early sign of the effects financial pressure would have on 
inter-war officer training.138 One area of the ship particularly in need of 
improvement was the accommodation  ratings’ work may have been suitable 
for midshipmen, but rating’s living conditions were not!139 That the scheme 
evolved at all showed that wartime experience had convinced some senior 
officers that officer education should be a high priority. 
 It was not only the education of young officers that suffered under 
wartime pressure. The shortage of time and instructors meant that boy seamen, 
candidates for petty officer, and those who wished to study for their own benefit, 
all suffered. In the immediate post-war period some localised measures were 
taken to improve the education of the fleet as a whole. 
 In Malta a disused building became the Fleet Education Centre.140 All the 
naval instructors and schoolmasters of the fleet were assigned to work at the 
centre, which had six classrooms one of which was reserved for midshipmen.141 
By concentrating staff and facilities in this way it was hoped that all fleet 
personnel could be provided with high quality instruction in a suitable 
environment.  
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 The centre was a useful and popular innovation. In February 1921, 
shortly after opening, it was attended by 234 midshipmen, 337 adult ratings, 
and 490 boy seamen. In May 315 midshipmen, 443 adult ratings, and 527 boys 
were in attendance. A report by the officer in charge stated that the centre was 
particularly benefiting midshipmen who tended to struggle with mathematics 
and navigational theory.142 
 Official responses to the scheme varied. In May C-in-C Mediterranean 
Fleet, Admiral Sir John de Robeck, was given the freedom to use his instructors 
as he wished, effectively permitting the establishment of a permanently staffed 
centre. Despite this it was felt important that instructors should go to sea with 
their own ships so that the men they were assigned to teach received 
continuous teaching.143   
 In July Their Lordships told de Robeck that the arrangements ‘reflect well 
on the officers involved’.144 Despite this enthusiasm, the centre was ordered to 
close when the fleet received its full complement of instructors. Although the 
acting schoolmasters working at the centre could be paid for their duties no 
money was available for prizes to be awarded to students. In spite of this official 
ambivalence the Fleet Education Centre Malta remained in operation. 
Unfortunately very little evidence about the centre is available and so most of its 
work remains shrouded in obscurity. 
If midshipmen’s experiences varied considerably, there was one certainty 
 examinations. A midshipman remained a midshipman until he passed the 
examinations for promotion to acting sub-lieutenant (or was discharged from the 
service after multiple failures to do so). No midshipman could afford to rest on 
his laurels, for there were examinations of one type or another at frequent 
intervals, even the repeated reductions of the syllabus did not entirely succeed 
in eliminating them.  
Midshipmen’s reactions to examinations varied  generally depending on 
the difficulty of the material and the amount of preparation. Often a journal 
merely notes that the owner had been examined, giving no detail. This suggests 
that exams were a frequent event and rarely difficult. On the other hand they 
were clearly a matter of concern. John Worth noted that a torpedo examination 
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was ‘much easier than I thought it would be’ and a mock paper in navigation 
‘fairly easy’.145 Ian Balfour was more negative, glumly noting that ‘nobody knows 
any wireless’ and that an examination in ship construction ‘we found very 
difficult, not having done more than two days of ship construction before’.146 
Clearly examination success was at least partly dependent on the amount of 
instruction a midshipman had received. These accounts suggest that despite 
efforts to reform them, midshipmen’s examinations still required hours spent 
studying material of little practical value  a clear indication that naval 
educational reforms were not always successful. 
The final seamanship examination, taking the form of an oral 
examination by three captains and lasting around an hour, was an important 
and unnerving occasion. Although failures were extremely rare, a good 
performance was necessary to secure a first class certificate which gained the 
holder four months seniority and some prestige. Bob Whinney, denied a first by 
the miscalculation of marks, noted bitterly ‘A ‘one’ in seamanship really 
counted’.147 Considerable effort was devoted to preparation, and as 
midshipmen’s results reflected on their ships most were excused their duties in 
order to study and many were given revision sessions and mock examinations. 
The experience could be exhausting for the examiners. Harry Oram 
noted that it was essential for the examiners to appear to know more than the 
candidates, and admitted that a board of examiners of which he was part met 
beforehand to revise their own knowledge!148 Under these circumstances it is 
perhaps unsurprising that many midshipmen found their examiners to be either 
very demanding or very relaxed.  
Frank Twiss considered that he had ‘three very fair examiners who were 
out to see what we did know and not what we didn’t know’.149 Conversely 
William Davis found the examinations a ‘fairly formidable experience’.150 Twiss 
and his colleagues left their examination ‘feeling like new men’.151 Wild parties 
normally followed these examinations, involving drunkenness, the destruction of 
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furniture, violent games, and the kidnapping of senior officers. Phil Durham 
recalled the ceremonial de-bagging of Admiral Somerville.152 
Examinations passed, midshipmen were promoted to acting sub-
lieutenant and could look forward to a spell of courses ashore and more 
examinations before being confirmed in the rank and commissioned. Becoming 
an acting sub-lieutenant therefore signalled the end of the young officer’s early 
career education. He had been educated in the theory of his profession ashore 
in the colleges, or in a static training ship. He had then gained practical 
experience as a midshipman.  
He may or may not have enjoyed the formative years of his career but in 
the coming years he would come to appreciate their effect on his professional 
and personal character. The period spent as a midshipman was particularly 
important in this respect, it was this period that did most to shape the young 
man as a leader and professional naval officer. 
This importance was understood by the naval authorities who poured a 
great deal of effort into making it as effective as possible. Throughout the period 
their efforts were dogged by numerous difficulties. It was very hard to find the 
right balance between practical and theoretical education and this problem was 
never entirely solved. There was also the problem of deciding what experience 
each midshipman must have and providing a continuity of experience across 
the service. 
The efforts of the Royal Navy were moderately successful. The vast 
majority of midshipmen went on to be entirely satisfactory, and in many cases 
very successful, naval officers. However the education of midshipman was 
marred by controversy and frequently the subject of reform with no entirely 
satisfactory solution being reached in this period. 
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Conclusion 
 
By 1939 much of Fisher’s grand scheme for the officer corps of the Royal Navy 
had been abandoned. Inter-changeability had long been rejected in favour of 
separate branches of engineering and executive officers, the members of which 
did not share the common upbringing Fisher had desired  for few Dartmouth 
cadets became engineers. The two branches differed greatly in terms of work 
and prospects, and there was some tension between them  although it did not 
have the disastrous effects on the officer corps as a whole that Fisher and 
Selborne had so feared. 
 It can be argued that the net result of the various reforms in officer 
education and employment was that the executive officers of 1939 were closer 
to being genuine military professionals than those of 1903. Whilst many 
specialist officers still did a great deal of technical work, the education and 
training of executive officers was increasingly geared towards the ‘management 
of violence’ rather than technical minutiae, even if the arts of war   tactics and 
strategy   remained somewhat neglected. 
Despite the changes, the educational basis of the Fisher-Selborne 
scheme remained largely intact; whilst there had been considerable curricular 
change, the training process was virtually unaltered. The scheme was 
supplemented by the Special Entry which provided a cheaper and more flexible 
source of officers. Methods of officer selection were virtually unchanged since 
1903, and most cadets came from the same backgrounds as their 
predecessors. There had however been a genuine, if small, movement towards 
the democratisation of the officer corps. 
 Having abandoned inter-changeability the Royal Navy had proceeded to 
reform the curriculum at Dartmouth to place more emphasis on English and 
history, largely at the expense of engineering. This change in emphasis moved 
the college away from its original aim of using engineering as a way of teaching 
cadets to think in a certain way and provide them with a wide variety of practical 
skills of use throughout their careers. The revised curriculum placed less 
emphasis on these practical mechanical skills and more on communication, a 
logical change given the movement of the executive officer corps away from 
engineering and towards problems of war-fighting. 
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The alpha scheme allowed cadets to develop their talents for English, 
history, and foreign languages; paving the way for them to become the thinkers 
and staff officers now demanded by the Navy. Later, the adoption of houses in 
place of terms improved the leadership opportunities available to cadets and 
also encouraged them to broaden their outlook  removing the narrowing and 
inward focus of the terms.  
The abolition of terms was a triumph for innovation over tradition but the 
latter remained a prevailing factor in naval education. While civilian educators 
were given more or less a free hand in creating the curriculum at the colleges, 
outside the classroom the lives of cadets were steeped in tradition and naval 
heritage. The Fisher-Selborne and Special Entry schemes were clear (if 
dramatic) developments of the previous system of officer education and their 
origins can be traced back to at least the seventeenth century. This adherence 
to tradition was largely beneficial  it encouraged the devotion of young officers 
to the Royal Navy, the continuation of suitable methods and loyalty to a 
common cause. The Navy was able (and generally willing) to change when 
required, although it would at times have benefitted from changing faster  the 
term system being a case in point. 
 The most important of the reforms in terms of preparing officers for their 
future professions was that of midshipmen’s education. The enormous 
academic curriculum and large amount of practical engineering prescribed by 
Fisher was gradually abandoned. The midshipman of 1939 did little school 
work, and only that directly connected to professional skills such as navigation. 
Instead he devoted a large proportion of his time to practical work on deck and 
in boats. True he was still liable to be treated as a child and starved of 
responsibility, but this was largely the result of naval manning policies (over-
officering and competition for promotion) and not of the training system. 
 The development of midshipmen was greatly aided by the restoration of 
the training cruisers in 1932  these ships provided a crucial opportunity for 
cadets to gain seagoing experience and self-confidence before joining the fleet. 
Particularly important was the opportunity to develop strong relationships with 
naval ratings in the relatively relaxed atmosphere aboard these ships. These 
relationships were an important part of the way in which the Navy taught 
leadership. 
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 The Royal Navy eschewed formal leadership training in favour of a 
system where young officers learnt from the people around them, not merely 
from those assigned as their instructors, but from all naval personnel with whom 
they came into contact. This had the great advantage of allowing young officers 
some freedom in developing, at their own pace, a leadership style that suited 
them. On the other hand it exaggerated the effects of poor leadership on 
individual young officers, and allowed poor leadership techniques to be 
perpetuated rather than wiped out. These problems were particularly acute in 
the fleet, where midshipmen were segregated from the officers and ratings who 
otherwise supervised and taught them, and were instead at the mercy of the 
bullying tendencies of the more senior occupants of the gunroom.  
 Leadership was not the only area in which the Royal Navy relied heavily 
on young officers learning through immersion. From their first day in the service 
they were constantly immersed in naval life, customs, and behaviour. The 
atmosphere in the naval colleges was as naval as possible, uniform was worn, 
naval routines followed, and every effort was made to teach cadets about the 
proud heritage of the service they were joining. This immersion in the ways of 
the service was at least as important as the development of academic 
knowledge and practical skills in forging the Royal Navy officer. 
 The development of a naval identity in young officers was particularly 
important in forming their professional identities. The history and traditions of 
the Royal Navy were constantly reaffirmed by serving personnel and those who 
were unwilling to embrace them were not welcome in the service. The strict and 
exhausting regimes inflicted on young officers served to reaffirm their naval 
identities. 
 The academic teaching at the colleges was of high quality and innovatory 
in nature. They profited from Fisher’s determination to staff them with the best 
educational minds of the day, and the freedom that these men were given in 
developing the curriculum and selecting the teaching methods. The work of the 
academic staff was, to some extent, undermined by their inferior status within 
the service  they invariably played second fiddle to their naval colleagues. 
Within Osborne and Dartmouth however the civilian staff had a great deal of 
influence, as a result of their remaining there for long periods, whereas the 
naval staff was subject to continual turnover. Certainly the civilian educational 
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staff employed by the Royal Navy had far more effect on naval policy than did 
politicians attempting to influence officer selection and education.  
Political interference was largely resisted because the Navy remained 
relatively autonomous. Politicians did not have enough power within the service 
to force change, and there was not sufficient public interest to compel 
parliament to take a decisive stand. The democratisation of the officer corps, 
whilst something of a lingering sore, never threatened any kind of crisis in 
military-civil relations. Nor was there a great desire within the service to force 
change  the majority of naval officers seemed to have welcomed some degree 
of democratisation but they were not anxious to throw the officer corps open to 
all. The net result was a process of gradual change, driven as much by matters 
of supply and demand as by the demands of reformers. 
 Those naval officers not serving in the Admiralty or at the naval colleges 
had a complex relationship with naval educational policy. Whilst charged with 
the education of midshipmen, and to some extent cadets, they had little role in 
determining what was to be taught or how. Their official submissions were 
received with interest by Their Lordships, but the complicated and often 
prolonged discussions that followed generally ensured that any changes to 
policy were not in line with the original suggestion. Those officers who chose to 
campaign outside official channels made little headway. The Naval Review 
provided a useful platform for discussion amongst interested parties but had no 
influence over policy decisions, possibly because the opinions expressed within 
it were rarely unanimous. Officer education appears to have been a steady topic 
of discussion in the wardrooms of the fleet but opinions diverged widely  
indicating the complexity of the problems faced by the Royal Navy. 
 The naval colleges have an important place in the development of 
modern educational methods in mathematics and science. Teaching methods 
pioneered by Osborne and Dartmouth are widely used today. This important 
work has been largely neglected by educational historians, perhaps because 
the engineering based curriculum was relatively short lived and did not spread 
to other schools. The highly specialised nature of the education provided by the 
colleges also had a negative impact on recruiting because parents were 
reluctant to enter their boys into an institution which was designed to prepare 
them for one career alone. 
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 This was a particular problem in the inter-war period when large numbers 
of naval redundancies made the service appear a dubious career prospect; 
officers faced the dangerous prospect of being thrown out of the service in their 
twenties or thirties ill-equipped to enter another career. Recruiting difficulties 
also resulted from the inability of the colleges to compete with conventional 
public schools in attracting pupils, through reducing fee rates or entry 
standards, or to induce preparatory school headmasters to encourage parents 
to direct their sons into the service. 
 Relations between the Royal Navy and the civilian educational sector 
were generally cordial but not close. The Navy’s desire to enter boys at as 
young an age as possible conflicted with the normal rhythms of private 
education  causing boys to be removed from their preparatory or public 
schools earlier than would normally have been the case. The entrance 
examinations, like the colleges themselves, placed an emphasis on science and 
mathematics at odds with most civilian educational establishments, especially 
as the Navy had little use for Latin, which retained primacy in private civilian 
education.  
Relations with state educators were even more awkward. Naval 
requirements were at odds with the normal ages for pupils to change or leave 
their schools and the state curriculum was at odds with naval requirements. 
Most importantly the Navy, to some extent, treated state educated boys as 
second class citizens  choosing to concentrate on entering those who had 
been educated in the private sector. 
 This was inevitable given the high cost to parents of supporting a young 
officer until the age of twenty-one, which consequently excluded most families 
who were not able to afford private education. All desires and attempts to 
democratise the officer corps were bound to prove ineffectual whilst this barrier 
of cost remained. The requirement for parents to support their sons as trainee 
officers was enforced primarily by the Treasury rather than the Admiralty; a truly 
democratic officer corps was impossible whilst the country was unwilling to pay 
for it. Notwithstanding this the inter-war period saw considerable progress in 
democratisation and this owed as much to developments in civilian education 
as to changes in naval policy. 
 The expansion of state grammar schools, and the availability of 
scholarships to private schools, opened up high quality secondary education to 
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a wider section of society than ever before. Many of these schools copied the 
uniforms, customs and curricula of the public schools as far as possible. Their 
pupils were thus socially trained and educationally suited to becoming naval 
officers, and were able to prove their qualities through excellent performance in 
the new national examination system. These new sources of suitable boys 
remained largely untapped by the Navy for a number of reasons. 
 In the first place, these schools did not have any tradition of sending their 
pupils into the Navy and preferred instead to develop strong relationships with 
the universities and the Civil Service. The Royal Navy itself was anxious to 
maintain strong relationships with existing (and proven) sources of officers. 
Through much of the inter-war period the number of cadets entering the service 
was very low. Under these circumstances there was little imperative for the 
service to develop new source of officers and no reason for the Treasury to 
grant additional funding so that boys from poorer backgrounds might be taken. 
Promotion from the lower-deck suffered particularly under these circumstances; 
even once demand for officers began to increase in the mid 1930s there was 
little scope for increasing it owing to small rating entries in earlier years and 
dramatically increased demand for senior ratings. 
 The increased demand for officers was met largely by increasing the 
number of Special Entry cadets. Flexibility was one of the greatest assets of the 
scheme, along with the lower cost to the state and the shorter period to produce 
each officer. It was also cheaper for parents than putting a boy through Osborne 
and Dartmouth, and so helped to democratise the officer corps. Special Entry 
cadets had a wider variety of background and education than those at the 
colleges and, as junior officers, outperformed their colleagues. However the 
thirteen year old entry attracted a wide variety of personalities and some very 
able boys who might not have joined the Navy at the age of seventeen.  
Fisher-Selborne scheme officers were arguably the backbone of the 
service and, in particular, of the executive officer corps. They out-numbered 
colleagues from other sources, and the steady stream of midshipmen entering 
the fleet from Dartmouth was in contrast to the great fluctuation in the numbers 
from other sources. The colleges provided a focal point for naval tradition and 
custom and their graduates were expected to imbue their colleagues with the 
ideals they had learnt there.  
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 Speculation as to the results of abandoning the thirteen year old entry 
must at best be haphazard. It is certainly possible than the Royal Navy would 
have experienced the same difficulties as the Army in attracting suitable older 
boys in sufficient quantities. More candidates might have been attracted to the 
Navy, including those who would otherwise have joined the Army or the RAF, 
but many would have been undone by the high academic standards required. It 
is by no means certain that public school headmasters would have given the 
same support to the scheme as prep school headmasters gave to Dartmouth. 
Whilst the increased number of cadetships would have made the scheme a 
more attractive prospect, headmasters would still have been reluctant to lose 
boys at the age of seventeen, and a naval cadetship would still have been 
inferior to an Oxbridge scholarship. 
The abolition of the thirteen year old entry would have considerably 
simplified the organisation of officer education, removing the need for a naval 
public school providing a general education, and enabling naval educators to 
concentrate entirely on professional subjects. Syllabi could have been simplified 
and fewer civilian staff would have been required. It might have led to a more 
organised system of officer education in which the different stages were more 
closely integrated. 
The variety and complexity of the problems of officer education formed a 
continual barrier to effective reform. The advantages of the thirteen and 
seventeen year old entries could be laid out simply enough, but there was no 
clear evidence that one was significantly better than the other. Any proposed 
alteration to the syllabi of instruction was certain to meet with opposition from 
some quarter  the aims of officer education were clear enough, but there were 
many potential ways to achieve them. It was accepted that theory was best 
learnt ashore and practical lessons at sea. But this policy proved very hard to 
implement. There was never any real agreement as to what the average officer 
should ideally know and be able to do   clearly he must be a capable seaman 
and leader and a sound tactician with some scientific and technical knowledge, 
but which aspects should be prioritised? The concept of officer-like qualities 
remained ill-defined throughout the period although there was no change in the 
qualities desired. 
It is hardly surprising that the numerous committees which enquired into 
various aspects of officer education, despite bringing together large numbers of 
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talented and experienced men, were rarely able to come to unanimous 
agreement. These committees were formed with a clear purpose and provided 
with all the necessary facilities and materials. However they were faced with 
complex questions and, on occasion, considerable stubbornness. The most 
important committees of the period were the Custance Committee of 1912 and 
the Bennett Committee of 1931. The former, through a series of generally small 
reforms, was able to alter the Fisher-Selborne scheme into a more practical 
proposition. Its true impact is hard to gauge as the First World War interrupted 
the implementation of many of its measures. The latter committee carried out a 
thorough investigation into all aspects of the selection and early career 
education of officers and laid down a programme of reforms which, although 
largely rejected in the short term, had almost all been adopted by 1939. 
The amount and variety of reform is indicative of a system of selection 
and education which required considerable modification. In its original form the 
Fisher-Selborne scheme placed too much emphasis on science and 
engineering, believing that mastery of these subjects would produce a perfect 
naval officer. The demise of the scheme was inevitable given the increasing 
variety and sophistication of naval equipment and, thus, the impossibility of 
combining the user and maintainer roles. In the meantime young executive 
officers suffered from a curriculum that over emphasised engineering, rather 
than the seamanship, navigation, and leadership needed to provide the basis of 
their professional expertise. 
The reformed system of officer selection and early career education, as it 
evolved from 1912 onwards, must be considered successful in that it provided 
the bulk of the professional naval officer corps which made the Royal Navy a 
highly effective fighting force in the Second World War. The success of the 
wartime Navy rested on the technical knowledge, seamanship, and leadership 
ability of those it had educated in peacetime   faced by skilful and determined 
enemies, rapidly advancing technology, and vast numbers of newly recruited 
personnel with limited training, they responded magnificently  demonstrating 
admirable skill in the ‘management of violence’. The Navy had chosen men of 
courage, intelligence, and determination and trained them as seamen, 
scientists, and tacticians. Although they did not have the common upbringing 
envisaged by Fisher, the different branches of the officer corps combined to 
great effect. 
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This study has gone some way in addressing the hitherto neglected 
subject of officer selection and education in the early twentieth century, but 
there is considerable scope for expansion. A more detailed consideration of the 
syllabi of instruction and their evolution might be undertaken but it would 
perhaps be more rewarding to focus on the factors that drove naval policy. The 
democratisation issue offers particularly fertile ground for an investigation into 
naval relations with the Labour Party and other pro-democratisation 
campaigners. Similarly there is scope for a more detailed survey of naval 
opinion, covering both the ward-room and lower-deck, and certainly for deeper 
consideration of how far democratisation was a practical proposition taking into 
account social, financial, and educational constraints. 
The Navy’s relationship with the civilian education system is also in need 
of further investigation. It is clear that the naval colleges were innovatory and 
influential establishments, but the extent and exact nature of their influence 
remains unclear. Equally whilst it is readily apparent that the Royal Navy was 
affected by national educational trends, in particular the expansion of state 
funded secondary school provision, the exact nature of the relationship is open 
to examination. 
A detailed study of the changing role of the executive officer in this period 
would shed considerable light on the educational problems faced by the Royal 
Navy. Attention has hitherto focused on the amalgamation and subsequent re-
separation of the executive and engineering branches and, to a lesser extent, 
on the increasing emphasis on strategy and tactics. Both subjects deserve more 
attention, but there is other ground to be covered. In particular the abortive 
attempt to form an electrical engineering branch in the early 1920s offers an 
insight into changing perceptions of the officer corps in general and the 
executive officer in particular. It is clear that there was considerable 
disagreement as to what the duties of a professional fighting sea officer should 
be, and what responsibilities should be devolved to his colleagues.  
In short, this thesis demonstrates the development and evolution of the 
Royal Navy’s systems of executive officer selection and early career education 
in the 1903-1939 period. It shows that what officers were taught was dictated by 
the work they were expected to do and thus that changes in the employment of 
officers inevitably resulted in educational reform. It examines the effects of the 
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failed experiment in inter-changeability. It discusses how naval officers were 
selected, what boys were chosen and how this changed over the period.  
Finally it explores the relationship between the Royal Navy and the 
civilian educational sector, in particular the development of state secondary 
education and modern teaching methods. Overall it provides a picture of the 
young men commissioned as executive officers in this period and thus a 
foundation for exploring their professional and personal lives and the life and 
work of their service. 
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Appendix I  List of committees concerned with the selection and early 
career education of Royal Navy officers 1902-1939 
 
Osborne and Dartmouth 1905 (Fawkes Committee) – Considered living 
conditions at the colleges with a view to reducing costs and maintaining a 
suitably naval atmosphere. 
 
Douglas Committees – Between 1905 and 1907 Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas, 
C-in-C Portsmouth, presided over a series of committees concerned with the 
practical implementation of Fisher’s reforms.   
1905- System of sea training for Fisher-Selborne scheme cadets and 
midshipmen 
1905 – Engineering education for Fisher-Selborne scheme cadets, future 
employment of officers as engineers 
1907- Integration of engineering and Royal Marines officers into the executive 
officer corps  
 
Custance 1912 – Reconsidered the practical operation of the Fisher-Selborne 
scheme 
 
Special Entry (Evan-Thomas Committee) 1913 – Formulated the system of 
entering and educating Special Entry Cadets.  
 
Osborne (May Committee) 1917 – Investigated living conditions at Osborne, 
paying particular regard to cadet health 
 
Goodenough 1918 – Considered the education of young officers in general but 
especially midshipmen, including consideration of whether the integration of 
engineer and executive roles was realistic 
 
McKenna 1918 – Considered the future of naval engineering. Had the Fisher-
Selborne scheme produced enough engineering officers, and if not what should 
be done? 
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Anderson 1919 – Investigated whether financial conditions were affecting the 
number and quality of candidates for the Special and Fisher-Selborne schemes 
and suggested remedial measures 
 
Ricardo 1919 – Investigated the possibility of a scheme for the development of 
suitable boy seamen into officers 
 
Bennett 1931 – Concerned with the democratisation of the officer corps; 
including the desirability of democratisation, how far it could reasonably be 
carried out and the backgrounds of existing officers 
 
Larken 1931 – Investigation into promotion from the lower-deck – were 
sufficient opportunities available to bright young men and what prevented 
suitable candidates from achieving promotion. 
 
James 1935 – Education of executive officers of all ranks in tactics and strategy 
 
Watson 1938 – General reconsideration of sea training for young officers, 
focussing particularly on midshipmen – subjects of study, and the need to gain 
as much practical experience as possible 
 
Other committees of relevance include the Lowry Committee (1917) which was 
concerned with the education of officers who had been sent to sea early during 
the First World War; the Field/Waistell (1920), Tudor (1921) and Tweedie 
(1924) Committees concerned with the allocation of engineering based duties 
between the torpedo, engineering and proposed electrical branches; the 
Dawson Committee (1926) which investigated the health of cadets at 
Dartmouth; and the Kelly report into the Invergordon Mutiny (1931) which 
discussed the deficiencies in the training and employment of officers. 
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Appendix II  HM Ships employed in cadet training 1907-1939 
 
Antrim – Devonshire Class cruiser launched in 1903 and sold for breaking up in 
1922. In 1921 she was briefly used for Special Entry training, at the same time 
serving as radio and ASDIC trials ship at Portsmouth. 
 
Carnarvon – Devonshire class cruiser used for sea training of Special Entry 
cadets from 1919 to 1921. She was launched in 1903 and sold for breaking up 
in 1921. 
 
Carstairs – Hunt class minesweeper (Aberdare group) launched in 1919 and 
sold for breaking up in 1935. Carstairs was used to provide Special Entry 
cadets with seagoing experience between 1924 and 1932. 
 
Cornwall – Monmouth class cruiser launched in 1902 and sold for breaking up 
in 1920. Cornwall provided sea training for Dartmouth cadets between 1908 and 
1914, and resumed these duties in 1919. 
 
Courageous – Lead ship of the Courageous class of battle cruisers, launched in 
1916. Courageous was used by Special Entry cadets from 1923-1924. On 
relinquishing these duties work began on converting her to an aircraft carrier, 
the refit being completed in 1928. Sunk by U-29, 17 September 1939. 
 
Cumberland – Monmouth class cruiser launched in 1901 and sold for breaking 
up in 1921. Cumberland provided sea training for Dartmouth cadets in the years 
before the First World War, after the war she housed both Dartmouth and 
Special Entry cadets. 
 
Erebus – Lead ship of the Erebus class of monitors. Launched in 1916 and sold 
for breaking up in 1946. Erebus spent most of the inter-war period as a static 
training ship and was used for both gunnery and Special Cadet training. Refitted 
for active service she served throughout the Second World War including in the 
invasion of Sicily and the Normandy landings. 
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Forres – Hunt class minesweeper launched in 1918 and sold for breaking up in 
1935. Forres was stationed at Dartmouth from 1925 to 1932 and was used to 
familiarise cadets with life at sea, undertaking training voyages of up to a week 
in length. 
 
Frobisher – Hawkins class cruiser launched in 1920 and sold for breaking up in 
1949. Frobisher was converted for cadet sea training in 1932 and remained in 
the role until 1939. After reconversion, she saw active service during the 
Second World War at the end of which she was resumed her cadet training role. 
 
Highflyer – Lead ship of the Highflyer class of cruisers; launched in 1898 sold 
for breaking up in 1921. Carried the first class of Special Entry cadets 1913-
1914. 
 
Sturgeon – R class destroyer launched in 1917 and sold for breaking up in 
1926.  Sturgeon was attached to Dartmouth from 1919 to1925 and was used to 
provide cadets with seagoing experience. Amongst her commanding officers 
was Frederick Dalrymple- Hamilton who subsequently returned to college as 
Captain. 
 
Temeraire – Bellerophon class battleship launched in 1907 sold for breaking up 
in 1921. In the years after the First World War she provided sea training for both 
Dartmouth and Special Entry cadets. 
 
Thunderer – Orion class battleship launched in 1911, the last and the largest 
warship built on the River Thames. Sold for breaking up in 1926. Thunderer was 
used for cadet sea training from 1921-1924 and thereafter employed as a static 
training ship for Special Entry cadets. 
 
Vindictive – Hawkins class cruiser launched in1918 and sold for breaking up in 
1946. Vindictive had a varied career, being used as an aircraft carrier, cadet 
training ship (1937-1939) and finally as a repair and depot ship. 
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Zinnia – Acacia class sloop launched in 1915 and sold to the Belgian Navy in 
1920. Zinnia was briefly used to provide sea training to Reserve Fleet 
midshipman at Devonport in 1919. 
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